THE FRAGILITY OF EXISTENCE

HANS LIPPS

BERSERKER
BOOKS

The Fragility of Existence

Guy van Kerckhoven / Hans Lipps

The authors

Guy van Kerckhoven has been Professor of Philosophy at the University of Leuven since 1997. He has published extensively, including works on Wilhelm Dilthey, Edmund Husserl and Eugen Fink.

Hans Lipps (1889–1941) was a member of the Göttingen circle around Husserl. After studying philosophy and medicine, he obtained his habilitation in 1921 with his work *Investigations into the Philosophy of Mathematics*. In 1928, he became a professor of philosophy at Göttingen, and in 1936 at Frankfurt am Main. As a doctor, he was conscripted into the Wehrmacht in 1939. He was killed in action in Russia in 1941.

Guy van Kerckhoven Hans Lipps

The Fragility of Existence

Phenomenological Studies on the Nature of Man

Contents

Introduction....11

Guy van Kerckhoven, Facets of Existence. Phenomenological Micrologies

Finding Oneself in a Bind. Human Embarrassment as an existential affect 21

1. Hans Lipps's inquiry into the nature of humanity 21
2. The Dilemma of Embarrassment 26
3. Fragile unity in the twilight. The Expression of Embarrassment 31
4. Human bias 42

Human fragility. On the nature of the shame phenomenon 47

1. The Guard of Shame 47
2. The control panel of shame 49
3. The existential chasm 54
4. Being-as-well 58
5. The fundamental human condition 65

Borderline cases of the circuit. Physicality and manic 'flight of ideas' 69

1. The affective ego and the affective world 69
2. Feeling a Certain Way and Being Swept Along 72
3. The joy of distraction and the relief from anxiety . . . 75
4. Confinement: claustrophobia 77

II. Hans Lipps, The First Psychology Manuscript: Human Nature

Embarrassment and Attitude 201
Shyness 208
Embarrassment caused by other people's behaviour . . . 208
Shame 210
mask 213
Exposure 214
Nudity 219
Shamelessness. Prudishness 221
Taboo 224
Self-confidence 230
Subconscious 237
Reflexivity of consciousness 243
Impression and sensation 245
Modalities of perception 256
Mood and flight of ideas 258
Emotions 261
Hate 264
Fear 268
Claustrophobia 268
Obsessive thoughts 270
Pedantry 271
Stinginess 274
Jealousy 276
Experience 278
Witness 279
'History' 280
Life experience 281
Encounter. 283
Adventurer 286
Players, Sensation, etc. 290

Addenda....294
hLebendigesi....294
hUnderstanding....295
hCharacter....296

hReflection.....320
hTrauma.....323

10

Introduction

'If a work has multiple motivations, multiple meanings, multiple points of interest, multiple facets indeed – if it can be understood and loved in multiple ways – then it is certainly most interesting – a genuine expression of personality.'[1]

One such work is undoubtedly Hans Lipps's final and finest treatise: **Die menschliche Natur* (Human Nature*). It was published in 1941 as Volume 8 of the *Frankfurter Wissenschaftliche Beiträge* by V. Klostermann in Frankfurt am Main, with the succinct foreword: 'Shortly after completing this book, on 10 September 1941, Hans Lipps was killed in action in Russia'. From the very beginning, the shadow of a tragic fate hung over a work that, like almost no other, was a direct expression of Hans Lipps's unmistakable

philosophical personality. O. F. Bollnow has soberly noted that this shadow has grown ever longer: 'Whilst Hans Lipps has long attracted attention for his *investigations into hermeneutic logic*, his philosophical anthropology, which he summarised in his last book *Die menschliche Natur* (*The Philosophy of Human Nature*), has so far remained completely overlooked.'[2] The wide-ranging research interests, which have since also been the

1 Novalis, Teplitz Fragments (1798), in: Writings, Vol. II. The Philosophical and Theoretical Works. Edited by H.-J. Mähl, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt 1999, No. 401, p. 399.

2 O. F. Bollnow, Hans Lipps: Human Nature, in: Dilthey Yearbook for Philosophy and the History of the Humanities, Vol. 6 (1989), Göttingen 1989, p. 99.

– On H. Lipps' investigations into the philosophy of language within the framework of hermeneutic logic, see: O. F. Bollnow, 'The Problem of Philosophical Anthropology. Hans Lipps, The Binding Nature of Language', in: *Die Sammlung* 1 (1946), pp. 689–699; now in: *Studies in Hermeneutics*, Vol. II. Freiburg/Munich 1983, pp. 251–267; ibid., review of: H. Lipps, *Investigations into a Hermeneutic Logic*, in: *Die Literatur*, Vol. 40 (1937/38), p. 508; ibid., 'On the Concept of Hermeneutic Logic', in: *Argumentationen*. Festschrift for J. König. Edited by H. Delius and G. Patzig, Göttingen 1964,

Ethics in the work of Hans Lipps, his phenomenology of knowledge, his engagement with Goethe's scientific writings, and the clarification of the internal connections that linked Hans Lipps's * * with the phenomenology of E. Husserl, A. Reinach and M. Heidegger have, to this day, failed to drive him away.[3] Au-

pp. 20–42; now in: ibid., Studies in Hermeneutics, Vol. II (1983), pp. 13–18 and pp. 268–286; K. H. Geissner, Man and Language. Frankfurt am Main 1955; J. Hennigfeld, Man and His Language. 'Aspects of Phenomenology in H. Lipps', in: *Philosophische Rundschau*, vol. 32 (1985), pp. 104–111; F. Hogemann, 'Copula and "sein" in H. Lipps's Language-Critical Approach', in: A. Gethmann-Siefert (ed.), *Philosophy and Poetry. In Honour of O. Pöggeler on his 60th Birthday. Vol. I. Stuttgart/Bad Cannstatt 1988, pp. 141–155; A. W. E. Hübner, 'Existence and Language. Reflections on the Hermeneutic Conception of Language in M. Heidegger and H. Lipps'. Berlin 2001; K. Meyer-Drawe, 'The Word as a Response to Things: Lipps and Merleau-Ponty on the Creativity of Language', in: Dilthey Yearbook Vol. 6 (1989), pp. 127–140; J. W. Owens, '"Meaning" in Hans Lipps', Munich 1987; F. Rodi, 'H. Lipps' Energetic Theory of Meaning', in: Journal of the Faculty of Letters, The University of Tokyo. Aesthetics, Vol. 17 (1992), pp. 1–12; ibid., 'Hermeneutic Logic in the Context of Phenomenology: G. Misch, H. Lipps, G. Spet', in: ibid., *Erkenntnis des Erkannten. On Hermeneutics in the 19th and 20th Centuries. Frankfurt am Main 1990, pp. 147–167; G. Roglev, The Hermeneutic Logic of Hans Lipps and the Justifiability of Scientific Knowledge. Augsburg 1998; E. Scheiffele, The Concept of Hermeneutic Logic in H. Lipps. Tübingen 1971; W. von der Weppen, The Existential Situation and Speech. Studies on Logic and Language in the Existential Hermeneutics of H. Lipps. Würzburg/Amsterdam 1984. Furthermore:
G. Bräuer, L. Wittgenstein and H. Lipps, in: A Small Festschrift to Mark the 60th Birthday of
O. F. Bollnow, Lippstadt i. W. 1963; ibid., Paths into Language. L. Wittgenstein and

H. Lipps, in: *Bildung und Erziehung*. *Monatsschrift für Pädagogik*, vol. 16 (1963), pp. 131–140; G. Buck, *Lernen und Erfahrung*. Stuttgart/Berlin/Cologne/Mainz 1967, esp. pp. 122– 131.

3 On the ethics of Hans Lipps, see: L. Mues de Schrenck, *The Problem of Ethics in the Work of H. Lipps*. Tübingen 1962; – on the phenomenology of cognition, see: J. König, review of H. Lipps, *Investigations into the Phenomenology of Cognition*, in: *Deutsche Literaturzeitung* N.F. Vol. 6 (1929), pp. 891–895; cf. the same author, 'On Hans Lipps' Phenomenology of Cognition', in: *Dilthey-Jahrbuch*, vol. 6 (1989), pp. 223–227; in particular: M. Wewel, *The Constitution of the Transcendent Something in the Act of Seeing*. Mainz 1968. – On

H. Lipps' philosophical approach to Goethe's scientific writings; see O. F. Bollnow, 'Hans Lipps on Goethe's Scientific Writings'. Translated into Japanese by T. Ashizu, in: *Morphologia*, Issue 4 (1982), pp. 50–59; F. Kümmel, 'On the Reception of Goethe's Scientific Writings by G. Misch, J. König and H. Lipps', in: Dilthey-Jahrbuch Vol. 12 (1999/2000), pp. 225–238; E. Scheiffele, '"Seeing is an interpretation of things". Goethe's natural science from the perspective of Hans Lipps', in: Dilthey-Jahrbuch Vol. 6 (1989), pp. 141–162.

– On H. Lipps' multifaceted relationship with phenomenology, see: H.-G. Gadamer, 'Foreword', in: H. Lipps, *Investigations into the Phenomenology of Cognition*. Works, Vol. I. Frankfurt am Main 1976, pp. VII–XI; W. Herbstrith, 'Hans Lipps in the View of E. Stein', in: Dil-

Apart from O. F. Bollnow and Evamaria von Busse, J. Hennigfeld also took a closer look at Hans Lipps's final work.[4] Yet this encounter did not give rise to any consternation. O. F. Bollnow struggled most persistently to extricate himself from the tangles into which Hans Lipps had entangled the reader, and to come to terms with the despair of 'how far the various points raised from different sides fit together'.[5] 'It is,' Hans Lipps himself admitted, 'as if one were stabbing into a haystack from different sides'.[6] The 'mosaic-like' 'coexistence of breakthroughs that do not merge ' is a characteristic that cannot be separated from this work.[7] The phenomenologist Lipps viewed human nature through a compound eye. The power of his philosophical language was that of a microtome.

In the following 'Studies', the successive

An exploration of the 'insights' into human nature. For Hans Lipps did not merely string together straws when he sought to reap the fruits of his teaching career in Frankfurt. Following the example of the late Dutch philosopher Cornelius Verhoeven's * *, a 'micrological' approach is adopted,[8] across

Dilthey Yearbook Vol. 6 (1989), pp. 31–51; F. Hogemann, 'Works by H. Lipps from M. Heidegger's library', in: Dilthey Yearbook Vol. 8 (1992/93), pp. 382–386; G. van Kerckhoven, 'H. Lipps, M. Heidegger and the Possibility of a Hermeneutic Phenomenology', in: *Heidegger and the Phenomenology of Existence*. Edited by Michele Gardini. *Discipline Filosofiche* IX, 2 (1999), pp. 135–151; L. Landgrebe, 'The Problem of Original Experience in the Work of H. Lipps', in: Philosophische Rundschau, vol. 4 (1956), pp. 166–182;

G. Matteucci, 'The Significance of the Real in H. Lipps's Phenomenological "Critique"', in: Phenomenological Realism. On the Philosophy of the Munich and Göttingen Circles. Quodlibet, Macerata 2000, pp. 921–939; F. Rodi and K. Schuhmann, 'Hans Lipps as Reflected in his Correspondence', in: Dilthey-Jahrbuch, vol. 6 (1989), pp. 52–98; K. Schuhmann, 'Hans Lipps as a e Phenomenologist from Göttingen', in: ibid., pp. 163–181.

4 On Hans Lipps's philosophical anthropology, see: O. F. Bollnow, 'Human Nature: Remarks on Hans Lipps's Last Work', in: Zeitschrift für deutsche Kulturphilosophie, vol. 8 (1942), pp. 229–235; now in: ibid., *Studies in Hermeneutics*, Vol. II. Freiburg/Munich 1983, pp. 240–250; ibid., *Hans Lipps: Human Nature*, in *Dilthey-Jahrbuch* 6 (1989), pp. 99–126; Evamaria von Busse, 'Philosophical Psychology: On Hans Lipps's Final Book *Human Nature*', in: *Blätter für deutsche Philosophie*, vol. 15 (1941/42), pp. 434–443; J. Hennigfeld, 'Shame and Anxiety: A Phenomenological Analysis of Existence in Hans Lipps's *Die menschliche Natur*', in: K. Held and J. Hennigfeld (eds.), * : Categories of Existence. Festschrift for Wolfgang Janke*. Würzburg 1993, pp. 351–364.

5 O. F. Bollnow, Hans Lipps: Human Nature, op. cit., p. 101.

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid.; cf. O. F. Bollnow, *Human Nature: Remarks on the Last Work of*
H. Lipps, in: *Studies in Hermeneutics*. Vol. II, op. cit., p. 242.

expressly refrains from the categorisations that O. F. Bollnow has tentatively attempted.[9] What is analysed as an existential affect, as a syndrome, as a blockage, as a thorn in existence, as a breach in the horizon, as a tension of intentions within the phenomenal domains: embarrassment, shame, mania, anxiety, a thirst for adventure, hatred (K.1–4; K.14–21), each constitutes a distinct 'differentiated structure'. As 'spheres' of phenomena, they are not predetermined but are decidedly 'diverse'. Shifts, distortions and

homologies form part of their scope. Shyness, prudishness, coquetry, revulsion, sacrilege, intoxication, claustrophobia, obsessive thoughts, pedantry, avarice, envy, jealousy, gambling addiction, curiosity, antipathy, contempt and revenge 'populate' these phenomenal regions. Human nature is not flawless. The nuanced borders on the rampant. Using a term borrowed from E. Husserl, we describe the chosen micro-level approach as 'situational-modal'.[10] 'The *single*, overarching question regarding the nature of humankind, … in which everything is held together' [11],has nothing oppressive or ponderous about it, which is then commonly labelled as 'philosophical'. Rather, it arises from the concrete modes of the situation—each unfolding differently—in which a person finds themselves. The fact that these are 'steps towards oneself' that a person takes in the process does not preclude the need for the Other in order to be properly situated within one's λογον διδοναι. (K.5–7)

The contoured form thus acquired by the interlocking analyses of phenomena stands out against a background that threatens, as it swells, to blur their edges. It did not escape O. F. Bollnow's attention that the

[8] C. Verhoeven, Lof van de Mikrologie. (Plato, Politeia). Baarn 1982.

[9] Cf. O. F. Bollnow, Hans Lipps: Die menschliche Natur, in: Dilthey-Jahrbuch Vol. 6 (1989), op. cit. – O. F. Bollnow has woven individual analyses of phenomena by Hans Lipps into his philosophy of existence; cf.: O. F. Bollnow, Existenzphilosophie. First published in: *Systematic Philosophy*. Edited by N. Hartmann. Stuttgart/Berlin 1942,

pp. 313–430; now in: O. F. Bollnow, Writings Vol. IV: Philosophy of Life and Philosophy of Existence. Edited by U. Boelhauve, G. Kühne-Bertram, H.-U. Lessing and F. Rodi. Kö nigshausen & Neumann 2009, pp. 136–255.

[10] E. Fink, VI. Cartesian Meditation. Part 1: The Idea of a Transcendental Theory of Method. Edited by H. Ebeling, J. Holl and G. van Kerckhoven, in: Husserliana Documents Vol. II/1. Kluwer, Dordrecht, Boston, London 1988, p. 41, note 107 by E. Hus serl.

[11] O. F. Bollnow, Hans Lipps: Human Nature, in: Dilthey Yearbook Vol. 6 (1989), op. cit., p. 101.

The chapters on sensation and impression (K.12–13) 'are by no means merely fascinating individual studies, but rather, as a continuation of the earlier *studies on the phenomenology of cognition* … , they form the necessary *counterpart* to the existential psychology centred on self-becoming'.[12] The discussions on the possibility of comprehension and language as an organon (K.9–11) in turn align closely with the *investigations into a hermeneutic logic*. The concluding chapters (K.22–26) are drawn from analytical endeavours concerning the 'development of character'. The poignancy of the already dense analyses of phenomena is shielded from such an overwhelming flood of light by a process of restraint. Reference is therefore made to the 'preliminary form' that Hans Lipps's work on human nature took. The *'first psychology manuscript'* (ANA 507a Supplement), published as a document from the Munich estate, provides a valuable insight into the original conception of the work. The editor of Lipps' works, Evamaria von Busse, has reported in detail on the various phases of its development in the notes to the text fragment **Psychology and Philosophy**, which was included in Volume V of the works.[13] In terms of wording, the analyses meticulously reconstructed below adhere to the final printed version published in * *. In accordance with Hans Lipps' fundamental intention, they represent 'transformations of selfhood',[14] in which one 'encounters' oneself anew time and again. The present work moves cautiously into these ever-changing 'declinations'. They are referred to as *'facets of existence*'.

The decisive impetus for this work came from Prof. em. Dr F. Rodi, Director of the Dilthey Research Centre at the Institute of Philosophy, Ruhr University Bochum, and editor-in-chief of the edition of W. Dilthey's *Collected Works* being prepared there. As the academic host of the Humboldt Fellowship I was awarded in 1986, he sparked my interest in the phenomenological writings of Hans Lipps through his

lectures and publications. During those years, Volume 6 of *the Dilthey Yearbook for Philosophy and the History of the Humanities* was being intensively prepared

12 O. F. Bollnow, op. cit., p. 124.
13 See: H. Lipps, Die Wirklichkeit des Menschen. Werke Vol. V. Frankfurt am Main 1977, p. 200.
14 Op. cit., p. 169.

which was published in 1989 to mark the 100th anniversary of Hans Lipps's birth. The philosophical research and editorial work on the 'Göttingen Circle' [15], carried out over many years by Prof. Dr H.-U. Lessing and Dr G. Kühne-Bertram in collaboration with Prof. Dr Rodi at the ' ' in Bochum created an atmosphere in which a sustained engagement with Hans Lipps's anthropological writings could find fertile ground and an open field of resonance. Prof. Dr K. Meyer-Drawe of the University of Bochum played an active part in the realisation of the present work, which required a long incubation period, through discussions, her own pioneering publications, and her suggestions and corrections. Admission to the working group of the Association pour la Promotion de la Phénoménologie—founded by Prof. em. Dr M. Richir (Université libre de Bruxelles) and centred on the **Annales de Phénoménologie**—opened up a new, far-reaching phenomeno logical horizon. Some of the present 'Studies' were translated into French and published there.[16] In 2008, the *A. von Humboldt Foundation (Bonn)* awarded a long-term research fellowship at the Bavarian State and University Library in Munich. Prof. Emeritus Dr E. Avé-Lallemant and Dr S. von Moisy were particularly helpful in facilitating access to the estate of Hans Lipps. Sincere thanks are extended to them all here.

In his *foreword* to the first volume of Hans Lipps' *collected works*,
H.-G. Gadamer, referring to Hans Lipps's final work, the publication of which the author did not live to see: 'The book, *Human Nature*, surveys a colourful array of phenomena in psychology and moral anthropology. Behind the concise, incisive observations with which he presents these phenomena, the author reveals—but one might almost say: conceals—his extraordinary knowledge of the world and the breadth of his education."[17] In "Attitudes, Postures of Existence", Hans Lipps found a seemingly inexhaustible source of insight into human nature. 'When reading his work, one must bear in mind,'

15 See: O. F. Bollnow, 'G. Misch and the Göttingen Circle', in: Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 34 (1980), pp. 423–440; now in: ibid., *Studies in Hermeneutics*, Vol. II, op. cit., pp. 19–45.
16 See: 'Bibliographical Notes' at the end of the Studies.
17 H.-G. Gadamer, 'Foreword', in: Hans Lipps, Investigations into the Phenomenology of Cognition. Works Vol. I, op. cit., p. X.

O. F. Bollnow remarked on this, noting "that Lipps completed the book in 1941 under the pressure of the outbreak of the World War. Under different circumstances, he might perhaps have allowed it to mature a little further … ; for alongside thoughts of great depth—which, ' ', are probably viewed in this way by no one else—there remain ambiguities that make it difficult to understand".[18] A deep chasm yawns between the 'steps towards oneself' and 'the power of truth in becoming ever more transparent to oneself from one's own origin' – that concluding sentence to which Bollnow repeatedly looked forward with anticipation. When

the shadow of incompleteness rests upon a text, a loving engagement is content to be 'the shadow of its shadow'.

Brussels/Bochum Guy van Kerckhoven

[18] O. F. Bollnow, Hans Lipps: 'Human Nature', in: Dilthey-Jahrbuch, vol. 6 (1989), op. cit., p. 98. – See also the four-page typescript 'Human Nature' in the Munich estate of H. Lipps (call number 507 Supplement td 11489 1–4).

- Guy van Kerckhoven Facets of Existence. Phenomenological Micrologies

Finding Oneself in a Bind.

Human Prejudgment as an Existential Affection

'The "embarrassment" of human beings and their gaze be s an existential affect.'

H. Lipps, Human Nature, (43).[1]

- Hans Lipps's inquiry into human nature

H. Lipps inquires into 'the human being' in a way that is to be 'understood as a form of engagement'. (7) Such a question does not express a non-committal 'interest' in human beings. Rather, one is personally affected by it. What affects one is 'that for which one was not prepared' (56). One is, in fact, taken by surprise by it. The subject under inquiry cannot be hastily 'reduced to a … field of objective findings'. (7) One was not prepared for this question in the first place. 'The reality of the human being cannot be apprehended from a single perspective and approached methodically.' (7) Perspectives presuppose something already 'fixed by a particular philosophical position and set of problems', whereby one 'remains entangled in pre-conceptions'.

- The reason one was initially unprepared for the question of the human being is 'that one is always entangled within oneself and remains caught up in circling one's own ground'. (56) One cannot find a way out,

'where one is to place human beings', even though one wishes to 'capture the "essence" of human beings'. (7) The question of 'the' human being renders one speechless when discussing 'the' people. It is unsettling because, in engaging with it, one experiences the 'impossibility of finding out'. (56) Hans Lipps therefore also inquires into human beings out of

1 H. Lipps, *Human Nature*. Frankfurt am Main, 1941. Now in: H. Lipps, *Works*, Volume III. Frankfurt am Main, 1977. Subsequent citations are taken from this edition of the works; references in the text are given in brackets. The emphasis in the quotations is the author's.

out of an *aporetic* situation.[2] It is precisely because the nature of human beings remains a profound mystery to them that his anthropological approach stands out as a philosophical one.

What 'people' are like can, of course, be gleaned from life experience. 'Life experience takes people into account in terms of the averageness of their behaviour.' (7) It does not arise from a preoccupation with the question of what it means to be human. 'People, like life itself, are regarded by it as something one must be familiar with.' (7) It manifests itself in caution and prudence. This familiarity takes people into account insofar as it 'expects certain things' from them. (7) And in this context, they are regarded 'in terms of someone who is still "unknown"'. (7) Their characterisation is based solely on 'what is typical of …'. Consequently, life experience is well-versed. It is in this indifference towards 'who it is' that it first becomes apparent how little it is, in essence, affected by the question of the human being. In this respect, it is not addressed by 'the' human being. Life experience's familiarity, as recognition, is not also an encounter with the human being in the sense of the 'who' of their being. Unconcerned by this, it 'is actually always only concerned with itself'. (7) This familiarity, as a matter of reckoning with, is a form of coming to terms that does not engage with 'the' human being. He is not in the picture; not even an encounter with him is on the cards here.

This is in contrast to the understanding of human nature that 'is not already inherent in life experience'. (7) For, as a practical discipline, it regards 'people as both partners and adversaries'. (7) The dismissive assessment that 'only knows how to take people at face value' is transcended here. (8) In practical knowledge of human nature, it is the individual themselves – and not merely 'how "people" are' – who is addressed as both ally and adversary. (7) Practical knowledge of human nature 'judges the individual'.

(7) Whether one has assessed someone correctly when including or excluding them 'only becomes apparent in the course of events'. (7) Yet it is precisely in 'engaging' people that their potential becomes a matter of

experience. Practical knowledge of human nature 'knows people in "their" potential', insofar as experience 'shows what a person has achieved, where they have come to a standstill, and in which direction they have strayed'. (8) Unlike life experience, which expects certain things from people, whereby

[2] See H. Lipps, *Investigations into the Phenomenology of Cognition*. *Works*, Vol. I. Frankfurt am Main 1976, Part II, p. 13; see also the same author, *Human Nature*, op. cit., p. 56.

Even if 'who it is' may remain unknown, a person's purpose – specifically 'their own' – is the measure of practical human knowledge, 'that which they … make, or can make, or ought to make of themselves'.[3] (8) The possibilities here are not those 'one must reckon with in people's lives', which one might also predict as general possibilities. (8) As his possibilities, they are those to which he determines himself in his reality; it is in the reality of a human being that they first become experience. And in this respect, practical knowledge of human nature is not indifferent to the 'who' of the individual. He who knows the individual in terms of his possibilities, and not merely 'knows how to deal with people', possesses knowledge of the world insofar as he 'can also move freely amongst them, that is, encounter them'. (8) In his assessment—which may prove correct or prove to be a disappointment—the individual human being is taken into account. 'He does not become commonplace among people.' 'Just as he maintains a distance from things.'

- Consequently, he is addressed as 'a man of the world'.
- For his behaviour takes account of a person's 'who', rather than merely what people have in common.

Yet even this insight into human nature still lacks the distinctive
'The tension of philosophical inquiry'. (8) Tailored to the 'who' of the human being, it can harden into an attitude 'that seeks to affirm and justify itself'. (8) It undermines the free movement amongst people, the encounter with them. In this judgemental attitude, 'one establishes oneself'. (8) Knowledge of human nature becomes critical and, in that sense, 'unmasking'. (8) It sets people straight, for instance by 'seeing through the arrangement of their feelings'. (8) 'It reveals the illusory in contrast to reality.' (8) A certain 'médisance' is likely at play here— —just as there is a certain cheapness in dismissively writing a person off. [4] Only through 'tact' can one 'empathise one's way to an understanding of the connections' and, through interpretation, find 'the core of a particular behaviour'. (8)

Neither Kant's 'Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View' nor the psychology of the French moralists – whose assessment of human beings is not entirely free from a disparaging attitude—

[3] I. Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. Stuttgart 1983, p. 29 [119].

[4] See, in this regard, the parallel remarks on 'Psychology and Philosophy' in: H. Lipps, The Reality of Man. Works, Vol. V. Frankfurt am Main 1977, p. 165.

can essentially be seen as pointing the way towards the direction Hans Lipps's anthropology seeks to take. Even if the study of human nature has 'always, in some way, had in view' a person's reality and their potential, this was nevertheless
'something whose *significance* must first be determined'. (7) It is only from this that the distinctive tension of philosophical inquiry into the human being—which drives Hans Lipps—arises. What in practical knowledge of human nature merely captured a sense of tact is to be made transparent, first and foremost,

as *the constitution* of the human being. 'The task is to uncover, within the possibilities of the human being, his nature and the nature of his existence.' (8) The constitution of his being is to be 'grasped'.

A person's nature is not something that can be gleaned from an encounter with a person in a particular context and then 'demonstrated' in its proper place. It must be approached by 'exploring' it. (9) There is no 'standpoint' from which to resolve the question of what it means to be human. Where one should situate it, what it signifies – these are matters that can only be traced by *circling* round them. 'One must set out anew time and again in order to bring into the open what, in the various directions of human knowledge, is touched upon or touched upon in different ways.' (9) When approached as a matter to be explored, one's gaze is directed towards 'the differentiated aspects of what is experienced in human beings', in which human nature appears. (9) The differentiated, as Lipps emphatically points out, is 'not a complication'. Complicated, for example, are natural phenomena which, in their external possibility, can be causally 'explained by the convergence of factors' and are, in that respect, also transparent. (9) What becomes experience in human beings, in which human nature manifests itself, must, however, be 'understood from its origin'. (9) 'What it (inwardly) is' must be revealed. (9) The aim is 'to interpret its characteristics in the light of human nature in such a way that the latter is recognised in each of these various possibilities of the human being'.

- The differentiated aspect that becomes an experience for human beings is a *'relationship of the self within itself'* that varies from case to case and which, in this respect, must also be 'declined' in anthropology.[5] (9 Note 1) Where the self

[5] L. Feuerbach, 'On the Origin of Philosophy'. In: L. Feuerbach. Complete Works. New edition edited by W. Bolin and F. Jodl. Vol. II. Philosophical Critiques and Principles. Stuttgart/Bad Cannstatt 1959, p. 214.

Whatever it has turned towards, whatever it might turn towards or even turn back to, is in each case something different and must be approached differently. Lipps' anthropology therefore also offers a – strangely – *prismatically refracted* view.[6] This applies not only to the diversity of human phenomena which she explores in a peculiar dynamism of philosophical inquiry, which considers no course of action permissible other than that which 'can only be "accidental"'. (9) The refraction stems – originally – from the fact that the 'I' relates to itself within itself, and is not, for instance, immediately present to itself in consciousness. It is precisely in this respect that one is, for example, 'disappointed by school psychology', for whose interest in human beings this consciousness is decisive.[7] (7) A person's involvement is thereby precluded. Yet it is from this that the question of the human being is to be taken up for the first time. And if that which becomes experience in the human being does not simply coincide with that of which they are immediately conscious, then the understanding of its origin—'what it "is" internally'—will likewise not be 'psychic' in the usual sense. Hans Lipps subtly transforms the traditional psychological question concerning the human being insofar as its justification – as a science – cannot, for him, be binding at all. For it expresses a non-committal interest in the human being that need not be further illustrated by an additional example. By moving away from this, Hans Lipps puts himself at philosophical risk. The purpose of his anthropology is this new beginning; that is to say, it can only take place in this way.

The point at which this departure takes place, at which one cannot help *but* be *affected* by the question of what it means to be human – insofar as one

[6] See O. F. Bollnow, 'Die menschliche Natur'. Remarks on the Last Work of H. Lipps, in: Zeitschrift für deutsche Kulturphilosophie, vol. 8 (1942), pp. 229–235; now in: ibid., Studien zur Hermeneutik, vol. II. Freiburg/Munich 1983, pp. 240–250, esp.

p. 242: 'Whilst for Heidegger, at the end of the interpretative process, there stands a certain fundamental formal structure of human existence, in which the various analysed phenomena coalesce into a coherent whole, for Lipps there remains a juxtaposition of breakthroughs that do not coalesce. He advances towards the same centre anew and from ever-changing angles. The systematic coherence of thought, which runs through itself, is deliberately destroyed, because Lipps is convinced that human existence cannot, in principle, be grasped within a system, but that every system cuts humans off from their immediate relationship with reality."

7 On the 'psychological concept of the school', see H. Lipps, *Die Wirklichkeit des Menschen*, op. cit., pp. 167–168.

— unless one was already prepared for it — is *the predicament of a human being*. One finds oneself exposed to it. The way the 'I' behaves within itself is revealed in this in a particular way. In this predicament, it becomes a specific experience. The direction of the enquiry into the human being then, however, becomes one of searching. In embarrassment, one is thrust into a disconcerting state of uncertainty. One comes closer to understanding how one *is entangled within oneself*. Embarrassment is only presupposed in anthropological 'research' insofar as the latter is tailored to what it 'means' to one.

• The Dilemma of Embarrassment

Just as human reality cannot be grasped from a single perspective and approached methodically, so too is 'the view of humanity … not impartial'. (10) It stands
'unwittingly under the influence of traditional ways of thinking'.

> • When it comes to the human being, there is a danger that 'what was once a stated viewpoint' may be reduced to 'uncontrolled opinion'. (10) The perspective on resolving the question of what it means to be human—which, surreptitiously and simplistically, offers the angle on which our view of humanity—unnoticed—becomes entangled—is that of a body-soul being, a psychophysical unity of life. This inner psychological life is said to be expressed in a person's outward appearance, in their facial expressions and gestures, and in their posture, all of which are supposed to point to this inner life. It is precisely in the case of embarrassment and its expression that this traditional way of thinking is likely to falter. The standpoint to which one has uncritically committed oneself—that human beings are, at heart, psycho-physical beings—begins to waver. 'Is embarrassment, for example, even such a "psychological" phenomenon at all?' And is it expressed in physical behaviour, in a person's outward demeanour? *'Does* it *manifest itself*,' for instance, 'only in that?' (10)

What it means to someone who finds themselves in this situation, and who is currently unable to adopt a stance within it, is crucial. In this respect, no standpoint from *which to resolve* the question of what it means to be human can be found in this predicament. Their self-consciousness is, in essence, rooted in this. They cannot fathom why their 'demeanour fails' either.
(13) The state of uncertainty in which a person finds themselves – specifically, in the *unity of their being* – comes to the fore. This is what Hans Lipps

is concerned with here. 'The "embarrassment" of the human being and their gaze signifies an existential affect.' (43) It is imperative to analyse this impartially. In contrast to a line of sight that fundamentally misses the mark because it does not allow it to emerge, *does* not move into it.

'The embarrassment one feels is essentially ambivalent.' (10) One can empathise with it 'when considering something that one objectively recognises, establishes as existing, and which anyone can examine to get to the bottom of'. 'Certain circumstances and situations *cause* one to feel embarrassed.' (10)

The embarrassment one feels overwhelms them. They experience it to the extent that the circumstances and situations bring it about . Insofar as one feels embarrassed, they do not 'have' this feeling of their own.[8] And when one finds oneself in a state of embarrassment precisely in view of something that can be objectively recognised, the 'situation' that causes the embarrassment is, for its part, 'nothing objective': 'It cannot be described as a relationship between this and that'. (10) It is, after all, not an objective relationship. Rather: the situation 'is reflected in the beginning of the one standing within it'. (10) It has been taken up by him within it. His presence is 'constitutive' of it: 'one encounters *oneself* in something'. (29) 'The person who is at a loss cannot, in a state of indecision, come to terms with difficulties that stand paralysingly before one's eyes.' (10) He is caught up in it. He does not simply find himself in this difficult situation, but is situated within it, is – affected – and consequently called upon to respond. Possibly, 'the embarrassed person allows himself to be driven into a decision that, as it were, breaks out of the situation and thereby becomes skewed'. (10) And this uncertainty 'is probably also transferred to his outward demeanour'. (10) It has that effect. 'But is what can already be seen externally in his demeanour thereby "expressed" in the strict sense?' (10) Is the outward demeanour of the embarrassed person 'not, after all, an expression of his embarrassment in that sense, just as a distortion of the mouth is understood as an expression—namely, as *a manifestation* of disgust'? (10) In general, the embarrassment that one perceives as 'arising from one's situation' is 'evidenced precisely *in this*'. (10) And in this respect, it is 'a state in which one finds oneself'. (10) 'So it is precisely not something internal, as the psychological is supposed to be.' 'The reality that weighs upon me makes itself felt in my state of mind.' (10)

[8] See H. Lipps, *Human Nature*, op. cit., p. 45, note 1: 'The indifferent, essentially meaningless nature of this "having" of sensations as something given, however, reveals how, even at this early stage, the nature of man—that in which he is open, as a capacity, to that with which he is—is being overlooked …'

Finding oneself in a quandary

Embarrassment arises not only 'in relation to something one can objectively recognise', but 'also when appearing before others'. (10) It 'overcomes one' in unfamiliar surroundings. One finds one's presence 'disturbing to others'. (11) One is 'afraid, for example, of being regarded by them as prudish'. (11) One realises one does not fit into the circle 'which one is naturally inclined to take for granted as one's own'. (11) 'One feels out of place in such a society.' (11) What is distressing in each case is how one comes to terms with this, how one finds oneself strained by the situation one has been placed in.[9] One feels embarrassed because one cannot 'maintain' one's 'participation', one cannot meet the others 'on common ground'. (29) Yet one may not be solely responsible for making this possible; the responsibility essentially also 'falls back on those who – each in their own way – must somehow, perhaps in a leading role, ensure it happens'. (29)

One *feels self-conscious* when one 'shies away from the public eye'. (11) 'But even watchful scrutiny can make one feel self-conscious.' (11) 'One loses one's naturalness; one's attention is divided.' (11) The uncertainty here relates to 'the fact that one might not be doing it properly'. (11) One feels self-conscious 'when one *believes* one is standing out in this regard'. One is under the *impression* of 'an observing spectator'. And this spectator becomes 'the occasion and yardstick for self-examination'. (11)

'Justified embarrassment' is something else entirely. (11) As a stranger, one 'cannot feel at ease amongst others'. (11) One does not wish to give cause for misinterpretation, nor to 'appear in a false light', but fears here 'not being taken seriously'. (11) Precisely when one 'seems to be making one's presence felt amongst others', one has 'a rising sense of embarrassment to overcome'. (11) One fears that, 'given that the others' understanding cannot find a foothold', one will 'inevitably slip away from them and become an object'. (11)

Insofar as the situation is such that the factual takes precedence, 'one shrinks from being overlooked in one's own self'. (11)

In the inability to come to terms with difficulties that loom paralysingly before one's eyes, in feeling out of place in a society, in the uncertainty that one is not doing things right and believes one is standing out precisely because of this, in

[9] Cf. H. Lipps, op. cit., p. 20: 'But human beings always "behave" in some way, insofar as they find themselves called upon to rely on themselves in certain situations.'

the fear of not being taken seriously in a given situation, is evident in the way one is called upon in different ways in situations that are received differently.

Even here – in the embarrassment that turns to shyness at not being perceived appropriately in a certain way, or at being overlooked in one's own self – there emerges 'an *ambiguity of the gaze* which one naturally seeks to avoid'. (11) 'For one is not automatically – and here, specifically, in the eyes of the other – unambiguously what one is.' (11) In the ambiguity of the gaze, self-consciousness breaks out; one tries to counter it there. For, as something 'obvious', it pushes one precisely in the direction in which one fears or shrinks from what is at stake. It is in this slipping ambiguity that one first realises just how little one 'is' unambiguously what one is to the other. 'And whilst shame is a threat
'who has "humanity" in mind, but is unsure about this, seeks to avoid something *for himself*'[10] (11) 'The ambiguity he shuns is not merely a matter of multiple meanings – just as, for example, everyone is open to multiple interpretations depending on their personal circumstances. 'Ambiguous' carries the sting of a reversal that calls the intended meaning into question …' (11) The person who feels embarrassed finds themselves trapped by their inability to remove this sting. For they are subject to the notion of the observer watching them, which fuels this 'questioning reversal into …'. And it is precisely in their attempt to pre-empt the looming ambiguity, in their attempt to intercept it, that it leaves its mark.

You can tell by looking at someone how they *become entangled* within themselves. 'The embarrassed person doesn't know what to do with their hands. Where to stand, who to turn to, where to look.' They cannot 'step outside themselves'. (11) They appear 'restricted, inhibited'. 'Precisely because they are under the compulsion to act in some way, to adopt some sort of posture.' (11) They withdraw. 'With a defensive smile, they seek to create a sense of distance from others, to establish an intermediate layer of the external world behind which they can hide.' (11) For the embarrassed person does not dare to step outside himself. 'In fear of committing a faux pas.' (12) Because he is unable to adopt a stance

[10] Cf. H. Lipps, op. cit., p. 32: 'Modesty does not actually seek to protect itself from anything – just as the self-conscious person, cautiously and prudently, merely wishes to avoid something, thereby measuring himself against something. Modesty, on the contrary, shies away from raising its gaze to the very source from which its danger comes.'

which he must somehow adopt, he behaves in a certain way. He resorts to non-committal behaviour, through which he is actually seeking to connect with the other person. He wants his embarrassment to be concealed and hidden away in this behaviour. And it is precisely here that 'his demeanour fails'. (13) 'He cannot play along. He cuts an unfortunate figure.' (12) The non-committal attitude he adopts as a pretext
'lacks the natural ease that comes naturally to those well-versed in society'. (12) In an unfamiliar milieu, he is 'as if placed in a vacuum'.

(12) The person who feels awkward does not have a grasp of the rules of this game. 'It is precisely the – objectively speaking – non-committal nature of social conversation that gives rise to awkwardness, because in such situations one can only, quite involuntarily, express oneself through what one says and how one says it.' (12) He is unable to express himself so spontaneously. 'He feels inhibited in what he would like to say. Nothing comes to mind. He cannot let himself go in the moment, cannot find the right tone; nothing he says rings true.' (12) If one does not feel properly understood in one's utterances, one cannot 'maintain the right tone'. (12) And the fact that one cannot quite express oneself outwardly here, that one cannot get the words out properly, that the utterance becomes indistinct as an utterance, 'rebounds, however, upon oneself, upon what one wanted to say'. (12) The embarrassed person 'seems to want to blur into indistinctness within himself'. (12)

'The embarrassment of the shy person *intensifies*'. (12) He can rely on what has already been tacitly undertaken in the social interplay – namely, through an unspoken assurance of understanding for the very things one can express in the process –

He does not take the 'risk' of opening up freely. This space for resonance is blocked off from the outset by the non-committal attitude chosen as a pretext. And in this respect, he does not even dare to trust his own words; he seeks – by controlling them – to prevent himself from being caught out by the embarrassment hidden behind this pretext. His remarks lack the relaxed, casual, unforced quality of social conversation – that ability to be at ease with whatever 'just happens' to be the topic of discussion, whatever might be alluded to, whatever happens to spring to mind. The fact that they are subject to the control of inner observation, and are under pressure to ensure they are interpreted correctly at all costs, is evident when one listens to them. And it is precisely in this that they are out of place. The shy person stands out in this context 'as an outsider'; he now becomes 'the object of astonished scrutiny'. (12) 'She gets hung up on the outward appearance', overlooking him 'in

'his very essence'. (12) The embarrassed person senses 'the proximity of ridicule'. (12) 'He sees himself through the eyes of others.' (12) *He begins to question himself*. Disconcerted – not because he may have done something wrong or not been properly received – but because, precisely in this very endeavour to do it right at all costs, he has gone astray. And this disconcerting sense of doubt

'then becomes for him a disruption of his emotional empathy'. (12)

'A mood as the basis of unspoken understanding can no longer arise in him at all.' (12) Everything he says, his facial expressions, seem increasingly unnatural and forced. 'He cannot find himself.' (12) 'In his outwardly constructed movements, which are subject to the control of inner observation, it becomes apparent how this embarrassment prevents him from finding the common ground that connects us to others.'

(12) What disruptively intervenes is 'the shift to adopted perspectives, the recognition that steps out of distance'. (12) The shy person is denied access to the 'centre that connects us to others' – the freedom to step out of oneself. The 'distance from which cognition emerges' is evidenced by the predominance of inner observation and self-control, and by the act of being viewed purely from the outside. The 'shift to adopted perspectives' is this overturning, reciprocal reversal of inner and outer views. It is *the fissure of division* that characterises embarrassment. Insofar as, as a human phenomenon, it means nothing other than this: *to break open the unity of our being, the 'constitution of a human being'.* – For it is precisely in the fold of this rupture that the 'traditional' view—that man is, at heart, a bodily-spiritual being—can take root. It is an awkwardness in which our view *of* man has become entangled, but not an awkwardness *of* man himself. It is the latter that leads us to the 'unity of their constitution' in the first place, because it is there that it breaks. What it means to be human comes into view 'prismatically' in this rupture.

- A fragile unity in the twilight. The expression of embarrassment

'Embarrassment manifests itself in blushing. But it is also evident in one's posture – and here one notices an expressive quality in the way one dresses'

'the position of the arms, the wandering gaze that finds no focus, and so on. However – does this not simply mean the same as when one says that someone's thoughts are written all over their face, or when one regards their expression as a tell-tale sign of their inner state?' (12/13) As a state of mind in which one is affected *by something*, embarrassment is, after all, 'precisely not something internal'. A person is affected by a reality that presses upon them; they find themselves challenged insofar as this reality presses upon them and they cannot come to terms with it. And further: 'It is not, after all, the case that in embarrassment something inner is revealed to the outside world – one's demeanour fails.' (13) It is precisely this – that one is unable to adopt a stance which one ought, in some way, to take – that is significant. For it reveals how one confronts the predicament – and that here means: how one takes it in, internalises it. One becomes so entangled within oneself that one cannot step freely out of oneself, and is forced to resort to behaviour that is only seemingly non-committal. One searches in vain to defuse the embarrassment *in this way*. Which, in this respect, becomes a test of one's mettle.

'Embarrassment *is* its "expression".' (13) How is this succinct statement by Hans Lipps to be understood? And what do the quotation marks signify here? One is led to an understanding of this only through comparisons. Without, however, equating the elements being compared. 'Just as laughter, for example, brings about a sense of relaxation; that is to say, it "expresses" only insofar as this relaxation resonates, asserts itself and takes shape in this gesture.' (13) Embarrassment expresses itself only insofar as one's demeanour fails, causing one to 'appear' unfree and inhibited. Just as embarrassment is not a sensation that one 'has', so too is it not to be understood as a
'feeling' – of insecurity – that is expressed.[11] The person who is embarrassed does not, after all, 'have' the feeling of insecurity; they *are* insecure,

That is to say, he is becoming increasingly unsure of himself. He gives that impression. By becoming so. Unless he dares to step outside himself and cuts a sorry figure, he does not express any sense of insecurity. It is precisely such an
'expression' is precisely what he wishes to avoid at all costs. For example, by placing his movements under the control of inner observation. Which, however, only then appear to be 'externally performed'.

'Anger seeks resistance upon which to vent itself; one "regains oneself" once one has snapped a pencil in a fit of anger. Correspondingly

11 On the psychology of emotions, see: H. Lipps, op. cit., p. 41, esp. note 1; – see the parallel discussion in: ibid., Die Wirklichkeit des Menschen, op. cit., p. 179.

'just as only the person in whom this "self" finds its *way towards a body*—which is not merely the condition, but the *very object of the sensation in question*—can feel constrained or relieved.' (13) In a failed manner of behaving, in unfree, inhibited action, the self-uncertainty of the embarrassed person finds its direction towards the body. And this is the 'what' of the sensation that is affected here, insofar as the inhibition, the lack of freedom, does indeed affect the 'rule' within his body. The affect is therefore 'nothing internal', just as the gesture is nothing external. The affect resonates within it, asserts itself in it, takes shape in it – as in laughter –; one intercepts the affect in the gesture and 'regains one's composure in the process' – as when one snaps a pencil in anger. (16) The affect 'intensifies and becomes clearer in the "attitude" which it

acquires through the gesture.' (17) In the awkward way the embarrassed person moves, behaves and expresses themselves, their insecurity intensifies. And they stand out because of it.

'Thoughts, intentions and so on may well be regarded as a person's inner life, insofar as one can only become aware of them or can only guess at them.' (13/14) If, therefore, they do not find their way towards a body, which is, however, not 'the object of perception' in this context. 'And because thinking involves engaging with something, it can certainly also be understood as something that "goes on within one".' (14) One does not, after all, *relate* in this instance in the direction of the body, which is likewise not *'struck'* as the 'what' of sensation here. It remains a mere 'process' that one 'encounters' in someone. 'What one thinks can *only* become *perceptible* in one's expression.'
(14) Insofar as one's thinking is unable to *articulate* itself in one's expression *as* something felt in the body, something encountered precisely there.

A telling indication that the affect is not something internal is Augustine's definition of *affectio animi* as a *distentio*. '*Tristitia contractio est*': sorrow withdraws into itself. (13) 'It causes the heart to cramp up.' '*Laetita diffusio est*.' (13) Joy is effervescent. 'One leaps for joy; it seeks to give itself room to breathe. Joy enables one to stride forward in high spirits.' (13) 'Timor fuga est.' 'As a " " (flight), fear manifests itself as something that does not look what is approaching in the eye, that scatters, that dares not stand its ground anywhere.' [12] (13) An-

[12] See the article 'Affect' by J. Lanz in: *Historical Dictionary of Philosophy*. Edited by J. Ritter. Vol. 1. Basel/Stuttgart 1971, pp. 89–100. The definition of

a fear that becomes a thought, which 'in the face of a danger perceived therein, allows for free determination'. (13) The fact that the affect is directed towards the body—which is the 'what' of the sensation that has been struck—does not, however, mean that one is here 'thinking' about something felt in the body, something struck within it, or
'remembered'. Just as, for example, 'a pain is experienced as "piercing", insofar as what is perceived therein leads one to "think" of something as lingering in the same place without abating'. 'Just as a pain in the abdomen, which is felt as cutting, is not simply compared to the effect of a knife, or is only reminiscent of it insofar as this effect of the knife is itself to be regarded as cutting.' (13, note 1) As it, for its part, conveys this *impression*. How, then, must the nature of the 'expression' of the affect be defined?

This, in turn, can only be addressed with caution. Hans Lipps draws on Aurel Kolnai's phenomenological analysis of disgust – the grimace associated with which is that of the urge to vomit ( ) – in his attempt to define the expression of this affect more precisely.[13] At the same time, he categorically rejects the view put forward by Ludwig Klages that the gesture is here a 'parable of an action'.[14]

First of all: 'the fact that a piece of news can also "make one feel queasy", and that a person can also be "nauseating" to me, shows how human beings always react in accordance with *the unity of their physical nature*.' (14) The pressure of reality is already anticipated in this. If *'state of mind'* is to be invoked in addressing the question of the human being, then its anthropological significance—what it is meant to signify in this context—is surely none other than this: the unity of his physical nature, from which, as his 'centre',

The conception of joy as 'exaltation' and of pain as 'contraction' has Stoic origins. On fear, see Augustine, *Tractatus 46 in Ioannem*, ant. fin., Vol. 9: 'Fuga animi timor est.'

[13] A. Kolnai, 'Disgust'. In: Yearbook for Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Ed. by E. Husserl. Vol. X, Halle (Saale) 1929, pp. 515–569. – For an update and substantial deepening of the bodily-phenomenological analysis of disgust, see:

K. Meyer-Drawe, 'Responses of the Bowels: Disgust. A Bodily-Phenomenological Study', in: *Handlung-Kultur-Interpretation*. Journal of Social and Cultural Sciences 2004 (13/1), pp. 9–25.

14 L. Klages, 'The Movement of Expression and Creative Power'. In: L. Klages. Collected Works, Vol. 6: The Science of Expression. Bonn 1964, pp. 139–313; esp. Ch. 2: Expressive Movement and Arbitrary Movement, pp. 175–193; on gesture as a 'parable of an action', see: ibid.,
pp. 190 ff.

to take a sharp look at what it means to be human. The way in which a particular human being responds to this pressure can only ever be traced back to this prior state of having already been taken in. The grimace of revulsion, which is that of the urge to vomit, allows one to sense the precise sense in which one must here uphold the unity of human physical nature. For it is only in this that a person is able to come *to terms with* themselves. In view of what they 'feel in this instance'. Which is 'struck' only in the body – but not as something 'pre-existing' that one might also encounter within it. For the aim is to 'uncover a person's nature within their possibilities', and not, for example, to restrict their possibilities to a bodily
'nature' of whatever sort.

'The grimace of disgust, for example, is that of the urge to vomit.' (14) The urge to vomit triggers – involuntarily – this grimace, but does not *cause* it. When one feels disgust, one contorts one's face – involuntarily – into this grimace of the urge to vomit. However, disgust can, for example, also become fixed in this grimace – or, to put it another way: 'one can, for example, voluntarily induce a state of disgust through its gesture'. (17) As a gesture, the grimace of disgust – even when made involuntarily – is not merely a reflex of the urge to vomit. Nor does the grimace of disgust trigger this urge to vomit; nor, on the other hand, does it cause one to 'think' of or 'remember' the process triggered by the urge to vomit. What disgusts me, however, *is* 'enough to make me vomit'. The grimace of disgust
It 'triggers' the revulsion at vomiting. However, it does not lead to vomiting, nor does it erupt into it. Nor is the convulsion – the spasmodic twitching that accompanies it – 'simulated' – intentionally – by the grimace. Vomiting is *affected*, in terms of what one 'feels' when experiencing revulsion, and this is brought about by the grimace. The gesture attunes the emotion to what one feels in this instance. But the sensations that may be associated with a detached urge to vomit – what one feels whilst vomiting – are here merely *'touched upon'*, neither fully realised nor, for that matter, copied. 'I can offer no resistance to what disgusts me.' (14) Just as I cannot suppress the urge to vomit; it prevails. 'Just as that which disgusts one arouses only a defensive resistance.' (14) Just as one tries to push back against what triggers the urge to vomit, resisting it by blocking it, so that the agitation does not take hold of the urge to vomit, does not 'infect' it. 'The grimace of disgust expresses how, in this instance, one can only "get rid of" something by force.' (14) Just as the convulsions during

Vomiting, those uncontrollable spasms, the violence of which one feels as a series of jerks, in which one rids oneself of whatever is causing the urge to vomit by expelling it. 'Disgust stands alongside weariness, which has had enough of something insofar as it was initially taken in.' (14) Just as – suggesting vomiting – one might initially complain about something that still lies heavy in one's stomach.

Whilst '"loathing and hatred" are *fundamentally* challenged as stances and attitudes' – 'depending on the "correct behaviour" that one "considers" to be right or to which one "adheres"' – 'disgust is something that simply "comes over" one'. (14) Someone or something disgusts me. And in this respect, revulsion is 'a sensation'. This is in contrast, for example, to 'trembling and shuddering'. 'In these, something becomes transparent in the direction of abysses, in which this abysmal quality is thus "experienced"'. (14) What arouses revulsion, however, does not thereby also become transparent in the direction of something that can, in this respect, also be 'experienced'. The repulsive is perceived as pointing towards something that one can only 'encounter' in the body, insofar as it appeals to the body's sensuality, makes a claim upon it;

for it is the body's responsiveness that makes sensual perception possible in the first place – though this is not, as it were, located within the body or to be found there. 'One experiences *a challenge* from that which is thereby perceived *as* repulsive.' (14) What is repulsive is 'not simply any kind of filth whose proximity is merely incidental, external or spatial'.
'That which is slimy, clinging through a lack of strength, playing out within it, as it were—and in so far as it is rebellious—is repulsive.' (14)

'In disgust, something is grasped sensually', that is to say, one grasps that which one sensually perceives here, or rather, that which, as something repulsive, challenges this sensory perception. (14) 'That which presents itself in all its breadth arouses disgust. Sticky things, but also the swarm of a caterpillar's nest and the unrestrained, shameless, uninhibited nature of a leering grin. In this grin, one perceives the mockery of the inescapable affinity with that which is repulsive. The ordinary is repulsive. But so too is the sallow pallor, the formless, the impoverishment and baseness of life evident in, for example, parasitic worms." (14) "Naked, pure life in its untamed state" is repulsive.[15] 'The spreading mats of a bacterial culture, for example, in contrast to the bacteria under the microscope, where they are seen in their differentiated form

([15]) Cf. A. Kolnai, op. cit.; pp. 554 and 556.

.' (14) The formless, the sprawling, the unbridled, the greasy, the sticky 'trigger' revulsion. But it is only the grimace that 'fixes' revulsion onto what one sensually perceives here, insofar as the body is not merely involved as a condition of sensual perception due to its irritability, but is itself the object of sensual perception in this instance. What one perceives sensually in disgust only acquires its specific *'form'* through the grimace of disgust. The sensual perception here *'condenses', 'comes to a* head' – to the extent that it is struck in the body, but is not to be found within it. (15/16) And this is achieved through the grimace of disgust, which thereby also comes to terms with the sensory perception in question, 'fixing' it in this way. (16) 'The initially indeterminate impression, uncertain of itself, tips over here into "proper" disgust.' (16)

How might one describe this intensification, this escalation, more precisely? The one brought about by the gesture? In what way is the emotion 'mastered', insofar as it 'takes a skilful course' here, for example, tipping over into 'genuine' revulsion? (16) Is the gesture, perhaps, a '*pictorial* intensification' that illustrates the sensory experience in this instance? (15) Does the grimace of disgust – by virtue of the similarity of the facial expression – perhaps depict the convulsive, twitching motion of vomiting? As an action whose purpose would be to express this sensory experience, to illustrate it? The problems are clearly piling up here.

Ludwig Klages defines – in general terms – the gesture as 'the parable of an action'. (15) And he understands 'parable' here 'as a pictorial condensation of something that is, at first and in essence, comprehensible'. [16] (15) Which is to be understood as the 'meaning' of an action. To begin with, gestures can hardly be compared to 'arbitrary actions'. The latter 'do, after all, look different'. 'They cannot be recognised simply by their *form*.' (15) The conduct of such 'proper' or 'deliberate' behaviour is to be 'understood objectively', that is, in terms of the matter intended from the outset. (15) The meaning of such conduct 'is to be found as a plan'. (15) And this makes it possible to 'understand the significance of the details of such conduct'. (15) In the case of involuntary movements, however – for example: 'in the involuntary turning about … or in the turning of the head to one side as a train whistles past'

[16] See L. Klages, op. cit., p. 190 ff.

'Granate' – 'the expression cannot be separated from its meaning at all'. (15) The meaning of the sequence of this behaviour is already recognisable from the very nature of its movement. It is not, for instance, shaped only by the object envisaged in the intention, which would be to be distinguished from the concrete action or embedded within it 'as a plan'. The way in which the movement takes shape expresses the meaning of the sequence of this behaviour.

– 'But where, then, in the grimace of disgust – if at all – does the allegorical lie?' (15) Does it resemble an arbitrary act or an involuntary movement – or both in one: does it intend, for example, to mimic an involuntary movement? Yet the nature of its movement by no means reveals to us the sensory experience involved here. And the intention to evoke or recall such a sensory experience does not, after all, determine the meaning of the gesture when one pulls the grimace; it is not to be found therein as a plan. The gesture cannot be compared either to a voluntary act or to an involuntary, retroactive act. It does not represent an involuntary movement, nor is this intention to 'represent' inherent in the gesture's form. As a condensation or intensification, the gesture is not 'pictorial' at all. For there is no object intended as an 'image' here that would, moreover, shape the form of the movement. For: the fact that the affect *is* its 'expression' means, strictly speaking, that it is not, as it were, 'depicted' in it.

Whose image, then, is the gesture – if not that of the sensation 'which is captured in the gesture, and which one comes to terms with through the gesture'? (15) But how is the gesture to correspond to the sensation? How is it that the analogy already pertains to sensation, and not merely to the gesture? In the grimace of disgust, for example, 'the challenge posed by what one subsequently perceives as disgusting' is taken in. It then comes to terms with it when it seeks to 'rid itself of it by force'. (14) 'Just as contempt shakes off something which – and here again lies the analogy – would otherwise cling to me.' (15) The gesture thus takes the sensation upon itself in the direction that has already begun to take shape within it, even if the sensation has not yet entered this course. It is precisely its *affective potency* that allows us to perceive that the sensation is moving in this emerging direction, 'aligning' itself with it.

'Closing one's eyes and thrusting one's arms out in defence when horrified … is not really intended to keep something that is leaping at me at bay. After all, one cannot here endure the sight, or rather "the thing"—

as if it were assailing me.'[17] (15) It becomes apparent here how, in the gesture, the metaphorical nature of the sensation is precisely captured or corresponds to it. 'And these movements, as well as the demeanour and posture of embarrassment, are indeed understood as an expression of sensation and state of mind.' (15) And not, for example, as arbitrary acts or as involuntary, retroactive actions. For the gesture does not – intentionally, for instance – represent the sensation

It is not presented 'vividly', nor does she – involuntarily – react to this sensation.

'And what, then, might laughter be a metaphor for?' (15)

'People laugh on all sorts of occasions. Not just at things that shouldn't be taken seriously. Even in despair, for example. There is such a thing as bitter laughter. And there is also that laughter without cause that comes from embarrassment.'

(15) 'What recurs everywhere here – in the distance of what strikes one as strange,[18] in the violent release of failure, in the distance at which the embarrassed person seeks to connect with the other – cannot, of course, be distilled into a formula.' (15) The way in which a given sensation finds its way to the body, moves within it, and 'aligns' itself with it varies invariably. Similarly, the way in which, for example, laughter takes shape from this point also varies. What laughter actually means can only be deduced from this affective potential of sensation, which is taken up and shaped in various ways. 'For the same reason

that the basic meaning of a word can only be sensed through the various ways in which it is realised— .'[19] (15)

To what, then, does the 'parable-like' nature of feeling refer? Is this reflected in the gesture or posture? 'The parable-like nature of feeling refers to how the most disparate elements are brought under a common denominator, insofar as they stand in relation to one another, with the human being as *the unifying centre* of *his feeling*.' (15/16) The 'centre' of one's sensibility is the human being, insofar as they find themselves in a situation that concerns them or that consequently has an effect on

([17]) See L. Klages, op. cit., pp. 192–193.

[18] See H. Lipps, 'The Mode of Experience of the "Primitives"' in: *The Reality of Man* , op. cit., p. 37.

[19] See H. Lipps, *Die Verbindlichkeit der Sprache*. *Werke*, Vol. IV. Frankfurt am Main, 1977, p. 115 ff.

is taken up by him; insofar as he finds himself claimed as a 'feeling' being. This centre of feeling is 'unified' insofar as man's state of being-with-something concerns *the corporeality of his existence*, his 'state of being' being a corporeal one. For, as a corporeal one, the affective potency of feeling is also 'possible'. Whatever concerns a human being, in view of this corporeality of their existence, is comprehensible; it can be taken in, ascertained and, possibly, brought under control. 'Human beings always react in the unity of their corporeal nature.' (14) They return to their state of mind as a corporeal one, insofar as they find themselves compelled by it; he grasps his state of mind in his bodily conduct or in his posture, possibly intercepting it there or attempting to master it there. By no means is the corporeality of a person's state of mind—the affective potency of their feeling as a bodily one—a mere potentiality of their physical body as an 'organ'. The way in which a person, through bodily behaviour or posture, returns to their state of mind as one experienced in the body and felt within it, cannot be compared either to a reflex movement or to its counterpart.

Laughter has already shown us how 'the most diverse things can be reduced to a common denominator'. (15) But it has also demonstrated to us the flexibility and adaptability of this very same denominator. Furthermore,
'the involuntary nature of the gesture here precludes, from the outset, any talk of a transfer, which, in the case of a word or a concept, would at least be possible owing to their availability and usability.' (16) The affective power of sensation only *manifests itself* in that which is apprehended as being felt in the body. As such, it is not at all available to a person; it cannot be utilised by them. In the gesture, it is 'mastered', but not
'translated'. For the gesture attempts, with that which is apprehended as felt in the body, to 'come to terms with it' or to
'to detach oneself from it'. (16) And not, by any means, to translate it into something comparable or something that might remind one of it. What, in bodily behaviour—for example, in laughter—'boils down to the same thing' is at the same time unmistakably different, just as it takes on a different form each time. There is no such thing as 'true laughter'—something that can be understood as such—which could be transformed into the bitter laughter of despair or the groundless laughter of embarrassment. As the 'unifying centre' of their experience, human beings grasp themselves in the *difference* contained within

affective possibilities. These may well be comparable to one another insofar as they are physically mediated as tangible possibilities. It is only when experienced in a different way that *the nuances* of how a person comes to terms with themselves first become apparent in the body.

Just how fragile this unified centre of feeling is—within which a person manages to find their bearings, precisely in the diversity of the affective possibilities it contains—was demonstrated by the bewilderment of the embarrassed person. This burst forth in the twilight of their bodily behaviour. The embarrassed person finds themselves confronted with something they are unable to come to terms with. *He is unable to relate within himself to what concerns him in this situation.* The diversity of the affective possibilities contained therein fails to find expression. Overwhelmed by what concerns him in this respect, he becomes entangled within himself. The demands he finds himself facing in this situation remain directionless. His sense of being affected lacks the focus required to meet those demands. Awkwardly, the embarrassed person becomes entangled in the tangle of feelings that overwhelm him, from which he is unable to extricate himself. Bewildered, he cannot find his bearings within it. Anxiously, he withdraws into himself, not daring to step outside himself.

In the twilight of his physical demeanour – the sense that he must act in some way, even though he cannot step outside himself – and in the resulting, equally unsuccessful behaviour, which comes across as clumsy and out of place, one can sense the bewilderment of the embarrassed person. Because, in his experience, the diversity of the affective possibilities contained therein fails to find expression, the embarrassed person seems to want to blur into himself indistinctly. Without a focal point, without direction, there is nothing that could in any way be compared to the affective potency of his experience, nothing that could be reduced to the same denominator as it. In vain does the embarrassed person search his own body for the focal point of his experience. As something inarticulate, the affective potency of his experience is not at all tangible within it. The demand to step outside himself, to also take hold of that to which he finds himself drawn, overwhelms him. The bewildered individual cannot pinpoint his bewilderment; the body cannot – struck as it is in a wholly different way – bring forth the nuanced way in which he manages to compose himself in the situation. Precisely for this reason, his bewilderment erupts into mistrust of the treacherous body, which seems to be letting him down.

The rift through which unease shatters the unified core of a person's sensibility can only be found in the inner conflict

of his physical existence. Just how deeply it penetrates this unified centre can only be gauged by this. *In the fragmentation of his physical existence, a person strives to counteract the treacherous nature of his bewilderment*. He wishes to provide proof of the unity of his physical nature. When put to the test, it eludes him. The embarrassed person wishes to present himself correctly to the outside world; he wants to get it right at all costs. He insists on faithful expression and constantly tries to monitor his physical demeanour and the manner in which he expresses himself. Because his consternation does not find a 'setting' commensurate with it through his demeanour or his expression, the embarrassed person goes to great lengths to create one. As it is contrived, the behaviour and speech consequently lack accuracy and persuasiveness. For, being subject to the control of inner observation and constructed within it, the intention has also been embedded therein to present oneself correctly or to put one's case to the other person. Precisely because they are attuned to this, the embarrassed person loses their natural demeanour. They resort to posturing and express themselves in a convoluted manner. And their bewilderment intensifies as they are overlooked in their very essence, reduced to the artificial and convoluted, and pushed into the realm of the comical. *The self-consciousness of the shy person is an affect of their existence*. An existence which, being overburdened, cannot compose itself, whose discomposure erupts in a faltering demeanour – and not, as in the case of revulsion, for example, in the distortion of the mouth. The self-consciousness of the embarrassed person envelops the individual entirely. It is precisely because they cannot be entirely themselves that the embarrassed person is – embarrassed. Self-conscious, the paralysis that utterly threatens their actions burrows into the gaze of the embarrassed person.

- Human bias

'In the "parabolic nature" of the affects, nothing else is expressed than the fact that things that are objectively very different can be seen as the same.' (16) That which affects is perceived only in such a way that it fits into a simile; the potency of the affect realises itself therein, 'empowers' itself only in this way. That to which the affect conforms is not, as it were, represented figuratively by something else with which it might be compared in any respect. Nor is it transformed into a

'translates' something else, because one would be drawing on memories here. That which is taken as the basis for assimilation *is incorporated* into something else which bears no demonstrable resemblance to it, nor in any way – however one might look at it – reminds one of it. It does not compare itself *with* the other, but *'to* the other'. It is only in this way that the assimilation comes into play. The affect can seize upon the most objectively diverse things for this assimilation; it enables this to become fundamental by the fact that, in the process, what is taken as the basis for assimilation only emerges as 'the same' in relation to something that is – objectively – entirely different from it. *In itself,* however, that to which the assimilation is compared cannot be reduced to this common denominator, nor can it be regarded as 'the same'. 'The fact that, for example, a person's disposition can be described as "crooked" shows how, in this instance, the person is regarded both from the perspective of things and as something within things in their crookedness. For what "crooked" signifies cannot be captured by mere form. One thing is compared to another without it being possible to distinguish between a literal and a figurative meaning of 'crooked'." (16) The parabolic nature of the affect—that which it takes as its point of comparison—lies in the sensation, insofar as it marks the beginning of a direction towards the body into which the affect has not already entered of its own accord. It only seizes upon itself, only empowers itself within it. That to which the affect compares itself, in which what it takes as a point of comparison also becomes visible as a 'same', is only grasped in the body, brought to a head there. In the gesture ' ' or the posture, 'an impression that is initially indeterminate and uncertain of itself comes to a head'.[20] (16) The parabolic nature of sensation is thus fulfilled, in such a way that what is taken as a point of comparison for one's state of being compares itself with that which is encountered in the body, emerges therein as 'the same' or is reduced to the same denominator. The affective potency of sensation is thus set free.

In gesture, emotion is 'mastered'. 'It signifies the
beginning of a distancing from that which moves me.' (16) 'Nothing other than the fact that comprehension, too, is channelled skilfully.' (16) 'Through the articulation of the sound, one has succeeded in freely retaining what is " " within it.' (16) 'Through the sound of the word, through this rebirth of the impression, it becomes itself

[20] Cf. the parallel discussion by H. Lipps in: Die Verbindlichkeit der Sprache, op. cit., p. 120.

'released.'[21] 'And only insofar as one keeps oneself out of it, does not allow oneself to be carried away, does one succeed in wresting the impression of transience from its hold and bringing it to the fore. The breaking free from … becomes a liberation into …' 'From the sensually and physically awakened animality, man breaks free by liberating his gaze from the dominion of sensation. (Lament).' [22] (16) However, the form that the affect takes through the articulation of movement in gesture or posture is also distinct from the rebirth of the impression through its expression in words. And the liberation of the affect in gesture or posture is different from the free retention of the impression. In affect, one is *not* in the presence of something which,

carrying one along, evaporates in the very act of being carried along. This is what one can only bring to light through *looking*. It is in this that the striking quality of the impression first takes hold, whereupon it takes shape through its articulation in the word. Through looking, one frees oneself from the *bewilderment* caused by the impression that evaporates within it. One 'has' it within oneself, whereupon it can also be conceived as an 'impression of'. And this is achieved through its articulation in words, whereby one is only then brought to that *which*, whilst having begun to take shape in the 'impression of', has not yet been 'released into its own being'.

'In an impression, however, one merely *perceives* something – one is not affected by it.' (16) In perception, one returns to the dazed state caused by that which makes an impression; insofar as one 'have', one perceives it as an 'impression of'. That of which one has the impression is captured in the utterance through the word; the 'impression of' reveals itself in it. And because in the impression one has, one merely 'perceives' something – 'therefore, one can seek to interpret the impression for oneself by drawing on one's memories.' [23] (16) In an impression, one is not 'overcome' by something that takes hold of one in that sense. One does not succumb to the impression in such a way that one is unable to act.

'… whilst one must come to terms with the emotion one finds oneself in *as a result*, namely by seeking to *detach* oneself from it.' (16) In

21 See, in this regard, Lipps's discussion of thought 'becoming liberated to itself' through expression, as well as of the impression 'being called forth' by the pronunciation of a word, op. cit., p. 112 and pp. 118 ff.

22 See in particular L. Klages, 'On the Nature of Consciousness'. In: Collected Works, Vol. 3.

23 See, in particular, H. Lipps, Die Verbindlichkeit der Sprache, op. cit., pp. 119–120.

Affect signals distress, not a state of daze. In distress, one is gripped by the affecting factor. One is thereby prevented from detaching oneself through contemplation. When one is seized by it, the affecting factor burrows in rather than dissipating. One is drawn into the affect that overwhelms one. One cannot maintain one's composure insofar as one is unable to keep the affect at bay. One succumbs to the onslaught of this affect, which cannot be controlled, and yields to it. And it is precisely at this point that one must 'come to terms' with the affect through one's gesture or posture. Through gesture or posture, one comes to terms with the affect insofar as one 'seeks to detach oneself' from it. The form it takes through the articulation of movement does not simply 'release' the affect 'back to itself'. It is not as though something were to emerge here that one could hold up for contemplation – as the impression does through its articulation in speech. Yielding, the affect resonates within the gesture, intensifying and clarifying itself therein. The pressure of the affective force at work here—to which one yields in the affect—is thus also met in the gesture or posture. One follows the direction in which the affective force burrows in. 'Just as one follows a sensation, seeking to stay on the trail of what is felt, becoming keen of hearing and sight, so the affect intensifies and becomes clearer in the "Attitude", which it acquires through the gesture.' (16/17) However, the affect only acquires this 'attitude' when the direction of the penetrating affectant reaches the point at which it strikes the body and is absorbed into it. Having arrived at this common denominator, as a 'That very thing' to which the affect can relate is 'reborn' through the act of affecting. And this is not so much by bringing it *back to* itself, but rather by liberating it *from* itself. In the articulation of movement through gesture or posture, it is not the affect that comes to terms with itself; rather, one regains one's composure *in* the *face* of that which affects one. That which affects one *is clarified therein*. The affect becomes 'free' through the gesture insofar as it swings out in it, yet this oscillation is stripped of its compulsive tension by the articulation of movement. In the gesture, one encounters the distress. In the ability to master the affect through the gesture or posture, one confronts that which merely overwhelms one. The

distressing element is taken in as something one can approach. One comes to see it clearly, becomes 'clear-sighted'. In that in which the affect becomes clearer, one comes to terms with it,

one catches it and 'regains one's composure in the process'. (16) In the grimace one pulls, the features of revulsion are sharply defined. This encapsulates the struggle against that which one can subsequently rid oneself of only by force. In the grimace of the urge to vomit, disgust is also captured insofar as it makes one want to vomit. And only then does one free oneself from the repulsive thing that disgusts one.

'Only that which is capable of physical self-expression can also *experience* emotions.' (17) It can come to terms with what affects it. The embarrassed person fails to do so. He cannot come to terms with himself, cannot find himself, in the face of what he feels in the process. Consequently, his demeanour also fails. As a state of mind, embarrassment is characterised by this. It is a self-consciousness from which a person cannot escape. The unified centre of their feeling, from which they seek to connect with others, is affected by it. In their physical demeanour, the embarrassed person cannot find their bearings; their bewilderment intensifies within it, without being able to find a solution. To the point of helplessness, which threatens to paralyse their entire being. One is at the mercy of embarrassment. As a human condition, it is hopeless. Faced with what causes embarrassment, the self cannot find a position within itself. It is without a foothold; it offers no possibility of a course of action that one might subsequently 'take'. If the aim is to uncover a person's nature and the nature of their existence through their possibilities, then embarrassment reveals, in the impossibility of gaining a foothold, the nature of the person and the nature of their existence. How their bewildered entanglement within themselves bursts forth physically, without it being possible to be struck by it.

Hans Lipps's anthropology began by interpreting, in the context of human nature, the still bewildered expressions of the embarrassed individual. The *question* of what it means to be human only arises in the perplexity of a person who is hopelessly entangled within themselves. It can only be grasped from that vantage point.

The fragility of the human being.

On the texture of the shame phenomenon

'The triumphant subject is not opposed by the utterly dispersed, but by *a fragile difference* set against massive unity.'
K. Meyer-Drawe, 'The Eccentric Self', in: Transitory Identity. The Processual Character of the Modern Self. Edited by J. Straub and J. Renn. Frankfurt am Main/New York 2002, p. 370.

- The Guard of Shame

Shame stands guard. Its vigilance is a tense state, distinct from the alertness of consciousness. In alertness, one is
'connected to oneself'. (48–49) The vigilance of shame, however,
'banishes and prevents'. (32) The specific vigilance of the sentinel is not automatically inherent in waking consciousness. 'Shame, however, keeps watch *over* something'. (31) And whilst the person feeling ashamed seeks to avoid something *for their own sake*, 'shame has its sights set on a threat to "*the* human being" and is not secure *in this regard*'. (11) The phenomenon of shame points us to a fragility and vulnerability inherent in human existence. 'Shame shies away precisely from lifting its gaze to where the danger comes from.' (32) The sentry of shame that has been raised does not, as it were, stand its ground against a danger that, once recognised, could be pinpointed. Vigilant shame wards off danger merely by 'circling around' it. Whilst the person feeling ashamed 'wishes, cautiously and prudently, merely to avoid something, and in doing so *measures* themselves against something' (ibid.), it is precisely this act of measuring oneself against something that shame regards as presumption to be prevented.
'Modesty *does not, strictly speaking,* seek to protect itself from anything.' (Ibid.) Keeping a watchful eye, it seeks to safeguard. 'As a feeling … modesty is not, strictly speaking, *protentional*, but *prohibitive*.' (Ibid.) Her gaze is downcast. Modesty 'prevents' it,

to 'look into the face' of whatever she has in her sights. She neither poses a threat nor confronts it. The sentinel of shame creates no battle lines. Shame *senses* a danger that must be conjured up. It guards against one raising one's gaze and venturing out. 'One lowers one's gaze, veils one's gaze,' (27) seeking precisely to withdraw from it. 'In shame, one does not conceal one's face as one would one's natural nakedness.' (Ibid.) What shame seeks to conjure up in a protective and preventative manner, yet is not certain of in this regard: the peril that one cannot avoid for oneself, but which is rather entrusted to the precariousness of human existence, is an *'exposure'*. Existence is, in itself, endangered. And even the vigilance of the guard it erects shows how shame stands 'at the origin of self-consciousness'. (31) For one is not uninhibitedly connected to oneself in self-consciousness – just as in waking consciousness. The awareness of that which shame pierces through is 'a *questionable nature of my own self*, marked within the problematic unity of the human being'. (35) Vigilantly, shame guards a 'strangeness' of my own self, (34) which it experiences precisely as 'exposure', and which it seeks to circle around in a banishing manner and preventively suppress. One becomes conscious of this in the overcoming of the unease at the prospect of being able to fall away from oneself. In that shame stands at *the origin* of self-consciousness, it is 'in this respect a *primary* concern of philosophy'. (31) For it is precisely this self-consciousness of which shame *is* not *certain*. – In which philosophy would like to perceive an immediate certainty, in that one is already, in one's self-consciousness,
has become 'in possession of', thereby 'possessing' itself. – This 'self-possession'
of the 'I', behind which philosophy seeks to entrench itself, stands in contrast to a
'becoming-self' of the human being, in which the latter *becomes* conscious of itself. 'Becoming conscious is something that happens of its own accord.' (44) And this happens precisely when one suspends the 'self-possession' of the 'I'. The stance taken by philosophy is *shifted* here. That which falls within the realm of shame, and is cautiously delineated therein, lacks the self-assurance of the cogito and concerns the uncertain existence of the human being.

It is characteristic of the analyses that H. Lipps devoted to the phenomenon of shame to allow *oneself* to *be affected* by this gnawing uncertainty.[1] If shame signifies an *existential fracture*, then

[1] H. Lipps, *Human Nature*. Works, Vol. III. Frankfurt am Main 1977, pp. 29–43. – On

It is tempting to approach them with the putty of outdated notions about the 'history' of humankind, to chisel away at them with preconceived ideas about their 'ultimate purpose' until the crack is sealed and only a thin scar remains. One overreaches oneself with modesty in much the same way as one does with Raphael's faces of the Ma , whose eyes one is tempted to pry open.[2] It is precisely in these drooping eyelids that they gathered their grace. What modesty takes into its care and safeguards is to be found *in modesty itself*. Like the seal of the closed gaze, the depth of modesty 'stamps' *the vulnerability of human existence*.

In what follows, we turn to the contribution by H. Lipps, which – unlike the analyses by M. Scheler and J.-P. Sartre[3] – falls outside the scope of a 'phenomenological ontology' and therefore does not constitute a milestone in phenomenological investigations *into*

'Shame and the Sense of Shame'. It falls within the framework *of anthropology*. This is, of course, not *a theory* about human beings: the questionable nature of humanity is thoughtfully incorporated into it. Step by step, he leads us towards the 'fundamental human condition' revealed in shame, in which its hold refuses to *let go* of him.

• The Control Panel of Shame

One is uncertain *about this* in an interpretation that fits into an original context of meaning whose motifs remain, for the time being, 'unexplored'. 'How the sense of shame defines itself' is not to be 'demonstrated'. (41) For it is precisely here that 'a particular interpretation takes shape: from where one understands oneself, to where and how far one's gaze is *directed*. It determines what—

On the philosophical significance of Lipps's analysis of the phenomenon of shame, see J. Hennigfeld, 'Shame and Anxiety: Phenomenological Existential Analysis in Hans Lipps (Human Nature)', in: *Categories of Existence: Festschrift for W. Jahnke*. Edited by
K. Held and J. Hennigfeld, Würzburg 1993, pp. 351–364.

2 One should carefully compare the Madonna d'Orléans, the Madonna Colonna, the Madonna di Foligno and the Madonna del Cardellino.

3 M. Scheler, On Shame and the Sense of Shame. Writings from the Posthumous Collection. Vol. I: On Ethics and Epistemology. Bern 1933, pp. 67–154; J. P. Sartre, *Being and Nothingness: An Attempt at a Phenomenological Ontology*. Philosophical Writings, Vol. I. Hamburg 1994, pp. 405–538.

'compares within itself what it has taken in, and thereby the direction in which it establishes and grasps itself.' (Ibid.) The assumption that *the feeling of shame* is something 'that is simply part of human nature' (ibid., note 1) obscures the fact that 'the *failure* of shame – regardless of which side it comes from – the fact that something was not undone out of shame – "wounded" shame is what first brings shame to life as a feeling'. (32) The premise of the feeling of shame arises from the broken spell of shame, from the distortion of that which it has in its sights *without* raising its eyes to it. That which shame engages with is precisely not 'raised' to such a degree that it can look it in the face. 'Shame is alive precisely in that it does *not* allow certain things to arise *at all*.' (Ibid.) It withdraws from that with which what it engages with might be compared, so that the direction in which it is established and grasped is determined.

This belatedness of the sense of shame – in presupposing itself as its own condition, so that the *originally unarticulated* framework of meaning, within the scope of which it comes to be interpreted, is brought to light – is a pointer to the audacity of the common-place way in which human beings understand

themselves. This understanding knows in advance what shame is all about, in that it aligns itself with what the sense of shame
'performs'. This defiance – the *perceived* shame as an 'inner experience', as a witness to which one wishes to summon oneself in order to elicit a confession as to what she means by it or what she is getting at – stands in contrast to the *fundamental trait* of the depth of shame, which is to entrust one's secret to her only under the seal of *confidentiality*. Shame gives us nothing to understand that would make it comparable to *any other emotion*. And in this respect, it is a 'syndrome'. (41) συνδρομαζ means: collision. The *offensive aspects* of my existence stir up shame.

The fact that the sense of shame arises only within the context of its failure suggests that one can 'only appeal to its acceptance within *certain limits*'. (41–42, note 1) Consequently, one cannot 'demonstrate' this as self-evident on the basis of the 'varying development' of human nature. Rather, the differences inherent in this are shifts in *the limits* of human existence. What is required here is an epoché from the common self-understanding of humankind—not to assume a sense of shame from the outset, but to pay attention to the limits within which one can only *appeal to* it. 'It is necessary to [the

shame] *at the root* of certain forms of embarrassment, revulsion, etc. Shame is also present in shyness.' 'Shame is something whose *mechanism* manifests itself in certain instances of embarrassment.'
(31) If shame differs from the feeling of shame in that the latter involves disregarding in advance precisely what the former seeks to 'preserve', then it is also a different *phenomenon*. In the latter's conception, a 'real event' is not reduced to the mere common denominator of a rationalised behaviour – something that everyone has experienced *in themselves* at some point, namely as a 'feeling'. (Ibid.) The fact that shame is to *be found* only on the *basis* of certain forms of embarrassment, revulsion, etc., or *is inherent* in shyness, does not refer us to a behaviour in which one is unsure of oneself, does not feel at ease with oneself, or 'experiences a challenge arising from what is at that moment perceived as repulsive' (14) – something which everyone can therefore experience *in themselves*, and which they subsequently wish to come to terms with. In the gesture, what is felt is reduced to a 'common denominator'. It is here that the affect finds its 'attitude', in which it 'intensifies and clarifies itself' (16–17). And the attitude 'actually modulates the affects': 'one can intercept the affects through one's attitude'.
(21) Shame, however, is not 'an emotion in the sense that embarrassment is an alteration which one seeks to master, against which one must assert oneself by regaining one's composure'. (31) It is precisely the sensation of an affect – in the case of embarrassment, an alteration which one attempts to bring under control through gesture and to counteract through one's demeanour – that shame seeks to prevent *from arising*, 'which – insofar as it is *not a form of behaviour* at all – is also *devoid of gesture*'. (Ibid.)

"Certainly: one 'feels' shame." "Shame overwhelms me – that's what they say." 'But *does* it actually *take hold* of me, or do I "become" something in the process – just as I, for example, "become" embarrassed?' 'What overwhelms me and makes me blush is the *feeling of shame*, but not shame itself, which, after all, has *not* protected one here from that very thing of which one is ashamed.' 'There is a *purity* of shame.' (Ibid.) That one might wish to let the feeling of shame precede shame itself as its defining feature, in which one could experience it as a real occurrence within oneself, in order to reduce it to the mere common denominator of a rationalised behaviour, whilst in reality one holds against 'wounded' shame only that which it, in its purity —that is, of its own accord—would not wish to allow to arise at all: the sensation of an emotion – such as

an alteration – demonstrates all the more clearly the extent to which the 'unrefined' nature of the phenomenon of shame has, in essence, been missed here, and how one has by no means come any closer to its phenomenal character. Shame is something whose presence *'manifests itself'* in certain instances of

embarrassment, is to be *found* only 'on the basis of certain embarrassments, revulsion, etc.', and *'lies'* within shyness. (Ibid.) It is not 'something typical' (ibid.), something one has already experienced as a real occurrence in and of itself, with which one is familiar and which one therefore reduces to the common denominator of understood behaviour, simply by asking what it is all about and what one is getting at. The 'context' of shame is precisely 'not an *identifiable* structure'. (34) As 'unresolved' in its purity, and not, for example, 'resolved' in the feeling of shame, shame establishes the reception of a
A barrier to 'motives' for explaining a behaviour. There is no gesture into which it might find an outlet. And no attitude can dispel the shame. Just as one does not face the person one is ashamed of. Shame is a syndrome in that there is no emotion of shame which, as in the case of embarrassment, 'is' its expression (13) – in which one sees how 'human beings always react in the unity of their physical nature'. (14) The fact that I 'become embarrassed not as a participant in a situation, nor at all through a situation, but *from within* myself' is a specific instance in which one first begins to trace the mechanism of shame. (30) Shame is not born of the situation in which I 'become' embarrassed. 'It is similar to the fear that *rises* within me', 'which is part of existence and which is contained in dread and anxiety'. (31) Shame arises on the basis of an embarrassment that comes from within me – the ground of which has thus *shifted*.
'Ambiguities in particular are embarrassing – allusions,
which one cannot – however reluctantly – avoid understanding. Indecencies." (30) Yet nothing 'impossible' was said; it is not the inappropriateness that causes embarrassment here, as if one had lacked a sense of the situation in which one was participating. 'The situation itself is something that must be constantly sustained through participation, the very possibility of which depends on those who – each in their own way – must somehow, perhaps in a leading capacity, take responsibility for it.' (29) The fact that one could not meet the others on common ground, that one was unable to translate oneself into a specific 'situation', that one did not meet them 'on a particular wavelength', (29–30) seems to lead to isolation, the

Can no longer find its way to one another – yet does not leave one at a loss *here*. 'It is considered indecent not to call a spade a spade. Why? – Because the double meaning of the word first reflects that which cannot be named. Or the word merely hints at it, cautiously, hesitantly. Yet this shifts what is meant into the sphere of discreet intimacy, a relationship with the other that I am precisely seeking to avoid. This straying towards something that, by not being named, *is* evidently *kept at a distance* – towards something that is therefore *not the thing* itself – is what stirs up shame here.' (30)

The threshold of embarrassment has shifted in a direction where one does not wish to encounter the other person in the first place. Or rather, one does not wish to be drawn into a situation in which one is already in danger of being led astray by mere insinuation. Precisely the situation that demands participation, for which my presence
'constitutive' (29) is something one seeks to keep at bay here by not referring to it – but which is brought into proximity through 'allusions'. 'One *is affected* by the – albeit reluctant – acceptance of the direction indicated by the allusion. One resists "openings". And shame is linked here to revulsion. The brazen invitation to something is repulsive.' (30–31) One becomes embarrassed *of one's own accord* here, because one is in danger of succumbing to a situation for which one does not wish to take responsibility – one that would be impossible to sustain and share with others. For it thrusts me out of my isolation; one does not wish to connect with the other in this direction, into which one is already in danger of veering simply because of the tone they have struck.

It is not a failure 'in the face of the demands made of one by things themselves or with regard to one's conduct in the presence of others' (29) that gives rise to embarrassment *in this instance*. – 'The person who is embarrassed cannot, in a state of indecision, come to terms with difficulties that loom before their eyes, or allows themselves to be driven into a decision that, as it were, breaks out of the proper course and thereby goes awry.' (10) 'Embarrassment also arises, however, when appearing before others.' 'As a stranger, one cannot be sure of one's place amongst others. One does not wish to give cause for misinterpretation, nor to appear in a false light. One fears here that one will not be taken seriously in some respect. […] One fears,

in view of this, that the others' understanding will find no foothold, and that one will inevitably slip away from them as an object. One shuns being overlooked in one's own self, insofar as

'the situation is such that the objective facts come to the fore.' (11) – However, in the specific case under consideration here, it is not the difficulty of the situation in which one finds oneself that gives rise to the 'ambivalence' of the predicament. It is not – in this instance – the case that one cannot unambiguously be who one is for the other person, nor that one's demeanour fails because what one intends to convey finds no point of reference for understanding in a situation that has, from the outset, forced one to focus on the factual. – It is precisely this straying towards something that is *not* the matter at hand that stirs up shame. 'One blushes.' (30) Indecencies cause embarrassment, to which one would prefer not to be open to in the first place. *'The tangibility that* comes to light in the untouchability of something' pushes itself to the fore. (41) This is the *control panel* of shame.

- The existential divide

Shyness, too, *harbours* shame. It resists 'revelations'. 'The shy person does not wish to open up to everyone; they wish to preserve their privacy, not to lay themselves bare. They shy away from the embarrassment they face when they open up to someone who does not take them seriously. Or rather, they do not dare to make a claim on the other person in *this* very *respect*.' (33) The shy person's reserve guards against the presumption of unjustified, ill-considered or inappropriate demands. 'Feeling embarrassed in someone's presence is different from the shy person's reserve. One is shy *towards* someone.' (Ibid.) Not only every word, but every situation too, needs to be weighed up. (29) 'The reserve of the shy person, too, *seeks* to connect with the other in *its own* way,'
(32) to hold back with regard to one's claims. 'Shyness is part of modesty.' (34) She is careful to observe the limits of such claims. However, this does not mean that one 'fails to assert claims *based* on one's own abilities' towards others. (34 note 1) 'Insofar as genuine modesty arises from a reluctance to overstep one's bounds when it comes to attributing something to one's "own" abilities.' (34) Here, too, we see how one is shy towards someone *from within oneself*. For one is unaware of one's own abilities or the claims inherent therein, and is reluctant to overstep one's bounds – presumptuously – precisely in this regard. 'One fears overstepping one's bounds in communicating that which is unspeakable.' (Ibid.) The limits of my

ability to open up to the other, and consequently to make a claim on them, are not placed in safe custody. They are entrusted to the care of reserved restraint.

As shyness *'knows* shame *in* situations where one *cannot be* certain of the other'. (32) – Whereas wounded shame,
'Shame, which overwhelms me as an emotion but causes me to sink into the ground: *being in the presence of* others becomes impossible'. (Ibid.) – Their gaze falls upon the vulnerable aspects of human existence, whereupon they do not lift it; upon indecencies one would rather not be confronted with in the first place; upon presumptions one would rather not be caught out by in the first place; upon openings one resists, yet from which one also defends *oneself*. 'Whilst, however, the shy person seeks to preserve themselves even in the becoming of their face, shame relates to *vulnerabilities* that do not at all belong to the human gaze.' (Ibid.) For the face signifies 'a confrontation with the world', that is, 'a free relationship to what is recognised as the world as a whole and which can therefore reveal itself within a horizon of decisive possibilities'. 'The way one looks at the world is precisely what makes one a self.' (26) A person is recognised in the face, insofar as

one recognises the face. (25) The orientation inherent in looking at the world, which is brought into sharp focus in the gaze, becomes visible therein. 'The face,
'i.e. that which makes someone unmistakable.' (Ibid.) 'One avoids the gaze of the other that penetrates and probes one.' (27) The shy person wishes to protect themselves from the other's gaze 'exposing' them. They would most like to undo the fact that, as their face takes shape, their own gaze becomes visible—a gaze that 'signifies a relationship, a stance towards the world, a *resolve*'. (35)

'[But] what does exposure mean, and where does the connection lie with the ambiguity of which the indecent was, after all, merely the first example?'
(32) This was yet another example of the presumption of looking out into the world with determination, of overreaching oneself in precisely that act – which is why the shy person would like to erase their gaze from their face, *appearing* reserved precisely in that very spot. How does this relate, for instance, to gêne, that is, 'shying away from the public eye'? (11) It is, after all, not similar to the case of embarrassment, in which we cannot 'find the common ground that connects us to others', (12) which is why 'the person feeling embarrassed fails to present themselves before others', 'their embarrassment *manifests* itself in uncertain restlessness'. (32) A violation of modesty *'exposes'* the vulnerability that one would rather not *reveal* at all. Whereas

whereas the person who feels embarrassed 'merely wishes *to* avoid' the public eye. (Ibid.) It is not the act of appearing before others that fails – in which embarrassment manifests itself, that is, in which it becomes visible. Simply being in the presence of others becomes impossible: the exposure one wishes to defend oneself against out of shame is bottomless. It *cannot* be *taken* in and brought out into the open. Wounded shame sinks vertically into us. That is why 'it is not possible to establish a structural *schema* of shame'. (34) Exposures that one does not wish to reveal, but which one nevertheless offers up and which – hurtfully – are imposed, strike at the unprotected, *precisely this* 'open' and fragile aspect of human existence.
There are a few sentences from Nietzsche's **Beyond Good and Evil** that
H. Lipps draws upon here: 'There are processes of such a delicate nature that one does well to bury them under a layer of coarseness and render them unrecognisable.
… It is not the worst things of which one is most ashamed. … A person whose shame runs deep encounters their own fates and delicate decisions along paths that few ever reach, and of whose existence their nearest and dearest must not be allowed to know. … Every profound spirit needs a mask.' (32–33; cf. F. Nietzsche, op. cit. Works in Three Volumes, Vol. II. Munich 1966, p. 603) 'Everything that is profound loves the mask; the most profound things even harbour a hatred of images and similes.' (Ibid.) 'The mask fixes the other.' (33) It has 'the peculiarity that one cannot, in turn, meet its gaze, that one cannot actually encounter it'. 'In order not to become vulgar, one seeks masks. One's very essence, in which one grasps oneself as absolute, does not wish to be brought out into the open and laid bare.' One does not wish to betray oneself. 'To betray oneself here means: to fall away from oneself.' (Ibid.)

Exposure signifies an existential rift. It intrudes upon a person's *existence*; it does not merely affect a 'state of mind' of that person. It is the emergence of such a state of mind that one seeks to suppress out of shame, whilst it manifests itself in embarrassment. 'Perhaps one can feel shame here *too*; but insofar as one is merely embarrassed, this is precisely what is set aside.' (34–35) For: the fact that the manifestation of one's embarrassment may signify an exposure of the person—which one must shamefully prevent—is something that the
'merely' self-conscious person does not take into account. Human 'existence' here means: being present, 'which, however, refers precisely to *eccentric behaviour*'. (26) In one's gaze, a person is 'present'. The direction of one's gaze into the world is thus brought into sharp focus.

It is precisely in *relation* to this direction that the human being is 'there'. They are received by the other, who catches them. An openness is manifested here; the gaze is 'the breakthrough of a beginning'. (Ibid.) And it is precisely *in this context that* a vulnerability arises, over which, for example, the reserve of shyness keeps watch. The very fact that he is regarded as if from the outside, under scrutiny, and that the other's gaze does not 'meet' his, clouds him. The decisiveness that it signifies falls into a 'distorting ambiguity'. (33) 'It is only as *an object*—that is, not in a face-to-face encounter—that one is "exposed" to the gaze.'
(27) Whilst the mask seals him off by fixing the gaze of the other, he withholds himself *in this* from looking out into the world. As one stares at the mask, the face withdraws. An essential aspect of *its* visibility is that no eyes are 'set' into it.

What was already perceptible in the allusion to indecency, and became evident in the timid pre-emption of intruding, inappropriate demands, recurs 'in a strangely kaleidoscopic shift' in the context of nakedness, becoming commonplace, and so on. (34) The straying towards something that is not the matter at hand, yet *which* concerns *oneself*, is – here – shifted in the direction in which one threatens to betray oneself in exposure, to fall away from oneself in becoming commonplace. 'Namely, in that one seems – as the average would have it – to discover oneself in that which only one could know oneself.' (33) That which is unmistakably one's own draws close to the ordinary – something one does not wish to be ensnared by, yet cannot shake off. The decisiveness one displays becomes dubious. Catching the scrutinising gaze, one turns in the direction it points, encountering oneself in a distorting external view which one – horrified – cannot shake off. In the distortion of its unambiguity, something is dragged into the light which, insofar as it is false, is nevertheless, *as a distorted image*, precisely that in which one appears *to oneself*. 'Just as its truth and reality cannot be demonstrated at all in contexts that are open and demonstrable: it is a semblance of understanding that arises from the distorting ambiguity into which it is cast by the foreign light falling upon it.' (33)

'The vulnerabilities that the self-conscious person fears to reveal are *weaknesses*, something one cannot face in the presence of others, and which one therefore does not wish to acknowledge or allow others to see.' (34) 'But *anything left unprotected* causes me to be overcome by shame. With regard to my *non-*

'The very power of that which can lay claim to me through gazes is a vulnerability.' (35) Shame conceals a fragility of human existence. Being able to be 'oneself' without reservation is precisely what shame seeks to safeguard, yet it is in this very aspect that human existence is fragile. The empowerment to be oneself is not simply granted to human beings. The openness expressed by one's gaze, insofar as it is a breakthrough of a beginning, and the decisiveness it signifies, in that one's looking into the world is thus brought into sharp focus, is not exclusively within one's control. The self-consciousness arising from a violation of modesty signifies *defencelessness* precisely where the self-consciousness of embarrassment seeks to deflect *in a defensive manner*. It is precisely the 'intermediate layer of the exterior' that the person feeling embarrassed seeks to create, 'behind which he can hide' (11–12), that is torn down in the violation of modesty, which in *this* very sense signifies 'exposure': that which is uncovered, behind which one cannot hide.

Something unprotected is precisely that which one cannot *bring oneself to* look upon, yet which cannot *be concealed from* the gaze of others. It is precisely in this *regard* that there are 'indecencies', 'vulgarities' and 'exposures'. When shame sinks *vertically* within us and is not already circumvented as a feeling—when one does not already set aside its intrusion with the prospect of a 'higher calling' of human nature—it lifts the veil on its phenomenological mystery.

- Being-as-well

It is not the *uncertainty* of behaviour, but the *precariousness* of existence, that shame focuses on. In this respect, it differs from embarrassment; its sense of self-consciousness is simply of a different kind. The

'germinating self-awareness' (34) to which one awakens in this context signifies a *suspension* of that self-assurance of consciousness in which one – immediately – also finds a foothold, not, by any means, *a undermining* of it. 'The unsettling and exhilarating nature of having first to *create* the new ground of one's existence is expressed in this.' (Ibid.) For here the inviolability of the cogito is affected by something kept at a distance, something it does not wish to invoke, something which, for this very cogito, signifies the 'impossible'. As a 'germ', it nevertheless stands at its origin,

is its – true – impetus. The self-assurance of the 'pure' ego exists only if one has already, in advance, risen above that which intrudes into the very foundation of existence as something offensive and alien. What stands at the beginning of this – philosophical – leap into the cogito, forming the starting point for its direction of thrust, is a sore spot, something unprotected. There is a *philosophical* shame that seeks to resist revelations which, precisely *for it* – as insolent – are associated with revulsion. It is only reluctantly willing to engage with shame itself, whose 'allusion' already constitutes a – philosophical – challenge. Shame points in a direction against which a philosophy of the cogito resists. With regard to its powerlessness in the face of that to which it is held accountable by the very thing that shame has in its sights, it is a vulnerability of philosophical self-assurance. What is actually vulnerable, wretched and fragile here is the *'purity'* of the cogito. The very thing it constantly presupposed, which, by wounding *its* shame, becomes ambiguous here. The budding self-awareness to which one awakens with shame is *insidious*. Like shame itself, which offers us no schema, it can only be 'grasped by its knots'. (41) And because shame has its sights set on something that is *not* the thing itself, 'the threads of these knots' – likewise – 'are not an *objective* text'. (34) Their *texture* forms 'no discernible structure'. That which is insidious cannot – philosophically speaking – be categorised.

'What above all gives rise to shame is *general sexuality*. For it is precisely in this—as something universal, in which one merely participates—that one becomes aware *of it*." (35) Sexual shame and its violation are accorded a privileged position insofar as they reveal the ambush of one's burgeoning self-consciousness, its various connections, 'which, of course, cannot be reduced to any formula' (41). What the indecent—in the form of ambiguous allusions—and the presumptuous—in the form of inappropriate claims—were merely initial examples of, but which then increasingly crystallised in exposure, vulgarisation, etc., in which one could not be certain of oneself or seemed to be falling away from oneself, is here, as it were, 'delivered to itself'. (16) The suggestion of what is kept at a distance, the insinuation of the presumptuous—which, in the clouding of one's gaze, in the tearing away of that intermediate layer of the exterior with which one sought—embarrassed—to 'maintain a distance' from the other (11), acquired a certain 'conciseness'—becomes tangible. Sexual shame and its violation—

These aspects lend the 'syndrome of shame' its 'distinctiveness'. The offensive aspects of my existence take on greater prominence here.

General gender is divided *within itself*. The fact that one – here – participates in something in which one merely *has* a share demonstrates all the more clearly the manner in which human existence exists 'outside itself' in this context. Sexuality is 'general' insofar as its existence is characterised by this being 'outside oneself'. The inability to be oneself without self-consciousness, or rather the experience of falling away from oneself, takes on a *specific* significance here. For human self-consciousness has been incorporated here. And it is precisely in this that general sexuality is 'without shame'. However, the fact that general sexuality *'above all* awakens shame' (35) now takes on a special significance in that the vigilance of the

guardian of shame is brought into sharp relief therein. Therefore, in general sexuality, one 'does indeed become aware *of oneself*' in the specific sense that the vigilance of the guardian of shame – here – awakens *'to itself'*. The vulnerability of 'the human being' that it has in its sights becomes – here – *visible* in itself. 'To become seeing here means: no longer *to be* uninhibited' (ibid.), namely in that one is 'outside oneself' here, splitting oneself off from oneself. 'Only when the gaze of the other, in directing itself towards *this* questionable aspect of my own self—as marked within the problematic unity of the human being—becomes ambiguous, can *nakedness* become a cause of shame.' (ibid.) For it is unquestionably embedded in general sexuality.

'One does not, strictly speaking, feel ashamed *of* "one's own" […], but *rather of oneself* in one's nakedness. One feels ashamed insofar as one is aware of an ambiguity that is obvious given the circumstances, or is unsure of the relationship one has with the other.' (Ibid.) It is precisely the shamelessness of nakedness that is at stake here, the very thing that sexual shame seeks to guard against. What is not at issue here, and what one is in danger of straying towards, is shame itself. 'The doctor's objectively examining gaze, for example, does not give rise to shame.' (Ibid.) Sexual modesty is not aroused. The shamelessness of nudity is not 'shamed'. The doctor's objectively examining gaze is directed towards the fact that it is general; it is not directed in the direction in which the patient exists outside of himself, thereby also connecting him to himself. In this respect, the patient is not at ease, but – feeling a sense of shame – remains vigilant, carefully scrutinising the doctor's gaze. He wishes to ward off the onset of shame. Ambiguity means – in this context – not, *taken* generally, that of

in which one merely participates, is involved, i.e. is held personally accountable for it. 'Even a divergence in mutual *attitudes* regarding what one person offers the other can, however, be perceived as an ambiguity in the mutual relationship – usually felt by only one of the parties; it is precisely the objectivity shown towards me, for example, that can then arouse a sense of shame.'' (Ibid.) In the case, for example, where the patient – not unambiguously – reveals *himself* in his nakedness, only to be rejected – objectively – precisely because of this; or when the doctor's gaze – not unambiguously – *rests* upon his nakedness, the patient, through the severity of his gaze, seeks to compel the doctor to objectivity.

'However – is it actually the *nakedness* of which one is ashamed?' (Ibid.) The very fact that one is not ashamed 'of oneself', but rather *in relation to oneself* in one's nakedness—insofar as, in this regard, the *shamelessness* of nakedness is what is *actually at stake*, or rather one is concerned here with not knowing oneself to be secure *in this*, with not being able to be certain of the other—indicates that sexual shame has shame itself in its sights, seeking to keep it at bay.

'Naked means unclothed. Animals are not naked.' (Ibid.) They cannot present *themselves* in this way, cannot undress to reveal their nakedness. They are not in a state where one might encounter them there, or possibly come into contact with them – in that respect. There is no nakedness in which they lay *themselves* bare, in which they come out into the open. Nor is the gaze of animals free. Their eyes are 'there, so to speak, *"only* for seeing"'; (25) the gaze cannot step out on its own. 'It is only evident from the stalked eyes of some animals—deep-sea fish, for example, which are sent out like feelers—how the animal seeks to *grasp* what it "sees".' 'An animal's species-character is written on its face; something general is expressed there in ever-changing forms. Or rather, what is attempted here to be seen as a face can only be understood as a physical formation.' (25–26) The features cannot, therefore, be 'understood' in such a way that a face is *discerned* here, in which a gaze into the world breaks through.
'The animal is not present in its gaze.' (26) In it,
no free relationship to his seeing, which is consequently also 'silent'. 'The dog's gaze is "silent"; it tells me nothing in it; the breakthrough to this is lacking.' (Ibid.)

'Hands and face can be neither naked nor clothed.' (36) There is no garment that could clothe them, that might

would lay aside. Whilst animals *have* no clothes, hands and faces cannot clothe themselves *in* anything which, if removed, would reveal them in their nakedness. Animals cannot *reveal* their nakedness; hands and faces cannot *present themselves* in their nakedness. "'Naked', when applied to a face, signifies a fleshly fullness which overwhelms the spiritual, the facial features." (Ibid.) For a face 'speaks'. (37) 'Nor does the hand, in which a person's spirituality is expressed, give the impression of being naked. The glove merely *conceals* it.' (36) – Just as the veil *veils* the face. In the movement of the hand as a 'gesture', for example, something is 'figured out'."

- It shapes the space that is, as it were, allotted to the other; the other's respective position is signified within it. 'It is only the posture that speaks here.' (Ibid.) For example, 'holding one's hand *over* someone'—taking them protectively towards oneself—insofar as this defends the other.
- Just as the features of the face are 'not something natural or morphological, but something spiritual', and a certain tension is 'constitutive' of them (25), so 'everyone displays, in their gait, stride, hand movements and the swinging of their arms, a posture unique to them', which 'shapes' them. (18 and 20) 'The refinement, the *style* of these features, ensures that the person "himself" becomes visible in them right up to the very heights of his spirit.' (18) Just as the face is that 'in which a person is unmistakable'. (25) Because the face and hands signify the manner of perceiving the world and handling things that make one a 'self', they do not belong to him *in the same way* as his *body*

(27) – which he can clothe.

'The body is not "oneself" – or rather, it is *only* "oneself" *in contrast* to, say, my suit. It *belongs* to me.' (Ibid.) It, too, 'is seen against the backdrop of a world' that is 'mine', in which I am addressed as myself. (46) *'One's self'* is the body insofar as one – here – does not encounter the other *'as* so-and-so' whilst wearing one's suit. (36) In my body, however, I am held accountable *to myself*. 'One can be "confronted" by being seized by the arm *no differently* than by being seized by the sleeve.' (27) 'Being dressed gives a person the opportunity to let themselves be seen *by anyone*; clothing creates "pure circumstances".' (36) Through this, one gains access to the public sphere. 'One can allow oneself to be encountered.'

'People are not simply "there" in each other's presence – as, for example, lovers can be.' (Ibid.) – Who, as a result, also *simply* present themselves in their nakedness. – Here, people 'encounter one another or connect with one another *in* something', which 'then also

in the gaze, through the gestures of my hand, and so on'. (Ibid.) 'Only human beings meet and encounter one another *in* something',

(46) which can be shared as perspectives and standpoints. Clothed

'But we encounter one another as so-and-so. My attire – and the savage's tattoo is also attire – is the *character* that is ascribed to one as a man, or that is bestowed upon one as a sign of one's age group, and so on … whereby "man" is not a general concept by which one would be defined, but rather signifies membership of a group within the community.' (36)

In gender, we do not encounter one another in something that we could share *as* 'so-and-so' – something in common – on the basis of which we could also be *understood* in terms of our respective specific affiliations. Nor, indeed, *as* 'man' and 'woman' – as general gender characteristics based on the sexual organs recognised as distinct, in which one would mutually participate. Sexuality specifically *shuns* the public sphere. Here, one does not freely express one's views or standpoints (opinions). Here, one is not – in an intellectualist sense – reduced to the mere common denominator of the 'most sensual pleasure of love (Buhlschaft)', nor is one 'conceived' in that way. As if, , one were – here – mutually serving as 'stimulants of lust'. At a significant point[4] , G. Misch points out how the distinction between 'opinion' and 'sensual

pleasure'—which is at issue here—comes into play. The language has preserved a trace of this in the word *'Minne'*, which 'as is well known, in the heyday of our medieval poetry signified high Minne, the highest spiritual striving, the Platonic ερος' – 'spiritual striving involving both the senses and the soul, longing'. A peculiar tension is revealed in the fact that Minne signifies 'loving union, but not union'. How this is realised, how the longing is fulfilled, has likewise been enshrined in language. 'The word for knowledge – […] in Greek γνωναι, in our language 'conviction', in the Old Testament: "he recognised her" – is thus derived in all languages from the act of procreation.' (Ibid.)

Whilst one *dresses* the naked body *in something*, 'fools want—

4 G. Misch, The Structure of Logic on the Basis of the Philosophy of Life. Göttingen Lectures on Logic and an Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge. Edited by G. Kühne-Bertram and F. Rodi. Freiburg/Munich 1994, pp. 321–322.

'that one might grant oneself, that one might offer to someone, "but be *covered*".' (36) 'Nudity is therefore […] not synonymous with that.'

'Being clothed—that is, not being naked—means that nakedness does not arise at all.' For here, people unite with one another in something in which they can also allow themselves to be encountered. 'Nudity is therefore […] *merely the condition* for the emergence of vulnerability.' 'And secondly: vulnerability relates only *to certain parts* of the naked body.' (Ibid.) Parts in which one cannot allow oneself to be encountered, parts in which one does not wish to connect with one another. As a result of which one may be claimed – simply by the other's gaze being directed upon them. 'Exposure relates to something that a person "*also* is" – whereby both the "also" and the "is" must be emphasised. It does not simply refer to the contingencies of my nature – such as my stature, for example – which merely play a disruptive or favourable role in human life. That one 'also' is something expresses how something *protrudes* into human life *as a defining foundation*, and how, conversely, nature is here determined by human beings." (Ibid.) The naked body is 'uncovered' insofar as human existence finds *itself* revealed *in it*. There is no 'natural nakedness' of my naked body 'in itself', insofar as it *belongs* to me. In *view* of this belonging, one can expose *oneself* in this way or offer this nakedness to someone. For it is only *on this basis* that one finds oneself, in one's existence, determined by something in which one is called upon to turn in on oneself. 'Even the nakedness of my body is something that cannot arise "in itself"—and that is to say, here: *dragged* into the reality that can be spread out before one's eyes—for that of which it is, after all, merely *the* natural *foundation*. *I myself* am the protection of my nakedness.' (Ibid.) H. Lipps quotes here, in abridged form, Aphorism 142 from Nietzsche′ : 'C'est l'âme qui enveloppe le corps.' (36)[5] 'My face does not signify any [– 'natural' –] vulnerability, for "it speaks".' One is unmistakable in it, or rather, one can therefore only 'lose' it. – 'And my arm, back, etc., on the other hand, not because they are not actually fundamental to a life that is to be lived. They lack the closeness to the personal, whose integrity could be violated.' (37) The *integrity* of existence is not affected by this.

5 F. Nietzsche, op. cit., p. 635; cf. M. Scheler, op. cit., p. 87, and the textual notes, p. 522.

- The Fundamental Situation of Man

'It is not shame itself that characterises a person, but "their" sense of shame, that is, the way in which they enter into the fundamental human condition opened up by shame; […] it is only in the significance

acquired by the path reluctantly taken [in shame] – the extent to which it takes hold, the extent to which it *can* take hold in a person – that their nature is revealed.' (109) "Shame is something by which *human beings themselves* are measured." (37)

It is not suddenly that I am who I am. The centre in which a person finds themselves, in which they cannot allow themselves to be encountered or connect with others, is treacherous. Here, one 'becomes entangled in oneself'; one becomes caught 'in circling one's own foundation'. (56) It cannot be defined in a compelling way; it is 'something impossible' into which one – here – sinks. 'The "embarrassment" of human beings and their gaze signified an existential affliction.' (43) In 'Embarrassment and its Expression' (10 ff.) , it was presented as a human *condition* and its inner conflict was laid bare. [6] However, the precarious nature of the fundamental human condition revealed in shame constitutes an existential *syndrome*. It was only traced in the 'sense of shame' insofar as, when violated, shame 'overcomes' one precisely as a feeling. Yet it does not represent a human state of *mind*, but rather, like the fear that wells up within one, belongs *'to existence'* itself. And just as a syndrome – as is well known – constitutes a clinical picture that arises only from the convergence of various characteristic symptoms, so the fundamental situation into which a person enters with a sense of shame unfolds in its various dimensions, which 'cannot, of course, be reduced to a formula'. (41) One must tackle the snares in the tangles in which one becomes entangled *within oneself* here. For the budding self-awareness to which one awakens with a sense of shame lurks behind the back of 'pure' consciousness. It is in relation to this hidden self-awareness that one *becomes ensnared*. The extent to which one can become ensnared can now only be gauged. It cannot be *controlled*.

The presumptuousness of inappropriate demands, the indecency of obvious allusions, the descent into vulgarity in which one finds oneself—

[6] See the preceding remarks on 'embarrassment as an existential affect'.

The advice, the vulnerability in which one finds oneself: these all formed the ambush of burgeoning self-awareness. It was therefore treacherous because one could not really *respond* to it. For it *signified* something in which one simply could not be oneself. 'But then one realises how this syndrome—the boundaries of which one becomes aware, the tangibility that emerges precisely in the inviolability of something, the ambiguity, the inability to emerge, and so on—how all of this recurs, albeit in a distorted form, in the concepts of taboo and sacrilege. The same 'basic type' lies behind it.' (41) The 'homology' that 'exists between the feeling of shame and the fear of sacrilege' (ibid.) sheds light on the precarious nature of the fundamental situation into which a person enters when experiencing shame. 'Only the "centres" to which both relate are different.' (Ibid.) For in sacrilege, 'one forfeits […] that which one has *taken* upon oneself to bear, of which one becomes *the seat*'. (43) 'The turn of phrase constitutive of nakedness—that one "is also" something', whereby one cannot be oneself—did not, however, signify *a 'possession* of the human being', but rather a shattering *discovery*. 'Shame, however, is precisely a form of self-consciousness.' (Ibid.)
'For the Polynesians, a taboo is something that one must not touch'
'shuns, insofar as something would thereby *be forfeited*.' (42) – What if, upon being touched, it were to come 'over' one? The touch would bring it forth in its efficacy, which would take hold of one. 'The tangibility that *comes to light* in the untouchability of something' signifies this possibility of summoning, through touch, something in which one cannot take hold of oneself, something which – by taking hold – one takes upon oneself. The tangibility that comes to light here is 'a particular *vulnerability* through things' (ibid.). 'What is taboo is not to be avoided because of its threatening nature.' 'Nothing forbids, nothing prevents one from touching precisely that which is taboo.' (Ibid.) One does not *recognise* something here *as* a danger. 'The wariness towards things that are taboo is not fear.' One does not anticipate here something whose significance one has grasped, against which one would keep this or that at one's disposal. 'It is precisely this freedom in relation to things that is lacking, which allows one to recognise them for what they are […]'

(Ibid.) The particular vulnerability to these things that emerges here signifies an 'inability to free oneself from', insofar as the 'active' element within the things that are taboo is embedded within them – and *remains inaccessible*.
'Part of the concept of a taboo is that it is "contagious": becoming infected—

'…means that the initiative lies with me – without, however, my being free to do so.' (42–43) It is precisely this freedom to act that is *impossible*. The effect that is 'released to itself' in the act of becoming infected cannot be delineated or circumscribed in a captivating manner. It 'comes upon' one. What one has taken upon oneself to call upon, 'one cannot freely encounter'. 'The beginning of a distancing' (16) is absent: one becomes its *seat*. 'Things are not recognised here in terms of their properties and understood objectively as this or that, but are regarded as the "seat" of forces that one can appropriate.' (43 note 1) 'To appropriate' here means: to bring them upon oneself by invoking them. 'In possession, "something has happened" to the person; here, they find themselves entirely given over to things, do not make sense of them by *incorporating them into the sphere of meaning* of their life, and are not their principle. Here, one *experiences* a powerlessness.' (43)

'To meddle with this is *just as* impossible as, say, the "something impossible" that lacks modesty or tact. One oversteps the boundaries set for humankind when one meddles with it.' (42) 'The transgressor *succumbs* to that which he has touched. Just as the gaze could *not remain untroubled* by that which it uncovers and desecrates. Or rather, just as the act of having come to see signified a state of self-consciousness.' (Ibid.) It is not the case here that one misjudged one's abilities. 'That, precisely, is what is lacking.' (Ibid.) The act of calling upon something, in which one compels oneself to do something, is not a 'failure' of an ability one possessed. The act of having come to see, in which one finds oneself revealed, does not allow the gaze to emerge freely. It is precisely the freedom to look out into the world that *is unavailable* in the downcast gaze – and not merely missed. 'One deludes oneself about something else. About the fact that, simply because one does something, one is not thereby already in control of it.' (Ibid.) In transgression, as in the violation of modesty, one fails to empower oneself to do something over which one has no control.
'Not powerful' means 'not *merely* a lack of control' (ibid.), because one has no control over the *consequences* of one's actions – 'much like something that, once set in motion, cannot be brought back; therefore, it can only be left to its own devices within certain limits, or its effects can only be anticipated to a limited extent'. (Ibid.) 'Not in control' refers rather to the *principle* of one's actions, over which one has no free disposal here. '"Not in control" means […], that something is not within my power at all, that one does not oneself "be" what one does, that one has relinquished oneself in this regard, so that one cannot freely take responsibility for it.' (Ibid.) The effect that arises—

triggered, released from oneself, binds one *into* it. 'Powerlessness manifests itself in the course of events: for it is not the *success* of the transgression that brings about Nemesis. It manifests itself as a vain *undertaking*.' (Ibid.) The *curse* strikes at human vanity; the breakthrough of one's undertaking does not always remain with one.

The 'constitutive turn' of nakedness – the idea that one 'is also' something – is revealed here – in transgression – as 'shifted in such a way that, in one's beginning, one is *skilfully* connected to the course of events'. (43) In shame, however, one is skilfully brought *face to face with oneself*. It marks the beginning of a breakthrough. I am not *constantly* the person I am. The perplexing question that arises in shame concerns the basis of human *destiny*. Who, then, am I *actually*? (109)

Borderline cases of the shift.

Physicality and manic 'flight of ideas'

'Human beings are not determined for something, but *for themselves*.'
(p. 103, note 1)

- The Affective Self and the Affective World

It is the attempt to take account of the imaginative and affective dimension of phenomena which, within M. Richir's phenomenological architecture, has led him to delineate the field of phenomenological anthropology and to measure the 'often mis ' of human beings, as revealed by psychopathologies. [1] In this way, she encountered L. Binswanger's 'insight into Dasein',

which fundamentally reformed Dilthey's structural psychology. Binswanger set out its foundations in his magnum opus *Grundformen und Erkenntnis menschlichen Da- seins* (1942); its analytical practice had already been applied on a trial basis in *Über Ideenflucht* (1933).[2] The publication of the French translation of *On the Flight of Ideas* and *Delusion: Contributions to its Phenomenological and Existential-Analytical Investigation* (1965) in the **Krisis** series confirms, moreover, the particular interest that phenomenological anthropology has since shown in Binswanger's existential analysis.[3]

It should therefore come as no surprise that H. Lipps, in a chapter entitled

1 M. Richir, *Phantasia, imagination, affectivité*. Millon, Grenoble 2004, p. 5.

[2] L. Binswanger, Basic Forms and the Understanding of Human Existence. Edited by M. Herzog and H.-J. Braun, Selected Works Vol. 2, Asanger, Heidelberg 1993; L. Binswanger, 'On the Flight of Ideas', in: Forms of Failed Existence. Edited by M. Her zog, Selected Works Vol. 1, Asanger, Heidelberg 1992, pp. 2–231.

[3] L. Binswanger, *Sur la fuite des idées*. Translated from the German by M. Dupuis, Millon, Grenoble 2000; L. Binswanger, *Délire*. Contributions to its phenomenological study and

in the section entitled 'Stimmungen' made a number of comments on Binswanger's study 'Über Ideenflucht', which were published posthumously in his * * in his final work, *Die menschliche Natur* (1941) – one year before the publication of *Grundformen*.[4] Insofar as, that is to say, 'When "mood" is understood in the sense of a particular way of being *in* relation to things' – in the sense of a state of mind – 'it also manifests itself in the manic flight of ideas'. (99) 'However, we distinguish the manic *state* precisely from a *mere* mood. We recognise it as a *case* of flight of ideas. The freedom and looseness of a mood mean that one can let 'one's' mind show itself and play. The manic individual, however, cannot *pull* himself *back* from a flight of ideas by which he is, as it were, possessed." (100) For Binswanger, however, this inability to pull oneself back from a flight of ideas does not mean that the patient could never, under any circumstances , *'return'* to an experiential content which he would have received 'dans la plénitude d'une sincérité profonde'. [5] It is precisely the analysis of the 'thematic structure' of the totality of its manifestations and expressions that enables Binswanger to bring to light the profoundly 'antinomical structure of meaning' of mania.[6] From H. Lipps's sole reference to Binswanger's work 'On the Flight of Ideas', it can be inferred that he considered only those sections in volumes XXVII and XXVIII of the

's studies, published in the *Swiss Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry*, were taken into account, but the analysis did not proceed as far as Binswanger's.[7] Binswanger's interest in Lipps' *Investigations into the Phenomenology of Cognition* only becomes apparent, in turn, in * * in the second chapter of the first part of *Grundformen*, particularly in the analyses devoted to 'taking hold of something'.[8]

daseinsanalytique. Translated from the German by J.-M. Azorin and Y. Totoyan, Millon, Gren ble 1993.

[4] H. Lipps, *Human Nature*. Works Vol. III, V. Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main 1977, pp. 97–104.

[5] L. Binswanger, *On the Flight of Ideas*, op. cit., p. 185 ff.; on the 'ability to bring oneself back', p. 191; on Binswanger's citation of the study by E. Pichon, *Essai d'étude convergente des problèmes du temps*, *Journal de Psychologie* 1931, vol. 28, nos. 1–2: see p. 177 and p. 185.

[6] L. Binswanger, op. cit., pp. 148 ff.

[7] H. Lipps, op. cit., p. 99, note 1.

[8] L. Binswanger, Basic Forms and Cognition of Human Existence, op. cit., p. 293. – H. Lipps, *Investigations into the Phenomenology of Cognition*, Works Vol. I, V. Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main 1976.

For H. Lipps, however, this response to his works from 1927–28 came too late.

It was undoubtedly the fact that Binswanger did not restrict his detailed description of the 'flight of ideas' to the 'actual course' of the mental states associated with this syndrome that aroused Lipps' particular phenomenological interest.[9] In contrast to the clinical picture of mania presented by psychopathology, Binswanger posits the 'form of being human', 'the anthropological structure', which first

becomes apparent in the flight of ideas.[10] This holistic anthropological structure is precisely the *world* as the patient experiences it. And this world reveals itself first and foremost in the 'disposition' of his existence, in which the particular manner of his being-with-things 'in the midst of being as a whole' is unveiled.[11] This 'mood of existence', shaped by affect, does indeed form the focal point of the first 'Study'. Binswanger confirms, moreover, that his study is intended as a contribution to the analysis of the 'world of affect- ', 'the world in which we live in affect', and of the 'affect-ego',

'that we are in a state of affect' must be taken into account.[12] Already in his earlier analyses of embarrassment as an 'existential affect' and in his detailed description of the 'texture of shame' as a mark of an 'existential fracture', Lipps has undertaken a 'declination of the various relationships of the self *within itself*'. (9 Note 1)[13] Following the thread of this declination, his anthropological investigations into 'human nature' gradually unfold. The 'being in' a mood is a form of declination that by no means eludes his specifically phenomenological approach. For one does not find *oneself* in it in the same way as in embarrassment or when one feels ashamed – which are, after all, not moods. Embarrassment spins a web in which one becomes entangled. 'Shame, however, when it overwhelms me as a feeling, makes me sink into the ground.'

(32) One experiences embarrassment 'as arising *from one's situation*
' (10) In shame, however, *'being* with others becomes impossible.'
(32) What do I feel in a mood? How do I find myself within it? What

9 L. Binswanger, On the Flight of Ideas, op. cit., p. 22.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid., p. 44.

12 Ibid., pp. 31–32, note 9.

13 See the two previous articles preceding this one.

What is the nature of their state of mind? How is the relationship of the self to itself reflected in their mood? The shy person fails to conduct themselves properly in front of others. 'They do not dare to step out of themselves, for fear of committing a faux pas.' (12) In shame, one seems
'to betray oneself, to fall away from oneself'. (33) One searches in vain for masks to put on: one is exposed and laid bare. This exposure relates to something that a person 'also is', but which they do not wish to acknowledge. The shy person fails *to 'adjust'* their demeanour. (21) In shame, however, there is no 'adjustment' of 'posture', which – untenable as it is – is also 'gestureless'. (31) Certainly: 'one blushes'. But by blushing, one cannot, as it were, 'intercept' the shame. (21) There is no 'modelling' of shame, which is precisely in this respect bottomless. (20) What of the
'state of mind' of the mood? What relationship does the self have within it , as described by that enigmatic expression which Lipps borrowed from O. F. Bollnow: 'Zu-mute-sein'? [14]

- 'Zu-Mute-Sein' and 'Mitgenommen-Werden'

O. F. Bollnow describes 'mood' as a 'fundamental state of being' of human existence. 'Moods belong to the layer of the underlying foundation of life.' [15] As Lipps observes, Heidegger speaks of moods as the 'most primordial ways of being' (98), as the 'most primordial mode of being of Dasein'.[16] 'The mood reveals how one is and becomes.' It points to an original mode of being or an original ground of existence, which

Bollnow defines as the 'ground of life', and Heidegger as 'being in its there'.[17] How does this reference by my self to the ground of my existence, to my 'being in its there', take shape? 'How one

[14] O. F. Bollnow, *The Nature of Moods*, V. Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main 1941,
p. 18. – Re-edited by U. Boelhauve, G. Kühne-Bertram, H.-U. Lessing and F. Rodi in:
O. F. Bollnow, *Schriften*. Critical edition in 12 volumes. Vol. 1: *Das Wesen der Stimmungen* . Würzburg 2009.
([15]) Ibid., pp. 18 and 20.
[16] M. Heidegger, Being and Time. First Half, in: Yearbook for Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. VIII, Niemeyer, Halle an der Saale 1935, p. 136; cf. H. Lipps, op. cit., p. 98.
[17] Ibid., p. 134.

'is and becomes', 'how I feel': 'One feels, finds "oneself" in it. So it "is" – without, of course, *realising* it as in thought, which is an existential step.' (105) 'A binding or release, or relaxation, of my *vitality* is characterised in depression and joy.' (105) *'Tristitia contractio est', 'laetitia diffusio est'*: 'Sorrow causes the heart to cramp'; 'Joy is effusive. One radiates it'. (13) 'All these affects', in which one feels oneself to be, 'are not "inner"'. (13) 'Augustine defines the *affectio animi* as a *distentio*.' (13) That the *affectio* of grief, for example, is a *distentio*, 'means a *spreading out* within it'. (105)
'Whilst I am suddenly overcome by an emotion in the strict sense – for example, when I fly into a rage – and in doing so try to regain my composure and control myself, in the case of grief, for instance, I am *myself in a state of emotion*.' (105) But these affections 'are not *moods* in the narrower sense, such as boredom, low spirits, etc. – which are *observed* in a person, but in which one *is not actually immersed*'. (105) 'Boredom, which overtakes one when one has nothing to do, has its root in my existence. Anxiety, too, is something that arises from within me. Without my actually manifesting myself in it.' (105) The state of being, of feeling oneself within a mood, is characterised by the fact that one is 'not actually situated' within it.

'One's attitude effectively *determines* one's emotions.' (21) 'One can only be truly sad if one surrenders to that sadness in one's attitude.' (21) Human beings' 'so-called emotions' 'mean something different from the mere "being carried away" experienced by animals.'
(20) 'Only human beings can – in the face of horror and terror – lose their composure.' (20) 'When regarded as mere emotions, without their attitudinal dimension, rage and anger appear to be related. Rage, however, is essentially anger at something, and this anger contains a sense of displeasure. One merely vents rage on someone, but it is not directed against them. It does not strike them in the same way as wrath, which is directed against another and refuses to overlook the failure to fulfil what one might expect of them. In anger, one grasps hold of something. Whilst the person in a rage loses their composure, allowing themselves to be carried away, one actively immerses oneself in the anger. It becomes powerful within one. In anger, one reveals oneself. Rage merely characterises them.' (21)
'A relaxed posture – sitting in a chair, for example – already helps to curb anger: one can counteract one's emotions through one's posture. Letting oneself be carried away by something is the opposite of this.' (21) The co-genome-

shows how a person 'finds themselves called upon *to turn inwards* in certain situations'. (20)

There is a 'mechanism' of shame. (31) 'What overwhelms me and makes me blush is [however] the *feeling of* shame, but not shame itself, which, after all, has not protected me here from the very thing of which I am ashamed.' (31) 'But shame *guards* over something.' 'Shame overwhelms me – so they say.' (31) 'It is similar to the anxiety that wells up within me.' (31) 'For anxiety is not timidity. One cannot "understand" it in the same way that one understands someone's fear and, through that, understands them. Anxiety

affects me differently from fear, from which I can distance myself and towards which I can maintain a detached, rational relationship. Nothing 'feels' constricting about the anxiety that, in times of trial, rebels against me as the sting of existence. Whilst worry and fear weigh upon me – insofar as they can hinder and paralyse me – anxiety prevents me from coming to my 'true self'." (105) "One veers off into obsessive thoughts and loses oneself in the process. Anxiety *blocks my train of thought*. It means being forced before oneself and finding oneself held fast in the breakthrough of a powerlessness that is *my own*. It has no measure, as fear finds in danger." (105)

'Fear is something which – held down by life's worries – nevertheless breaks out time and again, driving one towards, or into, that which lies behind it like a thorn: obsessive thoughts, pedantry, and so on. The attempt to prove one's freedom, to prove oneself within it, knows no end here; it finds no foothold in things. Only the person for whom this – not being able, of their own accord, to be what they are at that very moment –
'To be "oneself" entails a specific powerlessness; one can feel anxiety.' (105–106) In the sinking into the ground of shame, one *discovers*, precisely in that, that one "is also" something one does not wish to admit. (36) One becomes aware of it" – without any effort on one's part and reluctantly. (31, 43, 44) 'Shame is precisely a form of self-awareness', a repulsive one, 'associated with revulsion'. (31) The suffocating anxiety, however, does not imply vulnerability. It is not 'my being in the presence of others' that becomes impossible here. The fact that anxiety 'blocks' my functioning signifies something else. What is affected is my *freedom* – how I exercise it. Its *foundation* becomes contentious.

- The delight of distraction and the plunder of anxiety

My very gaze bears witness to the way in which I exercise my freedom. It signifies 'a confrontation with the world'. (26) 'The human gaze is free. It *encounters* things.' (25) The human eye is not, as it were, 'there merely for the sake of seeing'. It does not seek 'to become fixated on what it "sees"'. (25) A person's gaze crystallises the direction of their 'seeing into the world'. (25) 'This direction, however, is not a perspective that can be objectively determined and specified.' (25) A person is 'present' in their gaze. They 'frame' what they see. The world reveals itself therein 'against a horizon of possibilities *to be decided upon*'. (26) 'Through seeing, the field of action is provisionally opened up, and this *act of seeing* points back to the decisive role *of free decision-making* in this regard.' (31) But: 'seeing that is directed towards things has *always embraced* the freedom that has become available to it in the light of day.' (97) 'Things are brought out of the darkness into the light.' 'Things exist in stages.' (93) 'There is a "force" of appearance.' (83) Things are seen 'in their manifest form'. (ibid.)
'Darkness hinders vision – which is not the same as saying that
one simply lacks the opportunity to 'experience' something for oneself." (83)
'The world *manifests* itself both in appearance and in concept. It is through seeing that one comprehends and interprets things.' (83) In the light of day, 'one *"holds oneself"* in a certain way – differently, for example, from when walking through a dark cellar, where one finds oneself withdrawn into one's physical sphere, where, instead of being able to stride freely with a goal in mind, one must be careful not to take a wrong step. One defines and limits *oneself* differently in this context.' (97) What changes is the way in which one 'holds oneself', the way one 'is' in this posture. One 'behaves' differently. In these different ways of holding oneself and behaving, the 'feeling' associated with the various modes of our being in relation to things is different
'switched on'. 'The *destination to which* this inherently intermodal sensation *is directed* changes.' (97) In the darkness, my steps are unsteady; I am unable to extend my physicality beyond the personal space of my

body. However: 'Both […] – light and darkness – are perceived here merely *as incidental circumstances* and not *as evoking a particular mood*.' (97)

In contrast: 'How, for instance, a certain mood imposes itself in the evening, when the twilight, drawing things back, relaxes,

whose final concern is already the next day, when one finds oneself free. Or whatever mood the morning is in. There is a certain mood to a Sunday; its silence, in which everything that usually fills the streets comes to a standstill, is something that can weigh heavily upon one. The gloom of a rainy day weighs heavily on my soul.' As for the mood

'Something comes over me here, in which I find myself addressed in a particular way: the world appears different in it, and my state of mind changes.' (97) 'I must withdraw from the certainties of a reality that can be ascertained and defined as this or that, in order to surrender myself to what lies unnameably in the present as a mood. Or even in an image. And one is put in the right frame of mind by melodies. In both cases – what does 'reality' mean here? It is as though, in the case of colour and sound, it were to withdraw from *tangibility* altogether. The dreamer surrenders to the mood. He loosens his ties so that he may drown in feeling. He wishes to find himself again in nature – which is not an experience, which is not the fate of an encounter." (97)

It finally becomes tangible that, in the 'state of mind' of a mood, one is 'not actually *in control*'. Reality recedes. It is its definability and tangibility that withdraw here. It does not constitute a 'circumstance' of my 'situation' with which I am familiar. Something unnameable, indefinable has been embedded within it—something I cannot grasp, something that rather takes hold of me, something that overwhelms me, to which I surrender. That to which intermodal perception is directed: the 'attunement' (78), which signifies an 'anticipation', a 'grasp', in which I engage with the things of this world and grapple with them, has undergone an alteration.[18]

The devotion of the dreamer brings to mind the *Rêveries d'un promeneur solitaire*: 'I feel ecstasy, inexpressible rapture at merging, as it were, into the system of beings, at identifying with nature as a whole.' 'During these moments of reverie, my soul wanders and soars through the universe on the wings of the im-

[18] On the 'anticipations of attitude', see: H. Lipps, Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie der Erkenntnis, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 49 ff.; Vol. II, pp. 10 ff.; see also: G. van Kerckhoven, Intentionalität und Lebensbezug. E. Husserl's Phenomenology from a Hermeneutic Research Perspective, in: Proceedings of the Third International Meeting for Husserl Studies in Japan, 23–24 November 2003, Kyoto University, Kyoto 2003, pp. 43–56.

'…into ecstasies that surpass all other pleasures.' 'My imagination, which shuns objects of sorrow, allowed my senses to surrender to the light yet sweet impressions of the objects around me.' Or this sentence, which expresses the 'morale sensitive' of the 'Rêveries':

'My expansive soul reached out to other objects, and, constantly drawn away from myself by tastes of a thousand kinds, by endearing attachments that ceaselessly occupied my heart, I in a sense forgot myself; I was wholly absorbed in that which was foreign to me, and I experienced, , in the continual agitation of my heart, the full vicissitudes of human affairs.'[19]

The 'free rein' given to the imagination in the 'Rêveries', the delight in its 'distraction' [20],is countered by the 'obsessive thoughts' (105) in which the grip of anxiety 'loses itself': it blocks its course. Even the manic individual 'cannot *hold* his ground'. (93) He is *as if possessed* by a flood of ideas from which he is supposedly

unable to extricate himself. 'The manic individual rises […] above things'. Insofar as 'he lacks the centre of a situation', he is unable to
'fathom' it (99), his ability to switch gears *fails*.

- Blockage: claustrophobia

It is not only atmospheres that evoke a mood. 'One can be *infected by* the mood of others, by their cheerfulness and exuberance.' (98) 'But one can also be put in a certain mood. Persuasion seeks to change one's mind: it makes one want to do something that one would not have done of one's own accord.' (98)

'Heidegger cites the following as examples of mood: boredom, listlessness, a desire for something. The unfulfilled nature of my time – or, at a pinch, its being filled – makes me feel bored. Not being in a mood, or being out of sorts, means: not being in the mood for anything – which usually implies a certain vulnerability, irritability, unpredictability: moodily following uncontrolled whims. Something or other bores me. The mood may have a cause; but that does not explain it." (98) For Heidegger, 'it is, however, in this groundlessness of mood that

19 J.-J. Rousseau, *Les Rêveries du promeneur solitaire*. *Préface, Commentaires et Notes* , by B. Gagnebin, Le Livre de Poche, 1983, pp. 107, 109 and p. 125.
20 Ibid., p. 109.

'an ontological "foundation"'. (98) 'The *burden of existence* is, in fact, what comes to light both in a state of disharmony and in the serenity of being in harmony. The person who is out of tune cannot
'do nothing with himself'. The animal knows no boredom: it is not under pressure to have to start something." (98)

In fact, Heidegger describes mood as a 'turning towards and away', which either turns towards or turns away from the 'burden-like character of Dasein' – which reveals itself in this dual 'turning'. For the most part, it does not turn towards it. The mooded state of being in which Dasein has always already found itself 'flees' from the burden. In an elevated mood, it frees itself from it. Through the 'often persistent, even and pallid moodlessness', Dasein becomes 'weary of itself'. 'Being has become manifest *as* a burden.' In contrast to the transience and light-footedness of mood, it is the inertia, persistence and pallor of this lethargic state— —in which the mood exhibits no particular *tone* of mind: the *discord* in which the turning-inwards takes place.[21]

However, it is not this 'heaviness' inherent in existence – the burden of enduring life without support – that Lipps addresses first and foremost. Rather, he emphasises the eagerness to 'have to begin something' (98), the 'restlessness' of human existence. Even a person's gaze is a 'breakthrough of a beginning'. (26) 'There is a resolve implied in it.' (35) 'In one's gaze, one places', for example,
'the other'. (26) 'As something inherent in human nature, a mood is something that comes "from within me". Without my "self" being present in it, as in grief and joy, or as my nature reveals itself in my inclinations.' (98) It is not *an affectio* in the sense of a *distentio*; it is more primordial. One is not actually engaged in it; one does not immerse oneself in it. 'One would naturally wish to resist moods as such. For they prevent one from *becoming engaged* and asserting oneself. One can only seek to dispel them, but not to intercept them like an affect that seizes me, nor simply *be overcome by them* as one is by boredom.' (98)

'Depression, for example, is also a state of mind. The person who is downcast loses heart when faced with the meaning of their actions. Their attitude has changed. The ground is shifting beneath their feet. They become uncertain within themselves because the very thing they believed in has been taken away from them. They *find themselves*

[21] M. Heidegger, op. cit., pp. 134–136.

Not free to make decisions. He steps into a void and cannot proceed any further. He no longer possesses within himself what is necessary to feel a sense of solid ground, in the sense of finding himself free to be something. He has lost his footing and his sense of proportion. He considers the most impossible things to be possible. Unsure of himself, he is prone to exaggeration. He succumbs to impressions. The vastness of the stairwell, the length of the corridors, the silence, the formality of those he encounters – all manner of things strike him as conspicuous. It seems to him, in an eerie way, to signify something in terms of the changes he senses lie behind them. It is as if he were isolated.' (98–99)

The oppressive weight of boredom and the numbness of depression merely inhibit the circuit. Anxiety, on the other hand, 'shuts down' my circuit. It is not simply a case of – here – dragging oneself along or even treading water. Rather: 'one is seized *by* vertigo' in the process. (106) H. Lipps chooses 'claustrophobia' as an example. The bulwark of my freedom gives way and lets the 'nothingness' in. One does not stand around idly here, nor has one become uncertain within oneself; rather: one finds oneself *'at the* mercy' of something here. (106)

'Here, one finds oneself at the mercy of the *void* whilst standing on

on wide open staircases, whilst walking along streets whose continuous rows of houses offer the eye no point of reference. A sense of vertigo takes hold of one. Just as Strindberg, whilst crossing the Place de la Concorde, clung to a lamppost to protect himself from himself, insofar as he had nothing *within himself* with which to resist temptation. The alluring nature of emptiness lacks the appeal of the unknown. Vertigo is far *more deeply* rooted in human nature. Fear lies in wait within *each of us*. One is overwhelmed by vertigo. It is not just any fear that seizes one here, something that could be dismissed as unfounded. To the person suffering from agoraphobia, no path seems passable any longer. They can no longer find their footing in space. And whilst, following the lure of the unknown, one ventures forth boldly—namely in steps, be — here, succumbing to temptation signifies letting oneself fall. The danger here lies *within oneself*.' (106)[22]

That one loses the ability to maintain one's position in space
arises from something that wells up irresistibly within him and is almost

[22] On the 'adventure', see the comments below: 'Distance and the Foreign. The Transformation of Existence'.

The fact that the void *exerts* such a pull demonstrates all the more clearly which fundamental aspect of human nature is affected by vertigo. It concerns the very *foundation* of our spatiality. 'Both – the alluring nature of the abysmal and the enticement of the unknown – differ from the sensation underlying claustrophobia in that, in this case, something *within the human being itself* reaches out towards the abysmal.''What impresses him is not the space of our existence—which, despite its boundlessness, is nonetheless "oriented"—in which one can determine locations and remain in a particular place." 'The person suffering from agoraphobia recoils from the vastness of space, which seems to be fleeing into infinity.' (106) 'In anxiety, that which is initially hidden *within oneself* comes to life. One cannot resist temptation as a *trial*.' (ibid.)

The very foundation of the spatiality of human nature, which one first begins to sense in agoraphobia: the space that seems to flee into infinity, as kindled by vertigo, is, *strictly speaking*: 'nothing'. 'What makes one feel dizzy is actually

'nothing'. (106) 'Existence as a whole seems to be receding. One is lost within it and in it. And one slips away from oneself here too, when – finding no foothold within oneself – one clings to the arm of one's companion.' 'Objectively, there is no danger.' 'After all, the railing protects me.' 'One avoids looking down

into the depths, though one is constantly tempted to do so. Here too: it is not the depth *as such* that causes vertigo. It is absent, for example, in an aeroplane. But the fact that, whilst looking down along the wall, one cannot find a foothold, makes one feel as though one is about to fall. Here, one finds oneself powerless over it, unless one can stand firm *in one's own right*." (106–107)

"Attitude *virtually suppresses* emotions." (21) "It takes a tangible effort to assert 'his' attitude – or some other feigned one – in the face of what seeks to overwhelm me. For attitudes can be genuine or insincere, feigned or contrived." "But attitudes can also be 'adopted'. I have influence over my attitude." 'And it is not only others but also oneself that one can deceive by adopting a posture, as to how one "actually" feels – insofar as one does, after all, somehow
'is'—that is, is fully immersed in it, fully committed to it." (21–22) The fact that, in the case of agoraphobia, this 'switch' is 'blocked' has a specific significance. One is deprived of *this ability*, insofar as one finds no foothold within oneself

further. "In vertigo, a fundamental powerlessness opens up, and this is precisely *with regard to the foothold*, which is itself also 'nothing'." (107)

It is not emptiness as such that fills one with dread. 'The emptiness of space becomes *transparent* to the world to which one is at the mercy of.' (107) Insofar as 'world' here refers precisely to the foundation of my freedom to find a foothold within myself, it is this foundation that gives way – which is in itself 'nothing'. 'Existence is afraid of itself as existence. And the fact that it is actually "nothing" does not mean a total nothingness, but only: it is neither this nor that, none of all that …' 'Anxiety is in one's face. In it, one experiences *oneself* as being held within nothingness.' (107)

'It is also fear that overtakes some people when, whilst driving through a tunnel, they hold a candle at the ready to forestall the darkness of the tunnel. The sudden darkness, which the eye cannot penetrate, heightens the sense of confinement and hopelessness already created by the enclosed compartment. It is only foolish to attempt to make such a measure seem plausible by offering explanations about eventualities. The phobic individual cannot defend themselves against the healthy person, who, based on the *order of their world,* can only recognise justified fear. That is why they *necessarily* attempt to escape from anxiety into an objective, justified (or, *indeed*, *precisely* unjustified) fear, with which they can dwell and which they can grapple with.' (107) Crept upon and overcome by anxiety, one turns to obsessive thoughts.

- Burial: schematic rudiments

It is not in vertigo but in *the whirl* that L. Binswanger discerns 'the *existential* home of the manic form of existence'.[23] According to Heidegger, this form of agitation characterises 'decay'. In particular, it refers to the mode of temporisation of the latter: to the 'shrinkage' of the ecstatic structure of temporisation 'in the sense of its restriction to the mere present'.[24] However, the *existential* mode of confusion of the person whose ideas are in flight is not, as such, derived from—

[23] L. Binswanger, *On the Flight of Ideas*, op. cit., p. 183.

[24] Ibid., p. 185; cf. p. 218.

is ultimately determined by the vortex. 'Jumping, staggering, swimming or gliding' are different forms of movement, within which the patient remains within the fundamental ontological movement of existence

inherent in the vortex.[25] Although he inexorably, 'time and again', returns to 'the most beautiful moment of his life', which he received 'dans la plénitude d'une sincérité profonde' , he is unable to linger 'continuously and calmly' within this experiential content.[26] He is not, admittedly, 'held in nothingness'. But the centre of gravity of his existence has shifted. The tip of the spinning top traces strange patterns.

H. Lipps did not carry his reading through to the end of Binswanger's third study. Consequently, he does not focus his attention on 'decay' and the 'self', as Heidegger's existential-ontological analysis first brought to light, and as Binswanger's existential-anthropological approach subsequently adopted as a guiding principle for a description of mania, the central point of which is the 'individuality' of the patient, i.e. 'that which makes their world their own'.[27] Lipps speaks of a *'burial'*, a progressive scattering and obstruction of human existence.

(100) The very act of looking already constitutes a 'confrontation with the world'. 'To attribute a face to someone means: to recognise that they have a free relationship to what is grasped as the world as a whole, and which can therefore reveal itself within a horizon of decisive possibilities.' (26) 'Illness *shatters* the gaze.' 'Just as, in the weary, listless, trivial state of dementia, a person can only appear *as* if *blurred*. Or as in the awkward, exaggerated solemnity of the epileptic, where the human being does not actually become visible; rather, its hollowness makes it stand out as a sign of something – of obvious inhibitions, disturbances.' 'The dull vegetative state, the mental dulling in cases of paralysis or catatonia, demonstrate a progressive burial.' 'However, insofar as the human being is initially *embedded* in circumstances, at the onset of such an illness the "human" can be set free, through the *detachment* from the reality in which it was initially entangled.' (100)
'By shattering the framework of life, the

[25] Ibid., p. 219.
[26] Ibid., pp. 185–186; cf. p. 177, note 172.
[27] Ibid., pp. 58–59.

'Man – for short stretches at least – is just becoming free *to a truth that is no longer objectively fractured*.' (ibid.) The increasing burial opens a small window. It leads to an existence that is no longer embedded in objective relations.
That is to say, in relations to a reality whose refraction takes place at the focal point of his lenses.

This time, the phenomenological interpretation carried out by H. Lipps refers not to 'posture' but to *'grip*'. Binswan ger addressed this topic only a year after the publication of the
'Human nature' in its 'fundamental forms'.[28] There is not the slightest doubt that it was once again Heidegger who provided Binswanger with the framework for his analysis of 'grasping-at-something'. Lipps, on the other hand, is concerned with that which can become a *gripping* reality at the very moment one *lets go*. The enigmatic painting, shrouded in mystery, had already enchanted the heart; a lively melody inspired and uplifted the spirit. Reality receded and yielded; its definability and *tangibility* were set aside. Something unnameable lay in the present moment; it nestled close to the heart. The *impression* was not that of an emotion that 'culminates in gesture or posture'. (16) 'It swings out in the gesture; one catches it there and *regains* one's *composure* in the process.' (16) – It was a *grace*. For the solitary wanderer, it was a 'chord': 'The more con templator one is, the more one surrenders to the ecstasies that this chord stirs within one.' [29]
'A mood […] is also evident in the manic outpouring of ideas
outpouring.' Provided it is taken 'in the sense of a particular way of being with things'. (99) One is struck by its *discord*, which is not a 'mood' in Heidegger's sense: 'the transition from undisturbed equanimity to inhibited discontent and vice versa'. [30] At the beginning of the second study,

L. Binswanger describes with great care the manic mood that oscillates between 'pure joy of existence' and 'melancholic despair', in which the 'broken way of life' of the person prone to flight of ideas

28 L. Binswanger, *Grundformen und Erkenntnis menschlichen Daseins*, op. cit., pp. 253 ff. and p. 267.
29 J.-J. Rousseau, op. cit., p. 108.
30 M. Heidegger, op. cit., p. 134.

man manifests.[31] It is not this fluctuation as such that attracts Lipps's attention; rather, it is the manner in which the manic element is interwoven within it. In daydreams, too, there is a slipping and sliding, but this does not constitute a response to circumstances. 'The freedom and looseness of a mood enable one to let "one's" spirit show itself and play.'" (100) "La chaîne des idées acces soires flatte davantage l'imagination." [32] No "objet de peine" hinders the spirit's surge. [33] "However, we distinguish the manic state precisely from a *mere* mood. We recognise it as a case of flight of ideas." (ibid.) "What is understood as somehow 'out of the ordinary' is treated as a case." [34] It is precisely the freedom and looseness of a mood that is lacking. The distraction holds no appeal; the flight of ideas is by no means "flattering".

'It is often said that [manic flight of ideas] can illustrate

. Yet it is only *similarity* that conveys meaning here. *We* perceive this as contrived, but not the manic individual, for whom these connections come *naturally*. It is like a joke: one demonstrates wit by drawing parallels between distant things.' (99) The patient's loquaciousness, however, is not brimming with wit ; rather, it amounts to a *'levelling* of semantic accents'.[35] In the course of the third study, Binswanger points out that the 'principle of similarity' in question here

'is not applied to meaningful objects—that is, to meanings—but to "real" objects, namely those "made of the material" of sounds and sound combinations'. It is therefore a matter of a

'Manipulation' of a device, the 'speaking device', which the patient makes use of.[36] – 'Flight of ideas': the manic patient does not hold his ground. Bleuler speaks here of a loss of objectives.[37] By which is presumably meant the generosity with which things are here – in the double sense of the word – 'overlooked'. (99) The manner in which things are *grasped* by these perspectives is fleeting. The perspective fails to take hold: the outline is rough, undeveloped. The nuances are missing.

31 L. Binswanger, *On the Flight of Ideas*, op. cit., pp. 54 ff.
32 J.-J. Rousseau, op. cit., p. 122.
33 Ibid., p. 109.
34 H. Lipps, *Die Verbindlichkeit der Sprache*, *Werke*, Vol. IV, V. Klostermann, Frankfurt a. M., 1977, p. 49.
35 L. Binswanger, *Über Ideenflucht*, op. cit., p. 31 ff.
36 Ibid., p. 125.
37 Cf. L. Binswanger, op. cit., p. 36 ff.

Just as the intensifying 'condensation' of meaning through the articulated wording, so too is it the *piercing* gaze to which apperception owes its conciseness, which – here – undergoes an alteration.

What constituted the 'purity' of the 'mere' mood in those daydreams: the fortunate discovery of a common denominator to which the most diverse elements could be reduced, the mere fleeting glimpse of

which already had an alluring effect; the skill in flattering the imagination through a flurry of ideas, which did not
'blindly' but became downright 'seeing' by hitting the nail on the head, finding the radiant pinnacle of the mind – was already being eroded by the 'state' of mania. The patient loses his footing; the fluctuation of his emotions is forced, compulsive. The common denominator of the most diverse elements is crude, unpolished. He is prone to ranting. The 'case' of flight of ideas shows, above all, how the mind is losing its *subtlety*. It is 'schematic rudiments' that are taking hold. One notices the onset of a dulling of the senses.

A man of the world has a light gait; he strides forward with inimitable elegance. The frivolities of the sick man are presumptuous. His manner of speaking is often 'boyish';[38] his words come out like a shot from a pistol. 'The normal person appears ponderous in comparison to the manic individual. For he bears the weight of what he has taken on with a sense of responsibility.' He weighs his words. 'The manic individual, however, rises above things. He does not see the difficulties at all. His world is shadowless, because it lacks depth.' (99) In these concise sentences, H. Lipps refers us to Binswanger's detailed account, in his second study, of 'overreaching' and the 'levelling of spatial significance', which manifest themselves in the 'mood optimism' of the person prone to flight of ideas.[39]

Finally, Lipps turns his attention to the 'pervasive brightness, inexhaustible efficacy and infinite luminosity' through which, according to Binswanger, the moment of 'volatility or transience '—which belongs to the world of mood-optimism—is characterised.[(40)] It isprecisely at this point that he touches upon the refraction of light in the

[38] Ibid., p. 25.
[39] Ibid.; on 'exaltation', pp. 64 ff., p. 68, note 33 and p. 87; on the 'spatial significance', p. 78, note 56.
[40] Ibid., p. 87; see also pp. 69 ff.

Reality, as it unfolds at the focal point of the lenses. This focal point is shattered by manic illness. '[The manic] lacks *the light of revealed meaning*.' (99) The revelation of meaning 'illuminates': it elevates and fulfils the claim to weigh things up in the encounter. And it 'sheds light' by taking the measure of things, and consequently tailoring them accordingly. 'Unvarying, cheerful brightness prevents perspectives.' (99) The world of mood-driven optimism resembles an overexposed world. It is not a question of what the patient has *at* hand, but of what happens to him *'behind the scenes'* when his grip slackens and lets go.

'Not exactly, as if the manic person *took* things *less seriously than they are*. But surreptitiously, he withdraws from things, distances himself from them. The manic person does not probe. He lacks the centre of a situation. Which is why it does not even occur to him to doubt that those around him sympathise with him.' (99)[41] "This flight of ideas is particularly evident in speech. For the word *is* already fleeting ; its connection is its release. The hasty nature of the manic person's thoughts is striking. The brief connections, his 'without detours'."[42]

'The manic individual, however, cannot pull himself back from a flight of ideas by which he is, as it were, possessed. It is not actually "he" who speaks through them. It is characteristic of the manic individual, but not of "him", to be immediately on good terms with everyone. Even if one did not know him from before – this sympathy lacks any emotional foundation.'
(100) The manic individual does indeed *switch gears*, but *in a perfectly straight line*. The 'disruption' of the focal point of his lenses takes the form of a veritable 'shrinkage' of his world into a chain of 'pure' present moments strung one after the other. The patient does indeed 'exist' within this sequence of present moments; yet he does not
'as if blurred' within it, as is the case with dementia. Strictly speaking, however, it is *the articulation* of his relationship to the world that is impaired. And in that sense, he no longer 'is' there *in the true sense*.

An essential aspect of the grasp is the *swiftness* of the gesture being performed. Gestures 'create, give form to something'. (22) They permeate the space. 'In all these gestures, indeed in every gesture, space is shaped' or *'articulated*'. (23) With a view to this articulation of a *figurative* space, one places one's hand on something. In his analysis of 'grasping by taking hold of something', Binswanger also points out

41 Ibid., p. 82; cf. pp. 29 and 47.
42 Ibid., pp. 30 ff.

the 'articulation' and 'shaping' of a 'particular mode of transcendence' in this process, which, according to him, constitutes a particular mode of 'world-design'.[43] He does not, however, specifically address the process of *spatial configuration* as it is brought about by *the movement* of the gesture, which traverses space and traces its path within it. Lipps provides a concrete example of this, taken from the study by E. Straus: 'Die Formen des Räumlichen'.[44] 'The marching movement induced by *rhythms articulates* space in the first place; it structures [it] differently from goal-oriented movement, in which distances are traversed and space is also explored and recognised […].' (23) 'Fatigue can be overcome by marching *in time*. The *change in posture* is relaxing when, instead of having to reach a specific goal step by step, one surrenders to a closed *circle* of disciplined movements induced by the beat, *each of which leads into the next*.' (23 Note 1) This observation is not without significance for his analysis of the inner *fragmentation* of the patient's world relations, the sequence of which does not constitute a rhythmically structured form of movement induced by a beat , but rather culminates in a form of existence which, as such, 'represents a certain kind *of leaping in itself*'.[45] By refining his descriptions ever further, Binswanger, for his part, also advances at the end of the third study to the theme of *the 'tempo'* of the patient's stream of experience , of *the 'being drawn along'* of this stream within the 'inner life story' and its points of rupture.[46]

- Brief Connections and Miscellaneous Notes

The exuberant state of mind associated with mania is not the 'elevated' mood of intoxication. (100) In his ambitious study on

43 L. Binswanger, *Grundformen und Erkenntnis menschlichen Daseins*, op. cit., pp. 249– . 250, p. 251, p. 259.
44 E. Straus, 'Die Formen des Räumlichen', in: *Nervenarzt* 1930, pp. 633 ff.
45 L. Binswanger, *On the Flight of Ideas*, op. cit., p. 27.
46 Ibid., p. 177; see also pp. 206 ff.; on the concept of 'being drawn along', see the detailed analyses by G. Misch in: *The Structure of Logic on the Basis of the Philosophy of Life. Göttingen Lectures on Logic and an Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge*. Edited by G. Kühne-Bertram and F. Rodi, Alber, Freiburg 1994: 'Going Along or Being Drawn Along in the Nexus of Life-Relations', pp. 194 ff.

O. F. Bollnow considers moods, the intoxicating feelings of happiness, the Dionysian ecstasy and the 'pathological' states of intoxication induced by mescaline and hashish.[47] As early as Dilthey, in his empirical or structural psychology, showed a pronounced interest in those mental states that 'deviate from

the norm of waking life': in illusions and hallucinations. [48] In the course of his reflections on 'mood optimism',

H. Lipps also turns his attention to intoxication as an 'effect of alcohol'. (ibid.)

'When one is drunk, one is no longer "clear-headed", and in this state – herein lies the undifferentiated – everyone draws closer to the other.' 'For what is paralysed or disinhibited in intoxication is not out of proportion to the mind. For what is alive within me becomes thought, and it is only through articulation – that is, in speech and gestures – that it takes shape. There is no thinking free from the body." (100) "It hardly needs pointing out in this context that this is not intended as an allusion to the misunderstood banality of so-called 'mental processes'." (100 Note 2) 'The fact that intoxication is, in fact, the very cause of my misperception of things does not mean, for instance, that something is happening to me *as an object*.' (101 Note 1) *'One notices* the effect of alcohol *in oneself*, for example in the confusion of words.' (101) 'The fact that my misperception of things has its root in intoxication does not imply an intrusion into something that is "actually" to be understood from within itself.' (101–102) What is 'actually to be understood from within itself', I understand *of my own accord* and require no explanation. And *in itself,* intoxication explains nothing at all. It is precisely in my misperception of things—which, for its part, intrudes upon what is actually to be understood of its own accord—that *I notice* the effect of alcohol. This realisation is an *interpretation* of what has happened to me. Insofar as I invoke it as *an 'explanation'*, it is not at all to be understood of its own accord. 'Just as, for example, a state of absent-mindedness—which cannot be "understood" in the strict sense, for instance because one is occupied with something and *is* not *free* for anything else—can be "explained" by general physical tiredness.'

What happens to me behind the scenes is not the same as what happens to me *as an object*. Here, one is *not free* in relation to what is brought about by the

[47] O. F. Bollnow, op. cit., pp. 54 ff. and pp. 131 ff.

[48] W. Dilthey, Psychology as an Empirical Science. Part II: Manuscripts on the Genesis of Descriptive Psychology (1860–1894). Collected Works, Vol. XXII. Edited by G. van Kerckhoven and H.-U. Lessing, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 2005, pp. 207 ff.

A gesture, a movement, or a grasp – it is through these that things are first and foremost shaped and articulated: that which is not out of proportion to the soul – as in the case of affect – or to the mind. For it is precisely in this that one *establishes* and *maintains* 'contact with things'. (103) Building on P. Häberlin's 'General Aesthetics' and ontology, L. Binswanger raises for the first time the question of 'contact', not only with things and fellow human beings, but with 'world events as a whole', as the manic form of existence establishes and shapes them.[49] For, behind the scenes, the short-circuits of the manic mind's thoughts take place in 'relationships' that are *'at* hand' to it: in 'brief connections', 'without detours'. (99) As his grip slackens, a contact with world events becomes apparent, one which is no longer sustained by *articulated* behaviour, insofar as *the elaboration* of these events is not shaped by thoughts that *are only just beginning to take shape within him*. Sudden 'ideas' flash through his mind. The mode of expression of this existence is that of 'leaping'. 'Something else is the impulsiveness of the schizophrenic, who – and this is the split aspect – *does not intervene*.' (99 note 2)

Whilst Binswanger only comes to the conclusion, in the addendum to the third study and after the patient had suffered a second psychotic episode accompanied by 'hallucinations, severe feelings of being influenced and states of agitation', that in this case it may possibly be 'a case of schizophrenia according to Bleuler's definition',[50] H. Lipps turns directly to Berze and Gruhle's *Psychology of Schizophrenia* to ascertain exactly how the 'brief connection' in the mania's course differs from the 'detached' state of the schizophrenic, who *does not engage with it*. (101 note 2)[51]

'A specific emotional state, which, as it were, rubs off on everything, also unites, for example, the various symptoms of schizophrenia.' (101) This is not a matter of just any mood or elation of the mind, but rather of its *rigidity*. 'The schizo-

49 L. Binswanger, *On the Flight of Ideas*, op. cit., p. 46.

50 Ibid., p. 209.

51 J. Berze and H. W. Gruhle, *Psychology of Schizophrenia*, J. Springer, Berlin 1929. In his analysis of 'eccentricity' in *Three Forms of Failed Existence* (1956), L. Binswanger also takes into account the findings of the psychological analyses by Berze and Gruhle. See L. Binswanger, *Forms of Failed Existence*, op. cit., p. 255 ff.

Phrene does not hear voices in the sense that one would generally understand the term 'hallucinations'. They are misinterpreted as 'perceptual illusions' – insofar as this implies something against which these voices cannot possibly be measured." (101) The optical illusions cannot be compared at all with the voices he hears. One is already missing *the point* entirely. 'The schizophrenic is alienated from *himself* in these voices, against which he has nothing to set, and against which he cannot assert himself. The fact that he has lost his footing in reality is not merely a verifiable fact; it is the expression of the fact that he can no longer *find his place* at all in the reality against which things are made to be this or that.' (101) His *state of mind* is compromised, insofar as this implies a certain way of being in relation to things. 'Recognition means a conclusive, that is to say, *liberating,* setting-aside. One connects with *oneself* in this engagement with things.' (101) 'And the schizophrenic *does not grasp hold of himself in this freedom*. He cannot "enter into" the things which – alienated – seem to reveal all manner of things to him, to harbour a secret. He finds something in things. 'The trams glow a strange yellow' – what is so unsettling cannot be pointed out. It lies between and behind things. 'As if the Gorgon's head did not turn everyone who looks at it to stone, but only the one who knows.' (101)

The schizophrenic 'finds himself "under attack"'. 'It arises within him to open himself up to a reality which *reveals* itself only in features that are transparent to it, but which cannot show itself as what it is. For I must *stand in freedom before things* if they are to appear to me "in themselves", that is, as what they are in "reality".' (101–102) 'Perception is a step towards which one must freely "have" oneself through a foundation that is firm.' (102 note 1) In schizophrenia, this foundation of reality, against which things stand out, is hollow. In that reality merely
'reveals', but does not reveal itself; this indicates the *'subordination'* in which he finds himself in this context. (102) He relies solely on what he *perceives*. He no longer has *'freely chosen perspectives'* with which to 'discover different aspects of things' or 'view them *in* a *particular light*'. For it is only from such perspectives that they can be 'recognised for what they are and understood in their objective significance'. (102)
'It is telling how the hallucinations of the alcoholic and

those of the schizophrenic occur in *various sensory realms*. The deceptive activity of the alcoholic causes him *to see* all manner of things. In a state of intoxication, one finds oneself relieved of the need to reconcile what one sees. This results in a breakdown of the world's objective *reality*. One's own insecurity is reflected in the wavering of things. Intermodal perception demonstrates a kind of inducing power in the way the *intention to see* is prevented from being realised, in the way it is broken, and in the way it can even be – as the self-accounts of those intoxicated by mescaline show – bent." (102) The hallucinations of the schizophrenic, however, lie precisely not in the realm of sight, but in that *of hearing* and *touch*. 'For whilst things are sought out and observed with the eye, seen at *a distance* from me, the ear, for its part, is *reached* by sound which has already bridged the distance to me by the time I hear it.' (102) 'Out of his *vital entanglement*, the patient is

driven to auditory delusions just as he already feels at the mercy of his persecutors. This same fundamental disturbance, however, is expressed in the fact that the appearance of things is transformed for him *in the direction of strangeness*. For it means that he cannot open himself up to things in terms of recognised possibilities.' (102) 'And whilst the intoxicated person "gets into the mood" and
'speaks' is expressed in the uncertain, parable-like nature of the schizophrenic's words, as he is aware of the incommunicability of what is revealed to him." (102–103) The intoxication has a 'contagious' effect; it puts one in a good mood; one can be *won over* by it; one might even *take* it *out* on someone. The schizophrenic is barred from *being able to let himself go*. He feels *at the mercy of* whatever is tormenting him.

On the other hand: the overarching nature of his subjugation becomes palpable in his *behaviour*. 'The loss of contact *with* things is evident in the *incongruity* of his behaviour, which remains scattered and disjointed.' (103) What happened 'behind the scenes' in the manic state—what literally flashed through his mind—lacked that slowly emerging articulation in which the shaping of thought takes place. One's attention was drawn to the mental short-circuits, to the brief, lightning-fast connections, to the boyish manner of speech, and to the ready-to-fire expletives.
'The schizophrenic has lost all sense of proportion. If he
, for example, shoots out one eye in order to blind the other person with whom he had a row

with an unpleasant reality." (103) It is not the centre of *a situation*, in relation to which one takes a *stance*, that is lacking in him. Rather: "What is lacking is the centre in relation to which a *thought* is perceived as *aberrant*." (103) "If, for example, a patient, when asked
'"Give me your hand," he replies: "That might suit you just fine – for me to give you my hand and then go about without one."' (103 note 2) For the manic individual, verbal gestures were merely 'tools of speech' which he made use of: precisely 'the light of revealed meaning ' with which one weighs things up and measures them was lacking. In the case of schizophrenia, the situation is different.[52]

'At the outset of the process, he himself still perceives this detachment as a void and a coldness; nothing resonates within him. The schizophrenic
'does *not actually* "hear" the other and remains *stuck on the literal meaning of words*.' (103) The rudimentary linguistic elements of the manic that crept in were mere schemata of the rapid verbal gestures in which thought begins to take shape. For only they 'guide' the light of the unfolding of meaning, which spreads solely through them. In the manic state, these pathways were 'short-circuited'. The words of the schizophrenic, by contrast, are 'cumbersome and eccentric', painfully 'precise'. This 'is explained by the fact that he cannot *unambiguously* determine their meaning from what is otherwise the underlying basis of speech. The schizophrenic speaks "his" language – as demonstrated by the mannered oddities and the often playful nature of his expressions. Connections are established unrestrainedly.' (103) For example: 'Now all the obstacles to my thinking have been cleared away; the constricting dome is gone.' (103, note 3) 'Insofar as nothing is actually contained within them, the thoughts seem to him as if they were *made* to order.' (103) They do not spring to him

[52] At this point, the anthropological elaboration and articulation of its various 'turns' coincides precisely with that which is inscribed, through phenomenological transposition, into the framework of a phenomenological reading and analysis of mania, as carried out by M. Richir: op. cit., 'Excursus sur la manie: un autre type de psychose', p. 397: 'One might say, […], that it is the perceptual temporal fluidity of the gesticulations and vociferations, *together with the enigma* they carry—the flickering of meaning within them, but in fragments and at intervals, an enigma that must be constantly re-examined precisely because it flickers there like a phantom—that "saves" the manic from schizophrenia, just as one might say, conversely, that the maniac remains at a distance from schizophrenia only because he retains something of *corporeality*, precisely in his *flight*, which is infinite, and which still preserves a kind of dynamis for him."

not through the mind, but *over it*. 'And insofar as they are not actually connected, they rush past it.' (103–104) For example:
'I must hurry with this, otherwise they'll snatch the thought away from me even sooner.' (104) The flight of ideas has *broken away* from what is going through his mind. It is described *parabolically* by the statement.

Incoherence or scatteredness should not be regarded as a characteristic of schizophrenia – as if this were merely a
'thought disorder'. The yardstick by which schizophrenia is to be assessed is not to be found in the achievements of 'normal' people.
'A person who is unfocused […] is someone who cannot concentrate on tasks.' 'What is mistakenly regarded here as "abilities"' – which one may no longer possess – 'are, however, human *potentials*: human beings are not destined for something, but *for themselves*.' (103, note 1) In schizophrenia, the individual no longer grounds *their thoughts* in a reality that might, even if only partially, still *correspond to* it. The world of the schizophrenic is 'bottomless' insofar as not even 'a mere thought' any longer forms its centre. It is precisely in this that, according to Lipps, schizophrenia differs from paranoia in Kräpelin's sense: 'The delusional construct of the paranoid is different. He does not find himself – like the schizophrenic – *at the mercy* of things, but, as it were, as *the object* of everything's attention. He misinterprets what appears to him. Insofar as he constructs relationships and ascribes an objective meaning to things which – if one considers them impartially and not with the intention of proving anything – does not actually apply to them at all. Nevertheless – here everything is consistent and concise; only the appeal falls on deaf ears. The paranoid loses his sense of proportion insofar as, for him – who is closed off from others – a mere thought becomes the centre." (103, note 3)

'It is a different kind of reinterpretation when a schizophrenic, by shifting the sounds in the advertisement "Steigerwald und Kaiser", turns it into: "May he soon ascend to become emperor", whereby the meaning of this advertisement – since "Kaiser" derives from **cadere** – becomes: Climb up and throw yourself down', whereupon the schizophrenic climbs a ladder in order to throw himself down. Here the advertisement – rendered enigmatic – takes on a secret meaning accessible only to him; it is precisely its indifference as a newspaper advertisement that strikes him as conspicuous." (103–104, note 3) 'The madness of paranoia can be seen as an intensification of *the tendency to keep* one's distance

'Irrationality is to be understood *as* something. However, the schizophrenic is not increasingly overwhelmed by a single *thought*; rather, he succumbs to "visions" when he finds himself unable to engage freely with things.' (Ibid.)

'Whilst in our behaviour patterns usually prevail, fulfilling themselves *in* various ways *in concreto*, namely in the shifting currents of reality, here everything is carried out "in accordance"' – the face of the world is encountered in this guise –
'Unless the schizophrenic *remains grounded in* things, this leads to a rigid, formulaic state, to stereotypies and automatisms. It is not a πραττειν, not a way of getting on with things guided by them. The blockage, the slow, laborious nature of the process, becomes apparent when *one action no longer leads to the next*." (104)

In the borderline case of the shift, the fabric of meaning in the world – which has been skilfully woven and delicately spun – begins to fray.

The thorn of existence.

Forms of specific human powerlessness

- Outbursts of fear: the breeding ground for phobias

In anxiety, one is 'forced before oneself'. (105) It is precisely in this that it is 'rebellious' towards one: 'Anxiety does not allow me to come to my "self".' (Ibid.) 'One finds oneself held fast in the onslaught of a powerlessness that is so very much *my own*.' (Ibid.) 'Only the person for whom this—not being able, of one's own accord, to be what one must nevertheless be "oneself"—constitutes a *specific powerlessness* can experience fear.' (105–106) In 'Temptations', it is 'rebellious to me as the *thorn of* existence' – forcing one to face oneself without being able to find oneself within it. One finds oneself *held fast* in
'Obsessive thoughts, pedantry, etc.' (105), behind which the fear
'stands like a thorn'. 'One veers off into obsessions, losing oneself in the process.' (Ibid.) They force one away from oneself, without one being able to find oneself within them. Held captive by them, one finds oneself trapped in something, whilst losing oneself. What one has already lost in the process is some point of reference for being able to *engage with* oneself. 'Anxiety *blocks* my connection.' (Ibid.) In this respect, one is subject to a 'powerlessness *over oneself*'. 'Whilst worry and fear weigh upon me, insofar as they can inhibit and paralyse me' (ibid.), the fear that 'seizes me' and 'blocks' my connection is rebellious in its trials, which, as 'temptations' (106), are downright
'captivating', behind which it *'lies'* as the thorn of existence. The blocking of my circuit, the breakthrough of a powerlessness within myself, does not signify a 'shutdown' of my existence, which would be paralysed by sheer horror at the fear. 'Held down by the cares of life, fear is something that nevertheless *breaks out again* and *again*, *driving* into that which lies behind it as a thorn.' (105) The outbursts of fear *in the hothouse* of 'phobias' (108) are characterised by
'being *suddenly* swept away by an affect in the strict sense'

- , 'e.g. when I fly into a rage and in doing so try to regain my composure and control myself' (ibid.), precisely because of its unstoppable *'gnawing'* nature. 'Anxiety is rebellious' (107) in trials against which, *as temptations,* 'one can set nothing against them'. (106)

The fact that the person suffering from agoraphobia succumbs to the temptation to let themselves fall already demonstrated how 'here, *in human beings par excellence*, something *confronts* the abyss', 'the danger here lies *within oneself*'. (106) 'In vertigo, a fundamental powerlessness opens up, and this precisely with regard *to one's footing*.' (107) 'One finds oneself powerless here, insofar as one cannot stand *on one's own*.' (Ibid.) It is precisely the fact that, whilst looking down along the wall, one cannot find a foothold that *'makes* one *want* to let go'. (Ibid.)

'The emptiness of space becomes *transparent* to the world to which one is at the mercy of.' (Ibid.) 'The person suffering from claustrophobia recoils from the vastness of space, which seems to flee into infinity.'

- 'One experiences oneself within it *as* being held within nothingness', in that the 'nothingness' of the space transparent to the world is met, in human beings, by a specific powerlessness with regard to their 'hold', 'which *is* itself *also* "nothing"'. (107) The 'as' of this experience has a particular character. For: 'Existence is anxious about itself *as existence*'. 'Existence' is here *so* compelled before itself, finds itself held so firmly in this state, without being able to come to itself, that it *'experiences itself* as being held in nothingness'.

H. Lipps' phenomenological attention is focused on the specific nature of this 'nothing'. 'The fact that it is actually
'nothing' does not mean a total nothingness, but merely that it is neither this nor that, none of the above …'. (107) The *'intimate connection'* between vertigo and the 'nature of man' becomes apparent in the fact that, in recoiling 'from the vastness of space that seems to flee into infinity along with oneself', the person suffering from claustrophobia is 'overwhelmed' by that which meets them *within themselves*. It is precisely in this that 'anxiety lies latent in everyone, *ready to* spring'; the person suffering from claustrophobia is *'overwhelmed* by vertigo' because 'it is not just any fear that seizes him, which could be dismissed as unfounded'. (106) 'Nothing "seems" constricting in anxiety' (105), which is kindled here by the *'emptiness* of space'. The sense of hopelessness does not drive one into a corner. The fact that 'no path seems passable to him any longer' refers precisely to the fact that the claustrophobic—

the anxiety-stricken can no longer find *their bearings* in the room. (106) It slips from their grasp
'the space of our existence, which, in its boundlessness, is nonetheless "ordered", in which one can determine places and remain somewhere'. (Ibid.) It is precisely here that his 'freedom' is affected, and a specific powerlessness breaks through: 'a fundamental powerlessness with regard to holding on'. (107) To succumb to temptation therefore means, in *this context*, to let oneself fall. One 'slips away *from* oneself' when 'existence as a whole seems to be receding' and when, 'finding no foothold within oneself, one clings precisely to the arm of one's companion'. (106)
'What makes one feel dizzy is actually "nothing". After all, the railing protects me. *Objectively* speaking, there is no danger.' (Ibid.) It is precisely 'the *transparency* of the emptiness of the space towards the world to which one is at the mercy of' that has 'no *measure*, as fear of danger *does*'. (105)
'It is not the depth *itself that* causes vertigo' (107), which one 'avoids looking at, yet is constantly tempted to gaze upon'. (106–107) 'But this: the fact that, whilst looking down along the wall, one cannot find *a foothold*, *makes* one *want* to let go.' (107) 'In fear, that which is initially hidden *within oneself* comes to life.' (106)

'The temptation, which cannot be *resisted* here, corresponds to the obsessive nature of other phobias.' (108) What a person 'must, as it were, be' (106): 'to stand on one's own two feet' (107), the agoraphobic, overcome by vertigo, was 'unable to be on his own'. He could set 'nothing' against the temptation to let himself fall; in vain he clung to his companion's arm. Objectively, there was no danger. The transparency

of the room's emptiness towards the world had 'no measure, such as fear finds in danger'. (105) 'The anxiety that breaks through in the obsessive thought relates to a fear which, whilst it may be dismissed as *objectively unfounded*, cannot *for that very reason* be stripped of the sting *hidden within it*.' (108) 'Examples: having made a mistake in the decimal places on a prescription and prescribed a lethal dose; having failed to turn off the gas when leaving the flat; having poked someone in the eye with a walking stick held backwards.' (Ibid.) 'Nor can one counteract the compulsion here, insofar as the temptation arises from within oneself *to think about it* again and again, to imagine the consequences. One cannot talk oneself out of it.' (Ibid.) Precisely to gain 'the free relationship *of* thought', to 'distance oneself' (105), is forbidden in this context.

Compulsion is not an 'irresistible inclination' (108) to which one yields. The rebellious nature of obsession lies in the fact that
'the temptation comes from within oneself': 'one can only find oneself compelled to do what one does of one's own accord'. (108) It is not the instinctual nature but *human freedom* that is affected. Here, one does not succeed in taking 'an existential step' in *thought*, in 'becoming' within it. (105) 'Nor is it merely exaggerated timidity that regards the most impossible as possible, that is not yet satisfied even when something has been objectively settled, and which then perhaps merely discovers new difficulties.' (108) The 'objectively justified fear'

- is not fuelled by unfounded fears. 'For one is, after all, under the spell of having to verify *the same thing* over and over again – despite all findings, against one's better judgement.' (108) The defiant nature of the obsession is not an exaggeration of objectively justified fear. No new difficulties are discovered; the spell of compulsive re-examination refuses to lift from someone whose fears revolve *round* and round *the same thing*. Despite all the evidence to the contrary, he is unable to prove *to himself* that his fears are objectively unfounded: that they are 'groundless'.

'It is precisely because I know my worry *is unfounded* that I am driven back into fear.' (108) 'The madness of this fear does not mean bewilderment. On the contrary: one proceeds *methodically* here. One *scrupulously* turns everything over and over. And time and again one succumbs to the temptation to preoccupy oneself *with* 'nothing', to make it clear to oneself that it is 'nothing', without, however, being able to do *anything about* the fact that fear keeps breaking out of one time and again." (Ibid.) 'One experiences oneself in it *as* being held within nothingness', which is 'not a total nothingness' (107), but rather: 'neither this nor that, none of the above …', which, through observations or through greater insight, is
'could be *shown* to be "groundless". The systematic nature of the procedure, the scrupulousness of the checks, "relates precisely to the fact that all these are, after all, merely 'actual' certainties which one must adhere to, *but which one is not* 'oneself'". (108) The groundlessness of his fears is the sting of his anxiety. 'Existence' is here compelled against itself, unable *of its own accord* to be what it is precisely meant to be 'itself'.

The actual certainties to which one must adhere, but which one is not 'oneself', to which existence clings, yet in which it finds itself powerless, are not, by any means, that in which

It is not fear that 'lurks', but rather that in which it *'strikes'*. Objectively, there is no danger against which fear can be measured – rather: 'nothing' can be set against temptation, whereby, as a trial, fear precisely 'breaks out' or, rather, 'drives itself into' it. 'Fear "localises" itself here on the prescription, etc. It *drives one* to factual determinations, *manifests* itself therein, and, as it were, always *requires* fresh factual resolution.' (108–109) As the 'lack of object' in my fears, as the 'groundlessness of my anxiety, of which I am aware', anxiety pierces the actual certainties to which one must cling, but which one is not 'oneself' (108): 'Anxiety *actually*

only asserts itself in the very attempt *to turn away* from it.' The actual certainties to which one must cling, but which one is not
'oneself' are: obsessive thoughts in which one is compelled, precisely in the face of oneself, without being able to find oneself within them.
(105) What 'presents itself' is *the tangent to my freedom*, *which has* just *been touched upon* in a compulsive, obsessive manner. A person's 'specific' powerlessness is characterised by the fact that 'the attempt *to prove* one's freedom, *to prove* oneself within it, comes to no end here, finds no foothold in things.' (105) It *manifests itself* in the methodical, scrupulous pursuit of 'the "actual" certainties' which one cannot be 'oneself'. It is precisely this *self-assurance* regarding these 'actual certainties' that one has lost from the outset, which is why the 'line of reasoning' comes to no end here. 'Anxiety is *intensified* by this.' (109) 'It lies in the *agonisingly* compulsive, mad nature of these verifications, the outcome of which one somehow already knows from the outset.' (Ibid.) The point where freedom is compromised first becomes *apparent* in these obsessive thoughts. One was already aware in advance of the 'groundless' nature of one's fears, yet one still wishes to convince oneself that it is 'nothing', without being able to do anything about the fact that one can never be certain *of* the actual certainties. Which is why, precisely *because* one *is aware* of the groundlessness of one's concern, one is forced back into the fear that escalates in the torment of systematic, scrupulous scrutiny.
'ταραχη' here means neither 'being driven about' nor 'unresolved
uncontrolled recklessness." (109) For: one imagines agonising consequences, scrutinising the same thing over and over again with meticulous care. The agony of these imaginings, the meticulous nature of these scrutinies, is not something that "happens against one's will and involuntarily": "Against one's will

'And it happens involuntarily […] for example, that once one has been set on the path of a particular thought, one cannot turn back from it and ends up saying precisely what one was trying to avoid saying – just as, on the street, one must not fix one's gaze on that which one wishes to avoid.' (109, note 1) The 'path *reluctantly* embarked upon' (109) in the obsessive thought is not the one on which one involuntarily fixates on something from which one cannot then turn away, and which one is subsequently unable to avoid. Quite the opposite: 'deliberately' one tries to approach that which one cannot fix one's attention on at that very moment, behind which lies the sting that involuntarily drives one into something to which one succumbs: a *turning point within oneself*, and not an obstacle. One is – here – not, as it were, accidentally 'set on the path of a possible thought', without being able 'to turn away from it again'. (109) Rather: one is *'under the spell* of a thought' 'against one's better judgement'.

- 'One cannot talk oneself out of it.' (Ibid.) As a 'temptation'

it cannot be 'pinpointed' at that very moment and subsequently 'thwarted'. One succumbs to a temptation which, as a trial, one is powerless to resist – one does not give in to a tendency that lures one into something which, as something offensive, can no longer be avoided. It is precisely in the *trial* that the sting lies, which is not to be found in *temptation*. Succumbing to a temptation does not mean *yielding*. 'One *resists* it as one would something that may well come from within oneself, but in which one neither wants nor is able to be taken seriously.' (109) 'From the outset, one already knows somehow' the outcome of one's scrutiny: 'that it is "nothing".' (108)
'One is aware of the obsessions as a "general" challenge.' (109) It is only in the attempt to turn away from them that they are *elevated to* a *higher level*. It becomes apparent for the first time in the scrupulous back-and-forth, in the methodical manner with which one – here – sets to work, in the agonisingly compulsive, mad nature of the re-examinations.

'It is only in the *significance* acquired by the path reluctantly taken within the obsession—*how far* it takes hold, how far it *can* take hold in someone—that its nature is revealed.' (109) The 'fundamental human condition' revealed in the obsession concerns one's *freedom*. 'So one is probably also under the compulsion, for example, of having to skip every second stone. For however senseless that is, however much it disturbs one – one proves to oneself a *freedom to do so*. But how little – "am" I actually this freedom, if I have to assure myself of it in such an absurd way?' Into the Heart of Human Nature

The tangent of his freedom, touched upon in this situation, points us in this direction. The 'extent' of its insidiousness becomes measurable at this point of intersection. 'Not being able, of his own accord, to be what he must, after all, be "himself"' (106) refers, strictly speaking, to his 'freedom to do something'. This specific powerlessness pertains to the
'freedom to', which is not *'achieved'* here. The *'possession'* of this freedom to do something, as something already assumed in and of itself, is what is contested 'in general'. One simply becomes ensnared in the fact that it
'nothing' that one could 'be certain' of. Something one *knows*, however vaguely. The claim to *'authenticity'* made in the face of this is 'absurd' and 'meaningless'. One succumbs to the temptation to 'bring this original possession before oneself', in which precisely that which has been wrested from it and held fast proves to be merely *a tangent* to the 'achieved'. How little it *is*: *its incongruity* becomes apparent.

Nor can it be proven *by way of negation*. 'Fear also lies behind the temptation to say the wrong thing in an exam or something inappropriate in company – to test, as it were, whether one can deny oneself even to oneself.' This trap leads to *entanglement* in contradictions: 'But who am I, then, or rather, when am I *actually* "myself"?' (109) – if I make the denial of my own self a test of my freedom, and by contradicting my true nature, assert my claim to it?

- Manifestations of anxiety: the salvation of pedantry

Whilst anxiety *'breaks out'* time and again in the obsessions (105), 'actually *asserts* itself precisely in the attempt to turn away from it' (109), and 'escalates' in the agonising compulsion of obsessive scrutiny (ibid.), it is 'in its *suppression* […] also the hidden spur to activity'. (110) Anxiety is 'suppressed by the cares of life'. (105) As a spur, it lies behind the 'activity' into which it drives us, above all:
'behind the impersonal, feigned pathos of scientific objectivity and provable truth'. (110) 'For science is something in which one can just as passionately find oneself as *one* can *dispense with oneself*.' (Ibid.) 'One then clings to the task of processing material, without knowing what it is "in

'." (Ibid.) One veers off into an impersonal, feigned attitude towards the matter at "real" stake: without explicitly appropriating it, one clings to "externalities" that reflect its
It does not concern 'meaning'. It is only in *the 'perashic nature'* of a 'decision'—which lies behind the self-forgetfulness of object-oriented devotion—that one enters into a personal relationship with it; a relationship from which one *absolves* oneself through 'specialist knowledge'. Just as one might wish to avoid encountering the 'centre of gravity of things' (110, note 1) in one's goings-about, so, here, one shields oneself within one's 'field' against getting to *the bottom* of things. 'Just as in a game, one gains a *private* world within one's field.' (110) 'Private' does not mean that one
'could not exactly have it together with others', (ibid.) she could not 'share' it with others. 'The "private" aspect of this world rather merely reflects its *remoteness*. The world, *with its demands* and so on, remains outside.' (Ibid.) It is precisely in the sharing of specialist knowledge that it becomes apparent how one is merely 'engaged "*for* oneself"' in the process, without connecting with others *in it* to get to the bottom of the matter.

'The *unambiguous internal* relationship that one must establish here with the subject replaces the *original, inherently diverse* relationship one has with things.' (110, note 1) Openness to the diversity of demands recedes into the background. 'Interest in science is aroused here less by the subject matter itself than by

the *methodology* that unifies the subject as a discipline, insofar as this unleashes abilities and a *dexterity* for it is discovered.' (Ibid.) Like the collector, 'one devotes oneself to a clearly defined task that is to be tackled systematically': 'The *frictions* disappear'. (Ibid.) The friction of 'unreserved encounter' (123) is replaced by the smoothness of a seamless, skilful and professional application of *techniques*, through which one shuts oneself off from the fateful engagement with things. 'Just as someone who plays solitaire night after night finds in it a *self-contained* space of mere activity that can be *repeated at will*: everything revolves around this.' (Ibid.) In doing so, one *'cheapens oneself* somewhat' (123), 'one does not commit oneself' (111) to that which one does in 'mere', arbitrarily repeatable activity.

"– The 'pet subject' belongs here too. Whilst the overarching idea takes centre stage and the complex intrudes disruptively, one 'fixates' on something as one's pet subject. One regards it as the yardstick or parallel for all manner of things. Only the

'One sees what these might apply to. One remains *true to oneself* in the process, without – often in feigned naivety – wishing to give any hint of the *crux of the matter*.' (110, note 1) In the busyness, in the scientific pretence of pathos in the collection of material, in the whims, there is a capriciousness that is fundamentally different from the agonising and scrupulous nature of the scrutiny with which one *pursues* one's obsessions. Here, one is not pursuing something in which one finds oneself 'compelled before oneself' or in which one finds oneself 'held fast'. (105) It is precisely the torment of agonising scrutiny that is absent from the 'systematic tackling of clearly defined tasks' which lead into the 'margins'. – But also the 'Relentlessness' with which one gets to the bottom of a matter, *finding oneself* 'passionately' *immersed* in science. (110) The fact that one is merely 'engaged in it "for one's own sake"' here means: *'dispensing* with oneself'. The mere activity in which everything that might lay claim to being a fateful, pivotal encounter is 'arbitrary repeatability' does not force one back into fear, but flees *from* it. 'The hidden sting of busyness' is fear 'in its subjugation' by life's worries (105), which are rendered harmless by the fact that one is compelled to find *oneself* held captive within them. The tangent of the freedom touched upon here is a *line of flight*. The repetition, which remains on the sidelines, is not compulsive but *arbitrary*, seeking to stay clear of any 'trial' by staying away from the outset.

'Fear also lies behind *pedantry*. The pedant seeks *to save himself* and shirk responsibility by adhering to rules and templates.' (110) 'He evades fear.' (Ibid.) How fear 'drives into that which lies behind it as a thorn: […] pedantry, etc.' (105), the hidden sting in this instance being pedantry, can be deduced from the specific form of 'deflection' in which the line of flight of the freedom touched upon here traces *a curve* – one distinct from *the sphere* of compulsion. It is precisely in the *mere pretence of linearity* in his behaviour that the pedant bends his way past that in which he does not wish to find himself compelled or held fast: a *'direct'* responsibility: 'He thus distorts and *deforms* his responsibility' (110–111), so that he 'adheres to rules and templates', 'wastes his earnestness on trifles, and shirks the matter for which he is responsible'. (110) It is precisely this responsible standing by a

matter in which one is personally engaged is 'shunted aside'. 'Pedantry is *feigned* seriousness', (111) which here 'wastes itself on trifles' in which one does not engage personally – 'less to avoid giving others grounds for attack than to rid oneself of scruples'. (110–111) 'The moment of truth *confronts* me.' (112) Disguised seriousness, masquerading as straightforwardness, distorts *direct* responsibility: 'For responsibility requires decision-making as a step towards *one's own* possibilities.' (111) By adhering to rules and templates, the pedant shirks his responsibility.

'The subaltern has a tendency towards pedantry. He holds fast to principles. For him, they take *the* place of the *direction* he lacks.' (111) The subaltern's adherence to principles is not punctuated by *the rhythm of his own steps*. Just as the person who rides about on his 'pet subject', 'drawing parallels with all manner of things' (110), appears *scattered* in his 'whimsical behaviour'. 'The pedant, the man of principles, etc. […] is not truly connected to himself in a *step-by-step* process of becoming true. He allows himself *to be governed* by principles which are fulfilled insofar as they are followed, but which cannot *actually* become true.'
(112) Realisation here means an 'engagement in "my" own way'. (Ibid.) Yet this is absent from the straightforwardness of his approach. The subaltern is a *narrow-minded follower* of his superiors. 'What is striking here is the narrowness, the lack of perspective, and the presumptuousness *inherent* in this.' (111) 'Principles, insofar as they can be recognised as correct—that is to say, insofar as they claim universal validity—have no need of me at all. The pedant becomes ridiculous when he pompously sets himself up as their witness, as if they were only made true through him, as if he were, so to speak, their locus.' (Ibid.) The insistence with which he insists on their application, 'upholding' them, shows all the more how little the recognition of their correctness arises of its own accord, how the line of his 'straightforward approach' is *merely* a *traced* one. 'He appears *unfree*. Everything here remains isolated from one another. He lacks the 'world'. His incorruptibility, his 'without wavering', merely expresses the fact that he is unaware of the *fundamentally groundless nature* of his decisions." (Ibid.) – Decisions that are not made "in a step-by-step becoming-true" as "steps towards their very own possibilities", but are *"posited"* as isolated "indispensabilities". The 'world' he lacks is, as a whole, *a horizon of bold steps*. His incorruptibility is tainted by pomposity; his 'unwavering' stance comes across as narrow-minded.
'Take Robespierre, for example: his idealism of virtue *came* unstuck at the

reality. 'This man believes everything he says.' With this, Mirabeau hit upon the *schoolmasterly quality* in Robespierre." (111) "His faith was a firm conviction that something was right – something that can also be taught to others. But what constitutes a betrayal of genuine faith—which is always a gamble and aware of its potential for failure—is precisely that kind of *didacticism*, unchallenged by any doubt, which it cannot tolerate." (Ibid.) It was precisely the reformative *power* of the ideals of virtue that was not put to the test, but was instead swindled away in favour of merely didactic *tenets of faith*. Robespierre's 'convinced belief in the truth' of his ideals of virtue was not a 'genuine' conviction 'that remains *true to* itself' (111), but rather 'doctrinal'. As if this, in his positing,
'true' by casting himself as their key witness. Such self-importance lacks the *'original sense of truth'* (ibid.), which is revealed only *in the act of taking a risk* 'as an awareness of one's own potential for failure'. 'Genuine' conviction can always be 'certain of "its" case' (ibid.)—that it *is true* and not merely 'persuasive'. Gradual realisation resists *assertions*.

The 'ridiculousness' of the pedant in his pomposity does not conceal the fact that he 'has no sense of humour, is touchy' – whilst
'genuine' conviction, which is not doctrinaire, 'which has not lost the *freedom to laugh*'. (111) 'Just like the fanatic's rigid seriousness', the pedant's sensitivity to transgressions 'merely masks an insecurity'. (Ibid.) He lacks that genuine sense of truth which has no need to fear any violation of so-called 'principles' that are merely held to be correct – in assertions in which no step is taken towards their realisation. Principles recognised as correct do not need to be 'upheld' in assertions. In the process of realising them, one knows exactly where one is committed, or 'where one's seriousness lies'. (112) Which is why one also
does not lose 'the freedom to laugh'. (111)

In the hothouse of obsessive thoughts, *one* resists the madness of one's own scrutiny, which 'probably comes from within oneself, but in which one neither wants nor is able to be taken seriously'. (109) The pedant, on the other hand, *'wastes* his seriousness on trifles',
(110) which 'represent no step towards one's own possibilities' (111). He adheres dogmatically to rules and templates; his firm conviction that something is right is devoid of any original sense of truth. Whereas the phobic person, in turn, fails to be able to be his *own* actual certainties.

'Pedantry is seriousness in disguise.' (111) 'To make a claim without being serious means that one is doing so merely as if at play, that is to say, that one is not committed to what one says.' (111–112) 'A serious situation puts me to the test; it is the test of my ability, for example. And the seriousness of life is regarded as its demands and requirements, which one must be able to meet.' (112) The pedant 'asserts' his seriousness, but disguises the situation that might 'put him to the test'. His seriousness is not feigned. What he says is precisely intended to be regarded as 'binding'. He is – overwhelmed – unable to rise to the challenge posed by the situation that puts him to the test in his professed seriousness: to put the very claims to validity he has asserted to the test himself. His seriousness is a *pre-fabricated* one. The pedant does not take the matter seriously himself, the 'validity' of which he is precisely asserting *in general terms*. The 'trifles' on which he squanders his seriousness are rules and templates to which he adheres – for 'reasons of principle' that are too lofty, that are 'bottomless' (111) in that the principle *of committing* to them does not lie with him 'as a step towards his very own possibilities'. (Ibid.) By contrast: 'To be *affected* by "his" seriousness means: to be personally engaged in it to the extent that the confrontation with it cannot be avoided "in my own way".' (112) 'Not to evade means here: not to be *untrue* to oneself. For what is at stake here is myself as the *bearer of a belief*. Insofar as one is 'committed' to oneself, subject to the call of one's own self, there are moments of seriousness. What was at first merely a promise, a pledge, a confession, a faith, must now *be realised*.' (112) There is simply no question of 'principled reasons' to which the pedant shifts his responsibility. 'Being answerable to oneself' means having to produce the answer *from* within *oneself*. One does not set oneself up as a witness to universally valid truths, as if they were made 'true' in the first place by one's being, as it were, their 'location'. Whatever one believes in oneself, whatever one professes, whatever one promises oneself in the process – one must now take responsibility for this oneself and stand by *it*. 'The "I myself" to which I stand here, however, cannot be reduced *to any formula*. It is not *complete*.' (112) 'It manifests itself merely in my own way – no differently, but just as clearly as "my" way being distinct from "another's".' (Ibid.) One *bears witness* to oneself 'in one's own way'. 'The "self" is here grasped as *unconditional*, insofar as it makes existence conditional.' (ibid.) In its unconditional nature, however, it is *particular*, 'bound to itself in a gradual becoming-true' – and not in the feigned testimony of universally valid principles concerning itself

dispensed by oneself. 'The pedant, the man of principle, etc., however, *deflects* this gravity', in which one is *affected* – as 'one's own'; he *overrides* it with his appeal to principles according to which one is to 'proceed', 'but which cannot actually come true' (112): whose universal validity does not require the particular *commitment* of my own self.

'People smile at the pedant who takes everything seriously, or too seriously . One feels oppressed by the fanatic who, out of sheer seriousness, cannot laugh' [1] – whose seriousness is 'rigid'. (111) But what, then, does it mean to be *moved* by 'one's own' seriousness, to be truly connected to oneself in a gradual process of becoming real that is neither 'narrow and without horizons' nor 'dogmatic'? (111) – Which has therefore not lost the freedom to laugh? (Ibid.) 'How is this to be understood, when it is only *in earnestness* that a person is themselves', 'in short: when the " " self is addressed in the *strict* sense of the word' or 'in earnestness […] speaks from the *centre of their* self'?[2] – A self which, admittedly,

'as something that must be grasped', yet 'not complete', 'indescribable' (112), and can only be found 'on its path'?

'This, then, is my path – where is yours? This is how I reply to those who asked me "about the path". For *the* path – there is no such thing!' [3]

'A person's *horizons* are revealed in *what and how*

he is still able to *laugh* at something." (112) "The *way* one laughs *reveals* who they are, That is to say, what interferes with him here. But what a person laughs at *characterises* them. The limits of the humour a person understands are indicative of where their seriousness lies, where they feel connected to themselves.' (Ibid.) 'Or rather, where they *believe* they are bound to themselves. For most people's seriousness is, after all, merely a feigned seriousness, insofar as they evade their own selves.' (Ibid.) 'Foolish people tend to understand little humour.' (Ibid.) To the pedant, any form of humour goes 'too far', or rather, he cannot condone it at all as inappropriate. To the fanatic, that which others might simply wish to make light of is a matter of 'bloody' seriousness. His doggedness forbids one from making fun of it—

1 See O. F. Bollnow, *Einfache Sittlichkeit*, in: ibid., *Schriften*. Study edition in 12 volumes. Edited by U. Boelhauve, G. Kühne-Bertram, H.-U. Lessing and F. Rodi. Vol. III. * *, Würzburg 2009, p. 63.

2 Ibid., pp. 62–63.

3 F. Nietzsche, 'On the Spirit of Gravity', in: Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Part Three. Works in three volumes. Edited by K. Schlechta, Vol. II. C. Hanser, Munich 1966, p. 443.

to see what it is that he, in particular, takes 'more bitterly' seriously. Consequently, the pedant 'narrow-minded' or the fanatic 'ruthless'. His deadly seriousness reveals how 'blind' his faith is – whilst the pedant's pomposity amounts to 'presumption'.

One *understands* a joke or 'something in the laughter'. (112) 'For there is a *reason* for laughter, from which it reveals itself.' (Ibid.) 'One is invited to join in the laughter.' 'One understands, for example, an allusion.' 'Or rather, one discovers, without being asked, that one is part of it, part of the game, of that very thing from which seriousness is seeking to distance itself, from which it would like to shut itself off as something it regards as mere trifles. The punchline lands and sets things alight.' (Ibid.) The fact that the pedant has no sense of humour, that his straps are tightly laced, shows just how little 'reason to laugh' he has in his pompous seriousness – just how 'ridiculous' his *smug* behaviour actually is.

'Nothing is ridiculous *in and of itself*. One must share – or at the very least be able to empathise with in some way – *the particular relationship to the world* that varies from one people to another, in order to find the humour in a situation and to be able to laugh along at a joke.' (112–113) It is precisely the pedant's feigned seriousness that provides cause for laughter in a situation where someone hones the punchline of their joke *on the audacity of the pedant's smugness*. 'Humour, wit and the grotesque are different ways of finding this *freedom to* be oneself' (113) – a freedom which the pedant has *denied* himself through his feigned seriousness, causing him to '*miss* the punchline'. 'For one does not laugh at what happens to another any differently from the way one would laugh at oneself in the same situation.' (Ibid.) *'Human beings* are always ridiculous, but not *the* person' (ibid.) – that is to say, the presumptuousness of their smug behaviour in a situation where their pomposity is *a cause* for laughter, where it *provides* the punchline of a *'good'* joke. 'Insofar as someone at whose fall one laughs is *themselves* overlooked in the process, they are sensitive, and the demeaning and hurtful nature of mockery and scorn lies in the *intention* behind this overlooking.' (Ibid.) The pedant is to be taken seriously precisely because, in feigning seriousness, he has denied himself the freedom to find the reason for laughter – which is offered to him in the 'good' joke, in which he – by laughing along
e.g. – might find their way back to themselves.

'In a light-hearted, exuberant mood, however, one finds oneself *suspended* from "oneself"—as one is known by one's face—when one is absorbed in the general hustle and bustle and beneath the

mask of anonymity.' (Ibid.) In his feigned seriousness, the pedant sought to save himself, to *absolve* himself of his responsibility. Only cheerfulness keeps a way out open for him.

- The crippling of humanity: the root of avarice

'The original, inherently multifaceted relationship one has with things' (110, note 1) or 'which allows one to glimpse something of the centre of gravity of things' (ibid.), in which one encounters the world with its demands and frictions, vanishes into the *bottlenecks* into which anxiety drives people, in which they 'find themselves stuck' in their state of subjugation. 'The univocal internal relationship', which replaces the original one, shows how a person here does not stand in freedom to themselves out of their own being, how they *are overtaken* by something that is initially hidden within them, coming to *life* in the anxiety that *drives* them into a corner. In *the 'horizonless'* (111) nature of their behaviour lies the sting of the very anxiety *that is held down* within it.

'Avarice has the same root.' (114) 'It is not the person who – is narrow-minded – gives nothing away. Nor is the prudent saver." (Ibid.)

'Greed, too, is something else. For the greedy person wishes to possess something *for themselves*. They wish to exclude others from it. They begrudge others their share. It is not so much the object itself as its possession that appeals to them. Greed is aroused even at the *mere* prospect of *potential* possession.' 'The collecting of objects which are a joy to behold, and whose study perhaps unleashes special abilities, can degenerate into *an addiction*. Namely, when possession is sought *as a mark of status*, the 'allure' of the rare is savoured, and, moreover, one reflects in the process on a rivalry that is, for the most part, merely imagined." (114, note 1) The miser does not 'guard' his possessions frugally, unwilling to give them *to others* out of narrow-mindedness or perhaps wishing to snatch them away from them. 'But the miser is one who withholds *from himself* what he has.' (114) It is not the 'addiction' to having or the 'joy' of possession that drives the miser. 'The miser resists *the consumption* of anything.' (Ibid.) 'The object of avarice is, above all, *money*. But it is also avaricious, for example, to collect and bundle bits of string, only to then prevent one's own use of them.' (Ibid.)

'But money has value only *as a means*.' (Ibid.) To *use* it for the very purpose in which it proves its worth – this is what the miser resists. 'It is in his striving to remain *in a state of mere possibility* that the root of the problem lies...'

of avarice. He remains fixed in *contemplating* all that he could afford with the money – *whilst forgetting the disjunction* between these things.' (114) 'He wishes to keep the money for himself *in the sense* that he withdraws it from *its intended purpose*.' (115) He is miserly with money, just as one is 'miserly' with time: 'in *calculating* all the things one could do and accomplish in that time'. (114) The – *indivisible* –

It is the 'total' of his saved money that he clings to, by reminding himself of all *the specific* things he could afford with it.

'A miser *scrapes together* money without putting it *to any* use.'

(114) 'Avarice refers to *a quantum-like accumulation*. Wealth no longer signifies genuine abundance here. Nor is the money in the mattress my "assets" in the same way as that in the bank, which is in my name. The gold pieces set *aside* lose the very meaning of money, which is, after all, money as *a means* to an end. The miser, however, resists *spending* the money. He does not cling to a possession as such; he wishes to hold on to possibilities *as possibilities*.' (114–115) Yet in taking something in lies a *decision*, just as in *using it* lies a *disjunction* of the whole in favour of an individual. That which has been set aside cannot be 'disjoined', as happens in the *act of spending*, for example, when something is handed over. Here, too, the 'private' nature of that which is withdrawn from consumption essentially meets its 'remoteness'. (110) It is precisely from the *'circulation'* of money that the miser withdraws himself.

'To the miser, hoarding does not mean making provisions for the future. He *hides* his money from others. He takes pleasure in *secretly* counting his money. He does not want to be "questioned" about what he has. He guards it from the gaze of others, as if there were already an implication that *he ought to release* it as a resource: he "sits" on it. The secretive nature of his behaviour is conspicuous." (115) "He does not want

[the money] to be recognised as wealth by which he might be judged, against which his demeanour and his power might be *measured*." (Ibid.) "He avoids contact with the wider world, and not merely in the manner of an eccentric or a misanthrope." (Ibid.)

'Money cannot be worn out; it is *indiscriminately* at everyone's service; everything imaginable can be bought with it. Money *imposes no obligations on* its owner.' (114) Regarding the 'invention of this means', Kant remarks that it 'has *no* other *use* (or at least must have no other *use*) than merely to facilitate the exchange of human labour, but through this it also encompasses everything

'To serve the physically good amongst them, particularly as it is represented by metals.' [4] H. Lipps also emphasises that 'money is a means *shaped* into something'. (115) 'When *unused,* it is "rubbish".'

(114) 'What the "filth" of avarice *refers to*: avarice is filthy because of the money that the miser counts through his fingers.' He *clings* to his money, which he does not allow to *'flow'*. The gold pieces *do not 'roll'* across the table. 'Avarice *scrapes* money together'. (Ibid.) 'Miserly people are usually dirty in their appearance too. For cleanliness is an expression of *self-respect*. One despises the miser." (115) With reference to a "greed […] without enjoyment in mere possession, even with the miser's renunciation of all use" [5] Kant speaks specifically of "*contempt* in the moral sense". On what is it based?

'The miser denies *his own* humanity and, in so doing, withdraws from the world.' (115) 'It is precisely "psychologically" that avarice can only be demonstrated *as a vice* – just as, for example, Kant's anthropology treats human beings "from a pragmatic point of view", that is to say, with regard to what they make of themselves as beings acting of their own free will.' [6] By 'seeking to hold on to possibilities *as* possibilities', 'resists *spending* the money', 'refuses to *acknowledge* it as wealth', (115) withdraws from the world by secretly 'running through in his mind all the things he could afford with the money', (114) – persists in the *mere notion* of the potential of his 'wealth', without allowing others to *gauge* it – by not even wanting to be 'asked' about what he has, after he has

'has withdrawn from himself', the miser denies the *freedom* in which a person, *through* their *actions*, makes something of themselves. It is precisely the fact that, once it has arisen, avarice 'admits of *no* change' that makes the miser 'despised' in Kant's eyes. [7] Avarice hoards money without *parting* with it. The *disjunction between the 'action'* by which a person steps *out of themselves* into the world and *'interacts'* with others,

that is to say, offers something that *does not bind* them *personally*, is *blocked by* avarice. Avarice creates no *'clean'*, that is to say, in this context, no *'sincere'* relationships. 'Avarice signifies a *crippling* of the human being.' (115)

4 I. Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, Stuttgart 1983, p. 220 [273–274].

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid., p. 29.

7 Ibid., p. 220 [273–274].

- Disguised Fear: the Exclusivity of Jealousy

It is not *dispensatio*, *suspensio* or *disiunctio*, but *exclusio* that most profoundly characterises jealousy. Whilst 'to become jealous is always a sign of a faith that is not secure in itself', one

'is persuaded to do something here' (116) – 'the jealous person *keeps watch* over something'. (Ibid.) Behind jealousy lies *'a disguised fear'* (117), and not 'a belief that is unsure of itself', 'which hopes to gain more by belittling *imagined* opponents than by having already found itself'. (116) 'But mistrust and suspicion arise in the jealous person from an insecurity which ultimately' – as disguised fear – 'is also *genuinely* well-founded'

(117), which does not hope to prevail through *exstirpatio*, but rather: recognises in the *exclusio* the 'powerlessness' and
'own incapacity' as *its* source and breeding ground. The *specific powerlessness* of the human being, who in *'genuine* despair', 'from within oneself', 'is *driven* from one's faith'. (117) The very sign of this is 'the delusional madness' (ibid.) of jealousy, which is 'blindness' (ibid.) and not, for example,
'persuasion'.

Just as shame 'guards' something, so jealousy 'watches over it', *'protects* it from the gaze of others, so as *not* to let it become *commonplace*'. (116; cf. 31–33) 'Herein lies the difference between jealousy and envy. For envy *relates* to something which – though one might wish it otherwise – *anyone* could have. It thus regards *as commonplace*, or renders commonplace, that for which the other is envied.' (116) 'Jealousy, however, *is concerned* precisely with the fear of *losing* something in the sense that perhaps someone else *might* also have it.' (117) Like shame, jealousy banishes and suppresses, but with a *uniqueness of its own*. Whilst 'envy always affects only having, never being'
(116) Jealousy fears 'not for one's possessions, but for *what* one possesses'. (117) In the sense that perhaps someone else might also have it, the jealous person is not sure of themselves. However, what the other person is envied for does not affect the *self-assurance* of the envious person, which – in this instance – remains unaffected.

Meanwhile – 'what I might *actually* have, but which I just happened not to get, does not in itself make one envious. Nor is it envy to want to have what the other person has, that is, to be able to derive satisfaction only through *comparison* with others. Rather: the *apparent advantage* of the other person causes envy—

'disch.' (116) 'Envy is directed at the "happiness" that one does not have oneself but that the other does.' (Ibid.) *One does not wish* the other *well in* their happiness. 'Like resignation, envy seeks to express a powerlessness to accept having to be what one is. Envy is resentful because it must constantly bear in mind that the other person has something which – so it persuades itself, rather than being convinced of it – I *too* could have. It wishes to cast doubt on the *legitimacy* of that privilege. Reluctantly, yet as if fascinated by the other's happiness, it lingers on the matter, probing it." (Ibid.) It is precisely in this that he trivialises what the other is envied for. 'Ultimately, the envious person seeks to prove himself in the other's hatefulness, so as not to have to recognise himself as merely envious.' Here, envy reaches a *climax* in which 'the vulgar cannot, as it were, escape'; 'one recognises it in displacements, repressions'. (Ibid.) 'The very fact that the other seems to simply accept his privilege as a given – that is what annoys me about him.' (Ibid.) In ressentiment, one accuses him of not

> 'to relinquish one's superiority and start on my level', which is passed off as 'true greatness'. (116–117) 'Secretly, one hopes to discover something that casts the other's superiority in a different light. One maliciously highlights the downsides. A certain perspective, a certain way of thinking, is characteristic of envy.' (117) Envy persistently casts doubt on the other's happiness, making it seem suspect. In their resentment, the envious person attributes to the envied person a quality worthy of hatred, through which they wish to 'ultimately prove *themselves*'. (116) Whilst envy highlights the 'powerlessness' of 'having to be, 'what one is' (ibid.) is the 'inability' from which jealousy – 'the compulsion to control the other' – springs, namely: 'to be *so* attached to one's partner or wife *that one does not …*'.

- For 'in fact, one cannot *assume* that …'. (Ibid.) 'The jealous person does not wish to be forced out of a relationship in which they feel out of their depth. They therefore wish to interpret its uniqueness – and in doing so they already betray the beloved – as *exclusivity*.' (Ibid.) 'What is striking is the boundlessness of jealousy, which channels all its energy into its frenzy. Jealousy is capable of anything. The delusional blindness lies in wanting to guard an *illusory possession*. The jealous person resists losing something which, had it been lost, would not have been worth worrying about in the first place.' (Ibid.) He is unable to commit himself to the other 'in good faith'

bind. Desperately, he clings to the exclusivity of a semblance of possession; in his claim to exclusivity, he betrays the unique
'unconditional nature' of love. For: 'Lovers can *simply*
be 'there' for one another.' (36) Unreservedly and without possessiveness.

'The compulsion to "find" something in everything *relieves* the jealous person of what he somehow recognises as a sense of inadequacy within himself.' (118) As his insecurity erupts into mistrust and suspicion – as he succumbs to the delusion of losing his illusory possession – the jealous person masks 'the awareness of his own powerlessness' to live up to the *vinculum fidei et amoris* itself. 'In addiction […] *one slips away from oneself*.' (118) 'But the "addiction" to jealousy is *not a passion*.' (Ibid.)

'There is, for example, the pathos of science, passionate hatred and love. Passionate hatred is not simply heightened hatred. As if it merely "filled" one up, so that nothing else could exist alongside it. Rather – insofar as hatred fills one, one becomes absorbed in it, *finds oneself* in it, it is passionate hatred. The fact that it is inaccessible to rational consideration means that one is utterly caught up in it – just as one is in one's conviction. But behaviour is rational if it takes place in relation to reason – that is, *conditionally*."

- 'Certainly – passion lacks that detached relationship to things in which one allows oneself to be *freely* determined, freely grounded in one's behaviour. But that merely signifies its *objectivity* here. Passion is *unreserved*.' (Ibid.) Yet it is precisely the illusion of jealousy that *presupposes* all manner of possibilities that must be ruled out. 'Not everyone is capable of passion, nor does everyone possess the *greatness* required for it.' (Ibid.) Jealousy, however, casts suspicion of infidelity on every *trifle*.

In the third book of his **Anthropology**: 'On the Faculty of Desire' [8] Kant distinguishes between affects and passions *(passio animi)*. 'An inclination which the subject's reason finds difficult or impossible to overcome is a passion. By contrast, the feeling of pleasure or displeasure in the present state, which does not give rise in the subject to deliberation (the rational consideration of whether one should yield to it or resist it), is an affect.[9] 'The affect brings about a *momentary* interruption of freedom and self-mastery

8 I. Kant, op. cit., p. 210 [265–266].
9 Ibid., p. 192 [251].

about herself. *She renounces* passion and finds her pleasure and satisfaction in a spirit of servitude.'[10] If the affect is an 'intoxication', then passion is a 'disease', which is termed 'addiction'.[11] Kant cites ambition, a thirst for revenge, a thirst for power and the like as examples. In contrast, H. Lipps wishes to distinguish more carefully between 'passion' and 'addiction', and to question the 'spirit of servitude' in which, according to Kant, passion finds its satisfaction. 'Kant did not have true passions in mind when he leaves reason "in the chains" of passion.[12] For he cites as examples: greed, the desire for revenge, etc.[13] In other words, something in which a person seeks to "secure" something for themselves. Just as they also become the fool of their own cleverness.' (118, note 1) This

According to Kant, 'inclinations' 'relate merely to the possession of the means to satisfy all inclinations that directly concern the end. […] The possession of the means to *any given* purpose, however, extends far beyond the inclination directed towards a single inclination and its satisfaction. – They may therefore also be called 'inclinations *of delusion*' ( ), which consist in: equating the mere opinion of others regarding the

value of things with their actual value.' [14] – In 'addiction', 'one *loses* oneself'. (118) In passion, however, 'one *elevates* oneself, *finds oneself* in it', 'perceives oneself *as absolutely* present in it'. (Ibid.)

Regarding Kant's view that passion *renounces* freedom and self-mastery, 'finding its pleasure and satisfaction in a sense of servitude', whilst the affect merely 'causes a *momentary interruption* to freedom' – which is why the affect can be described as an 'intoxication' and passion as an 'illness' – H. Lipps remarks: 'However – *I myself* assert myself through the attitude that intercepts the affect.' (118, note 1) Not only does 'the affect intensify and become clearer in the "attitude" it acquires through the gesture'. (17) 'The attitude effectively *intercepts* the affects.' 'One can *intercept* the affects through one's attitude.' (21) The unreserved nature of the passionate is, however, by no means *'groundless*'. The 'chains' in which passion binds reason concern merely its – lack of –

10 Ibid., p. 212 [267].
11 Ibid., p. 210 [265–266].
12 See op. cit., p. 212 [267].
13 See op. cit., p. 213 [267–268].
14 Ibid., p. 215 [269–270].

'*objective* attitude'. *One 'throws oneself into'* passion; one *'reveals oneself* in it'. (See 21) 'Passions are *paths* of human existence that can only be understood in the light of their *fateful nature*.' (123)

Distance and Otherness.

Transformation of existence

'Human beings *themselves* are characterised by the narrowness and breadth of "their" horizons.'
(p. 123)

- Standing in the Abyss

'Both – the alluring nature of the abysmal and the allure of the unknown – differ from the feeling that underlies claustrophobia in that, in this case, there is something within *the individual* itself that reaches out towards the abysmal.' (106) 'And whilst one ventures forth *boldly*, *step by step*, following the lure of the unknown, here, succumbing to temptation means letting oneself go.' (Ibid.) 'The adventurer is lured […]. He ventures boldly into the unknown.' (120–121) 'He succumbs to the temptation to abandon *the defined realm of certainties*.' (Ibid.) 'He has a sense that the citizen's security is, after all, merely one that he finds fleetingly by clinging to things, but that he does *not actually* "stand" *in the abyss*.' (119) Of a 'fundamental powerlessness, particularly *with regard to a* foothold' (107) –
There is no question here of being unable to 'stand on one's own two feet' (ibid.). To venture forward boldly, step by step, is precisely not the same as letting oneself go. The 'fleeting security' that the citizen finds by clinging to things – as a demarcated sphere within which he dwells – *is what* the thirst for adventure *'seeks'* to abandon. The way in which a person stands apart from himself undergoes a profound transformation here: a transformation concerning 'his' horizon. It is fundamentally different from the constrictions of fear. In place of a powerlessness that, *in human beings*, confronts the abysmal par excellence, a *'longing'* takes its place. 'A longing *lives* within the adventurer.' (119) 'The adventurer longs *to* return *to the elemental*, that is, to step out of himself—

' (119–120) Whilst for the claustrophobic 'existence as a whole seems to recede' (106), 'he experiences himself within it as being held in nothingness' (107), *'nothing* holds the adventurer back' (120).

The elemental, which 'reveals itself to him, namely in the breakthrough to it' (120), in the transformation of his horizon, is something 'that is just breaking open for him *at the very depths of* existence' (120). As something unfathomable, the
'elementary' is not a 'void of space' that 'becomes transparent to the world to which one is at the mercy of' (107) – 'at the sight of which the claustrophobic feels dizzy'. (106) 'To the claustrophobic, no path seems passable any longer'; (106) the adventurer 'venture boldly into the unknown', (121) 'throws himself into the unknown, leaves it to chance'. (Ibid.) 'The alluring nature of the void lacks the allure of the unknown.' (106) As an 'impression' (106), the abysmal depth in which the adventurer 'actually "stands"' (119) is fundamentally different from the 'dizzying' abyss of the person suffering from agoraphobia. He is not at the mercy of 'the world'. 'The adventurer entrusts himself […] to chance.' (121) – But this sets the adventurer

in contrast to *the gambler*. Just as, conversely, the fact that there is a 'passion for gambling', that 'gambling is regarded as a passion', that *'fulfilment* is sought in gambling',

- 'places the gambler in contrast to the adventurer'. (Ibid.) For 'the adventurer, too, *seeks* fulfilment'. (121)

Whilst 'one is just slipping away into addiction' (118), 'one excites oneself', 'one finds oneself' in passion. (Ibid.)

'Being unable to break free from this "passion" to which one has succumbed', – for example, 'that the gambler *cannot* stop' – constitutes 'an addiction'. (122) But what does it mean that 'a *longing* lives within the adventurer'? (119) – 'That which is *not* anchored anywhere'? (120) 'Longing is not merely a desire for something or greed. For desire relates to *what is attainable*. And one is greedy in order to be able to *take* something. Desires are fulfilled insofar as they are *met*; greed is *sated*.' (119) The 'direction' of desire and greed is characterised by attainability and tangibility, whilst the 'direction' of craving is characterised by 'satisfaction'. 'The direction of yearning is the *opposite* of that of desire and greed.' (119) In yearning, one does not orient oneself towards that which one can attain or take for oneself, or which might possibly be 'satisfied'. 'The person who yearns reaches out *into the distance* beyond themselves.' (119) They are drawn to the unattainable, the intangible, to that which cannot be satisfied. Whilst desire is fulfilled

Even if they are fulfilled, longing is *something that cannot be satisfied*. For example, 'A longing for the other arises […] *from loneliness*. And it is *unconditional*.' (119) The desire for another person's presence, on the other hand, is 'always conditional'; 'the other is thereby called upon *to* fulfil *a certain* role' (119), which is to be met. 'One longs for the other insofar as one can only "be" what one is in their presence and with them.' (Ibid.) An unfulfillable demand arises from this. One wishes to ground one's own existence in the other's unbreakable fidelity. 'Longing seeks to arrive at itself through something' (119), which, as the 'unfulfillable', simultaneously possesses the character of the unconditional. 'In the stabilisation of everyday life, for example, where everything is taken care of for one and largely sorted out, one senses *the obstruction of the original*.' (Ibid.) Longing is downright weary of this satiated way of life. 'To long for something means: to want to move away from oneself in one's unfulfilled state towards another,' (Ibid.) which transcends, absolutely and unfulfillably, the saturation of life that has become a source of weariness.

'The unfulfilled longing from which the adventurer draws his drive does not simply mean a state of being unfulfilled – as in the case of someone who demands to be kept busy, whose abilities would otherwise lie dormant, or who is merely seeking to fill the time. The adventurer is repulsed by a life of mediocrity, in which work and pleasure are regimented, lived with only the short term in mind – devoid of destiny, reliant solely on luck and chance. What is attainable here seems to him to have already exhausted its reward." (119) When he entrusts himself to chance, *he "rejects* all worry and caution". (121) He is repelled by the prudent concern that, evading fate, craves petty happiness; that cautiously shuns any presumption that might challenge fate; that, advancing with measured steps along well-trodden paths, seeks only the day's wage. To begin with, the life of mediocrity seems to him unambitious, not a 'full' life, because it is content with what is attainable, securing itself by acquiring what is 'next' at hand. In the security that the citizen 'finds *fleetingly* through his hold on things', the adventurer senses the 'obstruction' of a life that 'does not actually "stand" in the abyss' (119): Only 'by breaking through the safeguards that man has placed protectively between himself and his origin in the course of everyday life' (120) does the element—

towards which he himself wishes to 'set out'. 'In contrast to the sensitive soul, who seeks [it] in nature and can thus find *it within himself*, insofar as he is part of nature', the adventurer longs to 'step *outside himself*'.

(120) For him, the elemental reveals itself 'in the breakthrough towards it'. (Ibid.) 'The adventurer *questions* what the man of everyday life all too quickly regards *as already settled*—as the meaning of his life. That is to say, what he actually merely
'believes' – in the devalued and inauthentic sense that he *considers* it *to be right* – but which has not been accomplished from within himself." (Ibid.)

What is 'taken off' the individual's hands in the stabilisation of everyday life, what is 'largely taken care of' therein, (119) – insofar as this amounts to a life of mediocrity for him, 'in which work and pleasure are regulated, which is lived with a short-term outlook – without a sense of destiny, geared solely towards luck and chance' (119) – is the act of making a decision 'of one's own accord' regarding its meaningfulness. Such a decision does not lie in the direction of what one 'considers to be right': a fleeting sense of security offered by clinging to things, in which one nevertheless merely 'believes' 'in a simplified and inauthentic sense'. (120) For 'true faith is always a *gamble* and is aware that it *may fail*'. (111) It is precisely in breaking through this security of the citizen – for whom the fleeting hold on things may suffice – that this security is therefore merely a 'safeguard' to be broken through, which
'has been placed protectively between him and his origin' (120) – the 'elementary' reveals itself to the adventurer. For him, it is 'a fundamental' or *'essential* uncertainty' – (120) regarding the meaning of life, which he himself must determine from his own origins, but to which nothing in this world can offer even the slightest foothold. 'The adventurer *is* not *held back by anything*.' (120) His life is not, like that of the citizen, 'devoid of destiny, *dependent* solely on luck and chance'.
(119) The adventurer 'senses a *fundamental* uncertainty' (120) when he 'entrusts himself to chance'. (121) This uncertainty is not one which, as in the case of the citizen, is stifled by worry and caution. Nor is it one which, as in the case of the gambler, is *sought* merely as *a 'tension* between bliss and destruction'. (121) The elemental quality that the adventurer discovers precisely in breaking through the protective safeguards of everyday life is, after all, not something that he – unlike the sensitive soul – could 'find' *within himself* as part of nature. His longing is not

amor fati, whose companion in fate would be a nature that 'always smiled upon him'.[1]

'The hustle and bustle only barely conceals [the citizen's] fear of the utter meaninglessness' of his everyday existence. In his suspicion of the question posed to him by the adventurer, 'there is, after all, a sense of foreboding regarding the loss of security', which he wishes to avert. (120) 'Certainly – the adventurer may fail; that is, *he himself* may fail, and not merely his undertaking. But the citizen is only *wiser* than him if he seeks to slip past the dangers that surround existence.' (Ibid.) The adventurer is *'prepared* for failure'. (121) 'It is not *actual* dangers that he anticipates, dangers which one could even face with prudence. Danger in this sense is *not built* into his endeavour *at all*; he is indifferent to it.' (Ibid.) 'Recklessness means something other than courage and boldness, in which a person's *measure*, in which virtues, are defined.' (Ibid.) The mediocrity of the citizen is no virtue in this sense: his 'prudence' is not measured by the danger in the sense of confronting it. In his undertaking, the adventurer is not prepared for danger, but for the possibility of his own failure. He puts himself at risk – something the citizen shuns, for it is precisely in this that he is a 'citizen': he wishes to remove himself from danger. 'The uncertainty of the bourgeois sphere, which is always only more or less great and is always objectively defined', 'is to be understood as *privative*' – 'the uncertainty that the adventurer senses, on the other hand, is "a *fundamental* one"'. (120) 'True uncertainty is […] precisely *the primary force* in opposition to any sense of security, in which *this* uncertainty is merely invoked and sought *to be circumvented by warding it* off', (ibid.) – as in bourgeois space. 'The adventurer sees through *the stage-like nature* of the space that seeks to draw the gaze to the scene of so-called "life"; he sees through the charade intended to distract him from what is currently breaking through at the very core of his existence.' (ibid.)

It is not, for example, that 'the *emptiness* of space becomes transparent to the world to which one is at the mercy of' (107) – but rather: 'the *stage-like quality* of space', which draws the gaze towards the stage of everyday life, becomes

[1] J.-J. Rousseau, *Les rêveries du promeneur solitaire*. Librairie générale française, Paris 1983, *Neuvième Promenade*, p. 150: 'Is it any wonder that I love solitude? I see nothing but animosity on people's faces, whilst nature always smiles upon me.'

transparent to the abysmal, in which 'existence actually "stands"'. (119) The adventurer feels 'deprived of his very own possibilities' within bourgeois society. (120) 'Insofar as these appear to him merely as possibilities *withheld from* him—that is, as those one can *seize* for oneself—insofar as he seeks to force his way through by means of violence, he becomes a *broken* existence.' (Ibid.) What bursts forth from the very depths of his being is 'reckless'. Whilst 'to the claustrophobic, no path seems passable any longer' (106), the adventurer 'vents his recklessness, namely in *steps*'. (Ibid.) 'Recklessly, he ventures into the unknown' (121) – which one cannot 'approach *with caution*'. What is existentially *'shattered'* in these steps relates to the *'horizon'* within which existence is confined in everyday life. These are *strokes of freedom* that shatter the spell of everyday life.

'Mercenaries, for example, were adventurers. For a meagre wage, they *risked* their lives in battle, thereby signifying that they wished to *free themselves* from those to whom they would otherwise have remained indebted.'[2] (120) Through their pay, they ransomed themselves from *any* debt obligation. The debt from which they ransomed themselves was of little consequence to them. The ransom was a *springboard* for them, enabling them to leap great *distances*.

'The adventurer is lured; he succumbs to the temptation to abandon the *defined realm* of certainties.' (120–121) He succumbs to temptations. 'He does not, as it were, seek out danger. Just as one might seek it out to test oneself, to prove one's *strength*. 'Self-discovery' would mean here: becoming aware of one's abilities and, consequently, of one's calling. And his life would be fulfilled insofar as his strength—the power characterised by boldness—would otherwise lie dormant." (121) To undergo such a self-discovery is not what the adventurer longs for. 'Danger in this sense is not at all inherent in his undertaking; he is *indifferent* to it.' (Ibid.) 'Recklessness means *something other* than courage and boldness.' (Ibid.) The adventurer longs to 'step *outside himself*'. (120) The fundamental element that reveals itself to him—namely, in the breakthrough towards this—does not lie in the direction of self-discovery—as a challenge to his own

[2] See H. Lipps, 'Die Wandlung des Soldaten' (1939), in: Die Wirklichkeit des Menschen, Works Vol. V, V. Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main 1977, pp. 97–98.

Strength. On the contrary: 'The adventurer throws himself into *the unknown*, *takes his chances*.'[3] (121) Reaching 'into the *distance* of his own self', he exposes himself to an *experience of the unfamiliar*. He is not prepared to 'prove his strength', but rather: 'to face *failure*'. The challenge of danger is something other than the allure of the unknown. 'The adventurer sets his life—which may *be lost*—against a life *oriented towards death*, which is preoccupied *with self-preservation*.' (121) 'The defined realm of certainties' that he wishes to *relinquish* is shaped by this fundamental existential orientation. Rebelling against the *certainty of death*, he places his life in the balance of chance. 'The *unbound nature* of his undertaking, however, also deprives the wanderer of the freedom to find *definitive* meaning in experiences and encounters.' (121) Indifferent to *danger*, which is 'not at all built into' his beginning (ibid.), 'for the adventurer, the *challenge of fate* is *just* as *incidental to* his beginning as is the shaping of things'. (122)

'The adventurer is at home *nowhere*.' (120)

- Transformation of existence

'How distant might such "distance" be?[4] – *That* distance for which the adventurer yearns? (124)

'When I am drawn to the sea and to all that is of the sea's nature, and most of all when it defies me in anger: when that searching desire is within me, which sets sail for the undiscovered, when a seafarer's longing is within my longing: when my exultation ever cried out: "The coast faded away – now the last chain has fallen from me – – the boundless roars around me, space and time gleam far out before me …'[5]

The adventurer, too, 'seeks fulfilment' (121) – just like the gambler.
'In play, fulfilment is sought.' (119) The 'passionate'

3 Cf. op. cit.: 'For him, danger signifies not so much something like self-experience and proving oneself as the *embodiment of the unknown*.'

4 F. Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra. The Sacrifice of Honey. Works in three volumes. Volume two,
, K. Schlechta, C. Hanser Verlag, Munich 1966, p. 480.

5 Op. cit., The Seven Seals, p. 475.

The 'play' (121), however, is distinct from the 'longing' 'that dwells within the adventurer' (119). 'Yet the ever-renewed "passionate" nature of play demonstrates precisely how it is perceived and understood as fulfilment. So that, in retrospect, even the unfulfilled comes to be seen from this perspective.' (121) What is 'taken' or 'understood' as fulfilment in the adventurer's longing, so that in retrospect even the unfulfilled comes to be seen from his perspective – what he longs for, what 'addiction' drives him on – is likely to be deeply questionable. For even its very beginning is 'unbound'. The 'unrestrained' nature of gambling addiction, however, shows precisely how one 'becomes addicted to something' (122) from which one can no longer escape. 'To yearn for something', by contrast, means: 'to want to move *away from oneself* […] towards another'. (119) The 'addictive' nature of that longing which dwells within the adventurer does not, in fact, relate to a 'desire' to which the passionate gambler, for example, might well *fall prey*. A *'seeking desire'* of a unique order dwells within the adventurer.

'The player for whom life has become dull, who is simply weary of it, seeks only *temporary oblivion*. The certainty he exchanges for an uncertainty that is, after all, *merely* that of chance, is not recognised by him *as a pretence*.' (121) He does not prepare himself for the onset of a sudden flash of fundamental uncertainty. The uncertainty that is '*merely* that of chance' is sought as *a source of tension*. (Ibid.) The 'challenge of chance' is intended to allow the gambler to temporarily forget his dull life. 'The gambler seeks a tension that is *repeatable* as a matter of responsibility. He lives by staking what he has and needs. And the tension between joy and ruin strikes him in a reality which he has *not left at all*.' (Ibid.) 'The gambler remains *passive* when he tries his luck.' (122) *'No transformation of existence* takes place here – only that *one* wall of security is torn down,' (121) which is precisely recognised by him *as* 'not a cover' for fundamental uncertainty. Gambling, which relies solely on the uncertainty of 'chance' and challenges fate in order to experience a tension that 'is indeed fleeting' but 'can be repeated at will as a matter of choice' (121–122), lifts a person only briefly above the worries of everyday life. 'In play, one gains […] a *private* world. The "private" nature of this world […] merely reflects its *detachment*.' (110) One finds 'an *enclosed* space for play' of mere activity' (110, note 1) – for example, roulette in a casino, which allows one to

An evening that makes one forget the mindless tedium of the day. The 'oasis' of happiness sought time and again, in which one, remaining passive oneself, simply lets the dice roll, is an *existential interlude*.

The gambler merely tears down *the one wall* of security that 'concern and caution' have painstakingly erected and are desperately trying to maintain. 'The gambler is *not actually* in opposition to the bourgeois world; he is simply *more sophisticated* than the bourgeois. Certainly – he, too, has a sense of the illusory and artificial nature of bourgeois life. He realises that all the things being explored here do not at all warrant the *seriousness* with which they are treated. But insofar as he merely introduces a *new tension* into this world —simply by perceiving its lack of appeal—he actually reinforces the structure of this space and makes it harder to turn away from it.' (122) His frivolity seeks merely 'to shed the *burden* of existence, as it is felt in the form of boredom and weariness'. (Ibid.) There is no question of a *new beginning* 'at the very root of existence' (120). The gambler's frivolity is not recklessness. 'Recklessness is something else.' (122)

The 'passionate' nature of the game – the fact that one 'bids for oneself' within it, 'finds oneself' in it, that one surrenders *'unreservedly'* to the game, (118) – can degenerate into 'addiction'. 'In addiction, *one loses control of oneself*.' (Ibid.) 'The fact that the player cannot stop signifies an addiction to playing, that is to say, an inability to break free from this "passion" to which one has succumbed once one has experienced the thrill of the game even just once.' 'Addiction consists precisely in succumbing to something one can procure as a stimulus, in enjoying a mere contingency which, whilst temporary, can be repeated at will.' (122) The gambling addict succumbs to the pursuit of ever-new thrills, which he wishes to enjoy as mere contingencies. Light-footed at first, yet tenacious in the pursuit of his happiness, he seeks to escape the burden of existence. He 'slips away from himself' (123) by succumbing to gambling, whose thrill allows him to 'detach himself from "himself"'. (122) 'Addictions, for example, *vary*. Gambling, for example – precisely insofar as it can appear as a passion – does not, after all, signify a *descent into depravity* – as is the case, for instance, with the drug addict. The latter's euphoria is a form of oblivion, which is interrupted by the states into which he sinks." (123) Whilst the drug addict sinks into *lethargy*, the person possessed by the gambling demon revels in the 'tension between elation and destruction'. (121)

'Only human beings *seek* stimuli, because only for them can responsibility as such become a *means* of detaching themselves from "themselves".'
(122) 'There are no elementary "instincts" in human beings. Rather, they are to be understood as *a manifestation of their indivisible nature*.' (Ibid.)
That is to say, as a declination of *the 'I' within itself*. (9, note 1) *Within himself,* man relates differently to the states into which his stimuli place him. These states are brought within the *sphere of his existence* insofar as they decline a *self-relationship* of man which, as such, is 'indivisible'. In the various
'turns' it becomes all the more apparent how he is, in each instance, differently *called upon to turn towards himself*. In the 'arbitrariness of repetition'
For example, it becomes apparent how a person, simply by enjoying the excitement that their game provides, is able to 'detach themselves from "themselves"' and, in doing so, *practise* 'temporary forgetfulness' – how they can 'set aside' the burden of existence in this way. (122) The outcome of his game of chance is, in fact, of *no decisive* importance to him. The gambler tries his luck or falls prey to gambling addiction when he is unable to break free from it. (122) 'Only human beings have the capacity *for such* a lack of freedom; an animal is *not actually* "driven" when it seeks what it needs.' (Ibid.) Because it *does* not *'tempt' itself* in its 'driving', the fulfilment of the drive is likewise no *temptation* for the animal, to which it might *itself* succumb as an 'addiction'. Its driving is, in this respect, 'elementary', i.e. here: *not reducible* on the basis of a self-relationship that it would thereby *confer* upon *itself*.
Looking back on it, *human freedom* certainly gains—
further characteristics. 'Freedom is not a concept ready for *application*, in relation to which one would merely have to ask, "in what" freedom is to be found in human beings.' (122) *Rational reflection* in the Kantian sense does not automatically touch upon *the* very *foundation of the self-relationship* that human beings *establish for themselves* in their various states. It is 'abstract' insofar as it merely considers 'the *idea* of whether one

surrendered oneself to a present state' , which evokes 'a feeling of pleasure or displeasure', 'or refuses to do so'. [6] Nor, however, is it 'the *will*'. 'One then speaks of the "will", but what is meant by this? For with this word one initially refers to the tension of *one's attitude* when one has set one's sights on something as a goal, that is to say,

[6] See I. Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, Reclam, Stuttgart 1983, p. 192.

has made up their mind about something. The will, or rather its power, is manifested here in the planning and execution of something. Alongside this 'setting one's mind on something' stands desire as *a* 'wanting to have'; but one also 'wants' what one expects from others, and so on. One notices how, in the *way* in which all this is compared here, precisely that which – like *the decision* – lies *at the* very *origin* of human freedom cannot be encompassed." (122, note 1) Neither the focused orientation towards a goal nor the energetic pursuit of that which is aimed at fundamentally captures the *specific turn* of a person's 'being claimed for oneself' in those states in which one establishes a *relationship with oneself*, in which one articulates one's 'I' *within oneself*. Human freedom 'must rather be understood *in terms of one's entire being*.' (122) Neither rational deliberation nor the attitude of the will nor the active attainment of the object of one's striving captures the 'gripping' aspect of human freedom arising from the 'entire being' of the human being. What is 'decisive' 'precisely at the origin of human freedom' (122, note 1) is, first and foremost: *'attempt*'. Consequently, human existence is a 'beginning', in that, through being 'called upon *to* turn in on itself', it *sets itself in motion towards this end* – what befalls it in the process is never 'mere fate'. Gambling, in particular, bears eloquent and unmistakable witness to this. Only human beings 'stake' what they have, or rather *live*
*'*by staking what he has and needs', (121)
by *trying* his luck precisely in this, enjoying 'the uncertainty, which is, after all, merely that of chance' (121) *as liberating*. 'Just as it is only from this, through the difference in his nature from that of the animal, that human sensuality is to be defined *as sensuality*.' (122–123) The sensual enjoyment of the tension 'has' a liberating effect. This liberation is what is actually 'sought' in the game, what 'lies' tentatively in the arbitrariness of the repetition of the game of chance, precisely therein
One can become 'addicted' if one cannot break free from it. 'Passions are *paths* of human existence that can only be understood in terms of their *fateful nature*.' (123) In the 'passionate' nature of the game, the player loses himself; he 'throws himself into it'. He catches a glimpse of the liberating joy of 'shedding the burden of existence'. (122) He sets out to enjoy this by *staking everything* 'on the uncertainty that is merely that of chance'. – Chance is therefore never *mere* luck to him; rather, he holds it *responsible* for the sole gain of detaching himself from 'himself'. Only by recognising that the

Insofar as the challenge of skill *offers* the player a *'release'* from the burden of existence, his passion is *'understandable*'.

'Recklessness is something else' from the gambler's daring as he tries his luck. (122) 'The challenge of chance is as *incidental* to the adventurer's setting out as the shaping of events is to him.' (Ibid.) The adventurer's setting out is 'unbound',
(121) whereas the gambler, 'precisely insofar as he stakes only what he *has*, remains *bound* to what the adventurer leaves *behind*'. (123)
'The player is already in a state of *distortion*, of slipping away from the adventurer. […] The player puts on a front, something of which he is still somehow aware as the fundamental human possibility. Yet he shies away from an *unreserved* encounter with it. He *cheapens himself* somewhat. Such cheapening, however, is the

ordinary reality.' (Ibid.) The player puts everything he has on the line; for the adventurer, as soon as 'the coast disappears', 'the *last* chain falls away'.
'He *casts aside* all worry and caution', 'when he entrusts himself to chance', (121) which is no longer held *responsible* here for relieving the burden of existence, as it 'is felt as boredom and weariness'. (122) The adventurer *throws himself* into the unknown, 'leaves it to chance', whilst *the gambler's roll* is merely an 'attempt' which, although 'repeatable at will' (122), lacks *the suddenness* of the 'outburst'. Thus – as an 'elementary possibility' of the human being – the adventurer enters into a 'fateful encounter', whereas the gambler – as 'ordinary' reality – 'cheapens' it (123); *it* is *'irrevocable'* and *'irreplaceable'*. A *'transformation of existence'* takes place when 'the adventurer sets his life, which may perish, against a life oriented towards death, which is concerned with self-preservation.' (121) His *amor fati* is *a defiance* of the certainty of death, from which he *distances himself*, rather than confronting it with existential 'resolve' in the face of extreme distress. The *second* wall of security, the 'true' one,
"primary", "fundamental" uncertainty is torn down. The adventurer's companion in fate is called: *ruin*. It no longer befalls him "in a reality he has never actually left". (121)
'In place *of* the "distance" for which he longs, he is faced with *the "foreign*".' (124)

- The Free Horizon

In his **Anthropology**, Kant sought to define longing in terms of desire *(appetitio)*: 'Desire without the exertion of force to bring about the object is a wish. This may be directed towards objects which the subject feels unable to procure for itself, and is then an empty (idle) wish. The empty wish to be able to annihilate the time between desiring and acquiring the desired object is longing.'[7] From this idleness, which arises solely from a feeling of inability to annihilate time, the longing that 'lives' within the adventurer,

(119) yet, according to H. Lipps, be fundamentally different. Whilst the gambler 'passes the time' with gambling, the unreserved encounter with it 'loses its value', (123) insofar as something irreplaceable and irrevocable ever occurs within it – whilst in the arbitrarily repeatable challenge of skill he tries his luck at the price of a 'destruction' that strikes him in a reality he has *not even left* – the adventurer enters into an 'unrepeatable' (123) reality of experience, which, with the
'Event' of time, which *becomes aware of* its destructive power, which knows its deafening 'roar' – just as it knows the mysterious 'glow' of space. *In the face* of death, of certain death, towards which life is 'oriented', (121) the certainty of which – in terms of direction – signifies the fundamental uncertainty *of existence*, which brooks no revocation and permits no return, which cannot be cheapened in a reliable reality that exchanges 'annihilation' for 'bliss' – he is seized by an insatiable longing. 'His life, which may perish' (121) the adventurer sets 'against a life, […] which is concerned *with itself*'. (Ibid.) What matters to him is the *'ability' to bring about* this demise, which cannot here be understood as the 'fatefulness' of death—which is precisely the 'object' of self-concern, seeking to 'circle him spellbound' and 'conjure him up'.
(120) The vain 'game' played out against the *final backdrop* of life, which seeks to hold the certainty of death *responsible* for it, in order *to* cope, in the extreme distress of existential anxiety, with the fundamental uncertainty of existence that erupts 'abysmally' from the very depths of being—

[7] Op. cit., p. 192.

The adventurer is averse to *becoming consumed by* distress. His 'standing in the abyss' is *not* characterised by *being-towards-death*, which – as a mode of being revealed, for example, in fear – is met with existential *'resolve'* and is thereby 'secured'. His audacity *does not choose* hopelessness. It *knows* no fear. It does not *seek* mortal danger in order to stoke self-concern to the point of utter distress.
'For the distance he longs for, *the foreign stands before him*,'
(124) which *'entices*'. (123) 'The fact that the foreign—as it is "experienced" in countries, landscapes and peoples—entices means, for example, something different from the *allure of the new*.' (123) 'The encounter with the foreign signifies a *liberation and a breaking through of one's horizon*.' (Ibid.) The *'pursuit* of the new' (124) as something exciting – in curiosity, for example – lacks the *alluring* distance of a 'free', that is to say, a broken horizon. Short-sighted, curiosity seeks 'satisfaction' that *does not last long*, because it dulls the senses. (124) The 'path to fulfilment' that the adventurer treads in his longing is not content merely to exchange the 'boredom of the familiar' (124) for the fleeting nature of the exciting new. What he sets out to achieve lasts *long enough* that its edge cannot be blunted or dulled. The duration of his time is not limited to brief moments. What *keeps* the adventurer's yearning alive—that of withstanding the greedy devouring of momentary excitement—is a lure that *eludes every moment*; one that, precisely because of this, cannot be taken in at a glance and thus *vanishes* from the *'field of vision'* that curiosity seeks to *circle*, *spellbound*, in its *ceaseless* pursuit of novelty. The irretrievable, irrevocable ' ' of the moment becomes for the adventurer the 'gateway' to a 'long alley' [8]– in which he encounters nothing 'new' that he might devour with his eyes, but rather: 'the foreign', which, however, cannot be confined within the circle *of new faces* and is therefore also called *'the* foreign'. For what is at stake here is a *rupture in the horizon*, or rather the 'liberation' of the horizon itself.

'Like all life-changing encounters, the experience of the tropics
, for example, is unrepeatable; one is easily disappointed when one returns, because the *transformation of the horizon* does not take place again

[8] F. Nietzsche, op. cit., *On the Face and the Riddle*, p. 408 ff.

can." (123) It is *unique*. Whatever comes over one there is not
'merely an encounter with the hitherto unknown', (ibid., note 1) for example, with *new circumstances*, 'which one had not yet known, and in relation to which one must *reorient* oneself'. (124) '"New" signifies a *factual* "strangeness", but an *existential relationship*.' (Ibid.) 'The expression "existential behaviour" does not, of course, denote here anything in which, in a fateful *turn* of events, a "reason" emerges from which something is decided ("clairvoyantly") – rather, it is here precisely *the everyday understanding* of things that contains "motives" – concealed, for the time being, of course.'[9] 'Things are understood each in accordance with a particular *meaning* – wer . The categories are situated within *the horizon* of a particular *interpretation* of existence itself.'[10]

'One succumbs to the allure of the new. One craves, one hungers for the new.' 'One needs the new as *a stimulant* when one is sated and weary. One seeks distraction here, insofar as one does not know what to make of oneself. Curiosity means: getting involved, taking an interest in something that *is none of my business*, for which I am not *the right person*. One grasps at news as the stuff of *non-committal* occupation, insofar as one can make all sorts of things out of it because of its open ambiguity. Here, one surrenders oneself to that which causes one to leap *incessantly* from one thing to another. This grasping for the new is something different from the adventurer's *restlessness*." (124) – He who *'throws* himself into the unknown, takes his chances' (121) – as *his own* cause, for which he is the right man for the job. The adventurer follows the alluring call of the unknown, the encounter with which offers him a

a 'fateful turning point' in his life, which 'irreversibly' *transcends the horizons* of his 'existential behaviour' and the 'interpretation of his very existence' contained therein. That which is therefore – as 'foreign' – is *not* an *objective* 'foreignness' to which he does not bind *himself*, but rather: 'the foreign', to which he knows himself to be *unconditionally* bound, insofar as he can only 'be' what he *is* in its presence and in conjunction with it, that is to say, insofar as he, *as an adventurer,* can only 'find himself' through it. (119) Only the Foreign *enables* him to experience the 'unbound' nature of his 'wandering' beginning, (121) which leaves his possessions behind; (123) yet at the same time it *deprives* him *of* 'the freedom to allow experiences and encounters to *take on definitive meaning* for him'. (121)

9 H. Lipps, 'The Way in Which "Primitives" Experience the World' (1929), in: Works, Vol. V, op. cit., p. 26.
10 Ibid.

Whilst his curiosity seems to be *scattered*, and the *ceaseless* pursuit of the new brings him only *fleeting* satisfaction, the adventurer's aimless wanderings are *inextricably linked to* the foreign land, to which he knows he is destined. It is only the foreign land that deprives him of the chance to find peace in his *own* heart – yet at the same time grants him the intoxicating joy of being able to celebrate his *'arrival'* precisely there. The contours of the 'rupture of the horizon' he has experienced – which, in its uniqueness, signifies an unrepeatable *'transformation of existence'* that cannot be captured at all within an existential relationship in the ordinary sense – become sharper. Here, the foreign does not stand for *something new* in relation to the familiar, but for *the extraordinary*, which fatefully intrudes upon life.

'Horizon, in the usual sense, refers to the boundary of the gaze that penetrates the world and presses towards things. It is a boundary which this gaze *does* not *encounter* as resistance *anywhere*. For it is only to the free—that is, *unobstructed—gaze* that something can reveal itself *as* a horizon, as the boundary up to which the gaze extends, in the sense that it accommodates things beneath the horizon. What is denoted here is a boundary immanent to space, but *not a fixed one*. The transcendence of existence *becomes experience* within the horizon. The abysmal nature of our existence is *encompassed* within it. It manifests itself in the 'indeterminacy' of the horizon, which is a *state of remaining open*. For the horizon is not a boundary in the sense that *the field of vision separates* what lies outside it from what falls within it. The broadening of the horizon signifies *something other* than the broadening of a person's field of vision. For here the aim is merely to free oneself from its *contingencies*. However, the broadening of the horizon does not merely mean becoming acquainted with what was previously unknown. In the process, the individual himself is transformed. He *himself* is characterised by the narrowness and breadth of 'his' horizon." (123, note 1)
The horizon is not a dividing line between what happens to be visible
and the invisible, or between what 'falls' within and outside the field of vision. It does not, for example, demarcate the field of vision as a fixed boundary that is effectively *imposed* on our sight and can only be *shifted* by our own movement. 'Nothing' comes towards us at the horizon that would thereby allow us to draw such a dividing line. The horizon does not exist in the same way that there is a boundary of the field of vision at which sight 'encounters' resistance, where it is forbidden to penetrate or advance towards it. Impenetrable—

The 'distinct' and the 'unavoidable' *'mark'* the boundary of *the field of vision*, which is not merely immanent to space, but is also emphasised by its *occupation*. Only to the unobstructed gaze—that is, the unimpeded gaze —can something reveal itself *as a horizon*; nothing stands in its way that might be 'found'—that is, localised —in space as a 'resisting' element. The horizon 'yields' without resistance, *giving way to* intrusion and counter-pressure; what is conceded beneath it does not possess the specific *'positional value'* against which

vision measures *itself*, but remains *indeterminately open*. The horizon does not 'define' the gaze, whose penetration into space is 'free' *in this respect*, i.e. is not claimed or restricted by what is seen itself.

The fact that, on the horizon, the transcendence of existence becomes 'experience', and that the abysmal nature of our existence is 'encompassed' therein, has a specific meaning. The 'peras-like' nature of the decision as to what 'enters' the field of vision and what remains outside it refers to a limit *imposed externally* upon our vision, which, whilst it may be shifted, cannot be abolished as such. However, no such 'limit' underlies the horizon, for which the course is not *'perashatically'* 'set', but which is rather 'indefinitely open'. The 'breaking through or liberation' of the horizon (123) is not an 'expansion' in the sense of the shifting of a partition that *takes place* within space. The fact that the horizon *'stretches* into the distance' merely expresses how the indeterminate openness *grows*, to which no *specific spatial location* can be assigned in space against which the power of sight measures *itself*. What comes to *pass* in the 'break in the horizon' is not that which enters the field of vision, 'whose contingencies' it is, in its expansion,
'to become free is the aim'. (123, note 1) There is *nothing permanent* that one *'disposes* of' in a decision. The fact that, on the horizon, the transcendence of Dasein becomes 'experience', and that the abysmal nature of our Dasein is 'taken up' therein (ibid.), does *not* point to *an 'existential relationship'* that is *transcended* precisely here. In the horizon, the abysmal nature of our existence is taken up as an *apeiron*, which is precisely not an 'invisible' thing that could be 'made' visible. What becomes 'experience' in the horizon as the transcendence of existence is something *that is, in principle*, *invisible*, and whose 'becoming free' does not mean 'becoming free from contingencies'. *The free horizon is not something over which existence has control in its conduct*. In that 'the adventurer *is not bound to any* place' (120), he *exists* precisely *on the free horizon*.

Given the nature of making things visible through one's own movement, the latter is something extraordinary – and it is precisely this that the adventurer *'takes a chance* on' by yielding to the temptation. For the adventurer, security is indeed a 'restrictive boundary' (124), yet the vastness of the open horizon is not *merely* 'uncertain' – just as the love of travel, for instance, relishes the uncertainty of the open expanse as a thrill of discovering 'new faces', in order to escape the 'boredom of the familiar'. *It is* not the unusual, but *the* extraordinary *that be s* 'the foreign' to him. It shows him no changing *faces*; rather, it is *a 'mystery'* to him. It reveals 'the face of the loneliest' [11].

'And now a thirst gnaws at me, a longing that will never be still.' [12]

- Shades of the Unknown

'One would like *to catch* a glimpse of where the adventurer is heading,' (124) of the *shiver* that runs down his spine as he does so.
For example, 'one seeks *the thrill of danger* and relishes this sense of playful tension that prevents things from becoming serious.' (Ibid.) Even at the circus, one seeks to get close to that shiver – 'insofar as it merely "spills over" into the security of one's own self, which the spectator never abandons, and upon which they reflect'. (Ibid.) 'The ingenious sophistication of this daring is striking', (ibid.) which captivates the spectator. '*Even* the shudder *merely brushes* against horror.' (Ibid.) 'Horror is
a *forced* halt.' (Ibid.) In the face of 'darkness' – but also
'One is horrified by "human depravity", for example (124); "in depravity, one encounters human possibilities one would never have believed in. Impenetrable darkness seems to call into question the possibility of seeing as something within my reach." (Ibid.) 'Horror is a *fixation* on *the abysmal and* an escape into the shifting of interpretations; the imagination fills in the gaps where emptiness and darkness can offer no measure.' (Ibid.) 'This is also the basis for the sophistication inherent in *cruelty*, which is anything but as simple and natural as blunt brutality.' (124–125) *Wonder*, on the other hand, is something else,

11 F. Nietzsche, op. cit., *On the Face and the Riddle*, p. 406.
12 Ibid., p. 410.

that 'takes one's breath away'. 'Something elemental manifests itself here that cannot be set aside by reason: one is reduced to silence.' (Ibid., note 1) 'But one can choose to learn *to shudder*. Here one has playful *options for retreat*, telling oneself that it is actually nothing. In feeling a shiver, one merely *savours* the horror', (125) which is therefore not 'pure' horror. 'A thirst for sensation, a shiver, but also the game itself – the *distortion* here lies everywhere in the fact that one wishes to *take* something for oneself.' (125)

The thrill of danger, ingenious acts of daring, chills, flirting with the macabre – all this merely mimics the adventurer's thrill without truly immersing him in these shades of uncertainty. What is laid bare are *the safety nets* in the playful way one deals with the risks one takes. The recklessness with which the adventurer exposes himself to encounters with the unknown mocks such 'escape routes' on which one relies in a petty manner. Adventure is not a game of risks from which one can extricate oneself in good time.

'To call something superstitious is frowned upon, but not as a presumptuous sacrilege. Superstition *recognises itself* as superstition.' (125)
'The wicked man *has* called something forth. What one calls forth comes "upon" one.'
(42) In transgression, *'one fails* to recognise the *limits* set for humankind when one crosses them'. (Ibid.) 'One is under the mistaken impression that just because one does something, one is not necessarily powerful enough to do it.' (Ibid.) '"Not powerful" means […] that something is entirely *beyond my* control'; 'this lack of power becomes apparent in the course of events: for it is not the success of the sacrilege that brings about *Nemesis*. It reveals itself as a vain *endeavour*. The sacrilegious person falls prey to that which he has tampered with.' (Ibid.) 'Superstition is superstitio', (125) but not presumption. 'The superstitious person *respects boundaries* which he somehow "wills"; he *alludes to* what lies *beyond them*.' (Ibid.) Superstition is under no illusion that just because one does something, one is not already powerful over it. 'There is a *temptation* towards superstition, or rather a *playful thrill* in superstitious timidity.' (125) Superstition, however, is not a 'vain undertaking' whose arrogance invites *nemesis*. Whilst the blasphemer '*has* summoned something' (42), the superstitious person distances *himself* from this *past tense*. He merely alludes to something he would not wish to have 'invoked' in the sense that it would 'befall him'. 'The accusation of superstition refers less to a lack of enlightenment than to this *distortion*,' (125)

the act of *not* taking something *seriously*. There is a *playful frivolity* in superstition, but not, as in sacrilege, a *self-defeating vanity*.

'Playful frivolity is expressed in the deliberate choice not to override one's better judgement, but to base a belief—whose fundamental foundation has been lost—on *practical calculation*.' (125) The loss of the foundation of their belief is not a cause for the superstitious person to disbelieve, but rather for a tentative reckoning with the possibility 'that perhaps, after all…'. 'The superstitious person, for example, wishes, following the failure of something, to discover in some trivial matter the warning they failed to recognise. Preparations for something are, for instance, postponed so as not to tempt fate through a confidence that runs ahead of the facts and is flaunted. By banging one's fist on the table, one *saves* oneself.' (125) This *salvation* is not that of the pedant, who 'seeks to shirk responsibility by adhering to rules and templates', thereby 'evading fear'. (110) The superstitious person seeks to forestall a crisis—'against his better judgement'—by having tampered with something that might subsequently befall him as fate. Fate might well be standing at the door, knocking. Yet there is a 'but' when he knocks back. By *adhering* to superstitions, he is not evading fear, but rather the *act of bestowing faith without hesitation*.

'Challenging folly, which takes something as a sign, may, however, be precisely an expression *of an inner sense* of security – of knowing that, despite the precariousness of a situation, one holds the key to it *oneself* – provided that courageous *resolve* succeeds in turning the circumstances to one's advantage.' (125, note 1) The *superator's* maddening attitude is not the calculating one of *the superstes*. 'In superstition, an attitude of the sort *follows*, as it were, *outwardly*:
'No bullet can hit me.' And this means that there are no longer *mere* coincidences for the one whose lot has already been *cast within himself*. Who understands fate as *his* destiny. Who therefore knows that all caution falls *short*." (Ibid.) Madness is brazen.
The adventurer's heart, however, yearns *for distant horizons*.
'And whatever fate and experience may yet be in store for me – there will be *a wandering* in it […]: in the end, one experiences nothing but oneself. The time has passed when I was still allowed to encounter chance occurrences; and what could now befall me that is not already my own!

It merely returns, it finally comes home to me – my own self, and that part of it which has *long* been *in a foreign land* and scattered amongst all things and coincidences."[13]

13 F. Nietzsche, op. cit., *The Wanderer*, p. 403.

The Team of Intention. Hatred

'… it is hatred that one becomes aware of *within oneself* here – as an intention in which one *lives* […]'

'Hatred is not a qualitatively ultimate thing, but an *intention* into which – in a *typical process* of self-interpretation – the most diverse elements converge.'
(p. 130)

- Directedness and Thought

Whilst *'fulfilment* is sought in play' (119) and 'the adventurer, too, seeks fulfilment' (121) – of his longing, which 'reaches out into the distance beyond himself' (119) – hatred is 'an *intention* in which one lives' (130) – of which one 'becomes aware *within oneself*'. 'The ever-renewed "passion" of the game demonstrates […] precisely how it is taken and understood *as fulfilment*'. (121) 'The tension between bliss and destruction' (121), in which the player 'lives', is 'a means of *detaching* oneself from "oneself", that is, of shedding the burden of existence as it is felt as boredom and weariness'. (122) 'The restlessness of the adventurer', 'whose path to fulfilment' (124) is something else: he longs 'for *his* distance, for which the foreign stands'. (124) Here, 'a transformation of existence' (121) takes place:
'The encounter with the foreign signifies a liberation and a breaking through of the horizon' (123) – *his own* horizon; for '*man himself* is transformed in the process' (123, note 1), 'by emerging from within himself into the elemental,
that is, by stepping outside oneself'. The realisation of hatred within oneself as an 'intention in which one lives' differs from the 'search for fulfilment', in which the 'passionate' nature of play or the 'addictive' nature of 'longing for' other *'paths* of human existence' respectively pave the way. 'Hatred is not a qualitatively *ultimate thing*.' (130) When 'the

Whilst 'the unbound nature of his beginnings' deprives the wanderer of 'the freedom to find *lasting* meaning in experiences and encounters' (121), 'his distance, for which the foreign land stands' (124) is nonetheless 'enigmatic'. The player, on the other hand, 'for whom life has become insipid, who is simply weary of it, seeks only *temporary* oblivion'. (121) 'The tension between bliss and destruction strikes him in a reality which he has *not* left *at all*.' (121) The game is an existential interlude that 'cheapens itself somewhat'. (123) What, however, 'in a typical process of self-interpretation' 'cumes into' the intention of hatred,
(130) is neither 'mysterious' and alluring goings-on nor cheap marketing.
'The roots from which hatred draws its nourishment, and which determine its strength and duration, are varied.' (129)
If 'passions are *paths of* human existence that can only
can be understood *in the light of their fateful* nature', (123) then
'the typical process of self-interpretation', which takes 'the intention' behind hatred to extremes, is not predetermined by this *perspective*. 'There is passionate hatred. But hatred is not, in and of itself, passion.' (126) 'In the face of the obvious baseness of another's hatred, one may recognise in oneself

'almost driven *mad by* "his" hatred.' (130) But there is also *'clairvoyant,* aggressive hatred'. (129) Hatred does not seek 'to move *away* from oneself […] towards another' – as longing does. (119) Nor does it seek – like the gambler – 'a tension that is repeatable as *a state of being*'. (121) The 'dynamic' of intention in which one lives when one 'becomes aware of hatred here within oneself' (130) is not a longing to 'step *outside* oneself'; (120) nor is any 'new tension brought *into this world*' in order to 'detach oneself from
'to detach oneself from oneself'. (122) The 'being here with oneself' of self-realisation, which
'[may] be *tinged* in various ways', (129) reveals life in the intention of hatred, 'into which the most diverse elements converge',
(130) as an *'elevation'* of itself, in which one 'grasps oneself *as unconditional* – just as in one's conviction'. (118)

'Insofar as one is filled with hatred, becomes absorbed in it, finds oneself in it, it is passionate hatred.' (118) Hatred, however, *seeks* no fulfilment – 'is not in itself already a passion', (126) the intensification of which would signify a 'fulfilment' – 'as if nothing else could exist alongside it'. (118) 'The game is regarded as a passion', (119) from which one 'cannot escape, […] to which one succumbs when one feels the thrill

'has only experienced the game once'. (122) What comes to a head within the intention of hatred forms part of 'a *typical process* of self-interpretation' of that which seizes one in the process. The *'here with oneself'* of becoming aware, in which the intention of hatred is driven to extremes, is confronted by 'the *distance from* oneself' of a longing which seeks to move away from itself – 'absolutely' – towards another. (119) In longing, one does not grasp oneself, but precisely *the distance from oneself* as absolute. Longing means being 'lured' (120) or 'succumbing *to* temptation'. (121) The fact that one 'can almost go mad "in one's own hatred"' (130) does not imply the wandering of someone driven about who fails to 'allow experiences and encounters to take on definitive meaning for oneself'. (121) One *almost* goes *mad at oneself* in 'one's own' hatred – insofar as one *perceives oneself therein as 'absolute*': as in the face of the 'obvious baseness of another's hatred'
(130) the intensity of 'his' hatred escalates to boundless proportions. The yearning springs from an *'unfulfilled* self', which is perceived as absolute. Passionate hatred – 'insofar as one *is filled* with hatred',
(118) 'one perceives oneself as absolutely caught up in it', (118) leads one astray *from oneself* 'in "his" hatred' (130).

'One equates hatred with antipathy, contempt, etc., and its place in this series seems to be determined by its opposition to love. The opposite of love, however, is not hatred, but *lovelessness*.' (126) In the series of so-called 'feelings', 'sympathies' and moral feelings – for 'just as respect is a moral feeling, so too is contempt' (127) – love should occupy the leading position. Nevertheless: *'longing* is hidden within love.[1] Love is not a desire to possess. Or rather, the possession of the beloved is merely a *condition* for the fulfilment of love.' (126, note 1) Even jealousy, which seeks to understand the uniqueness of the loving relationship 'as exclusivity', 'already betrays the beloved in this very act'.
(117) Lovers 'can *simply* "be there" for one another.' (36) The fact that 'longing is hidden' in love (126, note 1) means that one
'can only "be" what one is "with and alongside" the beloved'. (119)

1 As early as M. Scheler's *Phenomenology of Love and Hate*, love and hate are distinguished as 'emotional stirrings' from 'feelings, affects' and, in particular, from 'empathy' – cf. M. Scheler, *The Nature and Forms of Sympathy*, trans. F. Cohen, Bonn 1926,
pp. 165 ff. and p. 169.

One does not simply make a claim on the other in something that is to be 'fulfilled' as a condition. (119) Love is not fulfilled in the 'appropriation' of the beloved. As longing, it is 'unconditional'.

(119) However, the 'simply being there for one another' of the lovers is by no means *'selfless'*. 'One is selfless or selfish […] *in relation to something*. Insofar as one thinks of oneself in the process, or acts with regard to the other.' (126, note 1) As longing, love is not
'considerate' in a certain respect – with regard to what the beloved 'wants'. The 'simply being there for one another' of the lovers is
'Unquestioning': love does not *question* the other. 'The opposite of love, however, is not hatred, but lovelessness.' (126) The fact that love can
'turn into' hatred does not indicate a *contradictory* relationship,
that is to say, a counter-movement against the unique *'participation'* in the loving relationship. What can *'turn into* its opposite' is the *unquestioning nature* of 'loving', which is precisely 'not a desire to possess'. (126) 'Lack of love' is the opposite of love insofar as the longing hidden within it has *given way*: one can no longer 'be what one is' *'with and alongside'* the beloved. (119) One is 'with something' in which one
'thinks of oneself' or, in relation to the other, 'takes into account'. The 'transformation' of love into hatred, on the other hand, is a
'transformation' of its *longing*, which is 'absolute'. 'Passionate hatred', which is 'inaccessible to rational consideration', means,
'that one finds oneself *utterly* caught up in it – just as in one's conviction'. (118) 'Passion is *unreserved*.' (Ibid.) 'Fiery hatred' (130) and fiery love are indispensable. It is only in their *transformation* – their blindness to conditions – that hatred and love converge. Yet these conditions are present *differently* in hatred and love respectively.[2]

'The fact that it is directed and that it is *a* thought distinguishes […] hatred from *antipathy*.' (126) 'For the fact that one directs this towards someone *merely* means that it has its origin within me.' (Ibid.) 'To be sympathetic is to *be taken* with … The impression someone makes on me, the way they affect me, is sympathetic. And antipathy means *feeling repelled*. Sympathy and antipathy are forms of *being attuned to one another*.' (Ibid.) 'Antipathy towards someone leads one to avoid them. One holds back. Even the thought of the other person is irritating. One becomes aware of a specific vulnerability towards

[2] For the specific 'blindness' of love and hate in each case, see the phenomenological discussions below.

towards 'such' a person. Even in conversation, one seeks to avoid the subject when the talk turns to him.' (Ibid.) Antipathy does not 'target' the other person. It is simply 'a certain way of *being in the presence* of'
(99) She wishes to push the other person away. 'Even in that inexpressible first impression, one person *comes* across as likeable or unlikeable to another. They exert a force of attraction or repulsion. This aversion leads me to *keep my distance* from the person in question and to try to avoid them. Even in my thoughts I avoid dwelling on an unsympathetic person." [3] "Hatred, however, is *quite different*." (Ibid.) "In hatred, however, *one focuses* specifically on the other person." (126) "One practically *pursues* them in *one's thoughts* and *cannot let go*. Antipathy can, for example, turn into hatred. Namely when one is forced by circumstances and living conditions to endure the other's proximity. Out of necessity, one then has to deal with them.' (Ibid.) According to

According to F. Kluge's *Etymological Dictionary of the German Language*, the Old High German word **hazzên, hazzôn** ( ) means 'to pursue' – – whilst the Old Saxon **hâton** means 'to stalk'.[4] O. F. Bollnow, in particular, also draws attention to this basic meaning.[5] The fact that antipathy turns into hatred does not merely mean that it is 'taken up here' (ibid.) – *that* one *invests oneself in it* – whilst 'being in a certain frame of mind' does indeed 'come from within me', but 'without my "self" being present in it, as in grief or joy, or as my *nature* reveals itself in my inclinations'. (98) 'As *a thought*, antipathy is taken up here'

(126) – and not as an 'aversion' or a 'feeling of repulsion' whose direction is 'reversed': 'reversal' here means something other than a 'bending' of avoidance in the rotational movement of a forced 'persistence in'. 'Hatred *accounts for* [antipathy]. One seeks to *prove* to oneself that the other is *hateful*.' (126) This 'state of

mind' *tips over into* 'a way of sensing and *thinking*': 'Hatred is […] a *way of sensing and thinking*'. (127) 'Hatred seeks to be *justified*. It *relishes and savours* the stupidity that confirms it. Hatred *intensifies* in this way. And one *settles* into it.' (126)

3 O. F. Bollnow, *Simple Morality*, in: ibid., *Writings: A Study Edition in 12 Volumes*. Edited by U. Boelhauve, G. Kühne-Bertram, H.-U. Lessing and F. Rodi. Vol. III, Königs hausen & Neumann, Würzburg 2009, p. 78.
4 K. J. Trübner, Strasbourg 1894, p. 157.
5 O. F. Bollnow, op. cit., p. 79.

In view of the peculiar *directedness* of emotional 'acts' such as love and hate, M. Scheler points out, on the one hand, that in the alternation of emotional states they *'remain* fixed on their object like calm, steady rays',[6] whilst, on the other hand, drawing attention to the fact that 'love and hate necessarily target an individual core of things, a *core of value* – if I may put it this way – which can never be fully dissolved into assessable values, nor even into separately perceptible ones'.[7] 'They are entirely primordial and immediate modes of emotional behaviour towards *the value-content* itself, so that not even a function of assimilating the value (e.g. of feeling, of preferring) is phenomenologically present here; least of all, however, a value judgement.'[8] 'Nothing bears witness to this fact as much as the extraordinary *helplessness* into which we see human beings fall when they are asked to 'justify' their love and their hatred. It is precisely here that it becomes apparent how these 'reasons' are always sought only *retrospectively* and how, in their totality , they *never* precisely cover the nature and extent of what is to be 'justified'."[9] The question arises, however, as to whether such an 'act-intentional' description of emotional phenomena such as love and hatred – from H. Lipps's perspective – holds true without further qualification; that is, whether it captures, right down to its innermost core, the *interplay of intention* in which one lives when one 'becomes aware of the hatred within oneself'. The 'persistence' of 'calm, steady rays' upon an object that represents a 'core of value', whose 'content'—accessed 'immediately' or 'originally'—is, phenomenologically speaking, neither 'given' through a function of reception nor a

'Judgement' – the 'rationale' for which is always provided only after the event and by no means 'corresponds' to the inner reasons from which it draws – perhaps does not yet fully capture the *'judgement'* of hatred, which is *'judgement and thought'*, *'intent and thinking' all* in one.

For the 'aiming' of hatred is not simply *a matter of* calm, steady rays *resting* upon an object – but rather a *'pursuit'* and *'hunting down*'. Nor does this correspond to *any* meaningful *core of value that is grasped immediately* and *originally*. The

6 M. Scheler, op. cit., p. 169.
7 M. Scheler, op. cit., p. 172.
8 M. Scheler, op. cit., p. 171.
9 M. Scheler, op. cit., pp. 171–172.

Pursuit and re-enactment are, rather, a *'fixation on'* in thought, without, however, being able to break free. (126) 'Hatred *sinks its teeth* right into its object.' (127) Hatred *'broods*'. 'Hatred *consumes;* one *loses oneself in it*. Insofar as it can – often *delusionally* – seek to draw everything into its orbit. Its greatest power is concentrated therein.' (126–127) Whilst 'antipathy *blocks* access', 'hatred downright *blinds*'.

(127) 'Antipathy *prevents* one from doing something; one seeks to overcome it or at least to rise above it. Certainly – "one cannot go against one's nature". Here, however, this merely means that antipathy is an *emotion*. […] Unlike antipathy, which characterises a person's nature, a person's hatred already bears *the stamp of their mind*.' (127)

That love is a movement 'in which every concrete, individual object that embodies values attains the highest values possible for it and in accordance with its ideal destiny; or in which it attains its ideal value-being, which is peculiar to it; whilst hatred is the movement that is the opposite of this'[10] , which is 'linked to a positive focus on the possible lower value'[11] ; it is in this that, for Scheler, the respective 'creative' or 'destructive' character of these emotional acts is manifested. Once again, we must ask whether the image of *a ladder* leading upwards or downwards – even if it essentially involves an unfolding of value content inherent in the movement itself – provides us with an accurate description. Just as the persistence of firm, steady rays is perceptible only to the 'clairvoyant',

Whilst this may apply to a certain extent to 'biting' hatred, but not to the 'obstinate', 'corrosive' hatred (129 –130), the
'emotion linked to a *positive outlook* on the possible inferior value' of hatred, in turn, obscures the fact that hatred
'sees little other than that, by intruding and pressing in, it *distorts* things'. (128) Just as 'longing is *hidden* in love', (126, note 1) so 'hatred plots destruction'. (128–129) Love yearns and sighs; hatred broods and consumes. What stands in the way of an unbiased description is the view espoused by Scheler, according to which 'in the acts of love and hatred we see acts which, *by their very nature*, […] are mediated through *values to* objects', namely

[10] M. Scheler, op. cit., p. 187.
[11] M. Scheler, op. cit., p. 176.

'in an *intentional* movement', in which – in the case of love –
'the manifestation of an object's higher value *is realised* on the basis of a given value A of that object'.[12] Even if, according to Scheler, the 'intentional movement' means that something is added to the 'values already given "as real"', which, as 'still possible "higher" values', are by no means already 'given as positive qualities' – but which, , are rather merely 'co-intended as possible "foundations" of a *holistic and Gestalt* structure' –13 , the question still remains as to what the origin of the 'integrative' holistic or Gestalt structure of the 'value-objects'[14] in question is.

What hatred seeks to 'draw into its orbit' through contemplation, what the thoughts and longings of love cherish: one cannot hope to approach it through an 'intentional movement' which 'passes through *values* onto objects', upon which 'the manifestation of lower or higher values is realised' – values which, whilst not 'actually given', yet are *'co-intended'* as 'possible foundations of a holistic structure'. The 'distorting mirror' of hatred reveals no more than the *forgiving* 'service of love' does any nuances of 'value-objects' on the scale from the higher to the lower (and vice versa), starting from a value 'already given as real'.[15] The delusional 'blindness' of vengeful hatred *seeks*, rather – unlike the forgiving
'overlooking' of courtly love, 'which *regards* something *as nothing*' – (128)
to draw the *most diverse elements* into its peculiar sphere. What crystallises in various ways within the 'process of self-interpretation' or in 'devoted emotion', in *'thoughts* that will not let go', (127) which 'search for reasons for …' (129) or in a 'teaching *of* seeing' that 'causes one to overlook objections', requires close examination. At issue here is the *'realisation of the manifestation* of a value-content': of that which is 'worthy of hatred' or 'worthy of love', of which M. Scheler himself asserts that it stems neither from ' e function of assimilating the value' nor from a 'value judgement',[16] and that it *is* even *'indifferent'* to the two cases of the 'existence' or 'non-existence' of the value content in question

12 M. Scheler, op. cit., p. 178 and p. 177.
13 M. Scheler, op. cit., p. 177.
14 M. Scheler, op. cit., p. 181.
15 M. Scheler, op. cit., p. 177.
16 M. Scheler, op. cit., p. 171.

'rent'." [17] That hatred "aims at annihilation" (127–128), therein
'strengthens' – courtly love thereby 'teaches one to see' by 'allowing one to overlook', wishes to 'regard as nothing' (ibid.), anything that might cloud her flirtation – from this it follows that the pairing of the intention of 'persistent' hatred (128) and light-footed courtly love is, even *as an intention*, fundamentally different in each case. We are not speaking here of a descent or ascent on a scale of values, starting from a value taken as given in reality; rather, we are speaking of the *'intensifying condensation'* of *an 'affection'* which is, in fact, *'reborn'* within the pairing of an intention, (cf. 16) whose 'senses and thinking' in the case of relentless hatred, and whose 'senses and aspirations' in the case of flirtatious love, form a distinct 'spiritual character'. For hatred cannot 'break free' from the one *towards* whom it
'lingers, probing' (128), whilst love 'allows one to overlook' what courtly love, in its flirtatious manner, merely wishes to *'brush against'* – this fact *prevents* us from attributing their respective distinct 'pairings' and 'enclosures' to the unifying 'framework' of an 'intentional value-oriented behaviour', i.e. behaviour directed towards non-existent but 'co-intended' lower or higher values – linked to a real value – whose 'manifestation' is to be 'realised' in the intentional movement, specifically with a view to be 'regarded' as 'possible foundations of a holistic or Gestalt structure'.

- The *'typical course'* of hatred

'Unlike antipathy, which characterises *a* person's *nature*, a person's hatred already bears the stamp of their *mind*.' (127) 'My antipathy is something I *cannot help feeling*, for or against. For to overcome it is not the same as *to eliminate* it.' (136) 'A person's spirituality—to which they are *open-minded* and *perceptive*—can be revealed where the enemy is *recognised* within hatred. Yet every hatred is a sign of *a way of thinking*.' (132) By 'way of thinking', Kant initially refers to a 'source of one's behaviour *opened up* by the person *themselves*'.[18] But

17 M. Scheler, op. cit., p. 181.
18 I. Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*. Reclam, Stuttgart 1983, p. 243 [293].

'A person's way of thinking is not simply their *attitude*. It *is revealed* in what they *have in mind* towards others, or in the intentions they harbour.' (132, note 2) A person's way of thinking 'can be understood, amongst other things, [by their hatred]'. (132) 'Whilst one can meet on a certain *wavelength* and understand one another *objectively*, there is also a *harmony of minds*, a sympathy in one's *way of thinking*. How one relates to others and to oneself, how one approaches life—this reveals what a person is like: what they shamefully keep at a distance, what they prudishly shrink from; how envious and vindictive they are, how they cowardly seek to shift the blame onto others; how they respond to what others say—in general: *what prompts* them *to react in a particular way*." (132) 'Hatred, however, has the most varied motives and does not, *in* and *of itself,* define a person.' (129)

'The mode of thinking is not yet the *"character* that man bestows upon himself " (Kant).' (148) According to Kant, 'character' consists 'precisely in the *originality* of the mode of thinking'.[19] What is perceived as *'typical'* in the process of self-interpretation, in which 'the most diverse elements converge towards the intention of hatred' (130), are not, in this respect, 'traits of character'. A person's 'way of thinking', their 'intellectual nature', is revealed in hatred, (130) – that is, something which, as a 'mark', does not – unlike antipathy – 'characterise someone's *nature*'. (127)

'After all – nature is not simply *bestowed upon* me in the same way as my talent, for example, which one discovers within oneself – that is, something to which one has a free relationship of ownership, which one can develop and apply, but which one can also leave untapped.' (136) The fact that antipathy 'characterises someone's nature' (127) is precisely evident in the fact that, whilst seeking to overcome it, one is unable to eliminate it. It can only be 'redirected', but not 'overcome'. It is *not freely* applied. 'A person's nature, however, is understood as "their own" and not as a specific nature *found* solely in them. A person's antipathy is not viewed as *the natural cause* of something, in the same way that the scuffle between a dog and a cat is something natural. In one's nature, one is *given* "oneself"; one follows *oneself* within it.' (136) As an 'affection' (127), 'antipathy signifies a feeling of repulsion' (126) 'which one *directs towards* someone', i.e. which has its cause *in me* insofar as antipathy is a
'The way of being attuned to him' is what connects me to the other

19 I. Kant, op. cit., p. 243 [293]; cf. H. Lipps, Die menschliche Natur, op. cit., p. 150.

can be *avoided*. One acts in this way, or rather one is 'given to oneself' in this way, by '*holding* back' (126) or by not even wanting to allow the thought of the other to arise. 'Antipathy *blocks* access.' (127) 'This attitude effectively *shuts off* the emotions.' (21) 'Even in conversation, one seeks to evade the subject when the talk turns to him.'
(126) In hatred, however, antipathy is *taken up* precisely as a thought. (126) This, however, points to a *'rebirth'* of the affect within the intention of hatred, in which one is not 'given to oneself', 'follows oneself' – but rather 'pursues *the other* in one's thoughts and cannot shake them off', (126) 'stalk[s] them'. 'It is precisely in intentions that the *transcendence* of the human being comes to light […].'
(133) The way in which it is tailored to a person's way of thinking, and cannot be understood as 'their' nature, can now be gleaned from the course of self-interpretation that is 'typical' of hatred. (130) For 'one *places oneself* within *it*, […] one *presents oneself within* it' (126) in that, in hatred, one mentally pursues the Other, from whom one cannot break free. Just how little one is 'true to oneself' in this, 'follows oneself' in this, is demonstrated not only by the obstinate hatred 'from which one can no longer escape, in which one *loses* oneself' (130), but also by 'the *dull, smouldering* hatred'. (Ibid.) And 'in the face of the obvious baseness of another's hatred, one can almost go mad *at oneself* in "one's own hatred".' (Ibid.) It is precisely the *clarity* of 'one's own' hatred that drives one *mad* here.

'Hatred does not possess *the sovereignty* of contempt, for example. With contempt one *punishes* someone. In contempt – in contrast to esteem, which, like it, is a moral feeling[20] – a judgement is passed *on* someone. Esteem is simply due as *an attitude*.[21] Contempt-

20 On 'respect', see I. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, Meiner, Hamburg 1974,

p. 88 ff. [133 ff.], in particular Kant's reference to Fontenelle (op. cit., p. 90 [136 ff.]), in where he describes respect as a *'bowing* of the mind'.

21 M. Scheler, on the other hand, takes a different view: 'There may be *emotional acts* for which the *performance*

is *a prerequisite for a judgement* (or, rather, an assessment). To me, one such prerequisite appears to be 'respect'; it presupposes that initial distance from the object which, prior to the onset *of the emotional act*, makes a value judgement alone possible. It must also have the value of the object towards which it is directed present in a *specific intention*. […] in the case of esteem, the value in question is given in advance in a specific intention.' (op. cit., p. 171) – According to Kant, however, 'this peculiar feeling, which

must not be compared *with any pathological* condition', cannot be 'more appropriately designated' by any other name than that of the *'moral* feeling'. (I. Kant, op. cit., p. 89 [135]) 'Respect […] is a feeling which

Respect, on the other hand, requires *a reason and justification*. Namely, that one can *no longer* respect the other person. There is a right to respect which one no longer acknowledges in the other person. Disrespect means: failing to show respect. Namely, in one's attitude and mindset. Contempt, however, is more than that. For it *affects* the person.' (127) 'Contempt disregards the other person, turns away from them and *affects them* precisely by *overlooking* them.'
(127) It is *'the* person' *who* is affected here. – 'Insofar as a person […] is overlooked, they are vulnerable, and the demeaning and hurtful nature of *mockery and scorn* lies in the *intention* behind this overlooking.' (113) 'To "punish" someone with contempt, however, means: to make them *bear* this contempt *as a consequence*. This implies that they are not merely the object of this contempt and cannot simply escape it as a matter of "fate". "Bearing" is an *active* act. It stands in tension against resistance and the concrete. Insofar as one bears something, one comes to terms with it. Bearing is an achievement. Whoever bears something does not, in that respect, yield. And insofar as one bears something *as a consequence*, one does not, in fact, slip into becoming a mere object of punishment. As is the case, for instance, when, in self-deception about what this contempt actually 'strikes' here, that is to say,

is brought about by an *intellectual cause*, and this feeling is the only one which we recognise *entirely a priori*, and whose necessity we can comprehend. (op. cit., p. 86 [130]) 'This feeling (known as the moral feeling) is therefore brought about solely by reason. It does not serve to *judge* actions, let alone to establish the objective moral law itself, but merely as *the driving force* to make this law a maxim within oneself.' (op. cit., p. 89 [135]) 'Respect is a *tribute* which we cannot withhold from *merit*, whether we wish to or not; we may at most refrain from showing it outwardly, but we cannot prevent ourselves from feeling it *inwardly*.' (op. cit., p. 90 [137]) – What appears to differ here is the
'clairvoyance' of *the 'appreciation'* which M. Scheler, in a value-intentional 'Ein-
'appraisal', which provides the 'motive' for a subsequent *emotional act*, is based, I. Kant describes this as a 'taming of self-conceit', as a 'subduing of my pride', as an *'appearance in a purer light'* of a person's inner lawfulness, which is then also 'held up' as an example – so that I may 'see before me, *proven by action*, the feasibility of obeying it'. (I. Kant, op. cit., pp. 90–91 [136–138]) For, according to Kant, 'the cause of the determination of the sensation which we call respect lies in pure practical reason, and this sensation cannot therefore, by virtue of its origin, be called pathological, but must be called *practically effective*'. (op. cit., pp. 88–89 [134]) Once again, it becomes apparent here how precisely the 'intentionality' of 'evaluative' behaviour towards – personal – 'objects of value' constitutes the elements of the
'downgrading' of 'self-love' and 'conceit' or the 'exemplary
self-restraint' of a person's inner sense of right and wrong, which the moral

to which it returns and towards which it moves, merely sought to *resign itself* to this contempt. The fact that one is the subject of punishment and not its object is precisely what distinguishes punishment from retribution. Insofar as one bears the punishment as a consequence, one is thereby brought back *to oneself*. This *return to oneself* is *inaugurated* in the act of punishment. Retribution, however, merely causes one to 'thinks of it again', provided, for example, that he had already forgotten it again.' [22] The fact that contempt 'affects the other precisely by overlooking him' (127) is by no means merely its 'intention' – which, like respect, is in turn a 'moral feeling'. For in this act of overlooking, 'a judgement is passed *on* someone' which affects the other's *'claim* to respect' (127), which contempt *denies* them – and in doing so is precisely 'punitive'. It is not 'the belittling and hurtful nature of mockery and scorn that lies in the intention of this

overlooking' – as when, for example, one 'laughs at a *person* falling over', and consequently does not regard them *as a person* in the sense that something has 'happened' to them.
(113) The 'overlooking' of contempt is, in this respect, 'justified' and
'justified' when his *'offence'* against someone, through his own actions, makes 'the restoration *of any* relationship with that person' impossible,
(127) which does not merely 'regard' him as a person, but *'acknowledges'* him as such. A deliberate act of overlooking, such as that found in mockery and scorn, is by no means a 'justified' one, unlike that of reproachful contempt. It is not a 'hurtful belittlement' – of his person – that is increasingly carried into the ridicule of a human being, but rather a 'all-too-human' transgression is reproached in a vindictive manner, which – significantly – highlights precisely a 'profound' failure of his dignity as a person. The mocking gaze follows with displeased malice what has 'unexpectedly' *befallen* a person. '"Befallen" – this emphasises *a* casual *yielding*, the fact that one has not been able to *bring* oneself *to do* something'. (40) But: 'It is through *fate that* one falls into guilt.' (Ibid.) 'We distinguish between *fortune* – something that merely befalls a person, which must be avoided or averted, from which one must free oneself – and *fate,* which one must "be" as "one's own", which one must *take upon* oneself. The fact that something in my fate comes *'from* within me' is different from the possibility that the reasons for this may lie in my nature, such that I am pursued by something as a misfortune typical of me—

[22] H. Lipps, 'Responsibility, Attribution, Punishment (1937)', in: The Reality of Man. Works, Vol. V, Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main 1977, pp. 80–81.

de." (139) Through its relentless severity, the contemptuous gaze forces a person back to their "past" culpability.
'Past guilt' refers to an 'act committed' for which one must answer to oneself – not to a 'typical' misstep rooted in one's nature, for which one can
'excuse' oneself.
'It is precisely the ordinary, the commonplace that counts – as an excuse – as
'human'. One is also led to understand human nature in this way, for example, through stupidity. For what is stupidity? Not simply a lack of talent. Stupidity means obstinate lack of freedom, complacent narrow-mindedness, good-natured blindness. It is a *moral* matter.' (40) *Self-inflicted* stupidity is not, as , 'merely a lack of judgement without wit *(stupiditas)'* – as
'But the same flaw, when combined with wit, is foolishness.' [23] It is, as something 'all too human', precisely unforgivable. – 'In a *humiliation,* […] something is revealed as *mere pretence*. In a humiliation, one falls short of expectations that one has either raised oneself or to which one has given cause. One falls short of the appearance one has presented. Disgrace is the consequence of *arrogance*. To be disgraced is to have become a laughing stock. One cannot disgrace someone in the same way that one can shame or expose them; one *can* only *let* them *disgrace themselves*. That is to say, lead them into it. Disgraces are, in a trivial sense*, avoidable*. In humiliation, no vulnerability is revealed: it is the *unreality* of an appearance, but not the *absence* of vulnerability, that comes to light.' (39–40) 'For by having "failed", one is not actually caught out in a lie. It is as though one had merely pretended something. For I myself remain here precisely – in the ambiguous light in which I appear – *the measure* of my transgressions.' (40) 'My' misjudgement was *'genuine'*. The lack of vulnerability, however, is a *'betrayal of oneself'*, that is, 'a falling away from oneself'. (33) 'Being humiliated is a fate that befalls one. There is no word for the emotion into which one is thereby plunged. The vividness of humiliation, however, means that my state of mind on other occasions can be described as "feeling as though one were humiliated".' (40, note 1) One can 'only feel embarrassed in one's

own eyes through the eyes *of* another', whilst one 'can *feel ashamed just* as *fundamentally* before oneself as before another'. (40) 'One sees oneself, after all,

[23] I. Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, op. cit., p. 134 [203–204].

'yet here *in the situation* of embarrassment. One is only embarrassed if something has come to light.' (Ibid.) However, one feels ashamed 'even *when no one sees it*, when no one knows anything about it; and one feels *doubly* ashamed precisely because it is not thought of me.' (Ibid.)

Embarrassment concerns *'faults'* in *one's* 'assessment' *of oneself*; contempt is directed at an *offence* committed against *others*. There is no question here of a misjudgement that is, at any rate, 'genuine'. It cannot be remedied by shame; for it does not relate to a lack of vulnerability: to a falling away from oneself. It is not the person who – having betrayed themselves – ought to feel ashamed who is despised. Contempt is a *moral* emotion. It denies a person the right to respect on the grounds that they have wronged another person – precisely *in this respect*. In this respect, contempt is entirely *'just'*. For it *'judges'* the person by virtue of the *universal validity of this claim*—as the inner lawfulness of *every* moral act—which the person has violated through the act committed. In view of this *legal basis*, contempt is precisely 'sovereign', (127)
i.e. *unrestricted*. 'Hatred and contempt *are mutually exclusive*.' [24]
(127) Hatred does not overlook, but *'latches* onto its object'. (127) 'And in contrast to contempt, which affects human beings *as such*, *all manner of things* can be hated: not only specific people, but also such things as pedantry, verbosity, a certain kind of compulsion, and so on.' (127) 'Human beings as such' – this does not mean 'human beings in general' here – any more than 'certain people' refers to a specific individual. 'One always hates "*this sort of …*"'. So, in part, things for which the person in whom they manifest themselves is actually not at all to blame. Things that arise solely through circumstances. Because hatred is *a form of thought*, one hates 'this sort of thing' in a person, that is, a generality." (127) Contempt, as a moral emotion, strikes the human being par excellence; that is to say, however, this particular individual from whom 'the restoration *of any* relationship is cut off'. (127) Whereas any circumstance can bring out 'this sort of …' in a person, into which hatred sinks its teeth.

[24] See A. Schopenhauer, *Parerga and Paralipomena: Minor Philosophical Writings*. II. Second Volume. Diogenes, Zurich 1977, § 324, p. 642: 'Hatred and contempt are in clear opposition to one another and are mutually exclusive.'

'Conversely, one loves something in another person solely because one loves *that person oneself*; *from that perspective,* one then sees it in a special light.' (127) Love is not – like hatred – a form of thought. 'Love teaches us *to see*.' (128) It does not overlook the particular person with a view to
'to sever all ties with them'. (127) It does not fixate
'this kind of' feeling towards a person, which may in part be brought about by particular circumstances. What is loved in another person appears *to emanate from that person themselves*. What is 'special' here is *the light* that radiates from them. The vision of love is thus made possible by the fact that its radiance comes from the beloved themselves. From this, it has drawn the freedom that 'allows one to overlook objective objections'.
(128) 'Its blindness to the other's weaknesses means: to regard them as nothing.' (Ibid.) Love is 'unconditional' (128) in that it has embraced the freedom of vision in that radiance which has come to it from the beloved themselves. 'For it is *the other who* is loved, *pure and* simple' –
(128) and not, for example, *'humanity* as such'. (127) Contempt denies the individual human being the right to respect; love

'pay no heed' to anything that might dim the special light in which the other appears. Yet the particular circumstances themselves partly determine that one hates 'this quality' in a person, 'and thus a general one'. (127) 'One can also hate oneself, namely something within oneself: the very intensity of a hatred is a symptom that one hates something *within oneself* as something rebellious, but *in the other*. What the hatred *refers* to is *not* the person it *strikes*.' (127) Hatred draws 'the *most diverse* things' into its sphere. (129; cf. 126) This, however, in turn sheds light on the manner in which the emotion of antipathy is 'reborn' in the intention of hatred, how it is taken up here 'as a thought'. (126) That which 'intensifies and condenses' in hatred,倾注 into it and is subsequently 'released into itself', (130; cf. 16–17) is not to be understood as a *'parable'*, i.e. 'as a figurative condensation of something that is, at first and solely, *actually comprehensible*'. (14) Hatred is a form of sensing and thinking that 'downright blinds', (127) i.e.
'in the act of scrutinising the other in search of reasons for …' (129) *'distorts* things'. (128) 'One seeks to prove to oneself that the other is hateful', (126) whereby *'the most diverse things crystallise* into hatred'. (129) Yet there are *no analogies* to anything that is actually 'conceived' *in advance* as hatred – in which hatred, for instance, 'condenses into a vivid image' – nor are there any *'acts of comparison'* with any

object of value that could be figuratively depicted as a 'bearer' of 'non-values' or 'negative values'. [25]

We thus touch upon 'the most difficult aspect of the question' concerning the *'existence* of objects of value in love and hate', as M. Scheler presents it by drawing a complete parallel between the two 'emotional fundamental phenomena'.[26] According to him, 'love is' 'the movement in the direction from lower value to higher value',[27] whilst hatred is the opposite movement;[28] 'generally speaking, the lower value' or the higher value 'is given to us'. 'In the case of love for a person', according to Scheler, 'an *"ideal value-image* of that person is, as it were, *pre-drawn* within the movement itself", which is not "derived" from their empirical values that are felt, but *is* nevertheless *built* upon these felt values'.[29] Hatred, on the other hand, is 'in the strictest sense of the word "destructive"',[30] because, unlike love, it does not, 'creatively', 'bring entirely new and higher values into existence', but – destructively – 'effectively destroys the higher values'.[31] What Scheler has in mind with 'co-intended possible foundations of a holistic and Gestalt structure' [32] is, with regard to such a 'quasi-predetermined' 'ideal' or

a 'negative' *concept of value*. Nevertheless, Scheler himself must admit that not only 'this "superiority" and "inferiority" of values […] exist in principle *without an act* of *comparison* between values, such as is always implied, for example, in "preferring"', [33] but also that, in the case of love, 'there is no *distinction* between what I called an "empirical value fact" and an "ideal value image" in the above case' – and cor , in the case of hatred, there is no distinction between the felt empirical values and the 'negative value image'.[34] 'It is love itself that brings the ever-higher value to the fore in the object in *a* wholly *continuous* manner, and indeed in the course of its movement – as if it *were flowing* "of its own accord" from the beloved object itself […].'[35]

25 M. Scheler, op. cit., p. 176.
26 M. Scheler, op. cit., p. 182.
27 M. Scheler, op. cit., p. 181.
28 M. Scheler, op. cit., p. 187.
29 M. Scheler, op. cit., p. 181.
30 M. Scheler, op. cit., p. 178.
31 M. Scheler, op. cit., p. 178.
32 M. Scheler, op. cit., p. 177.
33 M. Scheler, op. cit., p. 176.
34 M. Scheler, op. cit., p. 182.
35 Ibid.

'[…] It may be said that true love *opens the mind's eyes* to ever higher values in the beloved object; it *enables one to see them* […].' [36] Hatred is therefore destructive 'in the strictest sense of the word' because it 'consequently dulls and blinds the eyes of cognitive preference and feeling [for the higher values]. 'Because it destroys them [in relation to these spheres], it is only then that they become imperceptible.' [37] With this twofold admission, however, Scheler himself undermines his act-intentional analysis of the 'objects of value' of love and hatred. What stands in the way of a more impartial analysis of the aforementioned fundamental emotional phenomena is Scheler's own starting point, according to which 'in the acts of love and hate we see such acts , which, by their very nature, […] are directed *towards objects through values*'.[38] However, *the way in which* love 'contemplates and strives', whilst hatred 'contemplates and thinks', is fundamentally different even *as a pair of intentions*. This 'precludes, however, [hatred] from being understood as the negative counterpart to love'. (128) The *basis for the manifestation of the objects of* hatred *and love*, respectively, is different in each case. In view of these differing *foundations within the* very *process of manifestation* itself, an 'act-intentional' analysis of the 'objects of value' of love or of hatred focuses on the *phenomenological quality* of the respective 'value-contents' or 'value-cores' in question,[39] by characterising these as 'higher' or 'lower' in relation to a, as it were, pre-defined 'ideal image of value' or its 'worthless' counterpart . The movement of love or hatred is not simply a matter of 'opening one's eyes' or 'rendering them dull and blind'.[40] For just as love's 'teaching to see' involves a 'blindness' specific to it, so hatred involves a 'field of vision' specific to it, within which it distorts things. (128) What intensifies and becomes embedded in the intention of hatred —which is both sensation and thought—is by no means pre-conceived as *a 'figuration'* pointing towards any 'negative value image'. Nor is the longing 'concealed' within love projected towards an 'ideal value image'. Such a supposed conception or projection of 'value images' – as an expression

[36] Ibid.
[37] M. Scheler, op. cit., p. 178.
[38] Ibid.
[39] M. Scheler, op. cit., pp. 171–172.
[40] M. Scheler, op. cit., p. 183 and p. 178.

of an 'intentional attitude towards objects of value' – love or hatred conceives the inherent 'movement' as the 'realisation' [41] of 'higher' or 'lower' values in one and the very same – personal – object, which is 'represented' through different 'images' as distinct *'value-entities'* in each case.[42] It is, however, this hallmark of *'intentionality'* that stands in the way of a *genuinely phenomenological* analysis. The fact that in love higher values, as it were, *'flash up'* in an object, whilst in hatred they become virtually *'imperceptible'*,[43] since one's 'spiritual eye' has, as it were,

'dulled', confirms once again that the correlative mo-

the 'unfolding' of 'values' is placed under *the lens of intentionality*, which is primarily aimed at *'value-entities'*, each of which is defined as 'positive' or 'negative'. A flash or dulling of 'values' on a network of connections that is, as it were, 'polarised' by a positive or negative endpoint, which 'regulate' the respective 'currents' of value in love and hate, is just as unsuitable as the subtraction of a 'conductor' for 'phenomenologically'

grasping the *course* 'typical' of hatred or the dynamism characteristic of love. After all, Scheler himself admits in * * that these are 'all very *crude and inadequate* definitions which actually *conceal* the basic phenomenon'. [44]

The very fact that one 'becomes aware of hatred *within oneself*' (130), who is currently in love with *someone else*, and one can indeed hate the 'rebelliousness' of one's own hatred, (127) whilst in love one *longs for* the other, 'insofar as one can *only* "be" what one is *in their presence and with* them' (119) – '*which is why* one *cannot love oneself* either', (128) but rather there is 'heartbreak' – must prepare us for the fact that hatred and love, *as fundamental phenomena*, are distinct, and not, as 'emotional acts', 'intentionalities' with different courses of action or directions of movement. '[…] It is the other who is loved, *pure and simple*.' (128) But: 'One can also hate oneself, namely *something about oneself*.' (127) As a 'thought', the intention of hatred is 'more universal' than the 'striving' of love, which is not – jealously – aimed at exclusivity, but at *'uniqueness'*, (117)

41 M. Scheler, op. cit., p. 177.
42 M. Scheler, op. cit., p. 187.
(43) M. Scheler, op. cit., pp. 176 and 178.
44 M. Scheler, op. cit., p. 182.

and *'springs* from loneliness' with longing. (119) Whereas in hatred there *is* precisely *jealousy*: 'There is jealousy even in hatred; we *want* our enemy *all to ourselves*.' (130) 'In hatred, however, one directs oneself *precisely* towards the other', (126) when one draws 'that which is most different' into one's circle. (129) That is to say, however: the web spun by hatred *casts* a spell of exclusivity; it seeks to *isolate* the other. The intention of love, for its part, is by no means 'straightforward' when it 'teaches us to see' the other's uniqueness and 'regards the other's weaknesses as nothing'. (128) Love does not, as it were, draw the *most diverse things* into a sphere of influence. It *rejects* everything that, whilst surrounding the beloved, nevertheless dims the radiance of their uniqueness – that which they *are* not 'absolutely'. Love 'allows objective objections *to be overlooked*'. (128) *As* longing, however, it does not *'strike'* the other
'towards the goal', that is, towards something that is regarded as '*that quality* in a person' (127), such as 'lovable'. The beloved is not a 'nice person'.

'The roots from which hatred *draws its nourishment*, and which determine its strength and duration, are varied.' (129) 'What hatred refers to *is not* the person it *targets*.' (127) It is in the *distinction* expressed by the negative copula that the most diverse elements *converge* within the intention of hatred, so that it may come *into play* at all. 'The relationship between son and father, the position of the slave, can provide the *ground* on which hatred arises. There is racial and class hatred . Goethe hated *experiments* such as those conducted by *Newton*. [45] For that is the distinctive feature of our hatred: *to develop*, *expand* and *establish* itself *on a firm basis*. It seeks points of entry at which it lingers, *probing deeply*." (128) The 'rejection' inherent in antipathy (126) is here 'taken up as *a* thought' (ibid.), the emotion of antipathy in this 'sensing and thinking'
(127) *reborn*, which *'latches* onto' its object. (Ibid.)
'Hatred intensifies in this way. And one positions oneself within it.' 'One seeks to prove to oneself that the other is hateful.' (126) What is of 'decisive' importance here is neither – as Scheler suggests – an 'implicit' inferior value nor the projection surface of a 'negative value image', but rather the *intensification in the line of reasoning* in which one positions *oneself*, that is to say, in which one *'tunes in'* to that very thing (cf.

45 See also: H. Lipps, 'Goethe's Theory of Colours', in: The Reality of Man. Works, Vol. V, Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main 1977, pp. 108 and 123–124; see also:
'On the Morphology of Natural Science', in: op. cit., pp. 18 ff.

16–17) in which the emotion intensifies to such an extent that hatred 'manifests *itself*' for the first time. 'Yet this very *objective basis* of hatred precludes it from being understood as the negative counterpart to love.' (128) Probing at its points of origin, 'hatred *searches* for reasons for …'. (129) It is significant that there is a *gap* here instead of an accusative. For this is why hatred does not relate to any *existing* 'object' as an intentional act mediated by a 'value'. A 'value-object' corresponding to hatred – as if hatred were to 'move' in its direction – cannot be found. One overlooks the 'typical course' of hatred, which here means: the specific *configuration* of its intention. What 'drives' the reasoning of hatred is its *self-intensification*, that is to say: *the unleashing of its power*. The factual basis of hatred is by no means 'objective' or 'logical' in its 'conclusions'. Hatred 'literally *pursues* [the other] in thought and *cannot let go.'* (126) As 'thinking', hatred is precisely not *an* 'existential step' towards oneself, (105) but rather: a
'Pushing in and *pressing* on', which *'distorts* things'. (128) 'Hatred does not
actually conceals nothing, but rather finds what it seeks to justify itself. Hatred is boundless. Its fixation on … often makes it appear *petty*.' (128) As 'reasoning and justification' (127), hatred is not – unlike contempt – *'just*': in hatred's self-unbinding, no 'sovereignty' is evident – as in contempt,
'which *passes judgement* on one' (127). 'Hatred *aims at* annihilation' (128–129). However, it does not 'annihilate' by turning them into their negative or reinterpreting them as inferior. Hatred does not annihilate values at any
'Object'. 'He *distorts things*.' (128) But these are not
'objects of value', but rather points of entry for his 'penetration and intrusion', into which the affect of 'being repelled' *spills over* – that is to say: is *reborn* within them in such a way that it *'breaks free*'. It is precisely the *'state of mind'* of antipathy, which is a *'state of being'*, that spills over into *'thoughts one cannot shake off*'. *'Being* repelled' escalates into a *'distancing* oneself from the other', (130) without, however, 'breaking free' from them. (Cf. 16) *This* 'series of escalations', however, is neither a descending 'ladder' of values nor a 'network of channels' of negatively polarised 'streams' of value.

'This very *objective basis* of hatred, however, precludes it from being understood as the negative counterpart to love.' (128) 'Love is

'blind, insofar as its *unconditional nature* causes it to *overlook objective objections*.'
(128) The unconditional nature of hatred is of a different kind: 'Hatred seeks to kill *in order to* annihilate.' (128) 'It *plots* annihilation.' (128–129) Only the death of the Other – *delusionally* drawn into its orbit – seems to him to finally sever the bonds of his thoughts, from which he cannot free himself. It is precisely in this that hatred 'obscures' the *'becoming free towards'* the Other. (Cf. 16)

- Enmity

According to Scheler, love and hate are 'primarily oriented towards values and objects (transparently through the values they embody) , whereby it is, *in principle*, *irrelevant* whether "I" or an "Other" possesses the values in question'.[46] 'For love and hatred to occur, therefore, the act's orientation towards an "Other", as well as any conscious connection between people, is *by no* means a *necessary* prerequisite.'[47] In this sense, love and hatred are 'by *no means essentially* "altruistic" acts'.[48] 'Love for others is thus *just as fundamentally* opposed to self-love, and hatred of others to self-hatred.'[49]
'There is, therefore, *just as much* an "love of self" and a "hatred of self" as there is a "love of others" and a "hatred of others".'[50] The ' tions of empathy', on the other hand, are, according to Scheler, entirely *'essentially* social behaviours'.[51] 'One can, for example, "love and hate oneself"; but one cannot empathise with oneself. For when one says that a "person feels pity for themselves", or that they, for example, "take pleasure in the fact

that they can be so happy today" [...], a closer analysis always reveals that what is at stake here is a figural content in which the person in question observes themselves, as it were, 'as if they were another person' and empathises with their own feelings 'as this (fictional) other'. Thus, *in my imagination*, I can put myself in the position of, say, walking in my own funeral procession, and so on. Phenomenologically speaking,

46 M. Scheler, op. cit., p. 174.
47 M. Scheler, op. cit., p. 173.
48 M. Scheler, op. cit., p. 174.
49 Ibid.
50 M. Scheler, op. cit., p. 175.
51 M. Scheler, op. cit., p. 173.

'but even then, compassion is a social act. This kind *of illusion* is not necessary in the case of self-love and self-hatred.'[52]

Incidentally, according to Scheler, love and hate are not only not social acts , but are also not 'acts of community' or 'acts of social disposition'.[53] Scheler also counts 'egoism' amongst these, which is precisely 'not "self-love"'.[54] 'For in "egoism", my individual self is not given to me as an object of love, detached from social relations and conceived solely as the bearer of those highest kinds of value which find their expression, for example, in the concept *of* "salvation"; rather, in my striving, I am given to myself as merely "one among others", who then simply "does not take into account" the values of others.'[55] "'Egoism' is not behaviour 'as if one were alone in the world'; on the contrary, it presupposes the reality of the individual as a member of society. It is precisely the egoist who is entirely absorbed in his

'social self', which *obscures* his individual, intimate self ! And he does not make this social self the object of an act of love, but is merely 'absorbed' by it, that is to say, *lives* within it.'[56] As an example of 'primordial' self-hatred, Scheler finally cites : 'Turning away from oneself, *being* unable *to* remain 'with oneself' (one type is, for example, the 'club-goer').'' [57]

What Scheler subsequently claims to have 'demonstrated thus far as the acts of love and hate' are, according to him, 'merely those ultimate *identical act-entities* which, in all the differences exhibited by these acts, are the same'.[58] According to Scheler, the correlate of these 'identical act-entities' is 'an *object of the entire* realm of values',[59] upon which higher values are 'creatively' brought into being or 'destroyed', or rendered 'imperceptible'.

H. Lipps also points out that 'self-love' does not mean egoism or, indeed, self-satisfaction: 'People either believe that "self-love" can be translated as "egoism", or they take it to mean a selfless preoccupation with oneself. How, indeed, can anyone "love"

52 M. Scheler, op. cit., p. 173.
53 M. Scheler, op. cit., pp. 174–175.
54 M. Scheler, op. cit., p. 175.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
57 M. Scheler, op. cit., p. 174.
58 M. Scheler, op. cit., p. 194.
59 M. Scheler, op. cit., p. 187.

'usually means nothing more than that one enjoys having him (around), seeks his company – that is, sympathising with him and thereby feeling at ease, but without actually, in the first place, coming to understand *oneself*.' (128, note 1) Nevertheless, Lipps does not mean that, in self-love, one would *'sympathise'* with oneself. On the other hand, he does not consider it possible that one might 'discover oneself' *through oneself*. 'But the fact that something like self-pity occurs merely shows how pity never concerns anyone in their *self*, but only as *"one* who" – in whom, of course, one can then also overlook "oneself".' (Ibid.)
'One cannot love oneself either.' (128) 'As "one who": this does not mean, as Scheler claims, that in feeling compassion for oneself one observes oneself, as it were, as if one were another person, and then, as this (fictional) other, empathises with one's own feelings. Just as one would not, in self-love, be 'purely the [beloved] other' (128). In self-pity, one *'spares'* one's *own* feelings, whereas self-love, on the contrary, is *'illusory'*. For the longing of love, which seeks 'to come to oneself' through the other – in which one is opened up to oneself – is 'hopeless' in self-love. And what is 'fictional' here is not 'purely and simply the [beloved] other', but rather the very self one is seeking. The
The 'self-loathing' of the club-goer, on the other hand, is something he becomes aware of within himself, yet which draws him away from the conviviality into which he would like to immerse himself upon entering the clubhouse. He hates the 'rebelliousness' *of his* constant 'remaining with himself', but he hates it *in* the club, whose conviviality does not afford him the 'light-heartedness of a cheerful, exuberant atmosphere' in which one 'finds oneself *suspended* from "oneself" '. (Cf. 113) 'Turning away from oneself, *being* unable *to* remain with "oneself"' has not – as Scheler suggests – 'nothing to do with love',[60] but rather nothing to do *with hatred*. 'Longing is hidden within love.' (126, note 1) 'To long for something means: to want to move away from one's own unfulfillment towards another.' (119) The loner does not *seek* to move towards another: he wishes *to find* himself suspended from himself.

Just as hatred and love are not identical entities which, in relation to an object within the entire realm of values, destroy or produce values respectively, so too it cannot be claimed that,

60 M. Scheler, op. cit., p. 174.

that it is 'in principle irrelevant to love and hatred' whether the corresponding 'value-bearer' is an 'I' or an 'Other', which is why – according to Scheler – they should not be regarded 'in essence' as 'altruistic' acts. Self-love and self-hatred, for example, are not *equally* 'given' *in the same original sense*. For 'I' and 'Other' are not *'points of reference'* to which love and hate are, as it were, ' ly' indifferent, such that they are *'not*
'relative' to'."[61] "What hatred refers to is *not the* one whom it
'*meets*.' (127) But it is 'the Other, *pure* and simple' who is loved. (128) The
The 'target' of hatred is no more, any more than the 'absolute' nature of the gift of love ( ) is, a socially *'indifferent'* 'intentional value relation' to an object that is 'transparent' through it:[62] that is to say, 'where , it is *in principle irrelevant* [whether] "I" or an "other" *possesses* the values in question'.[63] '[In hatred] *one seeks to prove to oneself* that *the other* is hateful.' (126) 'One hates something *in oneself* as rebellious, but *in the other*.' (127) The unconditional nature of love causes one *to overlook* the other's weaknesses. Self-love, however, is a *visual impairment* arising from the illusion that one is *unconditionally* open to oneself, for which – in vain – the most diverse imaginative content is employed. For in this one 'overlooks' the fact that one *is* never the 'absolutely self-given'.
In the 'Encounter of Hatred', it is not the 'I' that takes the lead in the
'negative' *valuation* of the Other, whereas in the selfless devotion of love, the 'Other' *conjures up* the 'positive' valuation of oneself. 'Hatred seeks *to kill* in order to annihilate. This *pathos* distinguishes hatred from

antipathy and disgust, which are concerned merely with the *removal* of their object. And it *is* not this that the hater *desires*—that the other should suffer. Whereas envy and revenge seek such *satisfaction*. Whilst exposure through ridicule *seeks* to humiliate, hatred *plots* annihilation.' (128–129) That antipathy
'being taken in as a thought' without 'being able to shake it off' (126) does not imply *'contestation'*. In hatred, 'being repelled' is not, as it were, *'sensually* perceived'. (14) 'In contrast to loathing and hatred, which, depending on the circumstances, challenge one to adopt the correct behaviour—*that is,* a stance and attitude—disgust is something that merely "comes over" one.' (14) 'Hatred, however, accounts for' antipathy. (126) 'Hatred seeks

61 M. Scheler, op. cit., p. 173.
62 M. Scheler, op. cit., p. 174.
63 Ibid.

'to be just'. (Ibid.) '… the *appropriate* behaviour in each case': this precisely expresses the act of 'judging' someone in one's thoughts through hatred. And this is not a matter of *'wishing ill* upon the other' – (128) but rather an *act of 'execution*'. The 'mood' of antipathy *rises* to this 'pathos' of hatred, *and is unleashed* precisely therein. Hatred 'plots annihilation'. (128–129) 'The envious person ultimately seeks to prove himself in the hatefulness of the other, so as not to have to recognise himself as *merely* envious.' (116) By 'maliciously highlighting the dark sides' of the other's 'apparent advantage' (116) (117) and casting doubt on their happiness, the envious person *seeks* to
To derive *'satisfaction'* from the fact that, fundamentally, he alone is the 'rightful recipient' of the privilege which the other 'simply seems to accept as a given' (116) – of the good fortune that befalls him so unquestioningly. Owing to the lack of 'objective justification' for his envy, he turns to the other's hatefulness, which also seems to *offer* him the 'reason' for this entitlement: not merely 'sufficient', but 'sublime' beyond all reproach. And just as with envy, there is also 'no "just" revenge'. 'The other merely becomes a victim' (128, note 2) of *the thirst for revenge*. 'Addiction consists precisely in becoming addicted to something one can procure as a stimulus, in enjoying a mere sense of belonging which, though temporary, can be repeated at will.' (122) 'In addiction […] *one loses control of oneself*.' (118) 'Insofar as one is filled with hatred, becomes absorbed in it, finds oneself in it, it is *passionate* hatred. The fact that it is inaccessible to rational consideration means that one *is unconditionally* caught up in it […].' (118) Whilst 'the apparent superiority of the other arouses envy', (116) 'one takes revenge *on someone* – as in blood feuds, where someone from my clan is avenged against the other clan, and *atonement* is secured for them. And the fact that – instead of despising the other for the unfairness of their triumph – one still *wants to show* them that …, that one is thus, in a way, taking them *seriously* again, is the *minor aspect* of revenge. This belief that one must make amends here. One takes revenge, for example, for insults. For these cannot be *repaid*. It is only from a certain perspective and kind of sensitivity that the possibility of an insult – usually entirely unintended – arises in the first place. It is one's position, the insecurity arising from *subordination*, that robs one of the freedom to respond appropriately. Out of *an inability to* retaliate, the desire for revenge arises here, that is, to somehow obtain *a substitute*

to provide *him* with satisfaction for this opportunity denied to him. A vengeful person is one who cannot forget what they have suffered. One who dwells on it, as if it were not long since over. Who does not simply wish to accept its passing as a fait accompli, but who wants to make it contingent upon *redress*. As if 'he' were *called upon* to bring about 'his' restoration. Judged by its ambition, vindictiveness appears as the desire of a 'small' soul *entangled within itself*." (128–129, note 2)

Whilst envy 'questions' the 'legitimacy' of the other's apparent advantage (116), revenge seeks 'retribution' which it – being powerless – is unable to bring about itself, and which is therefore exacted upon the other. Envy resents the 'possession' that is so self-evident to the other; it is precisely this 'way about him', his
'air of superiority' 'annoy me'. (116) The *presumption* sensed in this, when probed further, fuels the feeling of envy. However, *'suffering'* that 'one cannot forget' gives rise to a thirst for revenge. One does not linger, probing, on the other – 'as if fascinated by the other's happiness' –
(116) which, precisely because of the unquestioning nature of its behaviour, strikes one as 'put on'. One dwells *on one's* own feelings because one seems to be denied the opportunity to find the
'appropriate' response to the suffering one has endured. One searches one's inner self persistently for a substitute that would provide 'satisfaction'. The desire for revenge is focused on repaying another, whilst at the same time ensuring that one remains unscathed. One becomes entangled in this within oneself, the
To regard even the 'smallest' thing as justification for a demanded 'compensation', to measure oneself by the amount of damages sought. Her ambition spirals into excess to the extent that revenge – powerless – cannot keep pace with the answers she finds within herself. It is not 'free' to make this self-perpetuating claim to retribution, which it wishes to 'exercise' upon the other. As if fascinated by the 'sacrifice' of the other that it wishes to 'accomplish', revenge – having become 'addicted' to this very process – plays out everything that might in any way substitute for the opportunities for redress that have been denied it. The killing born of a thirst for revenge is not an execution. In this, she *oversteps the mark* with the victim of her retribution, in that even their annihilation does not 'satisfy' her hunger. In this respect, there is 'no "just" revenge'. The retribution she inflicts on someone is 'directionless'. 'In hatred, however, one *directs* oneself *precisely* at the other.' (126) 'Hatred seeks to kill in order to annihilate.'

(128) 'Exposure through ridicule is his aim; he plots destruction' 164

'Hatred.' (128–129) 'That which is most one's own, in which one perceives oneself as absolute, does not wish to be brought out into the open and laid bare. It does not wish to be ensnared in a mode of thought and understanding in which one would be abstracted from oneself. It does not wish to be *judged*.' (33) Yet the fact that hatred is directed towards annihilation does not, in fact, imply a 'judgement'. 'In hatred, one *takes a stand against* something.' (129) 'The thoughtless nonchalance with which someone makes themselves at home as if they belonged there, clumsy familiarity, a person's self-assurance, unfounded optimism, and self-righteous hypocrisy must be put *in their place*.' (129) 'One hates "this sort of thing" in a person, that is, *something* general' – (127) and not, for example, *'the most essential aspect* in which one perceives oneself *as absolute*'.
(33) 'Dwelling on …' these accusations levelled at the Ande-
Holding a grudge makes hatred 'often appear petty' (128), just as the desire for revenge 'appears as the wish of a "small" soul caught up in itself'. (128–129, note 2) The 'smallness' of revenge, however, lies in the fact that one *'wants to show* him, after all, that …', (ibid.) – and not, as in contempt, *'to strike at* him *precisely* by *overlooking* him'. (127) Vengefulness believes it 'must *make* amends' (ibid.), whilst contempt *'cuts off* any possibility of restoring a relationship with him'. (ibid.) 'In contempt, […] *judgement* is passed on someone.' (127) 'The objective justification for hatred' (128) is, however, not 'conclusive'. In that hatred pursues one in thought, in that it
'finds' what he is seeking as his objective justification, he cannot yet 'break free' from it. (126) Hatred is 'not *a qualitative ultimate*'.
(130) The *culmination* of his intention, into which – in a typical process of self-interpretation – 'the most diverse elements are incorporated' (ibid.), is not *a 'conclusion'*. In the distorting mirror of his intention, the objective reasons put forward do not appear as *logically necessary* steps. Nor do they offer any substitute for withheld opportunities for reconciliation. The 'interpretation' of hatred is aimed neither at
'Universal validity', not to mention 'atonement'. How one positions oneself within hatred – 'typically' – (126) now becomes clear. The 'typical course' of hatred is: *hostility*.

'"Enemy" is not the same as "opponent". One *does not measure oneself* against the other. Such a confrontation is, after all, rendered impossible precisely by the other's sense of certainty, by their manner of behaving as if they were above all doubt: and that is precisely why one hates them. Above all, that which is not one's equal *becomes* the object of hatred. That is to say, that against which one would, as it were, be forced to rise up, were one to confront it in battle—

165

'One cannot fight against stupidity.' (129) Whilst 'a person's position, the insecurity *arising from* subordination' deprives him of the freedom to find the 'appropriate response' to an insult (128, note 2), it is the *'certainty that presumes to be above* all doubt', 'this manner of the other', that makes any confrontation with him virtually impossible. Under no circumstances does one wish to stoop to that 'level' to which the *arrogance* of his behaviour seems to invite one, an arrogance that is to be put in its place. The 'annihilation' to which hatred aspires is *a derogation from* this all-too-smug attitude, which – by its very nature – is, however, 'vulgar', from which hatred wishes to 'distinguish itself'. (130) Whilst 'in disgust something is grasped *sensually*': that which *presents* itself broadly – one experiences a challenge 'from that which is *subsequently* […] perceived as disgusting' – (14) in hatred something is grasped *intellectually*, which *'spreads*'. Something is perceived as spiteful if, by its very nature,
hostility. 'A person's hatred […] already bears the stamp of their spirit.' (127) 'Hatred reveals a person's spiritual nature. That which they are sensitive to, that to which their gaze is attuned, that which they sense in its disguises.' (130) What one hates – as something 'general' – is 'all too common' in a particular person, but by no means thereby *proven* in its 'validity'. Hatred simply *seeks* to
'to establish it as justified'. (128) *Consequently,* hatred is simply 'not *the ultimate* in qualitative terms'. (130)

- Tinctures

'Hatred, however, has the most varied motives and does not in itself define a person.' (129) 'It is not only *antipathy* that is defiant that turns into hatred. *Powerlessness*, for example, can also give rise to hatred. 'There is no greater hatred in the world than that of ignorance towards knowledge' (Galilei); hatred *harbours* the longing to come to terms with a comparison which it finds itself – reluctantly – repeatedly challenged to accept." (129) It is not an *"enemy* image" that is "drawn" in hatred. How this 'hostility' develops, intensifies and attempts to establish itself becomes apparent at the *'turning point'* where the emotion – the roots of which may vary – (129) tips over into the 'intention' of hatred – which is not 'classified' as 'diabolical', 'evil' or 'bad'

166

classified as such"[64] For although by no means a qualitatively ultimate entity, (130) hatred nevertheless seeks to be "*just*". (126)

What 'becomes the object of hatred' (129) is not something that is encountered in hatred – in the sense that hatred *then* relates to it *as*
'opposing party' in a conflict. (Ibid.) The 'bottling up' of the affect, which, as a *distentio*, (13) fails to develop its tension as 'avoidance of' or 'coming to terms with', because circumstances and living conditions compel one to 'endure' in *the vicinity* of that which provoked it, turns into the intention of hatred, in which the affect is for the first time 'released to itself', (16) that is to say, here: it is unleashed in a mental 'distancing of oneself', without, however, breaking free. 'One *awakens to oneself* in this distancing from the other, whose opposition to oneself is *then defined* in hatred.' (130) *As* an 'opposition', it is by no means objectively *'given'* to

hatred in advance. It is precisely this proximity, which must be endured, that prevents an objective predetermination of this opposition from taking shape in advance through a 'discharge' of the affect. The
'Points of departure' (128) are only *developed* into a contrast through hatred. In the distorting mirror of its intention, hatred – thereby 'in thought' – 'reflects' the increasingly pent-up emotion towards the thresholds of the dust explosion. In this respect, its 'illusion' in no way resembles the 'projection' of any image. One 'always hates "this aspect"' in a person, (127) which, however, does not 'represent' a 'projected image' of that person inverted into the negative – nor does it 'already characterise them *as a human being*'. (129) 'This sort of thing about him' – this is where the emotion intensifies to a head, as it does in the intention of hatred
'reborn', that is to say, but here, with a view to a breakthrough of the pent-up emotion, it is 'reflected' by being stimulated up to a threshold value. In this build-up, the intention – as a thought – *cannot detach itself at all* from the affect it contains: rather, it flares up until it unleashes that which it had hitherto been compelled to 'endure'. Upon reaching this threshold, the intention of hatred is downright *'searching'*. As an intention, hatred has nothing 'sudden' about it; it 'lingers probingly' at the points of entry it seeks. (128) 'This *kind* of thing in a person' – it is here that a person is *probed primally* for the first time in hatred, and not, for example, through some *general image* 'represented'

64 M. Scheler, op. cit., p. 196.

'characterised' or even regarded as such – in terms of its *'entire* nature' – (143)
'characterised'. Neither 'diabolical', nor 'evil' nor 'bad'; there is nothing in *the hostility* of hatred that corresponds to any general image of the enemy, nor is there anything in which 'the individual traits of a person's demeanour and behaviour' have already 'come to coincide' with one another. (Cf. 143) Hatred is simply
'nothing qualitatively ultimate'. (130) The 'pinnacle' of its intention is not, as a 'figurative condensation', a 'parable' of any 'initially and essentially comprehensible' concept. (15) The most diverse elements that converge in the intention of hatred are by no means 'grasped' as hateful, i.e. 'objectively recognised and judged' within it. (130)

'Just as the most diverse elements resonate within the *same* gesture of laughter, so too do the most diverse elements take root in hatred […] […] And just as laughter *sounds* different, so too can hatred take on different *hues*: there is clear-sighted, aggressive hatred, but also obstinate hatred from which one can no longer escape, in which one loses oneself. Hatred can grip sharply or be corrosively devouring; glowing hatred stands in contrast to dull, smouldering hatred." (129–130) What takes shape here in each instance as hatred cannot be 'expressed as *a formula*'. (15) How one awakens to oneself in hatred, becomes gripped by it or works oneself up into a frenzy of passionate hatred, and is subsequently consumed by it – these are different 'hued variations' of *'life'* within the intention of hatred.
'Hatred prevents one from *flagging* in enmity.' (129) Its
It springs from a *primal* 'hostility' – not the 'recognition' of something already objectively defined and judged *as* 'hostile'.

'Disappointed love *turns to* hatred – all the more so the deeper one's bond with the other had been; hatred *proves* the necessity of a solution. Alongside the hatred born of *resentment* as a *petty* state of mind stands Goethe's hatred of Newton.' (129) At the point of this transformation, hatred comes to 'fill' one, that is to say, the disappointment of his love now compels him to shatter the *vinculum fidei et amoris*, whilst hatred, growing ever more lucid, ignites *itself* along the lines of deception: like a second eye which, precisely at those points where the blindness of love caused one to 'overlook' things, becomes sighted and drills its explosive charge into the pit of 'betrayal'. Resentment, in its pettiness, urges one to start at 'one's own' level and to forgo what one passes off as 'true greatness'. (116–117) The greatness of Goethe's hatred probes insistently into the most subtle realms

of Newton's boulder. *'Where* the enemy is *recognised* in hatred' –
'in this the *spirituality* of a person can be revealed', that is, 'that to which he is *clairvoyantly* open'. (132) 'But every hatred is *a sign* of *one's way of thinking*.' (132) 'A person's way of thinking is not simply their disposition. It *manifests itself* in what one has in mind towards others, or rather in the intentions one harbours.' (132, note 2) Part of the 'way of thinking' is the decisiveness *of an expressed opinion*.

The *'fulfilment'* of courtly love is, as γνωσθαι, an original *'coming to be known'*. [65] The 'strength' of hatred, however, is *an indication of the*

A person's *'way of thinking'*, that is, the *foundation* of their character.
'One may also assume that the formation of this character is akin to a kind of rebirth; a certain solemnity of the vow that [the individual] makes to himself renders both the vow and the moment when this transformation took place within him as unforgettable as a new epoch.' [66]
'A person's hatred […] *already* bears the *stamp* of their spirit.' (127) The *'inner principle of* a person's *way of life'* manifests itself in the 'fullness' of their hatred. [67] 'A positive consideration of the possible inferior *value of an* object' [68] remains, for this *inner driving force of hatred*, forever hidden from *its* initial *effect* on the 'firmness and perseverance' of a *principle*, [69]

65 G. Misch, The Structure of Logic on the Basis of the Philosophy of Life. Göttingen Lectures on Logic and an Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge. Edited by G. Kühne- Bertram and F. Rodi. Alber, Freiburg/Munich 1994, p. 322.
66 I. Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, op. cit., pp. 244–245 [293–294].
67 I. Kant, op. cit., p. 245 [294–295].
68 M. Scheler, op. cit., p. 176.
69 I. Kant, op. cit., p. 245 [294–295].

Steps towards oneself.

The 'unabridged reality' of the human being

'And insofar as pedantry, a sense of shame, etc., are presented here as existential possibilities, psychology always tips over into philosophy. Psychology merely defines the level at which philosophy can begin *as existential analysis*.'
(H. Lipps, *The Reality of Man*. Works, Vol. V. Frankfurt am Main, 1977, pp. 165–166)

'For what is the subject matter of psychology? The *attitudes, dispositions,* etc., of existence. What does it mean, for example, to call laughter "something psychological", or the emotions that cannot be separated from their physical

expression? Psychology, together with ethnology, anthropology, sociology and geography, forms part of our understanding of the world. The 'world' being that in which we *move*, in which life lived with others unfolds […].' (Ibid., p. 168)

'Existence "occurs" in avarice, wastefulness and greed. In these, it takes *steps towards itself*, whereby it may gain itself in its authenticity and lose itself in its inauthenticity. Avarice, pedantry, etc., are *fates*. Human possibility and reality can only be conceived as *transformations of selfhood*, for existence has *not left* its past *behind*. It is not *scattered* within a context of reality. Its past is to be found *in itself* as fate."
(Ibid., p. 169)

'Reality, too, can be explained by deeper layers than its superficial appearance. But this reality—or rather, its context—is here something which, being self-sufficient, can be brought into harmony with itself. Here, one sees through the appearances in their incomprehensible externality. The reality of the human being, however, is *an indicator of existential possibilities*.' (Ibid., p. 163)

'Understanding [is] always on the path to *inner* possibility.' (Ibid., note on p. 201)

'Reality = factum in the sense of Kant's question *quid facti*.' (Ibid.)

- 'Movedness': the philosophical affect

'Philosophical problems are not *readily* understood. One can only be drawn into philosophy. It is *not a natural impulse* through which philosophy introduces itself.' (The Reality of Man, p. 161) One is drawn into existential analysis, as H. Lipps suggests, insofar as – though not readily comprehensible – a 'psychology of man' finds its way into it. 'One cannot expect that tasks will be [taken up] there as something objectively given on the basis of a natural affect' (ibid.) – in which philosophy then introduces itself by getting to the bottom of these. 'A philosophical beginning, insofar as it reflects here on human existence', lends a psychology 'essential tension' (ibid.), whose 'subject-matter' consists of the 'attitudes, stances, etc. of existence' (ibid., p. 168), but which is fundamentally directed towards
'Human knowledge of the world' belongs – as the scope of his existential possibilities. Knowledge of human nature, which 'knows man in "his" possibilities' (Human Nature, p. 8), has, as such,
'not yet the tension of philosophical inquiry': 'The task is to uncover, within the possibilities of the human being, *his nature* and *the nature* of his existence' – to make their *'constitution'* transparent. (Ibid., p. 8) For example, 'to understand avarice from its origin, to reveal what it (inwardly) "is", and to interpret its manifestations in the light of human nature in such a way that the latter is recognised in *each* of these various human possibilities'. (Ibid., p. 9) 'In avarice and greed, existence "takes place". It takes *steps towards itself* within them […]. Avarice, pedantry, etc., are fates.' (The Reality of Man, p. 169)

'A psychology that is tacitly guided by a deeper desire for an understanding of human nature' (Wirklichkeit des Menschen, p. 162), H. Lipps contrasts with *'academic psychology'* (Menschliche Natur, p. 7), 'which is so thoroughly shaped by a particular philosophical

Position and Problem: Attempting to 'take as a starting point' something fixed such as 'consciousness'." (Ibid., p. 7) "Psychology, however, is virtually entangled in philosophical preconceptions. It seeks to investigate the 'phenomena of consciousness' as the 'immediately given', whilst remaining dependent on the decisive positions of Descartes, which it has adopted uncritically. It has been 'infected' by 'epistemology'."

(Wirklichkeit des Menschen, pp. 166–167) 'More specifically […] the academic concept of psychology is determined by the dogmatism into which Descartes' position has slipped. Psychology is established as a distinct discipline that investigates the phenomena of consciousness; its extension to include the unconscious emphasises precisely how it finds its point of entry in consciousness.' (Ibid.)

A 'human understanding of the world' which is interwoven with the attitudes, stances, etc. of existence, in order to understand these – which are only then fraught with tension – from their very origin, that is, from their 'inner' potential, insofar as existence takes steps towards itself in this process, in which it can gain itself in its authenticity or lose itself in its inauthenticity, is, strictly speaking, not a 'theory of consciousness' which
H. Lipps describes this as downright 'ideological'. 'To characterise something as ideological is to highlight the tension that exists between it and *unmediated reality*.' (Wirklichkeit des Menschen, p. 168) 'The thinking that is perpetuated in school traditions is ideological insofar as it remains trapped within itself.' (Ibid.) The attitudes, stances, etc., of existence are not phenomena of consciousness that are immediately given. H. Lipps sees the pitfall of school psychology precisely in the fact that, in the course of an examination of Descartes' position that slips into dogmatism, 'the *cogito* becomes a
'"given" content of consciousness'. (Ibid., p. 168) 'And from this
psychology takes up this cogito as phenomena of consciousness which appear in consciousness as *the present field* of reality and are observed, classified and explained as 'the psychic'. Whereas human beings are merely the *theatre* of these phenomena." (Ibid., p. 168) The fact that, nevertheless, in attitudes, dispositions, etc., a human understanding of the world begins to emerge—one which, however, does not rest on cogitationes in the sense of 'phenomena of consciousness'—now takes on decisive importance. In place of the 'display' of the 'psychic' comes an 'unabridged reality'. 'The possibility and reality of human beings is something other than the reality that unfolds in phenomena, in situations pas-

'… a reality that one must simply come to terms with, that one must simply grasp. This reality *does not speak to me*. I merely make sense of it, but it does not reveal itself to me, in the way that the reality of the human being can reveal itself to me.' (The Reality of the Human Being, p. 169) The approach based on given phenomena of consciousness is contrasted with *the claim* of an existence that reveals itself to me.

In a psychology of the human being that is conceived anthropologically from the outset—insofar as 'the reality of the human being is *understood anthropologically* from the outset when it stands in tension with the demands of the "life" that is lived' (The Reality of the Human Being, p. 164)—the cogito must take on a new meaning. This, of course, is not easy to arrive at. It is noteworthy that the central section of H. Lipps' text **Human Nature**, which is to be interpreted, is devoted precisely to this question. The fact that one 'can be disappointed by psychology, but also *moved* by it' (The Reality of Man, p. 162) is not a 'natural affect' – yet *it is* in this that existential analysis 'introduces itself' (The Reality of Man, p. 161).

• Points of attack on 'consciousness'

'Consciousness is an element of a cunning and patient being.'
P. Magnan, Un monstre sacré. Published by Denoël, 2004, p. 112

Shame was regarded as 'a primary concern' of philosophy insofar as it stands 'at *the origin* of self-awareness'. (Human Nature, p. 31) 'Shame overtakes one upon *realising something*. One becomes aware of it or of the delicate nature of a situation.' (Ibid., p. 44) Here, realisation means – precisely – not *a 'theory'*. Nor does that of which one becomes aware here: 'the tangibility that comes to light precisely in the untouchability of something', (ibid., p. 41) the 'delicate' nature of this situation, which virtually eludes 'objective determination'. The fact that 'the same basic type' underlies the concept of shame as well as that of the taboo and sacrilege: that, for example, 'there is a homology between the feeling of shame and the aversion

to sacrilege' (ibid., p. 41) demonstrated all the more clearly how, in this concept, 'real events are not […] reduced to the mere common denominator of rational behaviour'. (Ibid., p. 31) One could only 'to a limited extent' *appeal* to that which here – in *the sense of shame* –

was noted (ibid., pp. 41–42, note 1) that 'everyone has experienced this for themselves at some point' – 'the concept of which can therefore also be taken for granted in psychology'. (Ibid., p. 31) However, in the various conceptions of shame, taboo and transgression, for example,
'Differences in *life horizons* are noticeable'. (Ibid., pp. 41–42, note 1) One is disappointed by a psychology which 'distinguishes between feelings [admittedly], but *does not define* them. It does not interpret them. It does not demonstrate how [in this context] the feeling of shame *defines itself*'. How 'a particular interpretation crystallises within it'. (Ibid., p. 41) In contrast to eighteenth-century French psychology, which critically and unmaskingly highlights 'the illusory as opposed to the real' (The Reality of Man, p. 165) 'seeks to see through the arrangement of emotions' (Human Nature, p. 8), 'wishes to demonstrate, through *philosophical deconstruction*, what avarice, for example, "actually" is, namely in terms of its *inner* possibility' – 'to present pedantry, the sense of shame, etc., as *existential possibilities*'. (The Reality of Man, p. 165) However: 'Human nature is not something which – once one has familiarised oneself with this and that in due order – can then be demonstrated *in its proper place*.' (Human Nature, p. 9) One can only 'within limits' approach that which
'appeal', which is 'condensed' in the feeling of shame, for example – which
'horizon of life' is precisely what 'becomes perceptible' here. The references here to 'insight' and 'becoming aware of oneself' relate to
'intricate determinations' (cf. Human Nature, p. 57) – that is to say, to
'Entanglements' of the human being *'within themselves'* (ibid., p. 56) within their 'interpretation': 'from where the human being understands themselves, towards where and to what extent the gaze is directed here'. (Ibid., p. 41) Psychological 'demonstration' 'determines what the [i.e. in the feeling of shame] compares itself', 'and thus the direction in which it establishes and grasps itself'. (Ibid., p. 41) What becomes perceptible here as a horizon of life is *nothing unambiguous* – something that one could 'put into a formula'. (Ibid., p. 41) It is only through its 'entanglements' that the
'various relationships' that, for example, 'come to fulfilment' in the feeling of shame (ibid., p. 41) can be 'grasped'.

'Even in fear, for example, something is *recognised*, and that means, in this context, that the realm of objective relationships is discerned within it.' (Ibid., p. 44) Fear 'finds a measure in danger'. (Ibid., p. 105)
'One can understand someone through their fear.' (Ibid.) 'I can also distance myself from fear', maintaining 'a free

'Gaining a grasp of the thought'. (Ibid.) 'Here, knowledge means a process *of engagement* in which one *grapples* with things.' (Ibid., p. 44) On the other hand: '"*Timor fuga* est": what is meant here is not the fear that becomes a thought, which, in the face of a danger revealed therein, allows itself to be freely determined towards something. *Fuga* manifests itself as a fear that does not face up to what is approaching, that flees, dares not stand its ground anywhere, that abandons what prudence seeks to protect." (Ibid., p. 13) 'Whilst *the realisation of my own self* comes to light, for example, in the conciseness of my prudently grounded fear—which takes in this and that—in that it focuses on something, consciousness is *regressive*.' (Ibid., pp. 55–56) In comparison to knowledge, which marks the beginning of an engagement with things, 'it is something else entirely to become conscious of oneself or of a thing. For here one is brought back to oneself, or rather it

'One becomes' aware of something here. Awareness is something that
arises *of its own accord*. And whilst in one case what has been withheld from me is deduced and *intervened in*, here what is recognised is *set aside and preserved*; that of which one becomes conscious is, as 'not yet conscious', already, as it were, *laid out within* consciousness.' (Ibid., p. 44) But: 'What does it actually mean to *be* the "object" of my consciousness?' (Ibid., p. 44) What is it that takes shape within it?
'To be conscious of a thing means' – first of all –
'that it *is incorporated into my decision as a guiding principle*, or rather that one is clear about this'. 'This "being clear about it" as a state of my own being does not coincide with the *orientation* that might convey it – an orientation derived from a perspective or standpoint in which one merely "shares" in something given to *everyone*. Knowledge, too, is something else. For one *possesses it*, stands by it or establishes a relationship with it. Knowledge exists as something binding upon everyone. It is a factual body of knowledge that can be expanded, communicated and applied. Knowledge does not consist in the fact that I possess it, but in the fact that it is actual knowledge and not an error." (Ibid., p. 44) What one is clear about does not yet appear in the light of an overarching orientation shared with others, nor does it yet have any 'substance' in the sense of something 'binding' upon everyone. 'That which is incorporated into my decision as a guiding factor', that which 'one is clear about', likewise has no decisive significance in the sense of a definite 'orientation'. As 'incorporated', it is *'incidental'*. 'Language distinguishes—

'that which one has done somewhere, whether one is aware of it or not, is treated by the unconscious as something done *on the sly*.' (Ibid., p. 44) But: 'The mere fact of being conscious of something does not mean that one has yet entered *into a relationship* with it, in the same way, for example, that perception *engages* with things and *ascertains* their reality.'
'That of which I am conscious is *neither the object of my attention nor does it affect me*. Rather, it *determines* me: for I *allow* myself to be determined by it.' (Ibid.) 'One is, for example, […] aware of one's situation' (ibid.) in which one finds oneself; one is clear that it determines one. 'One can only become aware of *that in which one finds oneself*.' (Ibid., p. 56)

'It is precisely in the *reinterpretation* of consciousness as … into an *intentionality* of consciousness that such a relationship to … is expressed.' (Ibid., p. 45, note 1) The genitive object (*of which* one 'is' conscious) shifts when it is transformed into a dative object (*of which* one 'has' consciousness). What is initially placed to *one side* is repositioned when it is interpreted as 'directing' with regard to an
'manifestation' of consciousness, which thereby makes it abundantly clear
*'me*ans*'*, that is, chooses the 'centre' of his *resolute* acceptance of it . *'Cogitationis nomine illa omnia intelligo quae nobis consciis in nobis* fiunt' – as Descartes puts it.[1] The concept of 'consciousness', by contrast, signifies a *shift*. For that 'of which' consciousness is here is the *object* manifesting itself therein. Things are transformed into *objects*. They are 'placed' within consciousness. The *idea* becomes the prototype of the 'content' of consciousness." (Ibid., p. 58, note 1) Perceptual consciousness is conceived as doxical-thetic, that is, as positional in its objective 'belief'. 'The orientation towards
… is, as it were, taken up *from the other end*. The *object* must be traced in the form of consciousness.' (Ibid.) The object's self-revelation is the 'intuitive fulfilment' in the

1 The Works of Descartes, published by Charles Adam & Paul Tannery, Vol. VIII-1. *Principia Philosophiae*. Vrin, Paris 1964, p. 7 [IX]. 'What is thought?' 'By the term "thought", I mean all those things which take place within us whilst we are conscious of them, insofar as we are conscious of them within ourselves.' – Cf. R. Descartes, *Méditations métaphysiques. Objections et réponses suivies de quatre Lettres*. Flammarion, Tours 1979, *Définitions*, p. 259; or *Works of Descartes published by Charles Adam & Paul Tannery VII. *Meditationes de prima philosophia*. Vrin, Paris 1964, p. 160 [217]. *Definitiones*. "By the term 'cogitation' I encompass everything that is within us in such a way that we are immediately conscious of it."

It is left to the course of perception, which, as a 'synthetic act' of consciousness, is directed towards the identification of the supposed object. With the abundance of what is bodily self-given, it follows in the footsteps of its 'given-ness'. 'That the subject of being is "conscious" of itself means, on the other hand, precisely that it finds itself *referred back to itself* as the proof of being as an object.' (Ibid., p. 45, note 1) 'This consciousness, however, must first of all *seek out* its subject; or rather, it has in me only its *occasional* subject – I find myself here – reflexively – *included within it*.' (Ibid., p. 58, note 1) In the object-oriented orientation of perceptual consciousness, the subject – anticipating itself – is 'surrendered' to the given object in its representations, encompassed within its synthetic act of identification. Immanent reflection is required to uncover it – as such – in its activity for the first time. 'Occasionally' here means: 'on the occasion of' the act of perception, in which it is already entangled and appropriately integrated, and in which it only 'finds' itself – through immanent reflection – as already encompassed within it – as already 'already within it'.

This original *belatedness* of perceptual consciousness

—of anticipating itself in objective devotion and only 'finding' itself 'immediately' in immanent reflection—in an apodictic certainty which, however, by no means signifies an adequate given—is not without consequence for the nature of its 'synthetic achievement'. 'It *does not actually* perceive, but "has" perceptions. The indifferent, non-signifying nature of this

'Treating sensations as something given, however, reveals how, even at this early stage, the *nature of man*—that in which he *is open*, as a capacity, *to that with which he exists*—is overlooked, and how acts such as seeing, hearing, etc., remain *unconceptualised*.' (Ibid., p. 45, note 1) The objective 'orientation' of perceptual consciousness as an 'intentional supposition' or as an 'intuitive fulfilment' in the manifestation of what is supposed obscures the original *encounter* with things. For these are by no means 'given' in any sense. In the absorption of perceptual consciousness, one does not actually 'perceive', that is, *find one's way* into that to which human nature is specifically open *through bodily faculties* – into that *'with which'* human beings *exist* in the 'various modalities of their perception'. (Ibid., p. 81) That which affects the perceiving subject is merely a *datum of sensation*

is regarded as being subject to noetic animation, insofar as the latter conceives of the sensation as 'representing' in the objective sense. The sensation is reduced, as a 'given', to its representational function for the consciousness that conceives of objects. What is actually *at stake* in 'sensation'—the bodily 'contact' in 'being-with' things, is, in the general 'possession' of given sensations mediated by the body, 'the *scene on which* sensations occur' – without the perceiving subject being able to *'actually* "possess" this body as "his own"' (ibid., p. 81), but rather 'is' in it as in his *own corporeality*.

'The modalities of sensation are overlooked when the decisive perspective becomes that of seeking to bring something *into experience* through sensations. As if something were sensed "on" things, *picked up* from them, as it were. In the 'given' of sensation, the *detached*, *extra-mundane* aspect of this subject—as if existing solely in itself—is then expressed, or rather the fact that it does not actually come into contact with things by itself but only through the mediation of a body […]." (Ibid., p. 81) "One is never in a vacuum, but always 'with' things." (Ibid., p. 78) 'The senses *embody* different modalities of sensation.' 'My *bodily relationship* to things is always changing here: the circumstances vary; the expanse of the world shifts.' (Ibid., p. 81)

Consequently, one must consider, for example, seeing or hearing, in which one *is* always *'involved in a* different way' (ibid., p. 80), or indeed smelling and tasting, in which one is 'merely led *onto the trail* of things', without them having yet emerged 'under a single horizon'. (Ibid., p. 81) The conception of sensory data in their representational function—

This section illustrates the synthetic nature of perceptual consciousness in its 'noetic animation', that is, in its rational dynamism. This is directed towards the synthesis of the identification of the object intended in the course of perception. 'Recognition' here means 'ascertaining' what the intended 'representational' object is 'in reality'. The act of setting aside what has been withheld is here transformed into *the act of presenting*, in a preservative manner, what *has been presupposed*. What was initially established as the guiding principle in

my decision is now to be identified with absolute clarity as intended in a straight line (linea recta), so that it may be decided. 'Consciously' – this no longer refers here to that which,

'in which one finds oneself' (ibid., p. 56), but rather to that on which one *oneself 'relies'*.

To be conscious of something means: to be clear in one's mind that it determines me. 'Which is why "not being conscious of the fact that …" can indicate a deficiency in the sense of blindness, thoughtlessness and a lack of conscience, and "acting without being conscious of what one is doing" signifies a disturbance of the whole.' (Ibid., p. 45) 'This vague confusion of "without consciousness …" is something other than rashness. Something is done rashly insofar as it is done hastily and without reflection. "Rash" characterises an inner-worldly behaviour that is, in this respect, incorrect. ('Without reflection', on the other hand, would mean: without first thinking it over, without further ado – which may well be exactly the right thing to do.) One brings someone to their senses insofar as they, having been driven about, cannot stand on their own two feet. Coming to one's senses stands in contrast to a state of distraction. Someone who is tormented and hounded by whims cannot come to their senses. 'Reckless' means: without considering the *practical* consequences; 'impulsive', on the other hand, means: deceiving oneself about *one's own* possibilities and abilities. 'To be out of one's mind' means unbridled aimlessness." (Ibid., p. 45, note 2)

In 'determination', the *dynamism* of that in which one is, or in which one finds oneself, is indicated insofar as one *allows* oneself *to* be determined by it.

'Whereby "movement" […] naturally does not mean the movement of a "thing that exists".'[2] That which is posited as directing my decision is something *that "demands"* of me, and not merely something that "affects" me. Precisely 'the tangibility that emerges from the untouchability of something', for example, which shame seeks to 'fascinate' by circling around and 'suppress' (ibid., p. 32), demonstrates all the more clearly in what *the 'sensitivity'* that makes a claim on me differs from the

'that which affects me' is specifically distinguished from *'sensual perception'*. 'Shame is alive precisely in that it does not allow certain things to arise at all' (ibid., p. 32) – 'which plays a defining role in human life' (ibid., p. 36), but that is to say as a 'foundation' – in which 'the unsettling and unsettling aspect of having to create the new ground for one's existence is expressed' (ibid., p. 34). 'Directing' is

[2] Cf. L. Binswanger, Three Forms of Failed Existence. (1956) In: Selected Works Vol. 1: Forms of Failed Existence. Edited by M. Herzog. Asanger Verlag, Heidelberg 1992, p. 238.

– here – the 'set' aspect, insofar as it pushes precisely in the direction in which I am exposed, that is to say, in the direction of

'That which is most one's own, in which one is grasped as an absolute' (ibid., p. 33) – that which 'is close to the personal, the integrity of which could be violated'. (Ibid., p. 37) In the 'prohibitive', 'setting aside' of that which touches me, it becomes apparent 'how, in the opposite direction, nature is here determined by man'. (Ibid., p. 36) *'I myself* am the protection of my nakedness: C'est l'âme qui enveloppe le corps.'[3] (Ibid.) 'The nakedness of my body is something that cannot arise *"in* and *of* itself"—that is to say, here: *dragged* into the reality that can be spread out before one's eyes—for that of which it is, after all, merely the *natural* foundation.' (Ibid.) The visibly uncovered parts of my body, in their natural state, can only *to a limited extent* evoke the tangibility that points to my vulnerability: when, 'extended' beyond this simple natural state, it *appeals* to 'what is actually fundamental to a life that seeks to be lived' (ibid., p. 37) – or rather, 'touches upon' it. The extent to which 'sensitivity' actually differs from sensory perception is evident in the fact that

one *is*, as it were, *'touched'* by the gaze that rests 'on certain parts of the naked body'. This 'being touched' implies a 'sense of vulnerability' with regard to the 'unprotected' *parts of myself* (ibid., p. 35), and by no means a sensual 'touch', which the observing gaze – though 'floating freely' in its vision – is in any case incapable of bringing about at the relevant part of my body. The fact that this sense of vulnerability is nevertheless, as it were, *oriented* towards the sense of touch—as if the shameless gaze were groping its way, piece by piece, along the increasingly questionable parts of my body—relates to its special significance as a so-called 'close sense'. One remains *on the trail* of things by groping;
'the trail of the touched', the contact that lasts for a moment,
encompasses that which is 'experienced in *stretches* of its extension' (ibid., p. 80), but which remains *'isolated'* and 'separated from one another'. 'Extension' *does not*, *as such*, appear 'freely' in relations 'of the adjacency and opposition of things' (ibid.), for which 'an overview' is precisely lacking here. (Ibid., p. 79) 'Certainly – one is in space here – yet *one is*, *as it were*, *lost* to what is encountered within it. Certainly – one perceives

3 Cf. F. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil. In: Works in Three Volumes. Edited by
K. Schlechta. Vol. II. C. Hanser, Munich 1966, p. 635, p. 142: 'The most chaste words I have ever heard: "Dans le véritable amour c'est l'âme, qui enveloppe le corps."'

'extends here from here to there, just as my arm extends in a certain direction. But neither is this direction *strictly* spatial, nor does the snail *cover* any distance in space.' (Ibid., pp. 79–80) 'Even the parts of the body [remain separate from one another], which, although all relate to me, are nevertheless *not spatially close* to one another.' (Ibid., p. 80) 'Only when one breaks through from the sphere of sensation in the strict sense to the horizon of a world can the "here" be defined as a place in space.' It is *sight*, however, that brings about this breakthrough. 'The space that is seen is a *perceived* space.' (Ibid., p. 90) 'Through sight, existence expressly *renounces* the *inarticulate*, *specific sense of being* of things, as it can only be found in tracing sensation.' (Ibid., p. 83) – How
'when one emerges from darkness into light, when one shifts from the uncertain centre of *a state of being that is* constantly *bumping into* everything, back to the zero point of *orientation*.' (Ibid., p. 80) It is precisely this *'sitting* upon'—which is characteristic of the haptic near-space as a space of contact, in which the perceived spatial extension does not emerge into the open within a field of orientation that allows for an overview, but remains 'isolated'—that the self-consciousness evoked by the shamelessly *'rebellious'*, probing gaze *'is directed*'.

Clarity regarding what determines me is not *a clara et di stincta perceptio* in the sense of immediate certainty – an 'immediate realisation' [4] – but unfolds in the direction of a
'Becoming clairvoyant', a 'preoccupation with it in one's thoughts' or a *'conscientiousness*'. For example, 'Shame *is aware of* things about which one *cannot* be *certain* of the other's feelings' (ibid., p. 32). 'To have become seeing' here means precisely: 'to no longer be *uninhibited*'. (Ibid., p. 35) A reference to 'my *powerlessness* over that to which I may be held accountable through gazes' (ibid.) is established in this act of becoming seeing. Consequently, one is, in one's own shame,
has become *'questionable*': *with regard* to the *'uniformity* of his physical nature, within which man always reacts', which has become increasingly 'problematic'. (Ibid., p. 35 – cf. p. 14) Shame is borne of this 'disturbing and unsettling' questionable nature of the self – which precisely constitutes 'the depth of shame'. (Ibid., pp. 32–33) Something intrudes into the very core of human bodily behaviour that divides its 'naturalness'. It is, above all, the 'general sexual—

4 R. Descartes, op. cit., p. 259: 'que nous en sommes immédiatement connaissants'.

'consciousness', which gives rise to shame. (Ibid., p. 35) 'For it is in this, as in something general in which one merely participates, that one nevertheless becomes conscious *of oneself*.' (Ibid.) But this means: 'in something that man
'also is' – whereby both the 'also' and the 'is' must be emphasised" (ibid., p. 36) – which *fundamentally* eludes the certainty of one's own self.

'Consciousness is always *self-consciousness* insofar as one is conscious of oneself and also *of* one's *own state*.' (Ibid., p. 45) 'One is, for example, conscious of one's guilt.' (Ibid., p. 44) 'One becomes aware, for example, of "one's" guilt or one's intentions. Here, however, one does not identify with them – as if one were merely recognising oneself in them. Becoming aware of one's guilt means *acknowledging it*, *taking responsibility for it*.' (Ibid., p. 45) One is 'brought back to oneself' here (ibid., p. 44) insofar as that which makes a claim on one intensifies and condenses *in the direction of oneself*, who— —has not become questionable in the uniformity of one's physical nature, but rather 'splits' precisely within it,[5] but who, having gained clear insight into 'what [one] has done' (Reality of Man, p. 77), must find one's way to one's *responsibility*. 'One has responsibility insofar as one is "called upon" in relation to something. Human existence is responsible *in itself*. This is the expression of its *temporality*. Selfhood is realised in the fact that existence *returns* to itself *in a* responsible manner, that is to say, that in this it *assumes* itself as that which it 'is' in *fate* and guilt. Existence *moves towards itself in such steps*. It *stands by* its fate, which is not something finished, but something one must '*come to* terms with'. And the *perfection* of guilt becomes apparent in the fact that one can only relate to it by 'accepting' it. For one is not relieved of what one has done in the sense that one could leave it *behind*. In

[5] This division 'affects' bodily *behaviour*, that is to say, the ability to emerge from within oneself and present oneself to others; consequently, it affects 'bodily nature' *insofar as this* is *embodied* in one's attitude and posture. Characteristic of this are the *wandering gaze*, which does not dare to rise, and the *hesitant gesture*, the 'gesture' of 'tactful reserve' (cf. Human Nature, pp. 32–33), in which precisely this 'tangibility' becomes concentrated. A peculiar *shift* takes place in that, as a rule, tact 'spares the *other's* feelings', 'insofar as it is a *proportionate* and *reactive* behaviour' (ibid., p. 32), whilst the gaze 'signifies a relationship, a stance towards the world – […] a *decisiveness*'. (Ibid., p. 35) The *regression* of 'budding self-awareness' (ibid., p. 34) is manifested here: in the *shift* in human *'eccentric* behaviour', which
'is something spiritual' (ibid., p. 26).

one remains *connected* to it. Certainly – it cannot be changed, but it can be 'taken in', and one can engage with it.' (ibid., p. 77)

Whilst 'consciousness of oneself in one's guilt' means that one is brought back to oneself in such a way that one remains connected to oneself – in a responsible manner – 'to be "conscious" in the absolute sense, however, means: to be at one with oneself'. 'This denotes *a fundamental mode and the measure* of human existence.' (Human Nature, p. 45)
'The one who is waking is at one with himself.' (Ibid.) 'Those who are awake share a *common* world— —yet in sleep each turns away from this *into his own*.'[6] 'Why, then, is a person *not at one with themselves* precisely when they withdraw into their *own* world?' (Ibid.) Being at one with oneself evidently differs from the ιδιον κοσμοζ of self-centredness. This transgression of self-conceit, which is precisely 'maintained' in consciousness, is illuminating
'held' in consciousness.

- The centre of the actual situation

'One awakens to oneself in the morning. The fact that one *reassures* oneself of the reality of what is closest at hand, of what is tangible – that one simply knows one is not dreaming – does not yet allow one to come to oneself. Rather, it is this: that one – finding one's way back from what may be an unfamiliar environment – *regains a hold of* oneself in one's situation. By coming to terms with this within oneself. Certainly – one is self-sufficient in this regard. But this is precisely because one *can be the 'other' to oneself*. One needs the other in order to be *properly situated* within one's λογον διδοναι." (Human Nature, p. 46)

The alertness of consciousness is something that must be 'maintained' . The tangible assurance of what is closest at hand – and sight, too, has 'a place in the handling of things' [7]– upon waking and opening one's eyes – the act of looking around – is

[6] Heraclitus, Fragment 89: ο Η. φησι τοις εγρηγοροσιν ενα και κοινον κοσμον ειναι, των δε κοιμωμενων εκαστον εις ιδιον αποστρεφεσθαι. H. Diels: 'Those who are awake share *a single, common* world, but in sleep each turns away from it into their own.' – Cf. The Fragments of the Presocratics. Greek and

[7] H. Lipps, Studies on the Phenomenology of Cognition. Works Vol. I, V. Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main 1976, I, p. 79.

as such, it is not yet a 'step towards oneself'. It is only when one *is asked* how one finds oneself that one comes to terms with oneself – perhaps by finding one's way back from the unfamiliar surroundings. One regains a hold of oneself in *one's* situation, which – here – is 'shifted'. Insofar as it initially confused me, one 'comes to terms with oneself through it', that is to say, one establishes a 'clear' relationship with it. Strictly speaking, it is its *'orientation'* that concerns me: one must find one's way out of one's 'entanglement', insofar as this actually affects one. One only awakens to oneself by *transforming oneself* in the process. The fact that – being referred back to oneself – one must first of all acquire the correct *'attitude'* here means that, having been called upon to do so, one must find one's way to one's responsibility. One must find an answer to what is affecting me here. 'Being called upon to turn in on oneself […] corresponds to responsibility: λογον διδοναι.' (Ibid., p. 59) This, however, is in turn significant for the dream in the opposite direction, which cannot be understood here as an unreal, deceptive illusion – of which I am not certain.'
'The unreality of the dream lies in the fact that one is *detached from oneself*.' (Ibid., p. 48) That 'the possibility of waking up and becoming free to be oneself' (ibid., p. 49) lies within *oneself* – one
'is self-sufficient in this regard', because one 'can be the other to oneself': (ibid., p. 46) 'one needs the other in order to be properly situated in one's λογον διδοναι' – (ibid.) that one is therefore accountable *to* oneself here, 'selfhood' is *'brought* about' here, (ibid., p. 47) but this is the crucial point. Emerging from a state of obscurity and confusion, the 'reality of something' is, *by definition*, something for which one must 'take responsibility', something one must 'stand by'. 'For example, by setting it right and restoring it to its pure state.' (The Reality of Man, p. 78) The fact that one is thereby accountable *to* oneself, that one establishes one's 'self-standing' in the reality that has *just* been properly oriented *towards this*, as if one were, in the process, the Other to oneself – means, first and foremost, that one is not, in this context, the *immediately self-given*. 'In the 'addition of supporting reasons', one attempts, as circumstances permit, to arrange things in such a way that the demands of a free stance towards them have been met as far as possible. (Cf. The Reality of Man, p. 78) 'In a dream, however, one *slips* away from oneself. Here one is removed from reality. When one surrenders to *one's visions*, one is not in the truth.' (Human Nature, pp. 47–48) 'In a dream, one is surrendered to *the – '*

does not, as in the engagement with things, *withdraw into itself*; one does not have a free relationship with things.' (Ibid., p. 48) But what, then, does it mean in concrete terms that, in this withdrawal into oneself,

'one can be the Other to oneself' – that it is precisely in this 'being connected to oneself', in which 'a unity of transcendental apperception prevails', that one escapes from the ιδιον κοσμοζ – for the time being, this means that 'one thing *immediately* overlaps the other'? (Ibid., p. 48)

'The other is understood as "my equal". My equal is the one who is present in the same way as I am, with whom I encounter one another on the same basis – namely, as a being of which I am the subject.' (Ibid., p. 46) 'Just as I do' – in this, I encounter the other not merely in a situation in which I – like him – find myself, but in the way he is *'addressed'* by something that – like him – *'concerns'* me in some way. 'On the same basis … for a being of which I am the subject' – this does not so much express a shared situation as the fact that we are each, in the same way, 'called upon to turn in on ourselves'. That is to say, however, in the 'direction' in which one does not merely 'find oneself', but in which that in which one *finds oneself* – and to which one is oneself called upon – *is distinguished*. 'For whilst things, beyond their being, are understood only in terms of their whatness – so that this being of theirs, which is not even enquired after but is implicitly taken for granted, can be regarded as nothing more than a mere complement to their concept – human beings are *addressed* in *relation to themselves*, to what they "are" *and* "have" *of their own accord*.' (Ibid., p. 46) '"You are …" – this not only captures the situation, but also *directs* the person being addressed *towards something* to which they find themselves *connected as* "theirs".' (Ibid.) '"You have …"; '"you possess …"' are different modes of *the "realisation of oneself*". (Ibid., p. 47)

'Mortality, for example, is a "*dest*iny" *for* human beings. Human beings "have" – in *the true sense* of the word – talents; they "possess" knowledge, and so on.' (Ibid., p. 46) The obligation inherent in this *takes on* different *forms* in each instance. 'Existence *stands in relation to* its fate, which is not something finished, but something one must "come to terms with".' (The Reality of Man, p. 77) 'Avarice, pedantry, etc., are fates.' (Ibid., p. 169)

In the true sense of the word

A person 'has' talents insofar as they engage with them. A person 'rests' on their knowledge insofar as they 'run aground in it'. With regard to a person, something 'becomes' […] an experience, the

lies in 'nature', that is, in the constitution of man as a free and historical being.' (Ibid., p. 163) 'The reality of man is […] an indicator of existential possibilities.' (Ibid.)

'Finding oneself connected to something as "one's own"' – whereupon, having been addressed in this very way, one may also be *challenged* by the other – in this 'it is emphasised how I am connected to that which – as a matter of responsibility – is *distinguished through critical engagement*. And the 'freedom' of existence consists precisely in allowing oneself to be freely determined, in being able to ground oneself *with regard to …* 'Free', however, is the antithesis of 'self-willed'. For it is in my 'ability' that I *ground* myself." (Ibid., p. 79)

'To be able to ground oneself freely with regard to …' – it is in this that one can be the Other to oneself. (Cf. Human Nature, p. 46) For the distinction of that in which one finds oneself – whereupon one is called upon, insofar as one finds oneself connected to it as 'one's own' – undergoes a 'confrontation' in this. The counter-movement to 'self-realisation of one's own volition' takes place in the λογον διδοναι, that is, in the responsible grounding by virtue of the 'focus on …', which implies a specific ability: *'to have standpoints and to choose perspectives'*. (Ibid., p. 46) For therein lies the fact that 'one does not simply impose itself on the other', but rather that *'the centre of an actual situation'* opens up to me. (Ibid., p. 48) However, this essentially involves *lateral*,

i.e. *lateral*, references.

'Only human beings, who *engage with* things – but not animals, which do not relate to the element into which they are placed – can adopt standpoints and choose perspectives. It is only because the world in which I live is *mine* – and nature, too, is viewed from the *perspective of a world* – that I can share it with others, that it can be shared with them. Only human beings ' ' and 'encounter one another *in* something'." (Ibid., p. 46) The *"aspect of the world as a matter of interest"*[8] begins to emerge here – that of the things with which the human being, who "'is 'between' things', 'actually deals with' (ibid., p. 65) – that is, engages with – whilst the animal 'in each case "is" *in* one place'. (Ibid., p. 64) 'The sympathetic contact in which the animal relates to its own kind—

[8] See Husserl's notes on G. Misch, 'Lebensphilosophie und Phänomenologie', in: *Dilthey-Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Geschichte der Geisteswissenschaften*, vol. 12/ 1999–2000, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 2000, supplement, p. 162.

does not in itself imply community; an animal cannot feel lonely. For loneliness implies a deprivation of *existence*: the lonely person cannot share with anyone what they feel, *what moves them*. They cannot open themselves up to anyone.' (Ibid., p. 46) 'A longing for the other, however, springs from loneliness.' 'One longs for the other insofar as one can only "be" what one is in the other's presence and with the other. Longing seeks to come to oneself through something.' (Ibid., p. 119) 'Compassion', however, lacks this participation of the other in that to which one is currently *connected*.
'But it is only through interaction with others that one truly *develops* – discovering
oneself, for example, *in ways* that perhaps only one other person can recognise in me."
'One is always in the wrong; with two, the truth begins.' Only by *drawing* oneself *back* from the other, by one person taking on board the other's interpretation in turn, does the matter reveal itself from the other side and come *to light*.' (Ibid., pp. 46–47) One is properly 'positioned' in one's λογον διδοναι through the reflection on the chosen standpoint, or rather through a re-evaluation of the standpoint one insists upon but has not made 'clear' to oneself.

'Only that to which one is connected *in the realisation of one's own being* can be shared – that is, the world, insofar as every step that existence takes towards itself takes place within its horizon, that is, just as it reveals itself to one as something seen.' (Ibid., p. 47) The world reveals itself as seen within the horizon of perspectives and standpoints to which one 'is' connected, that is to say, as modes of realisation of existence which, precisely in this way, take steps towards itself – and can therefore also be reflected back by the Other, so as to be set aright in the light of the choice made and the standpoint one has adopted. 'And nature, too, is seen within the horizon of a world', (ibid., p. 46) in which one, as a participant, can encounter others. '(But there is no *actual* community with regard to physical nature. For it can only be demonstrated by means of apparatus, i.e. objectively in the sense of intersubjectively, namely, as it were, "between" the subjects. Or rather, that in which one can share here is a thing or the possession of a thing: there is a physical "image" of the world as a universe. But one does not *stand* within this world. There is no 'view' of it.)' (Ibid., p. 47) What is demonstrated objectively by the instruments, as if in its proper place, is a projection surface for physical hypotheses concerning their factual—

a nature negotiated through the act of taking a stand. One does not find oneself *claimed by oneself* in it, nor does one regain oneself from the other; rather, one encounters one another within the field of projection of claims to universality that are taking shape, in which one is abstracted from both the one and the other. 'Our world is a world *of testimony*. One plays the role of a witness, is cited as such. What one has seen oneself stands in contrast to what one must have others vouch for. The witness's *presence* signifies more than, say, the presence of a supervising observer during an experiment. For the latter would merely be an agent in this context. Yet it is only insofar as *selfhood* is *engaged* that something can reveal itself as the 'reality' of something. In terms of *having been there*, there are, for example, also the witnesses of an era, such as the last war. They bear witness to it insofar as they themselves have been shaped by the war, namely *marked* by it. The reality of something can only ever be attested to; it cannot, however, be objectively demonstrated. (Just as, on the other hand, the Cartesian cogito can only account for the objectivity of something, namely justify its positing.)' (Ibid., p. 47) One stands by what one has seen oneself; the reality of something is understood on the basis of having been present, which 'reveals' itself in what one has seen oneself. What one has 'experienced' in this context refers to 'what one has been part of'. 'Experiences, as that which one

has been part of—that which one can describe, insofar as one was present at the time—are not "psychological". When one speaks of feelings as "inner experiences", one has, as it were, understood oneself as a witness to one's own feelings.' (Ibid., p. 47, note 2) 'Having been part of' means: that which is connected to one's own experience. That which is 'attested' by others is that for which one was not 'there' oneself, whose presence eluded me – for which I cannot vouch with my own self as having been seen 'with my own eyes' – that is, insofar as my selfhood was 'activated' in my seeing. The fact that one 'plays the role of the witness, as that is how one is cited' (ibid., p. 47) means that, in giving an accountable account, one is addressed with regard to one's own presence at the event, or is called upon by the other on that basis. One is a 'witness to an era' insofar as one 'was part of it' – for example, 'in the last war'. (Ibid.) 'For here a radical change took place in one's relationship to the world.' (Reality of Man, p. 90) 'The soldier of the last war knew himself to be the true *bearer*

of his time. That his form of existence *was part* of the war which had shaped him into himself and *defined him as a type*.' (Ibid., p. 96)

Something manifests itself as the 'reality of something' only insofar as selfhood is engaged, insofar as one has connected oneself to oneself within it –
i.e. in the self-realisation of one's seeing, for which one stands in one's own right, or rather in the 'bearing' of one's time, 'under whose principle' one stands. (Ibid., p. 90) What is 'objectively demonstrated' is not the reality of something as it presents itself to me, as the witness to which I am cited, insofar as I am called upon on the basis of having seen it for myself – but rather the physical nature of something 'through methodological interventions', in which 'only that which is the subject of physics is defined, namely brought to the fore'. (Human Nature, p. 69) The fact that the Cartesian cogito 'can only *account* for the objectivity of something, namely justify its positing', which is neither demonstrated in its physical nature in its proper place nor reveals itself as the 'reality' of something in the self-act of seeing, refers to the fact that it *'grasps* itself in doubt'. (Ibid., p. 57) 'Namely, in the distinction indicated therein from that which is conveyed through the senses.' (Ibid.) For the fact that the sensory faculties can deceive means that the objectivity of that which, in the examination of doubt, must be grasped as belonging to the immediate self-certainty of the cogito—that is to say, the representation of a thinking 'object'—can be established, and its positing justified. 'For Descartes, what is truly real is that which he recognises *in unity with himself*, for which he stands up,
that is, what he can build up through his own efforts, what does not
from himself. One realises oneself in thought; one is connected to oneself within it. The relationship to the world that one must then establish can only be that of *an orienting overview*: 'representation' is something that stands at my disposal as a means. It frees me from mere appearance; it is a retrospective account.' (Ibid., p. 57)

Whilst something can only reveal itself as the reality of something insofar as *selfhood* is *engaged* – one realises oneself in one's seeing, is connected to the seen in the realisation of oneself, and stands by oneself in this – 'in a dream, however, *one slips away from oneself*'. 'Here one is removed from reality. When one surrenders to one's visions, one is not in the truth. Not as though one were hallucinating in a dream. Its unreality is different from that of mere appearance. The unreality of the dream lies in the fact that here one is *removed from oneself*. That one finds oneself on display, everything with oneself

Allows things to happen, is not actually 'capable' of anything; in this lies the realisation that one is only detached from reality to the extent that one has first slipped away from oneself. One does not 'have' oneself

in a dream: one cannot make oneself run, even if one wishes to flee. One cannot – without actually being hindered – hold on to what one wishes to retain. And the torment of the anxiety-inducing dream lies precisely in the fact that the redeeming word is always missing here. One stands as if under an inexplicable power that does not allow one to move freely. Not as if one had slipped into being a mere object of the events, as when one falls – for one is, after all, still *moving*. When dreaming, however, one is at the mercy of the visions; one *does not withdraw into oneself* as one does when grappling with things; one does not have a free relationship with things. The non-binding nature of things—the fact that one thing suddenly overlaps with another—essentially signifies a *state of not being connected to oneself*.' (Ibid., p. 48)
»[…] I must be able to face things *freely* when they
'themselves', that is, as what they are meant to appear to be in 'reality'. When they are to be recognised for what they are, understood in their objective significance. When I wish to appreciate their various facets from *freely chosen perspectives*, when I wish to view them in the light of something.' (Ibid., p. 102) 'That perception is a step towards which one must freely "have" oneself through a firm foundation, which one finds only in a reality in which one encounters the other (whereby the other may just as well be myself as he may, for example, encounter me in a language) – this is presumably what Jaspers has in mind when, with regard to the alienation of the world of perception, he says that 'in normal perception, apart from the objective aspect of corporeality , there must be something else which we would not notice were it not for these patients voicing their peculiar complaints'. [9] (Ibid., p. 102, note 1) In perception, one enters into a *relationship* with things 'in much the same way as perception *engages* with things *to assure itself of* their reality'. (Ibid., pp. 44–45) 'Perception operates in the light *of* a *conception of being*. Here one ascertains reality, which always *exists in some way*. However, it does not reveal itself, as it were, of its own accord, but through something that can be taken up *as a thought* and held fast *as a point of view*.' (Ibid., p. 67) 'In the *considerations* that are constitutive

[9] K. Jaspers, General Psychopathology. Springer, Heidelberg 1953, pp. 53–54.

for the 'what' of things, a particular *self-understanding* is always expressed. In this, the human being reveals themselves as *the principle* of reality. One defines oneself in the engagement with it.' (Ibid., p. 67) That in this self-determination one must be free on firm ground – that one 'is not, as it were, subject to an inexplicable power that does not allow one to move freely' (ibid., pp. 48) – and that one finds this ground, in turn, only in a reality in which one encounters others, 'whereby *the other* can be just as much myself as he is to me'
'e.g. encountered in a language' (ibid., p. 102, note 1) is of particular significance.

The 'dreamlike, otherworldly' quality of a dream is not *a hallucination*, such as that experienced by an alcoholic. 'The alcoholic's delusional state causes him to see all manner of things. In a state of intoxication, one finds oneself relieved of the need to reconcile what one sees. This represents a breach in relation to the world in its objective reality. One's own insecurity is reflected in the wavering of things. This intermodal state of mind exhibits, as it were, an inducing power in the way the *intention to see is hindered* in its realisation, in the way it is broken, and yet also in the way it can be—as the self-accounts of those under the influence of mescaline show—downright *bent*." (Ibid., p. 102) This contrasts with 'the non-binding nature' of things in a dream – 'the fact that one is at the mercy of visions', 'that one thing suddenly overlaps with another'. (Ibid., p. 48) One does not realise oneself through one's own seeing, so that one cannot vouch for what one sees. It is not that the *intention* of seeing is hindered, broken or distorted in its realisation. Whilst in perception intentions are fulfilled, 'which only become fixed *in the course of* contemplation' (ibid., p. 66), in a dream one finds oneself
'put on display', without being able to be *the other to oneself*.
The appearance of things is transformed in the direction of *strangeness*, in that 'appearances' emerge; one is unable to withdraw *into oneself* within them, that is to say: *to take in* the *very* intentions that become fixed in

the course of contemplation, which in this process remain entirely external to one. 'Completely external' means that one cannot see oneself here through the eyes of another – 'as if I were there'.
'That *dreamy, otherworldly quality* returns in *the rambling, unfettered nature* of *the imagination*, whose object is too *distant* to have any *discernible* connection to the present. In one's wishes, one dispenses with the concern for step-by-step planning. This otherworldliness of the distant, where

191

steps towards oneself

'One can give oneself over to the imagination and let it carry one away, but this is only a *relative* freedom: although the imagination runs ahead of the facts, it nevertheless remains *connected* to them.' (Ibid., p. 48, note 1) In the dream, the imagination's carefree rush towards a promising distance does not correspond to 'things failing to live up to their promise' – rather, it is precisely the seriousness of such a promise that is absent from the dream. The fragmentary nature of the dream reveals how a 'unity of transcendental apperception' can no longer assert itself. To be detached here means: no longer being able to 'stand and remain'. It is precisely when attempting to objectify the dream – when one wishes to describe what one dreamt – that the dream evaporates. It is as though one were decisively pushing the visions aside." (Ibid., p. 48) The unity of a wish-fantasy, for example, even if it no longer stands in a comprehensible connection with the present, does not come to full expression in the dream.

'Because *the centre of an actual situation* is missing in a dream, one is tempted to search for such a centre in an attempt to unravel the mystery. Just as the fragmentary nature of what is dreamt – because nothing here *is scattered into a context* – compels one towards *condensation*. And one speaks of dream "images" in reference to the emergence and disappearance of that which, lacking any connection, can, as it were, only be taken *within its own framework*. This also applies to poetry." (Ibid., p. 49) "In a dream, one becomes – *with clear insight* – unbound from oneself, free from that in which one is otherwise entangled, in which one is inclined to get stuck. The *striking aspect* becomes apparent when one characterises someone in a dream, for example through words one has them speak. One discovers anecdotal details that one would never have come up with through conscious effort. One does not succumb to the *temptation of experience* to dwell on it and set something aside in one's *external* understanding." (Ibid., p. 49) 'It is, of course, less a power than a potential of the dream that lies in the *liberation of the unconscious* or in the cessation of repression into the subconscious. Yet the agonisingly unfulfilled, alien nature of the dream shows how this detachment from oneself and from reality is defined as a "no longer" or a "not yet": *An essential* aspect of sleep and dreams is the possibility of being able to awaken and become free to be oneself." (Ibid., p. 49) In wakefulness, as "being 'conscious' par excellence", i.e. "being at one with oneself" (ibid., p. 45), lies *"a fundamental mode and the measure* of human existence

192

Opaqueness, loss, obliteration, twilight and emphasis

'is designated'. (Ibid.) 'Existence *occurs* in what Kant called Synthesis.' (Ibid., p. 57) It *is defined* therein. (Ibid.)

- Obscurity, loss, burial, twilight and emphasis

'People suffering from fever are "confused", have a "clouded" state of mind, and are not "fully" conscious. They fail to recognise people, project the figures from the wallpaper pattern onto the floor of their room, and so on. The *lack of context* in these interpretations is striking – just as, in a dream, nothing is *actually accounted for*.' (Ibid., p. 49) *'Losing* consciousness means no longer being able to "take in" anything – as a consequence of fatigue or paralysis of sensation that transitions into sleep. Where – in the case of anaesthesia
e.g. – this *vital connection* to things gradually fades away: at a certain moment, one is still just able to perceive the location of the cut, but no longer feels any pain; then one sinks deeper and deeper, as if into a

landslide, until all sensation is extinguished." (Ibid.) 'Anyone who is not in a state of (full) consciousness is regarded as having only limited, or no, criminal responsibility whatsoever. Provided that they are unable to account for their actions, or can do so only to a limited extent.' (Ibid.) 'In the case of impulsive acts, on the other hand, the question of criminal responsibility arises, insofar as the perpetrator's ability to intervene is prevented by emotion. The act does not characterise him, but rather a *type* of psychopathic disposition of which it is symptomatic.' (Ibid., p. 49, note 1) 'And in *the* (epileptic) *twilight state*, it is the scope of his consciousness of himself as the person who was there yesterday, or only recently …, that is restricted.' (Ibid., pp. 49–50)
'But what does one have in mind when one explicitly speaks of a
What is meant by 'self-confidence'? For example, one approaches something with self-confidence, or displays self-confidence. In both cases, one is aware of one's own *abilities*. However, my abilities are determined just as much by my own capabilities as by those of others. I am not always the one called upon to do something. Excessive self-confidence refers precisely to an air of superiority regarding the role that falls to one. What I focus on in my self-confidence, however, are the difficulties to be overcome, against which my ability is first determined and measured. 'Without self-confidence' is the person who does not believe in their own abilities." (Ibid., p. 50)
Not being fully conscious, losing consciousness, not

being fully conscious, the breaking down of the barriers of consciousness, approaching something 'self-consciously', overstepping one's bounds with regard to one's role within it – in each of these turns of phrase it becomes apparent how consciousness *is not something 'immediately given'* – as in the
the 'intricate' provisions that come to light here, because they touch upon different modes of self-realisation, as the existence that 'takes place' here. Just as – correlatively – reality, which always 'lies in some way', 'does not, as it were, reveal itself of its own accord, but rather from something that can be taken up as a thought and held fast as a point of view' (ibid., p. 67), or rather resists this. The unfolding of the ιδιον κοσμοζ into a shared world must not be *reduced* to a *status conscientiae* that is simply 'regarded' *as immutable*. 'That of which I can only *become* conscious at all is not an "intentional object" of consciousness.' (Ibid., p. 58, note 1) The 'unabridged reality' of the human being is not something which, as situated within the 'appearances of consciousness', *presents* itself so immediately as 'itself'.
'An explicit appropriation of oneself in what one is or wills is *denoted* by "conscious".' (Ibid., p. 58, note 1) 'One is set free from the *entanglement* of things, where one remained hidden within oneself.' (Cf. ibid., p. 67)

Bibliographical reference

- Finding Oneself in a Bind. Human Embarrassment as an Existential Affection

First published under the title: *Finding Oneself in a Bind. Human Embarrassment as an Anthropological Guiding Principle in H.* Lipps'
'Human Nature', in: Revista de Filosofia XIV (26). Ed. Complutense, Madrid 2001, pp. 55–84; now in: Event and Affectivity. On the Phenomenology of the Forming Sense. Edited by M. Staudigl and
J. Trinks. Mesotes, Turia + Kant, Vienna 2006, pp. 259–283; French: **La gêne comme affection existentielle* (H. Lipps)*, in: *Annales de Phénoménologie* (5), Paris 2006, pp. 99–122.

- The Fragility of the Human Being. On the Texture of the Shame Phenomenon

First published under the title: *The Fragility of the Human Being. On the Texture of the Shame Phenomenon in Existential Anthropology*, in: Education in the Technological Age. Being, the Human and the World according to Eugen Fink. Edited by A. Hilt and C. Nielsen. Alber Verlag, Freiburg/Munich 2005, pp. 315–339.

- Borderline Cases of Disconnection. Corporeality and Manic
'flight of ideas'

Franz. First published in: **Aux confins de la "Schaltung". Quelques notes sur "la fuite des idées" dans l'anthropologie de H. Lipps**, in: *L'oeuvre du phénomène. Mélanges de philosophie offerts à Marc Richir*.

Edited by P. Kerszberg, A. Mazzù, A. Schnell. Ousia, Brussels/Paris 2009, pp. 279–307

- The Thorn of Existence. Forms of Specific Powerlessness in Human Beings

First published in French as: **Epines du Dasein. Formes d'impuissance spécifique de l'homme**, in: *Annales de Phénoménologie* (9), Paris 2010,
pp. 63–81

- Distance and Otherness. The Transformation of Existence

French: *'The Distant and the Foreign*: *A Change of Existence*', in: *Faire monde: Phenomenological Essays*. Edited by M. Foessel, J.-C. Gens and P. Rodrigo. *Mimesis: The Eye and the Mind*. Milan 2011, pp. 125–144.

7. Steps towards oneself. The 'unabridged reality' of the human being

French first publication: **Des pas vers soi. La réalité pleine de l'existence humaine**, in: *Annales de Phénoménologie* (10), Paris 2011,
pp. 143–162.

- Hans Lipps

The first psychology manuscript: *Human Nature (1938)*

Published with the permission of the Bavarian State and University Library from the Munich estate of H. Lipps (Ana 507).
The marginal notes show, on the one hand, the archive pagination of the Bavarian State and University Library (h001i to h00142i) and, on the other hand, the original pagination by Hans Lipps (hS.i 1–126).

*hArchive pag.*i |
*hm. Pencil:*i

Lipps, Hans

1 typescript

Preliminary manuscript: *Human Nature*

Hans Lipps
(Ana 507) Suppl./

| *handwritten in pencil:* 'Property of Bhussei'
presumably preliminary manuscript of *Human Nature* by E. Ahvé-Lallemanti/

| *Stamp:* Prof. Lipps, Bad Homburg, Promenade 199/

h002i

h003i

h004i

|*written in pencil on the left:* i First ψ MS. *hOriginal page*.i

- Embarrassment and demeanour. 1 201
- Shyness. 8 208
- Embarrassment caused by other people's behaviour. 9 208
- Shame. 10 210
- Mask. 14 213
- Exposure. 15 214
- Nudity. 19 219
- Shamelessness, prudishness. 21 221
- Taboo. 24 224
- Self-confidence. 29 230
- Subconscious mind. 37 237
- The reflexivity of consciousness. 43 243
- Impression and sensation. 45 245
- Modalities of sensation. 54 256
- Mood and flight of ideas. 56 258
- Emotions. 58 261
- Hatred. 62 264
- Fear. 65 268

Claustrophobia. 66 268
Obsessive thoughts. 67 270
Pedantry. 69 271
Stinginess. 72 274
Jealousy. 73 276

- Experience. 74 278

Witness. 75 279
'History'. 76 280
Life experience. 77 281
Encounter. 79 283
Adventurer 81 286

Players, Sensation, etc. 86 290
Hmm. Ink:i Addenda! 90 294

| In psychology, shame is regarded – as a matter of course – as an emotion,
that is to say, as something whose concept is familiar to everyone, and whose distinction from other emotions can be elaborated in terms of its object, cause and occasion. Shame, for example, seems to be easily equated with embarrassment. One does, however, notice the narrowing of the meaning of 'shame' when it is equated here with the feeling of shame. And whilst an objective definition of the latter may well succeed, it is precisely in the adoption and pursuit of the guiding considerations here that one is led away from what shame 'itself' and
'actually' is. For shame is also 'present' in shyness; embarrassment can be an 'expression' of shamefulness, and so on. The similarity of the gesture does not in itself attest to the uniformity of what is originally active within it; rather, it merely crystallises in this direction of affective behaviour. What is therefore regarded as embarrassment par excellence—and setting aside original distinctions, e.g. as embarrassment—is thus the given framework within which shame is to be defined.

- *'Embarrassment and* Demeanour'

The 'embarrassment' one finds oneself in is essentially two-fold. It refers both to what one can empathise with and to something one can recognise objectively, that is to say, something which anyone can ascertain as existing or verify as to its factuality. In other words: the embarrassment I feel, into which I find myself in the face of certain circumstances, is so firmly grounded in this that it can be described as an objective situation. An understanding of the situation manifests itself in the feeling of embarrassment – just as, for example, the critical points of a situation are recognised in 'things'. 'Embarrassment' is, first and foremost, a specific form of embarrassment—one grounded in objective reality—which one can reflect upon, but which one can also anticipate, and from which one must objectively find a way out. Here, one is embarrassed 'about' something: indecisive. |

Unless one knows how to deal with it, one has every reason to fear this situation at the very outset. Anxiety lies behind this unease.

In this state of embarrassment, the uncertainty lies in the unpredictability of the situation. It is this that stands in the way, paralysing one.

One cannot shake it off. The situation is different when it comes to feeling awkward in the presence of others: here, one becomes insecure oneself. Awkwardness arises when appearing before …, that is, in the 'stepping into the limelight' described here. In an unfamiliar setting, one feels oneself becoming

embarrassed, particularly when one realises one does not fit in with the circle that takes one for granted as belonging to it. One feels out of place in such company. When one perceives one's presence as disruptive to others, for example, when one fears one might be regarded by them as prudish. However – one usually 'feels self-conscious' here – which is not quite the same as embarrassment. One feels self-conscious about doing something if one refrains from doing it, for instance so as not to appear in a false or undesirable light. One feels self-conscious when one hesitantly does something that one does not normally do in public. Being watched critically can make one feel self-conscious; one loses one's ease, and one's attention is divided. The insecurity here always relates to the fear that one might not be behaving properly. One feels self-conscious when one believes one is drawing attention to oneself. The person feeling self-conscious is under the impression of an observing spectator, who becomes the cause and yardstick of their self-examination. And here one always fears something, and indeed something specific – as opposed to the embarrassment that overwhelms me and causes my demeanour to become self-conscious altogether. So one feels embarrassed
e.g. also in his anticipation of his own embarrassment.

The embarrassed person does not know what to do with their hands. Where to stand, whom to turn to, where to look. They cannot step out of themselves. They appear constrained, inhibited, precisely because they are under | the compulsion to act in some way, to adopt some kind of posture . With a defensive smile, he seeks to create distance from the others. *hm. Red* text: +i[1] He does not dare to step out of his own skin. For fear of committing a faux pas. He cannot play along. He plays an unfortunate 'role'. His demeanour lacks the

1 *Stuck at the bottom of the page:* i +) He seeks, defensively, to create an intermediate layer of the 'outside' behind which he can hide. Just as the conventional smile is impenetrable, creates a distance, and is non-committal. Social conversation is frivolous. Here, only safe feelers are tentatively put out. Everyone ventures out only as far as they can always retreat again. No one actually reaches the outside here. Despite its non-committal nature in the sense of frivolity, this smile is, in turn, binding insofar as it invitingly meets the other 'halfway'.

A matter of course that comes naturally to those who are well-established in society. In an unfamiliar environment, he feels as though he has been cast into a void. He does not master the rules of this game. He feels inhibited in what he would like to say. Nothing comes to mind. He cannot let himself go in the moment, cannot find the right tone; nothing he says resonates. And his insecurity grows. Because he does not stand out as one of the group, he – overlooked in his very essence – becomes the object of astonished scrutiny. This scrutiny remains fixed on the exterior. The depth of his appearance narrows. He sees himself through the eyes of others. He begins to question himself. And for him, this means a disruption of his emotional empathy. A mood serving as the basis for inexpressible understanding can no longer arise in him at all. He cannot 'find' himself. Everything he says, his facial expressions, seem increasingly unnatural and forced. In the outwardly contrived nature of his movements—which are subject to the control of inner observation—it becomes apparent how embarrassment prevents him from finding the common ground that connects us to others. This is because the shift to adopted perspectives, the recognition that steps out of distance, disruptively intervenes.

Embarrassment 'shows itself' in one's demeanour – so they say. One notices the 'expressive significance' of the way one draws one's arms in, of the wandering gaze that finds no focus, and so on. However – does this not mean no more than when one says that someone's thoughts are written all over their face, or when one describes their expression as the tell-tale
'Expression' of the inner self? As if embarrassment were in fact also something of the inner self, which merely manifested itself in the gesture, as if the inner self were simply coming to the surface through it. Yet one only feels embarrassed—or adopts a certain posture—precisely because one is under pressure to

act in some way. The ‘demeanour’ fails. Embarrassment ‘is’ – *in quotation marks, with* an ink stain – ‘expression’. Just as only someone can feel constricted or relieved in whom this ‘self’ can be directed towards a body that is not merely the condition, but the very object of such a sensation. Certainly – even a piece of news can ‘make one feel anxious’. Just as, for example, a person can be ‘disgusting’ to me. For K l a - g e s, such gestures – being objectively incomprehensible – are parables of actions. However: arbitrary acts – even if, as with Kla-ges, this merely refers to proper behaviour – do look different. Or rather, the nature of such behaviour, as it is perceived,

h008i hS.i 4

MS Human Nature

h009i hS.i 5

is based on its factual meaning, that is, on the prudence and caution recognised therein. It lacks an overarching form from which it would be immediately apparent that, for example, it is a deliberate change of location, out of fear that … In the case of an involuntary about-turn, or of turning one's head aside as a passing grenade whistles by, on the other hand, the expression cannot be separated from 'meaning' at all. Where, if at all, does the figurative aspect lie here? Yet it lies already in the feeling itself. In the case of revulsion, for example, insofar as it presents itself broadly
'taken in'. Just as contempt shakes off something which – and again: a l l e d a l e a d s t o t h e parable +)[2] – would otherwise cling to me. Closing one's eyes and thrusting one's hands out in defence when horrified | (Klages' example) are not actually intended to ward off something leaping at me – after all, one cannot bear the G l a n c e or 'the thing' here, 'as if' i t were harassing me. And yet these movements and the posture of embarrassment are also understood as an expression of feeling. +)[3] What initially appears as an indeterminate, uncertain impression comes to a head in gesture and posture, tips over into 'genuine' revulsion, and becomes firmly established. Just as understanding takes shape in skilful ways. Just as one follows a sensation, seeking to stay on the trail of what is felt, thereby becoming more perceptive and observant, so too does the affect intensify and become clearer in the 'attitude' it assumes through the gesture. So that, for example, the affect is necessarily bound up with the gesture. Only that which is capable of gesturing can also have affects.

([2]) +) Note: The 'parable-like' nature of emotions expresses the same idea as the fact that things that are objectively very different can remind us of one another in terms of the impression they make on me. For example, we perceive not only the edge of a table, but also a person or a law, as 'hard'. Yet no external, i.e. no transferable, similarity is decisive here. The a r b i t r a r i n e s s of the gesture, however, precludes from the outset any talk of a transfer, which, according to , would at least be possible with a word such as 'hard' given its availability and usability.

[3] +) Note: In all these expressive movements, *the underlined text in red*: i 'shapes' space – just as rhythm-induced marching movement articulates space in the first place, namely structures it differently from purposeful movement, in which distances are traversed and space is thereby also explored and recognised, namely incorporated into the carefully interpretative engagement with things designated as 'knowledge'. The drawing of straight lines, etc., is the neutralisation of this. First and foremost, paths 'de-worlded' into stretches 'are' something, but not 'space', in whose conceptions

Embarrassment causes one to lose one's poise. Everyone displays a demeanour unique to themselves in their gait, the way they step, and their hand movements. Every movement contains expressive traits. *hEinf. m. Tinte*:i You can tell who is coming up the stairs just by the sound of their footsteps. The expressive value varies, however: the hands have greater expressive power than the legs. *hEinf. m. Ink*:i Speech shapes one's demeanour. *hEinf. m. Ink*: i It is also evident in the tone in which one speaks to someone; and a particular 'demeanour' is also expressed through one's dialect. One's nature and temperament are revealed in this. One recognises a person by their demeanour. Self-assurance, arrogance, pride, sincerity, composure and brusqueness are all forms of demeanour. Dejection is revealed in it, and embarrassment alters it. But as certain as one 'is' one's demeanour – one does not identify with it in the same way as with the thought in which one 'fulfils' oneself. Or as someone's disposition is 'himself', that is to say, 'his' character. Whilst thoughts are always 'a' particular thought, that is to say, something to which one can only relate as an existence, an attitude is only individually distinct. A person's nature is revealed solely in this. On the other hand: a human being does not have the unbroken relationship with their nature that an animal has. Yet it is precisely for this reason that the animal, in turn, lacks an attitude. The movements of a squirrel are 'those of' the squirrel – insofar as they may be normal, average, or typical, just as its

'behaviour' as a squirrel might otherwise be. That is to say, the species is taken as the measure here in every instance. Human beings, however, 'are' distinct from their nature, namely in an individual manner. *hm. Red and blue stamps and ink:* see note on p. 6a! |

+) Note: The fact that everyone has 'their own face' does not merely refer to something like their unique, unmistakable appearance. For it is in the gait, *hm. Rotst.*:i)[4] but in the face – insofar as one 'recognises that face' – that one recognises someone. 'Face' has a double meaning: looking out into the world and, precisely in the direction taken in doing so, becoming visible. This 'direction', however, is not a perspective that can be objectively determined and specified. Rather, it is emphasised in a person's 'gaze' – in the 'way' in which they look at one, for example. A certain tension is constitutive of the features of a face, which are not merely natural morphological traits, but something spiritual. *hNote at the bottom of the page*:i The face—that is, that which makes someone unmistakable—is what first determines, physiognomically, the nose etc., which are merely possessed by many as noses shaped in such and such a way externally

h0010i p. 6

h0011i hS.i 6a

[4] *Stuck on the page*:i 'In the corridor' one recognises someone, namely by the way one sees them or even hears them on the stairs, *underlined in* ink. What one sees corresponds to what one hears. That is to say, the impression conveyed to one through various senses is the same – and not merely something concrete that would be inferred on the basis of different sensory perceptions. h/i

can. The animal is the centre of its environment; its gaze is fixed on what is closest at hand. Its vision is focused on bare life. *Note at the top* of the page: The animal is not optically attuned. An animal's species-specific character is written on its 'face'; something 'general' is expressed there in ever-changing ways. The 'humanity' of features, however, points to a categorical distinction: the child's features are understood as undeveloped, and its gaze as 'simple'. This is because the 'face' signifies a frontal orientation towards the world. To attribute a face to someone means: to recognise in them a free relationship to that which is encompassed as the world as a whole, and which, from that vantage point, can reveal itself under a horizon of decisive possibilities. The way one looks upon the world is precisely what makes one a 'self'. The pre-fixed mask confers anonymity and, as it were, suspends its wearer from themselves. |

It is one's attitude, but not one's emotions, that characterises a person. One does not 'find' oneself in one's emotions – that is, in the effect something has on me, as described here – in the same way as one does in one's attitude. Or, even if an emotional gesture does reveal something about a person, it is in fact the attitude that shapes the laughter, for example. Or: the fact that someone falls into an affect—that is, that they lose their attitude on certain occasions—is what characterises them. The scope of my gestures is determined by my attitude, which usually corresponds to my emotional state, and it is from this overall attitude that the individual gestures first acquire their expressive meaning. *hM. Rotst.*: x xi[5] Attitude effectively regulates the affects. Pride *hm. Rotst.*: xi[6] does not allow certain emotions to arise at all; the expressive significance of this posture lies precisely in being able to look beyond … A relaxed posture – sitting on a chair, for example – already curbs anger. One can counteract emotions through one's posture. Allowing oneself to be carried away by something, or being overwhelmed by something, expresses the opposite of this. It requires tangible effort to assert 'one's own' posture or another, feigned posture in opposition to it. For postures can be genuine or inauthentic, feigned *hEinf.*: +i[7] | or contrived. However, they can also
'adopted'. I have control over my attitude. Through

5 *Stuck at the bottom of the page*: i x x And provided my posture is always consistent, I

, for example, on the telephone when speaking to my commanding officer, I also adopt a physically upright posture.

6 *Stuck at the bottom of the page*: i x Whilst pride is an 'attitude', arrogance is something that manifests itself only involuntarily in gestures and demeanour; arrogance holds one's nose high , looks down on …, fancies itself something: arrogance is something intellectual.

[7] + Note: Attitudes, on the other hand—that is, how one behaves towards others, what one feels towards them—cannot be feigned, but only pretended, and this precisely through the corresponding demeanour.

I can influence myself through the attitude I force myself to adopt: the indecisive person brings about their own resolve by first adopting that attitude, through a firm demeanour
, for example. And it is not only others; one can also deceive oneself, by adopting a certain attitude, as to how one 'actually' feels – insofar as one does, after all, somehow 'become' the adopted attitude, namely by immersing oneself in it and stretching oneself into it. *hM. Rotst.:* x i[8]

A person's 'freedom' is evident in the ease of their demeanour, and, in this respect, also in *the* 'measure' – *in* Tintei's *words* – that they claim over others. There are 'grand' gestures. These are the ones through which one brings about an outcome, which bind others to something, which create distance and push them aside, in which, as it were, others are assigned their own space. It is the demeanour alone that speaks here. And 'having demeanour' signifies not so much discipline as superior detachment. The insecurity of the self-conscious person concerns not only the boundaries within which he can move without causing offence; it relates precisely to the 'space' that he is unable to create for himself. There is the demeanour of the 'man of the world', or the not quite skilful one of the 'little man' who strives to emulate it. Demeanours can be 'pretentious'. As if to suggest that such pretensions cannot be sustained, one might, for example, describe someone's speech as 'pompous' in *quotation marks* written in *ink*. A pose is a grand demeanour put on for show. And the fact that a demeanour is 'merely a pose' means that it is empty, indeed hollow; that the person adopting it cannot 'fill it out' even in a performance – as an actor, for example. Vain 'strutting' is evident in the pose. One 'strikes a pose' when one takes oneself too seriously in a particular situation.

'Adopted' attitudes, however, are the social forms that one simply has to learn and be able to practise, and in which the style of this social interaction is manifested. Certainly – the attitude I have adopted, and which may have become a 'second' nature to me, is not my natural | attitude. Nor, however, is it a feigned attitude, insofar as it can, after all, only be 'adopted' in the first place. A conventional attitude is not a feigned friendliness. Here, the claim to be regarded as more than merely a figure is regarded as lacking in tact and taste, as presumption.

h0013i p. 8

8 *Stuck at the bottom of the page*:i x 'One can only be "truly" sad if one also surrenders to this sadness in one's demeanour.'

MS Human nature

- hShynessi

h0014i hp.i 9

Feeling self-conscious or embarrassed in front of others is not the same as shyness. For one 'is' shy, but does not 'become' so – for example, out of fear of exposing one's vulnerabilities. The shy person does not wish to open up to everyone; they wish to preserve their privacy, not to reveal themselves. They shy away from the embarrassment they face when they open up to someone who does not take them seriously. Or rather, they do not dare to make a claim on the other person in this very respect. Shyness is, in fact, closely related to modesty. The insecurity and embarrassment felt in consideration of others, or in the presence of others, is different from the reserve of the shy person: one is shy towards someone. A tendency to become embarrassed quickly characterises a particular type of person. A specific form of insecurity manifests itself in accepting oneself as the person one is to others, as one appears in their eyes. Existence,

the acknowledgement of which seems to be denied one when, under the observing gaze of others, one threatens to slip away from oneself and become an object to them, is here something that is sustained from the outset by others or, , by their recognition. Shyness, however, belongs to modesty. Insofar as genuine modesty +)[9] is born of a reluctance to presume to attribute anything to 'one's own' ability. One fears presuming to communicate that which is ineffable. A certain age is prone to shyness. Namely, that of burgeoning self-awareness. As if | one were to presuppose, even in others, the strangeness of that which one must first break through oneself. The unsettling yet exhilarating feeling of having to carve out the new ground of one's existence for oneself is expressed in this.

- *hEmbarrassment caused by the behaviour of* others

This was the simpler case considered so far, namely that embarrassment arises from a failure to meet the expectations held by the Din-

([9]) +) Note: Linguistic usage has shifted the meaning of 'modesty'. It is regarded here as a predicate of behaviour towards others. Namely, when the claims based on my abilities are not asserted. And 'false' modesty is when, out of uncertainty about the limits of such claims, these claims are denied outright.

approaching someone in this way, or in terms of one's behaviour in front of others. But the tactlessness of others can also cause embarrassment, and one's lack of self-control can be perceived as 'embarrassing'. And if, here, *the quotation marks with ink*:i refer to 'the situation' from which a subsequently 'general' embarrassment arises, this does not mean a situation in the practical sense of an inner-worldly circumstance, nor is it 'my' situation at all. Rather: my *underline with ink*:i presence is constitutive of 'this' situation, which arises from chance encounters, from the fact that one meets up with someone over something. 'Constituting oneself' – this reveals a reflective objectivity in contrast to the situation in which I find 'myself', in which the transcendence of existence becomes an experience.

'Saving' the situation here does not mean: restoring the situation in order to give the beginning reflected therein free rein – and space – but rather – in a more literal sense – it expresses precisely how this 'situation' itself is something that must be constantly sustained through participation, the possibility of which falls back on those who, for their part, must somehow – perhaps in a leading role – contribute to it. Just as it can almost 'weigh' on the partners in a conversation to keep the conversation flowing and prevent it from running aground. Here, one meets on ground that is neutral with regard to whatever might otherwise stand unspoken between the participants in the form of sympathy or antipathy. The boundaries of such a situation are determined by the tone set for this coming-together. It is a specific 'situation' to which everyone here must adapt. Every word must be weighed up. Here, people meet on a specific 'line'. But if an 'awkwardness' arises here, this signifies not so much my *[underlined* by me in *ink*] failure as rather the 'impossibility' of the situation itself. The words die away when someone steps out of line by snubbing another, misjudges the tone, or causes a discord. When something inappropriate is said, and so on. Everyone then seems to become isolated. One can no longer find a way back to one another. And the awkwardness intensifies as one empathises with the awkwardness of the others too; one avoids meeting their gaze. To feel awkward here means precisely that one is attuned to the situation. Being at a loss for words is different from the torment of the silence that hangs over the situation. The more clearly one recognises the situation – or sees it approaching – what may still be hidden from others or what they have failed to notice, the stronger is

h0015i hS.i 10

MS Human nature

the embarrassment. The *underlining in ink*:i Being part of the situation makes me feel embarrassed, and likewise allows me to breathe a sigh of relief when someone else perhaps manages to restore harmony.

- hSchami

h0016i hp.i 11

Ambiguities in particular cause embarrassment, as do allusions which one – reluctantly – cannot help but understand. Inappropriateness. Although it is not the 'inappropriateness' that is the issue here: it is not 'the situation' for which the feeling was lacking. Nothing 'impossible' is being said. It is not as a participant

in a situation, and certainly not because of a situation, but from within myself that I feel embarrassed here.

Well, *hm*. One feels it is 'indecent' not to call a spade a spade. Why? – The word thereby becomes ambiguous, taking on, as it were, a double meaning. Even – or rather, especially – when the matter is perfectly clear to the other person. Or the word merely hints at it, cautiously and hesitantly. But this shifts what is meant into the sphere of discreet confidentiality, and it is precisely this relationship with the other person that I wish to avoid. As if things could ever be ambiguous at all. This straying towards something by virtue of its | not being named – yet evidently *hUnderlined in ink*:i kept at a distance – towards something that is therefore n o t the matter itself, stirs up *hUnderlined in ink*:i shame here. One blushes. Insofar as one is affected by the – albeit reluctant – acceptance of the direction indicated by the allusion. One resists 'advances'. And shame is linked here with revulsion. The brazen invitation to something is repulsive.

I am overcome by shame. It is not an emotion in the sense that embarrassment is a state one seeks to control, against which one must assert oneself by regaining one's composure. Certainly – one 'feels' shame. But does it actually 'grip' me, or do I 'become' something in the process – just as I might, for example, 'become' *embarrassed* or 'be' shy? It is similar to the anxiety that wells up within me. Just as fear can take hold of me, but not the anxiety that is part of existence and is 'contained' within fear and worry – so too is shame something whose

'S c h a l t u n g' comes to mind in this predicament. It overwhelms me 210

in the emotions I find myself experiencing, which cause me to blush out of embarrassment and so on. What is expressed in the burning flush is therefore embarrassment, but not shame, which—insofar as it is not a form of behaviour in itself—is also devoid of any outward expression. Shame crystallises out of embarrassment, disgust, etc. There is a 'purity' of shame, but none of fear, etc. For fear is always defined as [*underlined* in *ink*]: the fear that (not) … – in contrast to anxiety. Fear is merely something typical, and so too is embarrassment. 'Pure' fear exists only in the sense of the 'pure instance' of a concept. This is different from anxiety and shame, in whose conceptions – unlike with embarrassment, self-consciousness, etc. – real occurrences are not reduced to the mere common denominator of an understood behaviour. A sense of shame is regarded – as is, for example, the conscience – as a constitutive element of the human being. Anxiety is found in varying degrees; fear is something one need not know at all; a certain age tends towards shyness; embarrassment is grounded in situations: all of this [*underlined in ink*] is something one experiences at some point, or rather, it is something that everyone has already experienced 'in itself' at some point. In contrast: one 'knows' what shame is – namely, how one is aware of oneself, even and especially in turning away from oneself; shame is a mode of self-consciousness. Like anxiety, it is not an interpretation, nor a way of making sense of things; existence is not encompassed within it.

Shame – because it cannot be objectively justified – is never 'a particular instance' of shame, but shame par excellence – just as, for example, horror is. For this reason, one cannot 'share' another person's sense of shame in the same way that one can share their concerns in the broadest sense, such as their fear and grief. Nor can I actually empathise with shame, as one might with another's embarrassment – which would amount to finding it understandable. One can only feel shame on their own behalf. For example, one feels ashamed to ask another for something because they ought, in fact, to do it of their own accord. Here, one feels ashamed f o r the other person. It is not that one feels ashamed 'oneself' in this situation – as one might well feel embarrassed oneself in the face of the impossible situation into which someone has got themselves – but rather that one feels ashamed 'deep within the other person's soul'. Namely, precisely because he is not ashamed. Insofar as what he ought to be ashamed of is not his fault, but something in which I, as a human being, also share. Just as I, too, can feel ashamed in his place.
My nature is revealed in my emotions, that is to say, in what

h0017i hS.i 12

MS Human Nature

h0018i hS.i 13

It affects me, and I am sensitive to it. But something like a 'constitution' of the human being, with *its underlying current of redness*, comes to the fore in the 'nature'—that is, in the inner potential for certain emotions, such as fear and embarrassment. Existence is shameful. The shame that overwhelms me brings me to an awareness of what I am and what I am meant to be. And the powerlessness of which one becomes aware in shame is a particular kind. It does not merely mean that one cannot escape one's inherited nature. For that would precisely mean: coming to terms with it in some way. It is precisely this, however—that one cannot do that—which is the sting of shame, in which one is confronted with something one simply has to acknowledge. Shame, fear and horror are not feelings that can be qualified in any way,
i.e. fleeting *accompanying* phenomena, *ink*: i. that which, *as underlined in red*: i. when philosophy is considered in its true sense, are natural occurrences about which nothing more could really be said. They are precisely the primary concern of philosophy. For in them I am confronted with myself. Not in the trivial sense that I experience myself here differently depending on the circumstances, in what I am at any given moment, or rather as what I perceive myself to be. Rather: here one finds oneself revealed in the
'Being' that I myself am at any given moment.

Modesty does not, strictly speaking, seek to 'protect' itself against anything. For protection implies precautions, whereby dangers are carefully anticipated. Modesty, however, does not 'anticipate' anything; it is not intentional in this sense, as if a 'space' were being prudently explored and understood. After all, there is no experience underlying modesty. Modesty, on the contrary, shies away from turning its gaze towards the source of 'its' danger. Modesty seeks – just like the reserve of the shy person – to connect with others in their own terms. One
'Respects' shame. But whilst the shy person seeks to preserve 'themselves' in the expression of their face, shame relates to something which, as 'nakedness', does not belong to the human gaze at all. Shame banishes and suppresses; it does not allow it to arise. It is not as though a
'otherwise having to feel ashamed' were anticipated 'in the imagination' here – true shame is alive precisely in that it does not allow certain things to be considered at all, does not allow them to arise at all. The failure of shame – regardless of which side it comes from – whereby something did not remain undone 'out of shame', is what then causes shame as a feeling to stir into life in the first place. |

- hMask

Mask

But what does 'B l ö ß e' mean, and what does it mean to say that certain things 'do not belong to the human gaze'? Where is the connection to the ambiguity of which the 'indecent' was, after all, merely the first example?

'There are matters of such a delicate nature that it is best to bury them beneath a layer of coarseness and render them unrecognisable … It is not the worst things that cause us the greatest shame … A person who possesses profound shame encounters their own fates and delicate decisions along paths that few ever reach, and of whose existence their nearest and dearest— —must not be allowed to know. … Every profound spirit needs a mask.' (Nietzsche VII 60)[1] – The mask fixes the Other. One determines how one wishes to be perceived within a framework of roles that is also binding on the other. Just as, even in irony, one withholds one's seriousness from the other. For it is not merely the misunderstanding that one 'perceives' here as a transgression. Not wishing to 'give oneself away' means here not merely the prevention

of a realisation that is possible in itself. To give oneself away here means: to fall away from oneself. In order not to become 'vulgar', one seeks masks. One's very essence does not wish to be laid bare—that is, brought to the fore—in 'objective' terms, i.e. viewed according to an external and alien standard. Since one's truth and reality cannot be demonstrated within contexts that are openly verifiable, what arises is a false understanding born of the distorting ambiguity into which it is cast by the oblique light falling upon it. (Cf. Kierkegaard VII 21)[11] It is also shame that holds us back from dragging tender stirrings and budding thoughts into the public sphere of our consciousness, or from setting them aside just as we are grasping them, allowing them to become frozen through the act of assertion. Thus one is also ashamed to know oneself to be an object of pity, and especially to be pitied for that which, as our most intimate suffering, is not 'known' at all, the reality of which cannot be attested to by another at all. *hM. Rotst.*: xi[10] One resists being compared to another, that is, by the |

h0020i hp.i 15

[10] *Note at the bottom of the page:* i +) 'True pain is modest'. (Hebbel IV. 5831) – Mental pain tolerates no pity whatsoever. One can only feel pity for someone if one cannot empathise with or share their pain. For just as memories torment and torment one, so too does mental pain. Pity, however, manifests itself in help

to be viewed from this perspective and thus, through the outsider's viewpoint, to be cast in an ambiguous light.

- hBlößei

Ambiguities, vulnerability, vulgarisation, etc. – all these recur in a remarkably kaleidoscopic shifting of perspectives. For the threads of these entanglements do not constitute a factual text. It is not possible to establish a structural schema of shame. One can only observe the reference of one thing to another – just as the context of reality is merely 'incorporated' into things, but is not a structure that can be isolated – in stark contrast to the dependencies as relationships *in the underlined text with red highlighting*:in Kalküll's work, for example, which in turn require that the referent = X.

The 'vulnerabilities' that the self-conscious person fears to reveal are weaknesses, i.e. something one cannot stand by in front of others, which one therefore does not wish to acknowledge or let others see. +)[11] Perhaps one might also feel ashamed here; but insofar as one is 'merely' self-conscious, this is specifically set aside. The exposure of the shame—*quotation marks in ink*:i—one does not, however, 'expose' oneself. 'Exposure' here has

and encouragement – but also in the regret of being unable to do anything. In times of pain and suffering, compassion merely captures the other person's state of mind.
[Friedrich Hebbel's Diaries. Edited with a foreword by Felix Bamberg.
G. Grote'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, Berlin 1887, Volume Two. Sixth Diary, begun on 24 November 1859. Gmunden, 2 August 1860, p. 487.]

11 +) Embarrassment, too, can cause one to feel ashamed. Here, one falls short of the expectations that one has either raised oneself or to which one has given others reason to expect. One is not actually 'recognised as …' when one is embarrassed; rather, it merely becomes apparent that one is not, or cannot, be, a certain thing. Embarrassment is the consequence of arrogance. To be made a fool of is to have become a laughing stock. If one 'feels' as though one has made a fool of oneself, one has 'deluded oneself'. The fact that one 'feels' as though one has made a fool of oneself here indicates the casual, detached relationship one has with oneself in this situation. One cannot make a fool of someone in the same way that one can shame or expose them. One can only let them embarrass themselves – that is, lead them into doing so. Embarrassment is, in a trivial sense, avoidable. Nor does any 'vulnerability' come to light in embarrassment. It is the unreality of an appearance, but not the absence of vulnerability, that is revealed in the process. Being humiliated is a fate that befalls one – there is no word for the emotional state into which one is thereby plunged. The vividness of humiliation, in turn, means that my state of mind on other occasions can be described as 'feeling as though one has been humiliated'.

nor does it have merely a relative significance. What one perceives as exposure here – as the previous examples have shown – is something over which one has absolutely no control: one cannot | prevent it from becoming 'recognised' as ambiguous. This powerlessness, which one is aware of in shame, is not, however, the 'inability to transcend oneself' that is usually the basis of the feeling of shame. 'Exposure' here means something else, something more complex:
Here, one is protecting oneself from someone. One cannot *prevent* them *from…*
m.Tinte:i to look someone straight in the eye. *hM. Rot- und Blaust.*: xi This is different from avoiding 'the gaze' of the other person when one feels embarrassed. Being caught out in a lie can give rise to both: feeling ashamed and simply feeling embarrassed. However, whilst the latter refers merely to the embarrassing situation one finds oneself in as a result – perhaps precisely in relation to the clumsiness displayed whilst lying, provided one has not anticipated this situation – in the case of shame, one becomes aware of oneself, that is to say, not in terms of how one 'appears' to others. In embarrassment, one feels at the mercy of the

other's gaze and seeks to avoid it. Here it is the gaze of the stranger that one shuns because he might discover that … One feels self-conscious in public. *hM. Red and blue markings*: xi[12] One is, however, ashamed, *as underlined in ink*:i, when, for example, one is taken to task by the other and, *as* marked in *ink*:i, confronted by them in one's own presence. In doing so, they presumably appeal to the trust they have placed in one. It is precisely because of this bond with the other that one cannot face them here. One does not feel ashamed in front of a stranger, but precisely in front of those who are close to one. One feels ashamed because one has betrayed their trust. It is the binding nature of trust that means one can, for example, feel ashamed in front of one's children. For this trust is not based on objective grounds here – as if my supposed 'knowledge' of him had been a deception on the other's part, as if I had created an objective 'pretence'. Rather: insofar as he placed his trust in me, he was mistaken about me. One feels ashamed of something when one is taken aback by something one did not expect. The vulnerability here is not a point of weakness that the penetrating gaze of the |

h0021i hS.i 16

h0022i hS.i 16a

12 *hAt the bottom of the page, in ink*:i x Note 1 p. 16a! x Note 2 p. 16a!

+) Note 1. One lowers one's gaze, covers one's face, because one cannot look the other person in the face. For it is in one's gaze that one encounters them – just as they see themselves in it
'meets'. For a gaze and a face cannot be seen in the same way as objects; they cannot be simply observed from the outside in a scrutinising manner. The angle from which an object is viewed depends on the vantage point, and this – as objectively favourable – is determined by circumstances. However, the directed nature of the gaze means that it reveals itself only insofar as it looks at me. Gaze meet and cross; they can be 'exchanged'. One avoids the gaze of the other that penetrates 'me' and probes me. (One is, however, 'exposed' to the gaze only as an object, i.e. not in a face-to-face encounter. Yet even here the gaze 'meets' me: one notices it, for example, when, on the street, one of the passers-by looks back at one.) This necessary reciprocity involved in 'looking the other person in the face'—namely, that this is only possible 'face to face'—is therefore not determined by the situation, just as the visibility of an object presupposes the fulfilment of certain conditions—light, etc. Conversely: communication is so integral to the very nature of looking into the face here that one might seek ways to protect oneself from the other's gaze whilst looking at them – for instance, by remaining in the dark oneself. To see oneself would mean: to look oneself in the face, that is, into one's own eyes. Which is 'somehow' impossible. One feels strangely 'alien' in the mirror; *underlined and highlighted in red*: i.e. primitives or apes do not recognise themselves in it. Optics here compels the gaze, as it were, to plunge into the void, insofar as the – formally – 'other' is merely its own mirror image, and the gaze, with its counter-gaze, is also denied the 'object'.
hWith red text: xi *hGlued to the bottom of the page, continued:* xi One's own face appears 'foreign' in the mirror—
Well. Not as though it were not yet, or were no longer, known. It remains essentially unknown insofar as it cannot be regarded as physiognomy at all. For it is inherent in the concept of physiognomy that one can approach something present therein in an interpretative manner. And accordingly, one's own voice sounds 'alien' when heard from the gramophone. In a voice, one recognises someone: one recognises the voice as the voice of … One 'hears' someone in it. But can one 'hear oneself'? The fact that one can not only speak to oneself, but can also hear the 'voice' of 'one's' conscience, must not lead one astray here. For in the one case, I am merely the other, and the voice of my conscience is, after all, that of the admonishing or warning conscience. But it is not 'my' voice, which can essentially only affect someone who is not myself in such a way that this or that 'lies' within the impression it makes. One cannot be 'moved' by oneself. (Again – the fact that something such as self-pity occurs merely demonstrates how, in general, pity never concerns anyone 'themselves', but only 'someone who …'. – In which, of course, one can then also overlook oneself!)
The principle of a character, insofar as it is a physiognomic trait, lies in the other. *hM. Ink*: Note i *in the continuation at the bottom of the page*: i Note. One cannot love oneself; one can only hate 'oneself' – namely, in this context: 'this sort of thing' in itself.
One places the other in one's gaze. When it is said that a person's gaze can 'betray' what they are thinking and wanting, the gaze is not treacherous in the sense that it reveals something as an involuntary expression, but because it is the first unintended breakthrough of a beginning. Much like the phrase 'someone is making a face as if to …' means 'they are already in the process of …'. For what one wants is 'determined' first and foremost in the 'course' of a beginning. However, in

The moment one catches someone's gaze, a free relationship between person and person is immediately established.
++) Note h2.i. Another disruption of the relationship with the public is represented by the
'To lose one's face'. One can no longer meet anyone. Because one is no longer the person one is taken to be and addressed as. For it is by, or rather in, one's face that one is known, that is to say, in that capacity to others. Certainly, that which one is ashamed of also causes one to lose face. But the latter means that one can no longer show oneself in public. Here, too, however, there is an ambiguity, insofar as one stands in a dual light. Because of this uncertainty, one then avoids encounters – for in what capacity may one still meet the other, or in what capacity does the other wish to meet 'me'? – 'To save face' means being able to show oneself. As an expression of flawlessness, for example. Or that nothing can harm one or throw one off balance; in defiance of death, for example, one 'saves' one's face. It puts one to the test before oneself. Or rather, one confirms to oneself that one is not actually the
Not the 'gaze' of others, but their testimony, which need not be shunned. |

discovered by others. Nor is it revealed here as an unreal illusion. +)[13]
In contrast to feeling embarrassed in front of others, one feels ashamed

'before oneself'. Namely, the realisation that one is 'that sort of person'. And when it comes to guilt, anyone can be 'that sort of person'. One feels ashamed, for example, of one's cowardice. One feels ashamed in front of others in precisely the same way as one first feels ashamed in front of oneself. Whereas, conversely, one can only appear to have embarrassed oneself in one's own eyes in the same way as one appears to others to have been embarrassed; one sees oneself as embarrassed 'through the eyes of the other'. And one is only embarrassed if something has come to light. But one also feels ashamed even when nobody sees it, when nobody knows anything about it – and one feels doubly ashamed precisely because others still 'expect' something else from me.

One feels ashamed of whatever affects one. One feels ashamed of a lie, for example, or of being naked. However, this compilation shows that even in the case of a lie, one does not feel ashamed of what one has done. The realm of shame is distinct from that of conscience or remorse over a wrongdoing or guilt. One falls into guilt through fate. By choosing one option over others

h0023i hS.i 17

13 +) But do I 'live up to' expectations or not? It is not merely the case that something is expected of me, as is the case with the weather. For with the weather, one merely anticipates … But something may be demanded of me. This implies more than 'mere' expectation. For insofar as I 'live up to' someone's expectations in a particular matter, *[underlined in ink:]* I relate to them.

h0024i hS.i 18

has brought to naught. Guilt is always my personal guilt. Something I must take responsibility for. The fact that I cannot free myself from my guilt, but must instead take responsibility for it, points precisely to the transformation of existence that takes place within it. Insofar as fate and guilt are never 'finished'—but rather one must always 'come to terms' with them—both are something towards which existence moves in stages, as it were, defining it. Certainly: one feels ashamed that one was like that or that one behaved in that way. Yet in doing so, one does not refer to possibilities that one has chosen as 'one's own'. One can only feel ashamed of what has 'happened' to one, or what could happen to anyone, and which can therefore

always recur. 'Happened' – this emphasises a casual yielding, *hm. Ink*: i this, that in relation to one's nature one has not brought oneself to do something. *hM. Blue and red pen:* xi[14] One feels ashamed
e.g. his cowardice. An animal cannot be cowardly. Yet it is courageous in a different way. In the case of the lion, for example, courage means a self-aware, natural strength that confronts the opponent. Man, however,
He 'faces' the danger or the adversary. In doing so, he finds himself called upon to act as a 'man'. Danger is 'regarded as nothing' here. A person's courage is always in tension with that to which, by his very nature, he is inclined to succumb. With regard to that of which one is ashamed, there can only be improvement in the sense of successfully coming to terms with one's nature. I can be put to shame by what another person achieves. By demonstrating to me the possibility of that which I shrank back from in despair, I am exposed. However, the 'limits' of which I become aware here signify two things: firstly, limits in the sense of a deficiency in my nature, insofar as these 'limits' express a tension in relation to certain demands. One is then ashamed of that towards which one, as a human being, is inclined – namely, that which one can merely 'be inclined' towards – insofar as the human being is not merely nature. One feels ashamed of what is merely human, ordinary, commonplace. And this 'nakedness' then signifies a breach in one's personal integrity. Secondly, however, in the shame of 'one's own', one becomes aware of—*hm*—what one is not actually 'oneself', but merely 'also' is. One

[14] *Stuck at the bottom of the page:* i x Note +) In reference to such a tendency to let oneself go, one also speaks, in terms of outward behaviour, of 'not being ashamed …', or of having to 'be ashamed' of another person when they …

is recognised in that which, as a human being, one merely shares in. As
'Nakedness' reveals something that one 'is' oneself, yet over which one has no control. It eludes all rationalisation and justification. Shame is the forced admission of this fact. Powerlessness refuses to be touched. Something that is meant to be concealed from view appears, if not concealed, as 'nakedness'.

It is one's drives, inclinations, and above all one's general sexuality that can give rise to shame. It is precisely through sexuality that one becomes aware of oneself. Herein lies the natural and existential significance of the formative years. It is precisely through overcoming these that one becomes aware of something once more. It is the ambiguity of human nature that one may feel ashamed of. Owing to their anthropological significance, natural inclinations are something of which one becomes aware. And one does not 'actually' 'be' aware of them, but rather becomes aware of them. Yet this expresses nothing other than the fundamental ambivalence of 'human nature'. Measured against humanity's essential demands, something appears here at first as 'unconscious', of which, as the vital and impersonal foundation, one can only ever become aware again and again. The feeling of shame is a specifically human emotion; it reveals the 'condition' of the human being. Unlike embarrassment, shame does not arise from situations, but only occasionally in connection with them. At the very core of one's existence, one feels ashamed. The puzzling and bewildering nature of the feeling of shame arises from the 'problematic unity' of the human being.

- Nudity

Only when the gaze of the other, in directing itself towards this questionable aspect of my own self—as designated within the problematic unity of the human being—becomes itself questionable, can nakedness give rise to shame. The objectively examining gaze of a doctor, for example, does not give rise to shame. However, a divergence in mutual attitudes regarding what one person 'presents' to the other can also be perceived as an ambiguity in the mutual relationship – usually felt by only one of the parties. *Indeed*, for example, an objectivity directed towards me can then give rise to shame. |

However – is it actually n a c k t h e i t that one is

h0025i p. 19

h0026i hS.i 20

MS Human Nature

Ashamed? 'Naked' means unclothed. Animals are not naked. And hands and faces can be neither naked nor clothed. When applied to a face, 'naked' implies a fleshly fullness that overwhelms the spiritual aspect – the facial features. Nor does the hand, through which a person's spirituality is expressed, give the impression of being naked. The glove merely 'conceals' it. Being dressed gives a person the opportunity to present themselves to anyone. Clothing creates 'clear conditions'. Through this, one gains access to the realm of 'publicness'. One can allow oneself to be encountered. However this encounter with the other is then shaped – through the gaze, through the gestures of my hand, and so on. Here, one meets or connects with one another in something. One is not simply 'there' before the other. (As, for example, lovers can be.) It would be, for instance, impertinent if a servant were to wish to meet his mistress in any way other than that befitting his position. But one encounters one another as so-and-so. My attire – and the tattoo of the savage is also attire – is the character that befits one as a man, or that is given to me as a sign of my age group, and so on. Whereby 'man' is not something general by which one would be 'defined', but signifies belonging to a group within the community.

'Exposures', however, are meant to be 'covered'. Being clothed – that is, not being naked – prevents exposures from arising in the first place. Nudity is therefore – insofar as it is merely the condition for the appearance of exposure – not synonymous with it. And secondly: exposure refers only to certain parts of the naked body. It refers to something that a person 'also' 'is' – whereby both the 'also' and the 'is' must be emphasised. It does not simply refer to the contingencies of my nature, such as my stature, for example, which merely play a disruptive or favourable role in human life. The fact that one 'is also' something expresses how something has a d e t e r m i n i n g i n f l u e n c e | on human life, and how, in the opposite direction, nature is here defined as vitality, i.e. in anthropological terms. Even the nakedness of my body is something that cannot arise 'in and of itself'—that is to say, dragged into the reality that spreads out before our eyes—for that of which it is, after all, merely the 'natural' foundation . I myself am the protection of my nakedness: c'est l'âme qui enveloppe le corps. (Nietzsche, VII 142)[III] My face does not signify nakedness, for it 'speaks'. And my arm, back, etc., in turn, do not do so because they are not, strictly speaking, fundamental

are for a 'life' that is meant to be lived. They are not closely tied to the personal sphere, whose integrity might be violated.

- *hShamelessness*, prudery

A sense of shame is not the same as tact. Tact is the right sense of what is appropriate here and now in this particular situation. And a lack of tact merely indicates a certain carelessness: one does not consider that … Tact is best demonstrated by striking the 'right note'. That tone determines how far one may go with something, where the boundaries lie, and what can still be said here.

The lack of modesty, on the other hand, is regarded by from the outset as a defect in the other person. Shamelessness is repulsive. Disgust [15] |overcomes one, for example, at the sight of the unrestrained, shameless nature of a leering grin. Disgust cannot be justified in the same way as revulsion or contempt. In this grin, what is captured here is the mockery of the inescapable affinity with that which is, in this context, repulsive. Naked 'mere life' in its unbridled nature is repulsive. Whereby this unbridled nature lies precisely in the intrusiveness of its display. Disgust expresses itself as a desire to rid oneself of something. Here, one experiences a challenge to what is subsequently perceived here as 'repulsive'. *hM.Tinte*:i Addendum 22a|

I can't counter what disgusts me. It's not as though I'm as troubled by it here as I am by the fear that comes from within me. After all, the objects of disgust can be specified: decaying matter, spiders, feathers, a person's leering grin. But disgust is something different from mere revulsion. What 'irritates' me, stirs me

h0028i hS.i 22

h0029i hS.i 22a

15 *at the bottom of the page, not assigned to the text*:i

+) Note I. Feeling embarrassed, however, is something one should overcome. 'He wasn't even embarrassed …' is only a reproach insofar as this lack of embarrassment may express indifference towards the opinions of others; there is a lack of respect in it. As if the others weren't there at all, or were too stupid to …

++) Note II. However, even the unhesitating disregard of due consideration is regarded as impertinence; it is perceived as provocative. One describes as 'shameless' a behaviour which, by virtue of the word, is contrasted with a restraint that may be an expression of 'modesty',

that is to say, the fact that one does not wish to 'forgive' others, but rather demands their detached respect.

blocking resistance. The grimace of disgust, however, is that of the urge to vomit. It expresses how, in this instance, one can only get rid of something by force. *[Underlined in ink:* i] Disgust stands alongside weariness, which has 'had enough' of something insofar as it was initially taken in.

In disgust, something is 'perceived'. It is a sensory impression. Smells are what disgust us most, because that is where the contact is closest. Hearing does not convey disgust, because sounds merely come from …, but are not properties of the things themselves. The face, on the other hand, because it recognises things in all their details. And in contrast to hatred, contempt, etc., which, depending on the situation, demand the correct behaviour—manifested as a stance and attitude—disgust is something that simply 'strikes' one. In revulsion and contempt, the person as a whole is decisively pushed aside. But one is always repulsed by something in him, and if 'the whole person' repulses one, then it is simply everything about him. … Disgust is a sensation, in contrast to horror and shuddering, in which something becomes transparent in the direction of abysses, in which this abysmal quality is thus 'experienced'.

What presents itself so broadly arouses revulsion. The exaggerated abundance, coupled with the impoverishment of life amidst the teeming mass of a caterpillar's nest. Decay is, in fact, linked to the intensification of life. Yet one perceives in it a breaking away from the overall structure of organised and differentiated life. One is repulsed by the uninhibited nature of base life – base life understood in the most commonplace sense, as is familiar to everyone. By the wasteful self-exhaustion of that which proliferates, which cannot actually be killed off. Something one can only remove, but not destroy, as it is itself already on the

path to dissolution. The uncontrolled, uninhibited and unstructured arouses revulsion. For example, a bacterial culture, as opposed to bacteria viewed under a microscope, where they are seen in their differentiated form. One does not wish to touch what is repulsive – not simply to avoid getting dirty. For dirt clings to me only externally; it can be washed off. One does not flee from the repulsive, but from the proximity of the repulsive. The repulsive comes across as intrusive. In the depths of the leering grin, for example, it becomes apparent how, in this grin, one is, as it were, somehow 'claimed' – as if *in quotation marks – by ink*:i. Hence: 'I' am repulsed by something.

It is often said that I am 'truly' repulsed. A vague, indeterminate sense of being affected is established through the reception of certain emotions. There is a formation of emotions, followed by a morphology of emotions. Something virtually 'becomes' revulsion, tipping over into it, as it were. The situation with emotions is no different from that of understanding, which takes shape in established directions. Just as no concept remains in isolation, just as every word belongs to a particular language, so too does every emotion belong to a specifically directed affectivity as a whole. There are certainly basic structures in the constitution of human existence, but no 'general' human psychology. For 'general' *[Corrected in ink*: i] can only be something that occurs universally. |

There is such a thing as 'false' shame. For example, when someone believes they cannot accept something, or when someone does not want to undress in front of the doctor, and so on. The embarrassment felt in such situations already betrays the lack of self-assurance underlying this feeling. What is lacking is the proper relationship to shame. One does not know what is 'actually' at stake, namely in the

The root of shame is, insofar as one has not yet penetrated to this root. It is not that one actually confuses something stirring within oneself with shame. After all, one believes, *hm.Tinte*:i, that one is connected only to a 'relationship' as the appropriate response here. There are acquired feelings. They are stirred in the imitation (which is something different from mere copying) of postures and gestures as their inner essence. +)[16] 'False' shame refers to the superficial, not the genuine, nature of this feeling, because it is groundless. And secondly, because it is an 'inverted' feeling; one is off the mark with this behaviour. But 'false' probably also means: inappropriate. In other words, a shame that is unnecessary and, in that respect, also inappropriate, inasmuch as shame must be justified. |

P r u d e n c e, however, is not a feeling of insecurity. It may conceal shame, but it is not shame in disguise. It is considered good form not to mention certain things, or to brusquely refuse to discuss them. What is 'shocking' is that which must not be mentioned. As if it were enough simply not to refer to certain things. As if one were then free of it. As if one could keep oneself free of it at all and need only fear being infected by it. Prudery is—*underlined in ink*:i—a sensitivity to certain things that is paraded for all to see. Namely, to those whose ambiguity is regarded by society as indisputable. Prudery therefore betrays precisely an actual lack of shame, for which it pretends to stand, wherever it seeks to position itself. *hM. Rotst.*: xi[17] 'Disguised' is genuine shame here, insofar as it is obstructed, its object having been relegated to the inappropriate, the out-of-place. The self-conscious lack of freedom, the uncertain anxiety of the prude, shows that he has not come to terms with that which shame is precisely bringing to consciousness. This repressed shame amounts to a pretence before oneself. Prudery is not in

16 *hAt the bottom* of *the page*: i +) These are, in fact, examples of James-Lange's theory of emotion. However, it is precisely the applicability of this theory to these cases that reveals the in ness of its explanation when it comes to 'founded', i.e. 'original', emotions.

17 *Stuck at the bottom of the page*: i ++) The prude 'puts on airs'. This is akin to coquetry. One might, for example, play at being uneducated. Coquetry plays on the tension between revealing and withholding. Here, merely a layer of the 'exterior' is created. The other person is captivated, duped, insofar as they, for their part, are challenged – for example, to parade themselves as a philistine when it comes to education. Coquetry has various motives. For example, this too: not letting the other person get close to oneself, or concealing actual shortcomings, protesting against something in an exhibitionist manner, etc.

Shame that obscures one's true nature is, in this respect, akin to pedantry and anxiety that obscures fear, insofar as this fear is, after all, alive within it. In the case of prudery, the nature of the deception is much the same as that which is usually regarded as modesty. Conformity to role models is regarded here as a requirement. One wishes to be judged accordingly. One wishes to measure up in comparison with others and to gain the corresponding standing. Prudery seeks to project an image.

The cynic calls things 'by their proper names' and thereby turns against the prudishness that can positively provoke him. It is precisely this internal reference to an adversary that distinguishes cynicism from shamelessness. Cynicism is an attitude that seeks to set things right. The cynic recognises vulnerability for what it is. He specifically tears apart the ambiguities that are being exploited, whilst the shameless person wishes to linger in utter complacency – as if a veiling pretence could simply be cast over these matters. |

- hm. *Pencil.* Taboo

This 'finding oneself brought back to oneself', this powerlessness of what one 'is' or 'does', this tangibility that emerges precisely in the 'untouchability' of something, the moment of 'exposure'—this syndrome, as depicted in * *, recurs—in a strangely shifted form—in the concepts of taboo and sacrilege. *hM. Rotst.*: xi[18]

For the Polynesians, a taboo is something one is reluctant to touch, in case this might 'forfeit' something. This reluctance towards taboo things is not a fearful one. What is taboo is not to be avoided because of its threatening nature. After all, one does not 'expect' anything here. As if something had been 'understood' in its 'meaning' *[quotation marks in ink*: i]. It is precisely this freedom in relation to things that is lacking – the freedom to recognise them for what they are and to keep this or that at one's disposal against dangers. Nothing forbids, nothing hinders

[18] h *At the bottom of the page, in the margin*: i x There is a homology of emotions. In comparative anatomy, morphologically similar organs are contrasted with structures that are merely analogous. Thus, for example, the claws and legs of a crab are variations on a basic type. Similarly, however, it is precisely the homology between the sense of shame and the taboo that points to something pervasive in the constitution of human nature.

precisely to touch that which is taboo. The aversion to the taboo expresses the rejection of the alluring. That which is taboo is by no means beyond my reach or intervention. To touch it is only similarly impossible, just as one who lacks modesty or tact 'does something impossible'.

But one 'misses the mark' as soon as one touches upon it. And again – not in the sense that one might, for example, overestimate one's abilities here, or simply 'misjudge oneself'. That is precisely what is missing. One is deceiving oneself about something else: namely, that one is not, for that very reason, already 'powerful' 1)[19] in what one does. Which does not merely mean a lack of control. Just as something, once set in motion, cannot be brought back, and therefore can only be left to its own devices or its effects anticipated within certain limits.

'Powerless', however, means that one has relinquished one's power in this instance, so that one cannot freely bear the consequences. This powerlessness becomes apparent in the course of events: | it is not, as it were, some sort of 'success' of the wicked deed that brings Nemesis upon the evildoer. Nemesis is not mere retribution. For retribution – and this applies particularly to revenge – could only be meted out for that which is actually attributed to one as having been done; in revenge, for example, one settles scores with … Yet precisely this reckoning remains meaningless in the case of a mere beginning, such as the wicked act is. The very act of beginning, however, leads in its wake to the exposure of itself as a vain undertaking in its own right. The transgressor has fallen prey to that which he touched. He has brought his own fate upon himself. The phrase 'to have forfeited something' expresses precisely this. It remains an attempt that proves to be a temptation. One succumbs to it. This does not merely mean that one yields to oneself – in one's inclinations, etc. – that is, fails to overcome oneself , but that one 'falls prey' to that which one touches and with which one is tempted to become one. Profanation 1)[20]

19 *hBelow:*i 1) For 'power' is more than 'being able to do something'. Power is held precisely by those who, w i t h o u t d o i n g a n y t h i n g, can bring about something. The fact that one can only let something happen here expresses how this lack of power does not mean an unbroken state of helplessness, but rather that it is something one must be.
20 *hBelow:*i 1) A comparison with frivolity springs to mind. However, frivolity means something different from presumption. It is a lack of reverence. Which is not simply the correct, indeed the required, attitude – frivolity has no nemesis to fear – but rather something one freely and of one's own accord offers up to an incomprehensible mystery. Frivolity is the exploitation of this freedom. Namely, a failure to recognise the connection—

that which is touched upon in wickedness corresponds to the exposure that comes with shame.
The transgressor has invoked something. But what one invokes comes
'over' one. One cannot encounter it freely. A different fundamental way of 'being', a specific affectivity arising through things, becomes apparent in this. One is gripped, 'possessed' by … It is part of the concept of the taboo to be 'contagious': to become infected means that the initiative lies with me – without, however, my being free to do so. Here, one is not simply struck by something as a matter of nature, just as, for example, the cold merely affects me. Rather: here one 'works through' | what one has taken upon oneself. 'Reality' is structured differently here. For us, it is a context in which everything is, in its place, what it will be understood to be in the 'natural' circumstances associated with it. Things here become
'Included', that is, taken into custody; to 'include' means to make something available to oneself. In their everyday usage, they are taken here. They 'are' what they mean to me in the context of my purpose. They are incorporated into decisions. They are thereby set aside. They are drawn into the sphere of meaning of life. Their 'principle' lies with me.

It is a different 'world' that comes to light in the concept of the taboo. The peculiar nature of the affectivity expressed in the taboo, the sheer otherness of the way in which existence finds itself here amidst being, is demonstrated, for example, by the use of animal masks. It expresses how, *as Bleist.*:i here, in interpreting his existence, man understands himself not from within himself but from something else, and how he can therefore – in the totem – also experience himself as akin to animals. whereby what is given to nature is taken away from man. The mask replicates the 'features' of something. Here, the morphological is interpreted spiritually. In such a way that an 'essence' is represented in these features, and not merely in the sense of an image, but 'in itself'

'depicted' – namely by sketching it out, much like the rain in *Regenzauber* – has been 'created'. The 'outer appearance' of a being is regarded here as a character it has chosen for itself. Or rather, as something it 'wears', with which it is 'equipped'. *e.g. with a pencil:* i.e. what

belongs to the flip side of this freedom. Recklessness is then called 'downright frivolous' not so much when the difficulties of getting started are underestimated, but rather when the seriousness of responsibility is taken too lightly.

it has acquired it by some chance. 2)[21] These features of the mask 1)[22] signify |, in their reduction to the essential, an ascent. For the primitive person, an animal's outward appearance 'is' something in a different way to how we understand it in the sense of an external 'appearance'—not merely as the manifestation of a particular nature, but also in terms of the significance of its details. We recognise in the outward appearance a 'what' that has been created by us—that is, after all, what 'to recognise' means: namely, to be aware of something. When – as is often the case among primitive peoples – the image is taken for the thing itself, and the dream carries the same weight as reality, this does not signify a lack of critical discernment, as if, for example, the image were confused with the thing itself. Rather, it signifies a de-realisation of the appearance, so-

[21] *at the bottom in pencil:* i 2) That they are beings …
'The Raven …'
[See H. Lipps, 'Mask', in: The Reality of Man. Works, Vol. V. Frankfurt
a. M. 1977, pp. 177–178: The fact that it is 'beings' that come into play here—beings whose outward appearance can only be recognised as a kind of symbol—does not, however, preclude the fact that one also seeks to explain this outward appearance: the raven is black because it singed its feathers whilst fetching fire. The tortoise is flat because, during a bet with the vulture, it let itself fall to the ground from a considerable height; and so on. And such causes are counterbalanced by the snake's condemnation to a creeping, out-of-sight movement. So, because once …, therefore …: a mythical story is one that reveals itself only through symbols, but into which one cannot probe. Whereby
'the raven', which is taken, by analogy, to refer to that particular individual raven which bears the perceptible traces of the fire. For perceptions here still amount to nothing more than an occasional foothold, without the ground of actual experience having yet been gained. They remain isolated. They have no exemplary significance as a path or method. Only in a conciseness that has been perceived but not yet objectively understood—that is, only as a recognised connection—do they become authoritative.
'The raven' is defined here by the role it plays in the animal kingdom and, in that respect, amongst 'its own kind'. The crow, for example, as its relative, belongs here to the wider circle of its family. (Just as, in our context too, it is the species and not the individual animal that is identified as a raven and observed in a particular place.) 'A' raven – this is something that can only be defined out of context .]

[22] *hBelow:* i 1) The mask, in the narrower sense, has facial features. Yet here, too, a gaze is captured which, in its rigid immobility and lack of depth, is the 'gaze' of a 'being'. The 'absent, otherworldly' quality of this gaze heightens the spellbinding effect of its sudden, unannounced presence. The mask's incorporeal, unreal and immovable nature is striking. It needs no reverse side. The sight of the mask signifies an encounter in which I am merely the object. I find myself at the mercy of its gaze, unable to take it in or see through it on my part, that is to say, unable to meet it on my own terms.

unless it is regarded merely as a 'view' through which something can be revealed to me. (p. 54!) *Hmm. Pencil* note: = p. 55?i

Something is also invoked through the word. Names can be taboo. Whereby this act of invocation is an act of commending oneself to it. Just as the relationship of possession is, in general, teetering on the brink of suddenly swapping its subject for the object. The fulfilment of the word is here placed within the power of the word itself. But what at first – from the perspective of the logos semanticus – appears as though the word were endowed with an occult, incomprehensible power, whilst failing to recognise the limits and the actual function of the word, stems precisely from the same root. One comes to understand precisely the revealing, conceptual power of language when one draws upon a seemingly so remote use of the word as that of the curse. For one does, after all, perceive something in the word. It resounds within me, insofar as it awakens within me, insofar as it calls forth what has been expressed in the word. The meaning of the word, which quite naturally stands at the centre of the philosophy of language, *hm.Bleist.*:—which, when one seeks to isolate it or link it to the word merely associatively, one is always tempted to do so, a temptation that has all too often been confused with the concept itself—this meaning of the word nevertheless springs from a potency that the word possesses as a transformative, articulating sensorialisation. For its origin lies in the faculty of the imagination. But not in and of itself, rather only in its turn towards the logos semanticos, only in the sense of communicative speech, is the word an existential in Heidegger's sense.

And just as the sign always stands for that which it represents, just as it is the midpoint between that which is not yet and that which does not wish to be a mere omen – so too must the rain-making ritual be understood from this perspective, or indeed the preparations made in New Guinea and amongst the

Mountain Damara to facilitate childbirth: that one opens windows and doors, cupboards, loosens the bowstring, and so on. Through foreshadowing, the manifestation of an event is here compelled, an event which is in itself complete, needing only to become powerful. Practice here does not mean a knowledgeable, prudent and sensible way of going about things. Just as things here are not sought as objects possessing an understandable suitability for something, but as the 'seat' of forces. Even the mere act of thinking of oneself here constitutes a preparation through which an event is set in motion. And through this foreshadowing, things are given power over myself, just as one conceives of oneself as the 'seat' of a cosmic force—

One realises this through a sense of presence. Here, one experiences oneself as being present in things – the exact opposite of what is meant by the term 'anthropomorphism'.

To invoke something is considered superstitious. However, it is not frowned upon as presumptuous sacrilege. Superstition is *underlined in ink*: it recognises itself as superstition. Playful frivolity is expressed in the deliberate choice not only to set one's better judgement aside, but also to base a belief—whose fundamental basis has been lost—on practical calculation. It is precisely this distortion – and to a lesser extent the lack of enlightenment – that the accusation of superstition refers to. Superstition is superstitio. The superstitious person wishes to
For example, discovering the unrecognised warning in some trivial matter after something has gone wrong. Preparations for something are put off, so as not to 'tempt fate' through a confidence that runs ahead of the facts and is flaunted. One indulges in the simplified imagery of strange notions, and so on. This is not a fear of possible *hm. lnk*:i coincidences, which could be dismissed as unfounded, but rather a feigned anxiety. By 'tapping on the table', one 'saves' oneself – just as the pedant proves his seriousness through trivialities. The superstitious person respects boundaries which he sets as he pleases or as he needs. There is a temptation towards superstition, or rather a playful 'thrill' in superstitious fear. 1)[23]

Within the realm of the taboo, the realisation of one's powerlessness is experienced as an experience. Nemesis, experienced in one's own flesh, brings me back to my limits. But I do not actually recognise myself
'myself' in it, as I do when – affected by something – I feel ashamed. The turn of phrase that is constitutive of vulnerability, that one
'also' is, in fact, revealed here as a shift in one's understanding of the whole of nature, of which one finds oneself to be a part. Shame, however, 'is' precisely a form of 'self-awareness'. |

23 *hBelow*:i 1) Defiant folly, which takes something as a sign, can, for example, be precisely an expression of an inner-found certainty that, despite the precariousness of a situation, one holds the key to it oneself – provided that courageous resolve succeeds in turning the circumstances to one's advantage. In superstition, an attitude of the sort, as it were, is projected outwards: 'No bullet will hit me'. And this implies that there are no longer mere coincidences for the person whose lot has already been cast within themselves. Who understands fate as their own destiny. Who, for that reason, knows how all
'caution' falls short.

And this becoming conscious of oneself—*hm.Tinte*:i—is not merely a matter of knowing or realising. For one comes face to face with something that was previously unconscious, but not merely hidden. The feeling of shame can be employed precisely to address the 'problematic' nature of consciousness. After all – one does recognise 'oneself' and is aware of oneself in that shame – only that the meaning of these words lies in a direction other than the one usually favoured. But what does this preference mean? One cannot appeal to its comprehensibility in the same way that one readily recognises, for example, the merit of mathematical knowledge. To make it comprehensible here means that the fact of this merit must be explained.

- hSelf-confidencei

Becoming aware of oneself also occurs, for example, in philosophical reflection. Insofar as what matters here is to explicitly *hInserted with pencil:*i appropriate one's origins. However, one must not reduce this to the notion that it is a matter of beginning with 'consciousness' or with the 'immediate givens' designated therein. For this 'consciousness' is a school concept, the 'immediate givens' a hasty approach, and their concept the expression of preconceptions rooted in a particular standpoint.

Phenomenology, for example, begins with εποχή as a pausing in the course of an action. Here, something is brought to consciousness; that is to say, it is explicitly highlighted. That which one is engaged with is something one has 'had at hand', something one has done 'of one's own accord'. 'Done of one's own accord' does not mean: without first giving it any thought. It does not refer to the unmediated, ungrounded nature of a beginning. Rather, one finds oneself engaged in something which, by virtue of its very existence, has outstripped any questioning of it. For philosophy is not concerned here with laying a new foundation. A proper understanding of what is philosophically relevant manifests itself here precisely in the fact that one 'holds fast' to a pre-understanding, to the use of examples, insofar as it is only through their concretisation that one can be enabled to carry out this self-understanding. 'Unconscious' expresses the unexpressed, the buried and superseded aspect of that which, as an intention, provisionally serves as a guiding principle for existence as it orients itself towards something in this context. In the fact that one has no control over one's beginning, that one finds oneself here

The aporetic nature of philosophy lies in the fact that one can only relate to a foundation that has already been laid. This manifests itself as the impossibility of finding one's way out – in that one remains forever entangled within oneself and caught up in circling round one's own foundation. This 'relating to …' is not a mere turning back upon oneself. That to which one was not attuned is what affects one. And insofar as the anticipations, under whose guidance I grapple with things, are something essentially prior – that is, something that can only be made conscious retrospectively – their highlighting constitutes an εποχή. It is the way in which the philosopher exists, presenting himself to himself in the dynamism of his attitude – but not an object – that determines philosophy here.

This 'being affected by …' therefore does not imply 'conviction'. For one is convicted of something obtained by deceit, or of that which had remained hidden from one – such as a premise made in some way. To convict someone of this presupposition implies a critical, corrective destruction. For 'concealment' is not an essential feature of this presupposition. And to be affected by something in this context would merely create a sense of embarrassment.

The 'given' therefore does not express what happens to be at hand—*hm. Ink:*i—that which lies open to examination in a consciousness, but rather an intricate definition of the philosophical endeavour: philosophy can only exist in the form of a particular self-consciousness, in 'repetition'. It signifies a step. It takes responsibility for an event whose root, just like its own, lies in the powerlessness of Dasein to be.

The explanations provided by Husserl himself, of course, point in a different direction. For Husserl, 'consciousness' is the residue of a destruction of reality. *hEinf. m. Tinte:*i εποχή here means the elimination of something, insofar as it is not brought into play. Doubt cannot affect what remains of this in consciousness
'is given'. +)[24] The perspective representation of the object

h0039i p. 31

[24] +) Descartes, however, finds himself in doubt, that is, in the distinction against sensibility indicated therein. Doubt does not find a limit here, but rather establishes it in the sense of a determination: in the Cogito, Descartes determines his 'being' as being, in principle, of a different kind from that of things. For Descartes, what is truly real is that which he can recognise in unity with himself—that is, construct from his own resources—and which does not alienate him from himself. The relationship to the world that must then be established can only be the

h0040i hS.i 32

leads to 'being', namely the 'consciousness' of the object, whereby the orientation towards … designated in my consciousness is, as it were, taken from the other end. In the form of consciousness, the object is communicable. However, this consciousness must first of all seek its subject; or rather, it finds in me only its 'occasional' subject. |
But if consciousness is thus the locus of an expulsion of
If it is posited in relation to 'objects' and, in the mind, remains the defining prototype of the 'content' of consciousness – Leibniz's monad – then self-consciousness can only be understood in reflexive terms. According to the *Potentia*, every form of consciousness is reflexive here, insofar as its intention can be turned back upon the subject. However, this subject then merely finds itself within this consciousness. *hInserted with blue and red markings*: xi And the identity of this subject, too, is then simply to be established, just like that of the object, or, from an epistemological perspective, to be demonstrated as necessary. *hInserted with blue and red markings*: xi *hUnderlined with red markings*: i
'The analytical unity of self-consciousness is possible only on the condition of a synthetic unity.' [25]

become part of an orienting overview: the representation is something that resides within me.
'Consciousness' here means: constitutive consciousness, which remains just as bound to its 'object' as the latter is to its origin in that consciousness. All this follows step by step from the Cartesian position. Becoming conscious of oneself here occurs in tandem with a disempowerment of the world. Dogmatism, however, interprets it as a philosophical doctrine: as though Descartes – merely as a critical guardian of knowledge – had analysed the situation in which man finds himself and distilled it into a formula. As though the position arrived at by Descartes were the original situation, initially concealed by self-forgetfulness, which one need only recall.
Admittedly, Descartes' account is ambivalent. It is only the poorly founded aspect of his doubts that indicates how this doubt is, in fact, the primary concern. And then: 'By the term "cogitation", I mean all those things which, whilst we are conscious of them, occur within us …' [Oeuvres de Descartes publiées par Charles Adam & Paul Tannery VIII-1: Principia Philosophiae. Vrin, Paris 1964, p. 7 [IX], Principiorum philosophiae pars prima. De principiis cognitionis humanae. Quid sit cogitatio. 'By the term "cogitation", I mean all those things which take place within us in a conscious manner, insofar as we are conscious of them within ourselves.']
The 'I' of the cogito, whose 'esse' = 'cogitare', becomes something in which 'cogitationes' are to be found. Since then, 'phenomena' of consciousness have defined the field of psychology. Their approach is ideological. Sensation, for example, is then attributed the term 'sensation' as something that occurs in the subject, which is thus tailored from the outset to objective cognition .
[25] [Cf. I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason. Edited by R. Schmidt, F. Meiner, Hamburg 1956, B 133, p. 143b:

However – it is precisely in self-consciousness that the ossification of this 'consciousness' into the hypostatised entity of a theoretical concept becomes apparent. For what does 'self-consciousness' actually 'mean', 'to do something with consciousness', 'to be conscious'? What does 'unconscious' mean? 1)[26]

I am clear about what I am aware of. One makes someone aware of their situation by explaining it to them. Being aware of something therefore means having a sense of orientation. But what sort of orientation? It is neither the orientation provided by an overview nor that derived from knowledge. For 1) an overview is something internal to the world. One gains it from a particular vantage point, provided that everything can be placed in the right light. But that of which I am conscious and about which I am clear in this respect has been 'taken into "consciousness"' here. And 2) 'knowledge' means being in the know, that is, understanding things, being able to handle them, being able to deal with them. | Knowledge is something one can apply, something one can draw upon. One possesses knowledge, but one does not 'be' it. It is expandable, a factual stock that can be communicated, learnt and made public. Knowledge 'exists' as something binding upon everyone. It stands in contrast to not knowing. Knowledge is not really such that it comes from me not on the fact that it is 'held', but on the fact that it is actual knowledge and not an error.

One is, however, aware of something. And that of which one is aware is not simply targeted by 'consciousness' in this context. Not just anything can become the 'object of my consciousness' in the first place. To be conscious of something means that it is incorporated, as a guiding factor, into my anticipatory actions and volition. The absence of consciousness implied by the term 'unconscious' points to the, in a specific sense, existential significance of that of which one is or becomes conscious. For example, one is conscious of one's situation. And only indirectly, insofar as it characterises, for example, my situation, can, for example,

h0041i hS.i 33

'… the *analytical* unity of apperception is possible only on the condition of some *synthetic* unity.']

26 *hBelow:*i 1) It is no objection that these are in fact 'later' meanings of the word 'consciousness', insofar as this was taken from philosophical usage as the translation of Leibniz's 'conscientia'. For what is decisive is merely that the philosophical meaning of this word—which extends into a specific set of problems and is therefore defined in a particular way—is replaced by an unproblematic, implicit understanding that can be grasped immediately. This goes hand in hand with the fact that the word is used in some everyday sense.

h0042i hS.i 34

this room here, in its furnishings, is the 'object' of my consciousness. Primarily – and probably also originally – however,
'consciousness' means a sense of guilt. It is precisely here, however, that the contrast to mere reflection becomes apparent: for becoming conscious of one's guilt means accepting one's guilt without shirking from oneself, and taking responsibility for it. The 'identification' that takes place here does not mean a merely retrospective recognition of the non-distinction between myself and the one who …

That of which one is 'not aware' is something one is not aware of whilst doing something – due to thoughtlessness or inattention. I have 'failed' here (in the verbal sense). This is in contrast to what one does 'unconsciously'. That which is done on the sly is revealed as unconscious. From that perspective, something is unconscious. What
Something done 'unconsciously' is something of which one could also be conscious – in other words, merely an action freely directed towards possibilities |. If, for example, I instinctively step aside or, whilst thinking of something else, carry a letter to the postbox, this happens a u t o m a t i c a l l y,

i.e. without intention, but not 'unconscious'. 1)[27] It is from this – as has been said – that something is defined as unconscious: namely, that which happens unconsciously. For nothing 'is' in and of itself conscious or unconscious; one cannot ask whether the unconscious 'exists'. There is no such thing as 'acts' 'of consciousness' at all. And that of which I am conscious is not thereby 'intentionally' targeted as an object. Just as

e.g. thinking of something, i.e. taking it into view, keeping it in mind, would be an 'intentional' behaviour determined by its object. To be conscious of myself, i.e. the *underlined part with ink:* i Clarity about something on my part is something other than, for example, the clear- ity of things as they become accessible to me through sensory perception. 2)[28] Nothing is 'given' in consciousness, as if things were here—

[27] *hBelow:*i 1) 'Unconscious' is not the same as 'unintentional', where a word, for example, slips out against my will

a word slips out, for example. (Gruhle, Weisen des Bewußtseins, Ztschr. f. Neurol. 131, 1930, p. 78)

[28] 2) Admittedly, it had not been claimed of 'things' that they are 'given' to consciousness, but rather of 'objects'. In the concept of the object, however, the 'intentionality' of consciousness had already been guaranteed. For objects are represented; they can only be found in their representational form. The actual meaning of consciousness as being-with-oneself, or as being-in-oneself-as-a-directive-attitude, was thus already present in the fundamental premise of idealist philosophy. Consciousness steps in where the relationship to the world—transcendence—had been severed. (See G. E. Schulze, Critique of Theoretical

might reveal themselves. Being conscious of something is not a relationship to its reality – as, for example, its perception is. That of which I am conscious does not 'determine' something like 'my' consciousness as a consciousness 'of' this or that. If one has not thought of something, one is not aware that … It is I who, in my free behaviour, am 'determined' by that of which I am, in some way, merely aware. Which is why the 'not being aware that …' constitutes a deficiency, and 'being without an awareness of what one is doing' constitutes a 'disruption' in the whole. 1)[29] However, the fact that someone 'lacks' awareness of this … points to a moral defect, to a blindness characterised by dullness, thoughtlessness and a lack of conscience. Yet this initial lack of awareness can be 'awakened'.

Consciousness, however, is always self-consciousness insofar as one is always conscious of oneself and also of one's own 'something', or insofar as 'being conscious' in the absolute sense means 'being with oneself'.

The concept of 'being conscious' denotes a fundamental mode and the measure of human existence. When one is conscious, one is 'at oneself': but the one who is awakening is at oneself. Heraclitus, i Fragments 89.[IV] To what extent is a person not 'at one with themselves' when they withdraw into their own world? They are not, insofar as a person can only come to themselves by approaching themselves through an interpretation of the world as the defining reality. Yet, in their commonality – insofar as there is such a thing as testimony here – the world is precisely demonstrable. One person needs the other in order to find oneself in one's λογον

Philosophy, 1801, where it is shown that one cannot proceed from the idea to perception
.) [G. E. Schulze, Critique of Theoretical Philosophy. 2 vols. C. E. Bohn, Hamburg 1801.]

29 *hBelow*:i 1) This state of confusion and uncertainty associated with 'without consciousness …' is distinct from rashness. Something is done rashly insofar as it is done hastily and without reflection. Rashness characterises behaviour within the world that is, in this respect, incorrect. ('Without reflection', on the other hand, would mean: without first thinking it over, i.e. without further ado, although this may in fact be exactly the right thing to do.) One brings someone to their senses when they are adrift and unable to stand on their own two feet. Coming to one's senses stands in contrast to a state of distraction. Someone who is tomented and hounded by random thoughts does not 'come to their senses'. 'Reckless' means: without considering the practical consequences; 'impulsive', on the other hand, means: deluding oneself about one's own possibilities and abilities; 'being out of one's mind' signifies unbridled aimlessness.

h0044i p. 36

h0045i p. 37

To have 'διδοναι' corrected. It is only in this responsible coming to oneself, in transcendence, that existence is realised. In a dream, however, one slips away from oneself. Here one is removed from reality; insofar as one surrenders to one's visions here, one is not in the truth. This should not | *hm. Ink*: be understood in a banal sense, as though one were deceiving oneself here, which would merely mean that one was deceiving oneself if … The unreality of the dream is different from mere appearance. The unreality of the dream lies

in the fact that here one is estranged from oneself. The 'redeeming word' is always 'missing', and in the fact that one finds oneself on display here, allowing everything to happen to oneself, being unable to 'do' anything at all, one realises that one is removed from reality here only insofar as one has first slipped away from oneself. – People suffering from fever are 'unclear', have a 'clouded' state of mind, are not 'fully conscious'. They misidentify people, draw the figures from the wallpaper pattern on the wall into the space of their room, and so on. The lack of coherence in these interpretations is striking – just as, in a dream, nothing is actually accounted for. 'Losing consciousness' means being unable to take anything in any longer – as a consequence of fatigue giving way to sleep or a 'paralysis' of sensation. Whereas under anaesthesia, for example, this vital connection to things gradually fades: at a certain moment one still perceives the exact location and length of the incision, but no longer feels any pain; then one sinks deeper and deeper, as if into a landslide, until all sensation is extinguished. Anyone who is not in a state of (full) consciousness is regarded as having only limited capacity or as not being of sound mind. 1)[30] Insofar as they are only able to account for themselves to a limited extent. And in the (epileptic) twilight state, it is the scope of their consciousness of themselves as the person who was here yesterday, just recently, etc., that is restricted.

The abstract philosophical concept of self-consciousness is contrasted with a becoming-conscious-of-oneself in the diversity of concrete meanings: becoming conscious of 'oneself' in the context of shame, or being conscious of one's guilt, but also of one's intentions or one's situation, position, and so on. However, one is never conscious of 'oneself' as a mere 'subject' – or indeed as the subject of consciousness.

30 *hBelow:*i In the case of impulsive acts, however, the question of criminal responsibility arises if, in such instances, the perpetrator's 'restraint' is prevented by emotional distress. The act does not characterise 'him', but rather a type of psychopathic disposition of which it is symptomatic.

But what exactly is meant when one speaks explicitly of 'self-awareness'? One approaches something with self-assurance, for example, or displays self-assurance. In both cases, one is aware of one's 'Self-confidence' – being aware of one's own abilities. However, my abilities are determined just as much by my own capabilities as by those of others: I am not always the one called upon to do something. 'Excessive self-confidence' refers precisely to an air of superiority regarding the role that falls to one. What I focus on in my self-confidence, however, are the difficulties to be overcome— —by which my competence is first and foremost determined and measured. *hM. Rotst.:* xi[31]

- hSubconsciousnessi

We speak of the 'subconscious'. This does not imply any theoretical notions – as if, for example, consciousness were a stage on which ideas sought to supplant one another, whilst the subconscious lay, as it were, behind the scenes, suppressed. There are, for example, 'subconscious' thoughts, That is to say, those that one does not want to 'allow to surface'. For example, thoughts that 'spring to mind' (association). However, 'subconscious' also refers to what one does not want to admit, to which one does not actually shut 'oneself off' from – as in the acceptance of a thought – but rather what one does not wish to see. Just as, for example, one does not wish to acknowledge the fate that has befallen me. Thus, one's supposed annoyance at a noise makes one so angry simply because one senses, for instance, a lack of consideration for oneself behind it. But what lies 'in the subconscious' is also something which, however much one may try to—

(31) *Stuck at the bottom of the page*: i x When one's self-awareness is shaken, one finds oneself questioning precisely that which one believed one could be certain of. People are 'without self-awareness' if they are characterised by the belief that they can lose their clarity about themselves. However, whilst the ability of which one is aware is explicitly brought into play here in relation to something, it merely serves to justify the nature and extent of one's sense of self. This is understandable in this context, or rather, it reveals itself as an expression of blatant overestimation of oneself. To have one's sense of self struck is to suffer an affront, an insult. For one had, as it were, become accustomed to it. Criticism lies outside the realm of self-esteem. Self-esteem fluctuates between pomposity and a pathologically low sense of self-worth. It relates to what one thinks of oneself. It is an expression of the space one believes one is entitled to claim.

h0046i p. 38

h0047i hS.i 39

seeks, yet | cannot quite break free from that which distracts one.
One notices the diversity of that which falls under the common denominator of
is attributed to the 'subconscious'. This is a way of maintaining the appearance of a coherent structure that is only possible within a preconceived theory of the 'psychic'. For as certain as it is that, for example, does not allow thoughts to arise—that is, does not yield to them insofar as one does not pursue them, i.e. does not take them in, follow them through and think them through, namely think them through to the end—a tendency to 'not allow them to arise' would mean something quite different and nothing in the direction of the subconscious, namely: that one prevents them from arising. And 'giving in' to them would simply be a matter of following them – without this, in turn, implying their acceptance into consciousness. Becoming aware of them here merely means not closing one's eyes to the vitality of this inclination,

without this causing it to unfold as the accepted thought does. Both the thought that one refuses to accept and the inclination that one is reluctant to acknowledge – in both cases there is a certain degree of repression, as described above as the third case.

One 'opens oneself' to a thought when one accepts it. But where, then, does a thought to which one closes oneself remain in the unconscious?

To think of something means to be connected to it. Not to think of something (anymore) signifies indifference. The act of thinking of something denotes an existential relationship with that which one is thinking of. To think of something means: to take it into account, to care about it, to concern oneself with it, to keep an eye on it or to take it into one's view. To have forgotten, as in *hm. Tinte*:i, usually means: no longer t h i n k i n g of something – even if one can still remember it or could . | There are limits to the possibility or ability to remember something or to reflect on it. *hM. Rotst.*: 1i[32] Not thinking about something, however, requires a justifying explanation. Forgetting is not simply the opposite of thinking about something, but rather, in this context,

'F e h l e n' (understood as active and intransitive), whereby what one thinks of need not be what is desired; it may simply be what is natural and, in that sense, expected.

One thinks, for example, of oneself, of how one might extricate oneself from a predicament,

32 *hBelow*:i *hm. Red ink*:i 1 *hm. Ink*:i Note p. 39a

or 'self-forgetful' towards others. And to think of someone means: to care for them. What one thinks of does not simply lie in the direction of one's actions and desires. I can resolve to think of something. Whatever a *meminisse* is. ('To think of something *again*' is a repeated act of thinking of …) Promises are not made in the form of an intention, but in such a way that one wishes to think of something. Here, one is mindful of what is retained retrospectively. It is, for example, foolish or petty to still 'think' of something once it has become obsolete. That which one cannot forget is something one has not yet come to terms with. The focal point for what is 'thought'

'is' takes on specific forms: following something in one's thoughts, reflecting on something thoughtfully, acting with deliberation, whilst constantly reassuring oneself, step by step, that … To 'give one's thoughts to something' can virtually mean 'to worry'. A thoughtless person is one who is indifferent to what is to come. To be thoughtlessly distracted: not to be focused on the task at hand.

Keeping something in one's sight whilst thinking is different from 'fixing' one's gaze on things in attentive observation. Where there are practical limits, where bringing something to mind must be established as a situation, where things impose conditions on their visibility that the practice of intervention and experimentation must fulfil. When thinking, one is 'at one with oneself'.

'Being lost in thought' implies a specific absence, insofar as|

Note.

One recalls something insofar as it 'comes to mind'. One is reminded of something again by someone else or by circumstances. For example, even by a knot. And what one is reminded of in this way is precisely something that needs to be done right now. And the fact that it 'comes to mind' does not mean, for instance, that something is being 'brought back into consciousness' here. – Knowledge is recognition. A face, for example, seems 'familiar'. For *[underlined in ink]*: in the way one sees something, in discerning its features, memory proves itself. It manifests itself in the act of practising, but not in the act of visualising anything. One remembers – 'vaguely' – in the process of discerning how and what 'this actually is'. One 'remembers' insofar as one finds oneself brought back to one's own experienced self. The repetition of steps takes place according to memory. In 'learning' to know, one connects with things. Experience is something one 'has'. Forgetting means a 'lack of …'. This is how one recognises leather again

'by feel', which, like taste, requires practice through repeated sampling of … Here, too, one recalls that sensation one has felt between one's fingers before, without needing to recall the circumstances of that time. – A face

'reminds' one of … But also in the sense of a resemblance that can only be experienced in this way *[underlined in the original]* *m. Ink*i similarity – just as an impression 'evokes' others within me, one almost searches for what it might remind one of, in order to allow oneself to be carried away by the impression in its purity. This, however, is not a practical 'ability' that leads directly to a

h0048i hS.i 39a

MS Human Nature

Memory (mneme) in the sense of a 'natural faculty'. Rather: a person's mind is revealed in the nature of their thoughts.
One cannot wish to remember something in the same way that one wishes to reflect on something. One can only wish to allow oneself to remember something. For example, by reflecting on the situation in which one heard a name, thereby creating the conditions for associations, as a result of which the name then comes back to mind 'of its own accord'. (When 'remembering', one is passive, in contrast to 'reflecting', which originates from oneself. In the latter, one can make an effort. One reflects on one's experiences or on oneself; one reflects on one's situation, insofar as one consults with oneself about it. That which one reflects upon, one turns over in one's mind, keeps in mind, and carries with oneself.)
But 'remembering' also means being able to visualise something. To 'visualise' means to bring something to one's inner eye. For example, one might visualise one's room at home. But also the situation one finds oneself in at that moment. Bringing something before one's inner eye therefore implies stepping back from the situation. (In contrast, one forms a mental image – namely, of or in relation to something. The clarity one seeks here to explain something is different from the repetitive visualisation (reproduction) of its defining features.)
However, what is analysed as 'memory' – that is, what is investigated experimentally – and what is a striking phenomenon, such as numerical memory, is the ability to memorise, which can be methodically practised and technically developed through aids and rules. One 'has' something in one's memory; this 'having' is a field of possibilities: one can do something or 'knows' something or can visualise it. You commit telephone numbers to memory, remembering them by 'something or other'. One creates associations with them. For in themselves they are nothing that one might be led to through the typical course of life. Memory helps me. As opposed to 'thinking of', which can be an 'end in itself', in which 'my' behaviour is reflected. Memory can be measured; one person's memory can be compared with another's. To reproach someone for not having thought of something is a moral reproach. But to reproach them for not having committed something to memory properly—that is, for not having made an effort commensurate with their limited memory—affects their competence, and the justice of this reproach is measured by the limits of the 'nature' with which they were endowed. |

one is, here and in the very best sense of the term, 'focused on the matter at hand', but not on the details of the contingent situation. One does not allow oneself to be distracted 'from oneself', that is, from one's thoughts. To take on board as thoughts that which moves me or which comes to me as an idea means to take stock of it, to clarify it. Thoughts should be internally consistent. To engage with something 'in thought' does not imply actual interaction. In one's thoughts, one turns things over and over, visualising or imagining them. To become a thought means being able to hold oneself free. In thinking, 'my' thoughts take on a certain direction. Whatever one thinks, one always thinks about something. The productivity of thought is evident in the fact that it can be developed and expressed in a formula, that one

can give it a point. Thoughts gain clarity and form. They find application. There is the 'right' of a thought. *Handwritten in ink*: There are good thoughts, but also reprehensible ones, etc. Thoughts are always someone's, e.g. one's own or another's. They can be suggested to one. And because every thought is a step towards oneself, and can only be realised by my connecting with it, one can therefore also defend oneself against thoughts, i.e. prevent them from arising. But one may also wish to 'suppress' them outright.

A wish, for example, is merely a thought. It remains, in this context, simply a matter of mentally pre-conceiving a situation in such a way that something occurs to one of its own accord: 'it should …'. On the other hand, however, thoughts are something so objectively 'factual' that one cannot help but share them, accept them, understand them, or close oneself off from them. In generalised forms, thoughts can be made accessible, communicable and openly presented – which is different from – as usually happens in speech – 'sharing' them with others by 'noting' their observations and so on.

Thoughts can be clear, correct | simple and complicated, witty and baroque. 'Nonsensical' refers to 'far-fetched' thoughts. (The
'Un-' has the same meaning here as it does in words such as 'unheimlich' (eerie), etc.: that of the greatest possible intensification of detachment from what is regarded here as the 'positive'. A phrase such as 'and is with' is, at first glance, simply 'meaningless'. 'Meaningless' here would denote the absence of meaning in the sense that these are words being linked together, i.e. something to which meaning actually belongs.)

'Subconscious' refers to thoughts that have not been (fully) assimilated. That is, those that have not passed through the scrutiny of responsible accountability. Those to which one has turned one's back, i.e. with which one has not connected. Those that have been split off and are able to go their own ways. And precisely insofar as one has not 'come to terms' with them, they then emerge as the hidden thorn in slips of the tongue or reveal themselves as the deeper meaning of what one says or does, insofar as they assert themselves through symbolisation in the process. 'Complex-like': complexes are not foreign thoughts, but are not really thoughts at all. Their split-off nature means that I am 'involved' here with something that precisely lacks the form of selfhood, insofar as it has not passed through me.

Subconscious thoughts are therefore not, as it were, thoughts that lie 'behind' others. *hEinf. m. Tinte*:i In the

h0050i hS.i 41

MS Human Nature

h0051i hS.i 42

h0052i

one wishes to conceal this other aspect. Just as there are 'ulterior' motives other than those actually pursued in a given matter. *hM. Tinte:*i Yet any undertaking that is meaningful in itself is, precisely for that reason, one that does not allow one to look for other motives. 'Ulterior motives' are indicated, for example, by allusion or the double meaning of words. In the words, for example,
'Are you actually coming tomorrow evening?' might be another thought that is clearly implied, expressed through my tone of voice and facial expression – perhaps quite contrary to my intention. |
And if subconscious thoughts are something one can
'concerns' means: 2. something different from being 'convinced' of some thought in the sense that there are thoughts hidden within it which are objectively implied. Thoughts that have crept in unnoticed. That is to say, one 'would have to' take them into account as something to which the responsibility for what is actually thought would have to extend. For example, one critically exposes the other's surreptitious assumptions. However, the other was simply 'unaware' of these very assumptions. *Quotation marks and underlining in ink*: i 'not aware'. It is not 'criticism', however, that touches upon the 'sub'conscious. To address someone regarding what occupies them in their subconscious does not amount to unmasking them. For in that which one is not yet actually conscious of, the groundwork may well be laid for what is subsequently taken up as a thought. 1)[33]

On the other hand, refusing to let a thought arise usually means denying it precisely because one does not want to accept what it says. One tries to get past it. And one exposes someone here insofar as they have 'deceived themselves' about both their own nature and what they are fundamentally inclined towards, what they want. They
'pretends' here to himself. This self-deception is not a deception about …, in the sense that one might objectively be 'deceived' about something. For self-knowledge does not mean an objective, conclusive understanding. It stands in direct contrast to this. Insofar as it means grasping oneself and, in acknowledging oneself to oneself, also taking oneself on. 2)[34] One does not 'pretend' when one deceives oneself. |

33 *hBelow:*i 1) As a preparatory stage, the subconscious is distinct from that which

'guides behind the scenes' in something which, as something essentially prior, one can only relate to retrospectively. That is to say, 'relate to' has various meanings: one is, after all, not brought 'back to oneself' in that which is merely active within my subconscious .

34 2) Also by Scheler [M. Scheler, 'On Self-Deception', in: Zeitschrift für Patho-

What is concealed is not simply gone, but, despite its presence, cannot be found. One is kept at bay here by the illusory nature of its absence. And what matters here is not merely to 'unveil' something, to make a delusion intelligible, but to 'confront' the other, that is, to catch them red-handed at the very point where, despite their refusal to acknowledge it, they can still be found.

- *The reflexivity of* consciousness

'Consciousness' refers to the explicit apprehension of something. Its absence or preparation is understood in terms of the 'sub-'conscious. *Underlined in ink*:i Unconscious and non-conscious – both signify a lack of awareness of what one is doing. However, 'unconscious' can refer to the act itself, whilst 'non-conscious' can only refer to the act being performed.

That is *why*, however, the 'realisation' of oneself also takes place as a becoming-aware-of-oneself; one takes oneself in as the one one 'is'. This explicit appropriation of oneself, however, takes place through articulation. It is the luminous brightness of the conscious that undergoes, in the word, merely an intensification. For, as an expression of something, the word signifies its reception. Yet the fact that the realisation of the being that I ever am takes place as becoming conscious precisely marks its essential difference from that of things. For what does

Psychologie, Vol. I, No. I, 1911; published under the title 'The Idols of Self-Knowledge' in: ibid., Treatises and Essays. Volume Two. Verlag der Weissen Bücher, Leipzig 1915, pp. 3–168; now in: ibid., *On the Overthrow of Values*. Treatises and Essays. Edited by Maria Scheler. Francke Verlag, Bern 1955, pp. 215–292. – Cf.
H. Lipps, *Human Nature*. Works, Vol. III, Frankfurt am Main 1977, pp. 154–155, note 1.] Self-deception is incorporated into the perception and expression of my feelings. However – even when I do not wish to acknowledge something as untrue, I myself am the one, and there is nothing within or about me in which I am deceiving myself. For example, when something – and this may also be the attitude of another person – is mistakenly already regarded and presented as love. Because one has no idea at all what love 'actually' is. Here, nothing is 'confused', in which case the elements of the confusion would have to be known to one, as is usually the case with delusions. Rather, it is an expression of self-deception. Insofar as one is unaware of one's own emotional poverty and has deluded oneself about the lack of meaningful encounters and experiences. Only a few possess depth. Only a few actually live from 'their' centre – most merely 'behave' in one way or another.

h0053i hS.i 44

here – that is, specifically in the case of the school – 'knowledge'? Is any 'being' recognised here at all? What is the 'object' of knowledge? Rather, it is the situation denoted by the objectum-essē. To recognise something

to recognise something 'as' a chair means: to recognise the existence of or the presence of that thing. The things one is dealing with are not individual objects. For example, the rain outside, the lack of … – but also 'the light' in the context of physics, for example
'are' after all only 'something' within the framework of reality. T h i s i s | that with which one grapples, through which one finds one's way. Experience spreads and becomes more nuanced. What is 'recognised' is what one is capable of, namely what one can practise or has already practised. The 'what' of things are handles that recur. Namely, grips through which one, in turn, gains a foothold – one gains a foothold in reality. A fleeting passage, however, anticipates recurrence: concepts are general. In the light of decisions, things reveal themselves in a meaning. One allows them to 'be' this or that, i.e. 'posits' this or that. Yet the question of what is actually posited as being would necessarily be asked in vain if one did not leave it at this or that. Or rather, what is posited is a being of which one becomes aware, or rather, in which one recognises oneself. In the existence of …, 'there is', etc., is expressed how one finds oneself placed before 'facts'. One becomes aware of reality as the
'Given' in a conscious sense. That is to say, the Being 'recognised' therein is one that one oneself 'is'. This, however, means that in the sense in w , in which any Being at all can be recognised, there lies nothing comprehensible. +)[35] One becomes aware, for example, of being driven to …, ++)[36] of the desire that …; one becomes aware of one's guilt, but also of one's premises in relation to something, of one's course of action, and so on. Thus

[35] *hBelow:*i +) Note: A break becomes apparent here in Kant's concept of appearance: for the inclusion of the aspects constitutive of the 'what' of things—for which the concept provides the rule—does not yet imply the positing of objects that are such and such. Yet it is precisely in the fact that the object is always one and the same = x that the fleeting and essentially provisional nature of cognition, as a process of finding its way, comes to light. The 'being-in-itself' of things, posited in the noumenon, is, however, a non-concept ( ).

[36] ++) Note: One cannot be at all aware of what is perceived as a 'drive' in self-observation *[underlined in ink:* i], that is to say, what finds its place within the contexts of a reality whose scope is defined by the scientific method of 'psychology'. Here, the human being is regarded merely as the theatre of drives, etc., as of phenomena that occur.

how one also encounters the other in this, corresponds to him, positions him, and so on. And it is precisely in this that one 'recognises' 'him'. Provided, that is, that he is not taken in advance for or as … Becoming-aware-of-oneself-in-something, however, signifies not only a step taken by existence, but also a topical transformation of the 'object' of consciousness. 'Unconscious' does not mean hiddenness; 'unconscious' does not merely mean being overlooked.

One becomes, or is, aware of oneself insofar as one relates to, or is affected by, another. The 'reflexivity' of consciousness is linked to the precedence of that which is taken up within it. In contrast to the way in which one feels 'embarrassed' or 'blushes with shame' – generally speaking: 'one's self' when one is confronted by things. On the other hand: the feeling of shame does, after all, signify precisely a becoming aware of oneself. And embarrassment intensifies with the awareness of one's situation. The sensation is not yet a conscious 'cogito'. But how is it taken up within it?

- *Impression and* sensation

I 'have' the pain in my finger, and it is 'I'—that is to say, it is my finger—that is being pricked. One is being hurt: one feels a stinging, piercing, tearing pain. I feel
'the prick in the finger'. What causes me pain is the finger itself, just as much as the prick in it. It is only when your finger is pricked that you become aware of it. There is no such thing as a 'quality of pain'. Just

as, in the hardness of wood, it is not actually a quality that is sensually experienced, but rather its resistance. However, whilst here I can feel my way with my finger to try to recognise something (which is always a matter of 'grasping' or 'comprehending'), pain always signifies a disruption of this freedom.

But one comes to know 'oneself', that is to say, one's position in relation to, or on, the ground one treads upon. 'Solid' is that upon which I can rely, which sets me free for possibilities. A structure, for example, but also the ground on which I walk. To the depressed person, it seems to sink away; they step into a void and cannot proceed. For they do not find themselves free for the future, whose ways out seem closed to them: it is not within them what is necessary to perceive the firmness of the ground

h0054i hS.i 45

MS Human Nature

h0055i hS.i 46

h0056i hS.i 47

to be able to perceive it as 'solidity' at all. One might call this 'symbolic', insofar as a symbol here coincides with what it signifies. The structure of things is determined by how I feel. What one perceives has its specific limits in the nature of one's own feeling.

The impression that something makes on me is something that I

'h a b e' – that's what it was called. 'It' fills me with dread. This 'it' is not defined by the situation, as in 'it's raining', 'it is to be feared that …'. In situations, there is a temporal existence. But someone's physical pain is not 'his' pain in the same way, *hm. lnk*:i just as what he thinks is 'his' thought. But one 'has' a sensation in the same way that it has me, namely it seizes, grips, overwhelms. For example: 'I'm freezing'. One is under the influence of a face, for example. What 'is' here, that is, what has this effect, is certainly this face here – but no more so than this needle causes me pain or the blooming of an orchid gives me joy. That is to say, *simply put, lnk*: I thereby justify my pain or my joy, without, however, this addendum enabling the

object captured in the impression to be objectively identified. Or rather, what the face 'tells' me becomes apparent only through the reception of the impression, the nature of which cannot be separated from the fact that it is imposed upon me. +)[37]

The pain in the finger, the (aching) finger, the 'I am' ( ); and so I, too, am that which seizes me with horror, from which, once gripped, I cannot break free. ++)[38] In the pain, in the sensation ( ), I am not yet | 'myself'. What I 'have', namely what I am (εχειν, intransitive!) +)[39] I do not dispose of this as I would a possession. The free relationship denoted herein is only just beginning to be gained. On the other hand: it is a 'clear' sensation, the accountable reception of which signifies something other than the apprehension of what is initially disordered. Much-

[37] *hBelow:*i +) Note: Kant's notion of the 'private validity' of sensibility, however, refers to sensations, understood as conveyors of objective qualities – to the fact that one can only agree, indirectly and not through the demonstrative development of a concept, on which colour, for example, is meant by 'green'.

[38] ++) Note: My feeling of cold, as a 'state', is presumably related to the fact that it is cold outside. However, this does not refer to the weather that one anticipates, that one can describe, and whose coldness can be read 'on the thermometer'. The coldness that is felt is something else.

[39] *Stuck at the bottom of the page:* i +) Similarly, in Aristotle, the eye 'has' colour – without the colour being inherent in the eye as a property, so to speak.

more: what is grasped – namely, what is decided upon in the act of setting aside what is decisive – is the situation, the structuring of which constitutes a step.
One has 'a certain impression' of someone. I have
'no impression' of a person if they leave me indifferent. The impression I have of someone can become more firmly established and clearer. However, it can also be obscured and take a back seat to the image one forms of that person, based on what one has experienced of them oneself or heard about them from others. ++)[40] In an impression, one grasps someone, but one does not 'recognise' them. For recognition means getting to know them, namely from one's own perspective. Every act of recognition involves a question. Something reveals itself here from my perspective. And insofar as there is an attitude or viewpoint underlying this, there is also scope for deception. Step by step, with care, evidence is gathered to substantiate a recognition. The other person, however, is grasped in a single glance. And it is not the impression that can be false, but only the thought it arouses in me. *hQuotation marks in ink:*i 'Deception' could here only mean that it is perhaps 'nothing'. U n g e b r o c h e n | something is grasped here. *hM. Ink:*i +[41] An impression arises unbidden. Upon entering—

40 ++) The immediate impression of something, as its 'effect', is not an impression – such as a trace left on a wax tablet, understood in a causal sense.

Something other than this impression, which apprehends the other, is not only sympathy and antipathy – which, being rooted in my own and the other's intentions, are always relative – but also the 'impression' of the other, under which I, as the recipient of an effect, am always subject to it insofar as it implicitly determines my behaviour towards him. Tact – as a kind of finer sensibility – guides one imperceptibly; one is not even aware that one is attuning oneself to the other. A lack of tact is seen precisely in the fact that one has no sensitivity for …

One always listens to the other person, and only then takes in what they say. It is easier to persuade someone than to convince them. Suggestion is not a subconscious mechanism, as if something were being transmitted here, for example, through stimulation. After all, belief is already countered by rejection. What is meant by 'suggestion' lies solely in the self-deception that one accepts, on objective grounds, what is in fact merely believed on the basis of the other person.

41 *hBelow:*i +) A loud bang, for example, makes me flinch immediately. The impression of fear prevails here against one's better judgement. Compare, for example, the terrifying whistle of a grenade—to which one succumbs without resistance, turning aside—with the sound of a shrapnel explosion, the significance of which is merely 'understood'. Animals 'feel' in the same way. Uninterrupted, they perceive it through their sense of smell

It would seem that there is no passage through human movement. It is made clear by being brought into the centre, taken up as a thought, that is to say, articulated. However – cognition and the grasping of an impression cannot be demonstrated separately in isolated cases. For – on the one hand: the impression does indeed need to be taken in, and its clarification occurs through one's attempt to describe what something looks like. And on the other hand: the perspective of the question taken up in contemplative cognition is not chosen arbitrarily. It is determined by a sense of …

The clarity of an impression is a specific kind. It lies in the forcefulness of the impression, which cannot be dismissed. This is in contrast to the clarity of recognition, which is measured by me. A realisation should be unambiguous. For realisation does, after all, mean: placing things in context, understanding their significance, whilst one must explore connections and constantly re-establish one's grounds. There is something 'in' the impression. But I must first discover what lies within it. It lies in the direction towards which the impression awakens me. From within myself. For that which moves me here is essentially ambiguous: it is both this, from *hKorr. m. Bleist:*i that which acts upon me, stirring me in my thoughts, as well as the thought itself (by which I am stirred). What is grasped unbroken in the impression cannot be communicated. However: one does not, after all, need the other here, in so far as a point of view etc., that is to say, in so far as a knowledge corresponding to the object is not at all designated in the impression-based | grasping of something. From the impression, which cannot be interpreted away, the world I share with others appears rather as one for which the act of leaving things as they are—that is, their being set aside and dealt with—is precisely constitutive. The very fact that I seek to clarify an impression by saying what something looks like, or by describing the impression allegorically *using quotation marks* written *in ink*: 'like …' 'as if …', emphasises precisely how the right word for it is lacking, how the impression is 'actually' indescribable.

What evokes an impression in me are mostly perspectives, points of view, etc. It is the case where, for example, a situation

circumstances, without any sound being interpreted as a warning signal in this context.

Thanks. Although thought is merely one form of practical behaviour that must be carefully justified. Although one perhaps returns time and again to the impression as the touchstone of one's interpretation, and must in doing so renounce all bias anew. That an impression is 'the right one' relates to the thought it causes to flash through my mind. But in order to be able to make sense of an impression in this way, one requires a certainty that arises only in a fleeting moment, when one finds a foothold in things, when one manages to grasp reality as a whole in things as if they were interlinked. In this, nothing remains isolated, and one does not, as it were, drown in the impressions. It is a certainty, comparable to the attitude through which emotions are absorbed. Resolve is its prerequisite. +)[42]

The depressed person, however, 'succumbs' to impressions. The vastness of the stairwell, the length of the corridors, the silence, the formality of those he encounters 'affect' him differently. He has, in fact, lost his composure, having maintained it only with great effort | on the surface. And accordingly, it is a certain sensitivity that makes one shrink from sitting in the middle of a row of chairs. From this vantage point, the 'normal' people appear dull. Provided, that is, they remain unchallenged. But the fact that they do not challenge what fills the other with paralysing horror shows how the impression arises from within me: at different times, things have different effects. And the impression isolates me. Because it knocks away the

foothold I had in the world's shareability. I cannot 'find' myself. Just as one is driven about in a dream, images are dreamt in which one sees oneself. Here, one is relieved of the need to come to terms with oneself. 'The analytical- e unity of self-consciousness is possible only on the condition of a synthesis.' (V) But this requires decisiveness. Being oneself occurs only in 'becoming'. Yet in order to take steps, one must

42 *hBelow:*i +) However, an impression can also be 'conceptualised', that is, 'defined' as an impression. For example, when one says of a person that they are 'dry' or seem 'leathery'. For a person 'is' dry in a different way from, say, wood, where a quality is experienced through the senses. For *hEinf. m. Tinte:*i to test wood for dryness, I ascertain whether it is not wet. Wetness is here specifically distinct from dryness. One does not dwell here on the sensation that serves practical knowledge. And it requires an artificial setting aside of this most immediate aspect in order to discover in the wood something that resembles the impression of a human being and which, in turn, brings that impression to mind. Here too, however: one must be free to form this association.

are made possible by a firm foundation. One seeks and finds it in 'reality', that is, in a reality in which one encounters others. 'The Other' – this can just as easily be myself, just as he may also encounter me in a language, for example.

Nevertheless: I grasp something through an impression. And it is precisely this – that the first impression is decisive, whilst one is still free from … – which shows how it is only the distillation of the impression, in the absence of objective checks, that constitutes a failure. There is a fundamental willingness to take into account the possibility of error. And does one actually succumb to a particular impression? One succumbs, after all, to that which one ought actually to come to terms with: the things, that which stirs within me as a concern. In accordance with the fact that what is actually recognised is the situation and not the individual things.

For things are perceived in their immediacy, in their interaction and counteraction, and always in the totality of their particularity. One experiences resistance, too, only insofar as one is directed towards something 'behind' it. |

It is only through resistance that I realise what, as a mere circumstance, was indifferent and not actually 'there'. It is only my preconceptions that prevent me from realising that I am never in a vacuum. 'Sensing' the atmosphere means, in itself, seeking to approach things freely. One allows oneself to be affected here; Perception is a tentative probing that retains the option of retreat. Only the finger, placed in the service of knowledge and proceeding tentatively—that is, gauging its distance—is the 'organ' of humankind.+)[43] How humankind in general ++)[44] perceives in the unity of its nature,

[43] *hBelow*:i +) The meaning of 'organ' has undergone a significant shift in psychology: the term 'sense' organs is now used. 'Senses' are here regarded as the specific tools for acquiring lasting knowledge. 'Sensations' are then regarded as the given *hquotation mark m. lnk*:i 'means' of gaining knowledge about the properties of objects. Their 'image' unites what the senses teach us about them. However, only the indifferent 'subject' of perceptions – this word not understood in any philosophically binding sense – ultimately regards these as objectively distinct 'sensations'.

[44] *Below, partly stuck to the page*:i Man also 'sees', for example. 'Seeing' is not to be defined in terms of what the physiologist regards as the 'eye'. The 'eyes' of lower animals, for example, merely 'perceive' differences in brightness, i.e. they convey stimulation through this.

The eye is merely a means of bringing about the act of seeing – just as, for example, brightness is only 'active' brightness in this context. 'Being able' to see implies two things.

the faculty of sensibility cannot be divided into that which can only be separated, in a purely physiological sense, by the senses. What one perceives may be the same thing, regardless of whether it is heard in a sound or seen in *the gaze* of another. One perceives insofar as one stands in the world, but does not stand opposed to it.

Things are noticed and sensed, but almost never actually

'perceived'. For perceptions are something that can be reported, something that can be objectified, communicated and repeated. In the perceptions one forms, something is always established. Namely, a factual element defined as a fact in terms of its where, when and how. One cannot help but recognise what one perceives as a fact. When something is perceived, it is incorporated into the body of our knowledge and understanding. The world of perception is something that is in fact 'constituted' in this way. That, for example, 'the sky has become overcast', we subsequently describe as a perception that has been made, that it is a fact which conveys meaning. It is not 'things' themselves, but 'facts' that are perceived.

Perceptions are repeatable. It makes no difference who made them. I am merely the subject of a perception. I share it with others.

Seeing, hearing, etc., are, however, different modes of perception. This should not be understood to mean that they are 'the senses' for the various aspects that perception reveals in the structure of things […]. Rather, the mode of my perception is different: When I see, I relate to things differently than when I allow them to reveal themselves to me through hearing. For, in observing, I 'engage' with things, seek to discern their various aspects, approach them, choose a vantage point that becomes my perspective, and so on. The free-floating nature of the gaze, which seeks out and follows things, *hEinf. m. pen:*i—penetrates or remains on the surface—stands in a certain contrast to the way in which the ear, for its part, is reached by the sound that penetrates it. Again: when I hear something, I am not approached in quite the same way as, say, by the cold

h0061i p. 52

Firstly, these *quotation marks* in a certain context, *with ink:*i 'possibilities', i.e. the *underline with ink:*i 'ability' or 'becoming able to …'; secondly, however, the *quotation marks and underline with* 'capacity' of the face that has organised itself in the eye. One must not confuse that which makes something possible with the means by which it is put into effect. Yet blindness presupposes precisely the organisation of this capacity: the paramecium, for example, is not blind.

is only perceived as being 'out there' when one exposes oneself to it, etc. My relationship with things is constantly changing here; the vastness of the world and its horizon shift.

Through vision, the context of actions is tentatively explored, and this "viewing" – *in quotation marks with ink*:i – points back to the decisive role of free choice in this regard. The world in its visibility brings me face to face with myself, insofar as it is the counterpoint to my existence. *hM. Rotst.:* xi[45] Here, the world is placed within my capacity. For the fact that the world is visible signifies a specific 'possibility'. To be smellable means that something has a particular smell
'has'. It is in the nature of things, in what they are capable of in relation to others, that this possibility exists, which one can make use of. However, anything can be made visible. One can compel things to present themselves in the medium of neutral phenomenality. For here one 'overlooks' the specific mode of being of things – which can, for example, also be experienced through smell. The neutrality of appearance and the detachability of colour, for example, mean that there is the possibility of an internal order here. What one tastes or smells , however, is materially bound. Appearances | are deceptive. One remains on the 'surface' of things. *hM. Rotst.:* xi[46] The

[45] *Stuck at the bottom of the page, with red stamp:* xi ++) In their visibility, things can be experienced as the 'world'. (Cf. pp. [53–54] below) Painting, for example, captures them freely in their apparent nature – without vision here being bound up with concerns about their reality. To be able to 'see' a painting by van Gogh properly, one needs an affinity with the one who, as an existence, questions and sees here.

++) I can – insofar as seeing is a form of interpretation – freely hold up what I have seen to myself or to another in an image. The essential features of a visual impression are reproduced in the image. (There is nothing corresponding to the 'image' in the other senses). The drawing is, in *quotation marks*, with *ink*: 'expression' like the word that is a responsible entity, the formulation of which signifies a rebirth of that by which one is moved as a thought .

[46] *hStuck at the bottom of the page*:i It does not contradict the dematerialisation of colour if colour is seen as the material 'appearance' of something specific and if, as a result, conceptually diverse nuances are brought together – for example, in *hEinf. m. ink*:i κυάνεος, for example, which is the colour of the sea, ranging from dark blue to light green.

The essence of painting lies in my ability to reproduce colours. I cannot, however, reproduce sensations; rather – because they cannot be separated from what is experienced within them – I can only attempt to imitate them deceptively. The imitated scent of a rose is therefore not the very thing it merely pretends to be.

Things are not perceived 'in themselves' in the sense that, for example, the 'unmistakable' scent of a rose is such that one can identify it as such. What I see, however, is at a distance from me, and this distance is perceived as temporal insofar as what is seen in the distance is not yet present. The appearance of things —whether man-made or natural, for example—is of the same nature. Our own body is seen no differently from a foreign body. Everything looks a certain way, has colour and form; that is to say, it 'presents itself to me' in this way. Things are brought out of the darkness into the light. I break them open in order to see their inner workings. The fact that they take on colour in the process does not imply any change or increase in their properties. Things are 'there' at various levels. They can be experienced, but can also be seen in their phenomenal manifestation. In this context, however, they are seen as a whole in their 'whatness', which is always a specific 'what' distinct from others. *hEinf. m. Tinte*:i It is not merely individual

aspects of or relating to things that are perceived. The neutrality of their phenomenal nature—the fact that one thing is seen in relation to another—constitutes, however, the specific index of the 'whatness' or 'truth' of the phenomenon. The world manifests itself in the phenomenon just as it does in the concept. Visibility is a possibility that is activated. One that can, in fact, be activated at any moment. It is not a possibility 'given' in the nature of things. Colour is the law of nature in relation to the sense of sight. Visibility, however, is in this respect a constant, and it is primarily 'possibility'. The spontaneity of seeing, the Gnostic aspect, means precisely this: that in seeing, one can 'unfold' things. *(Added in ink*: i Seeing is an interpretation of things. Darkness 'hinders' seeing –

The fact that phenomena may or may not be true as evidence is the reason why Goethe speaks, in relation to painting, of a 'higher' truth which nature can discover through the painter's style. Hence we have Titian's 'purely colouristic imagination', for whom colour still meant something in and of itself. It was not until the beginning of the 19th century, in any case, that colour came to be used exclusively in the service of optical (Hetzer). [Th. Hetzer, Titian. History of his Colour. V. Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main 1935; now in: ibid., Titian. Writings Vol. 7. Urachhaus 1992. – Cf. H. Lipps, Human Nature, op. cit., p. 84, note 1, and also: 'Goethe's Theory of Colours (1939)', in: The Reality of Man. Works, Vol. V, Frankfurt am Main 1977, p. 116, note 2.] Note: Sensation in the strict sense of the term has no 'truth' of its own, but it is through sensation—and only through sensation—that I become certain of the reality of something *[underlined in ink*: i].

which means something other than merely lacking the opportunity to 'experience' a thing for oneself. Insofar as the thing is perceived in its specific nature, it is not understood in its 'whatness'. The exterior of things, however, precisely as their exterior, possesses a testifying 'truth' – which is situated within the 'for-what-sake' of existence. In which the engagement of transcendental questioning is designated. This specific truth is precisely what is lacking in that which is 'self' | tangibly experienced. Appearance, however – by virtue of its mere referential character – can always turn into mere semblance. In the act of seeing, existence expressly dispenses with the inarticulate, specific sense of being of things, as it can only be contained in the sensibility that traces it back.

However, keeping one's ear open to what comes one's way already implies an attitude of 'listening'. I seek and maintain
'connection with …'.

Through smell and taste, however, I am merely led 'on the trail' of things. These are experienced here solely in terms of their vital relevance. I remain focused on myself in the process. What 'strikes' one is 'experienced' here; seeking reassurance, one attunes oneself to … The 'private' nature of the sphere touched upon here, however, stands in contrast to the world that makes itself known to me audibly or, indeed, reveals itself ' ' beneath a horizon that serves as the boundary to which the unobstructed gaze can reach. *hIn red pen:* xi[47] *hIn ink, underlined in red pen:* i Addition
p. 54b, c. |

[47] *Stuck at the bottom of the page*:i +) Blindness and deafness are therefore not merely defects, such as the lack of taste, for instance, whose *quotation marks—written in ink*:i—have been 'accidentally' omitted, leaving one's relationship to the world as a whole unaffected. The blind and the deaf, however, fall prey to the fate of isolation, insofar as they are excluded from the world—a world that is closed off to the one through its invisibility, and from which the other is cut off.

Nature as a whole reveals itself in the 'world' of colour; this is why painting exists. Sounds, however, are in themselves an expression and thus the given means of expression. For they are heard as the vocalisation of … The purity of the tone embodies lightness, in contrast to noise, which – again measured against the tone – sounds as though it were stifled by the matter that does not allow it to emerge freely. – There is nothing in the other senses that corresponds to painting and music.

Addendum

One tends to regard what one sees, what one has 'before one's eyes', as the ultimate authority. Yet appearances are precisely what deceive us. Should one even rely on the senses at all? Our opinion on this wavers. Namely, when one is asked this question so directly. One does not know how to counter the sceptical objections. Yet one follows them reluctantly. For in practice, one can, after all, 'come to terms' with these deceptions. One is struck by the fact that, in practice, one has always understood things correctly, just as … Certainly – the arguments of scepticism are not far-fetched difficulties. Nor, however, are they natural embarrassments.

The senses interfere with our cognition – so the saying goes, for example. But is what one perceives ever simply attributed to another as a property? Take the warmth outside, for instance? In the face of circumstances and obstacles, the 'in itself' is already excluded by definition. And the 'thing in itself' initially signifies nothing more than the contrast to the external aspect of its appearance. Yet it is precisely through smell and touch that I 'experience' it. The curious thing is simply how there is a specific truth precisely in the appearance – insofar as this bears witness to something. Yet how, precisely where the thing-in-itself is experienced, with the removal of the possibility of an illusion, the tension in the attestation of a being also ceases. Certainly: I 'interfere ' when touching. But what I perceive is, in terms of its meaning, inextricably bound up with the way I experience myself within it. *hM. Rotst.:* xi[48]

Scepticism perceives difficulties in a form of knowledge such as that understood by the dogmatist. And it argues against the external possibility of such knowledge – rather than, for example, demonstrating the internal possibility of something like 'appearance'. One may well, in individual cases, doubt whether something is 'actually' as it
'at first glance'. However, one cannot generally treat as a question the matter of whether things are in themselves as they appear. It would be a false and contrived question, insofar as its focus remains confined to the very level of understanding of things whose disregard is precisely what gives rise to it as a 'philosophical' problem in the first place.

However, the common worldview is by no means a 'point of view' that one can discuss and from which one could also 'withdraw'. The fact that one trusts one's eyes – insofar as one merely 'takes' what one sees in some way here, namely, for

example, by perceiving it differently from a tactile sensation – must not be reduced to a 'naive' realism. There is no opinion involved whatsoever. It is only by taking the other person by surprise that one succeeds in persuading them to hold the opinion that things 'are' just as yellow as they 'are' hard, and so on. Whereas they are, after all, seen as yellow and as hard

48 *Stuck at the bottom of the page, with red markings*: xi Finally – 'what' do I recognise? Vinegar, for example, or blue, or chalk. That is to say, I engage with it in a familiar way, or I familiarise myself with it. In this respect, I discover the 'what' or 'how' of something. 'How' something is can only be enquired into from a specific perspective – such as the 'how' of a colour or a taste on the tongue, or 'how' big something is, and so on – but not in the sense of how 'something' is 'in itself'. For whilst the 'what' of something is identified, the
'how' of something is to be defined more precisely; there is an 'approximate how' …

MS Human Nature

h0065i hS.i 54c

h0063
*Cont.*i *hCont.*
p.i 54

h0066i hp.i 55

will experience. 'Critical' realism generally advocates a restraint which is justified in relation to what is visible, and which is also 'self-evident', but which is out of place when it comes to smell and taste. And idealism 'absolutises'
'the situation' in which things, in their visibility and *[underlined in ink:]* in this respect, appear to me as 'phenomena'.
But in general: one merely 'adopts' positions *and* uses *quotation marks in ink*:i when assessing matters. 'Things', however, are something one deals with, towards which one adopts different attitudes, particularly in the context of 'knowledge'. Scepticism argues against the possibility of knowing an 'object' which possesses enduring properties, which can be reduced to its 'in itself', and which, strictly speaking, is really only the result of a 'representation'. Its such-and-such
'Being' is empty and signifies nothing other than what can be predicated of it. Things, however, are 'experienced' or 'seen' and so on; one explores them tentatively. In a fleeting passage, they are passed by and, in turn, grasped. |
It is not the senses, but the circumstances that deceive us. Namely, when they can interfere without us realising it. We overestimate or underestimate distances, depending on whether it is hazy or clear outside. The standards we derive from experience fail in extraordinary circumstances. And it is not only the circumstances outside, but also the bias arising from my own attitude that interferes disruptively. For example, I overlook my microscope when it – having tipped over – does not conform to the pattern under which I am looking for it. The fact that I allow myself to be deceived simply means that, through my own bias and the circumstances, a deception is presented to me. |

- *Modalities of* sensation

One always perceives 'oneself' – so it was said. And that does not imply reflection, as is the case with consciousness. The modalities of perception indicate the direction in which this was anticipated. For it was not simply the fact that what I perceived was related to me as an affect that was in focus. Rather: I perceive 'myself' insofar as, for example, when seeing, I 'find myself free for …' or as 'addressed by …'
…', if I have an ear for … Insofar as what moves the 'world' then becomes decisive for me – even if it is only that, as a result, each of my steps takes place in proportion. Or when I experience myself within the boundaries drawn around my nature precisely because, as nature, it defines itself in relation to other natures through its 'capacity'. One
'f i n d s' oneself differently. (It was referred to above as 'affecting' oneself, insofar as one was on the way to …). The transcendence of existence unfolds in this. What is perceived in particular only differentiates itself from these | distinctions. And the unity of my being manifests itself in the 'relationships' towards which it extends.

It is telling, for example, how the hallucinations of the alcoholic and those of the schizophrenic occur in different sensory realms. The deceptive activity of the alcoholic causes him to see all manner of things. The schizophrenic's hallucinations, however, lie precisely not in the realm of sight, but in that of hearing and touch. For whilst things are sought out and observed with the eye, seen at a distance from me, the ear, for its part, is reached by sound which has already bridged the distance to me by the time I hear it. Out of his vital entanglement, the patient is driven to auditory delusions just as he already feels at the mercy of his persecutors. The same fundamental disturbance, however, is expressed in the fact that the appearance of things is transformed for him in the direction of strangeness. For this means that he cannot open himself up to recognised possibilities. He cannot freely enter into things, which, eerily, seem to portend all manner of possibilities to him, or to harbour a secret. What is altered here by the illness, or disrupted by alcohol intoxication, is not simply contact with things, but—as —its 'foundation', namely the individual's 'attitude' towards the world. It is precisely in this regard that the 'alienation of the world of perception' [vi]reveals a failure. Here, the individual finds themselves open to a reality which merely reveals itself in features that are transparent to it, but which cannot show itself as what it is. For I must stand in freedom before things if they are to appear to me 'in themselves', that is, as what they are 'in reality'. If they are to be recognised for what they are, understood in their objective significance. If I am to appreciate

their various aspects from freely chosen perspectives, if I wish to view them in relation to something. Yet in this 'revealing' of reality to me, a certain submissiveness on my part is presupposed.

In a state of intoxication, one is freed from the strain of a temporal context of reality. However, as one finds oneself suspended from the need to reconcile one's perceptions with one another, things also change in terms of what is taken to be a property, | connection, and so on. The intoxicated person finds themselves in a specific reality that cannot be dismissed through argument. And the particularity of their images, etc., stands in opposition to the demands that the world, as a counter-proposal, places upon an existence that interprets itself within it. In intoxication, there is an intrusion, a disruption with regard to the world in its objective correctness. But this also applies to the

He is carried away whilst describing the state of helplessness into which he sinks; this gets in the way. The objectivity inherent in the communication then inevitably leads to over-interpretations. The uncertain, parable-like nature of his words reveals how he is aware that he
'dispels'. The patient, too, relies on sensory certainty when he cannot doubt the reality of his impressions. No amount of reflection or resolve can help *him* to free himself from these impressions. However, insofar as the patient has not simply forgotten our world, he is compelled to justify his sensations, to 'objectify' them and to substantiate them retrospectively. Sensory perception stands above all doubt and is just as irrefutable as it is unfounded. Yet it is only through perception that one is assured of reality. Which is something other than 'objectivity'. For a l s e t w a s e r k a n t is something 'objective' (in this sense). This private validity +)[49]of sensation therefore does not imply a discrediting in the sense of 'mere' subjectivity, i.e. a lack of objectivity. As, for example, in Descartes, where 'sensation' – namely, what is sensed therein and conceived as objective – is posited as existing only in relation to the subject.

At one with 'reality', one perceives 'oneself' in the particularity of one's condition – whilst my (self-)consciousness relates to 'myself', that is, to my selfhood.

- *Mood and* flight of ideas

To be under the influence of an impression means: to be bound and released in one's vital freedom, and thus to be 'mooded' in some way in one's being-in-and-with the world. Just as space, as the setting within which my movement takes place, is modified, so too does the world as a whole transform in the modalities of such moodedness. For one who becomes uncertain within oneself when that in which one believed has been knocked away,
'the ground wobbles' beneath their feet. 'Mood' manifests itself as the effect of an affect on one's demeanour.
|

Augustine defines *affectio animi* as a *distentio*.
For example, tristitia contractio est: my heart cramps up when

(49) See *below:* Kant, Critique of Judgement, 8.
[I. Kant, Critique of Judgement. Ed. by K. Vorländer. Meiner, Hamburg 1974, p. 42.]

something. +)[50] One is saddened by the i r r e v e r s i b i l i t y, and not merely by the loss of something. Grief thus feels bound to a past that is definitive. Deaf to any words of comfort, it refuses to step into a present that seems intent on diverting it from what it can now find only within itself; grief wishes to remain alone. – Laetitia est diffusio: joy is effusive; one radiates it; it has something infectious about it, it seeks to share itself. What has been achieved brings joy, setting one free once more for … Joy allows one to press on in high spirits. – Timor fuga est: Fear of … means: failing to stand firm in the face of what is anticipated here. Only a being that foresees something – or, indeed, 'sees something before itself' – can fear something. In other words, one that 'extends' into it. The affections are not functions of the animus, but modes in which it 'is', extending itself between 'things' – insofar as it clings to them, foresees them, opens itself to them, and so on.

Heidegger speaks of moods as the 'most primordial ways of being'. VII He cites boredom, a lack of cheerfulness and a desire for something as examples. Not being in the mood, or being out of sorts, means not being in the mood for anything – which usually implies a certain vulnerability, irritability or unpredictability: following whimsical, uncontrolled impulses. Such moods may have a cause, but this does not 'explain' them. An ontological 'ground' reveals itself precisely in their empirical groundlessness. The burden of existence is, in fact, what comes to light in the mood. That is to say, the fact that I must be something over which I have no control: the person in a bad mood can do nothing

'coming to terms with oneself'. Despondency means losing heart in the face of the 'meaning' of my future. | Moods are contagious; one is swept along by the exuberant mood of others. Grief weighs heavily upon one. A mood is – like fear – something that arises 'from within me' in the sense that it is not an effect on 'me' in my nature. The fact that the gloom of a rainy day can weigh upon my soul just as, conversely, everything looks different depending on my mood, shows how the basis of the mood lies in transcendence—

h0070i hS.i 57a

50 *hBelow:*i +) However, pain is perceived as 'piercing' insofar as what is perceived in it 'suggests' something that lingers in the same spot *and* does not subside. *Quotation marks and underlining in ink:*i Just as pain in the abdomen that is perceived as cutting is not to be compared with the effect of a knife, or rather is only reminiscent of it insofar as this effect of the knife, in turn, is the cutting action
'regarded'.

lies in the essence of existence. I must withdraw from the certainties of a reality that can be ascertained and defined as this or that, in order to surrender myself to what lies in the present as an indescribable mood. Even when looking at a picture, for example. And one is put in a certain mood by melodies. In both cases – what does 'reality' mean in the context of colours and sounds? It is as though reality itself were here withdrawing from tangibility altogether. Just as, at dusk and in the twilight of dawn – which withholds things from me or has not yet revealed them – a mood-like quality imposes itself, in contrast to the unemotional day, whose brightness keeps the gaze fixed upon things. This mood expresses man's sense of not being at home in the world. Or rather, the fact that the ground of reality is not yet a firm 'foundation' for our existence.

Moods are the most compelling reality. One can simply be 'led' into a mood. Persuasion seeks to change one's mood. And that precisely means that, in the process, someone is led to do something they would not have done of their own accord. Inclination and desire – that is 'myself': that is my nature. But I would certainly like to defend myself against moods as such. They prevent me from getting involved or asserting myself. I am dependent on my moods. I can only try to dispel them, but not intercept them like an emotion.

For example, being manic or depressed are also 'moods'. What, for instance, 'is' a manic flight of ideas? It is supposed to illustrate association. Yet only similarity conveys meaning here. The w i r as feel that they are 'being sought'. But not the manic individual, for whom these connections come naturally. It is like a joke, for example: one demonstrates wit by drawing parallels between distant things. (However, comparisons that are 'off the mark' – that is, those without a punchline, which therefore come across as flat – are regarded as trivial and silly.) | 'Flight of ideas': the manic individual does not hold his ground. Bleuler speaks here of a loss of objectives. By this he presumably means the generosity with which things are 'overlooked' here. The normal person appears ponderous in comparison to the manic individual. Insofar as he, that is, 'bears' the weight of what he has 'taken on' with a sense of responsibility. The manic individual, however, rises above things. He does not see the difficulties at all. His space is shadowless, because it lacks relief. He lacks the light of revealed meaning. A uniformly cheerful brightness prevents perspectives. Not exactly as if the manic individual takes things more lightly than they are. But surreptitiously he shifts

steps back from things, distances himself from them. The manic person does not probe. He lacks the centre of a situation. Which is why it does not even occur to him to doubt that the world around him sympathises with him. Flight of ideas is particularly evident in speech. For the word i s already fleeting; its bond is release. The hasty nature +)[51] of the manic person's thoughts is striking.

- Affectation

We regard the 'world of facts' as reality. The fact that something 'cannot be discussed away' does not, then, mean that a discussion would be out of its depth, but rather that it involves the *quotation marks*
m. Tinte:i must reckon with 'given facts'. 'Nature' is something against which we cannot will anything, and which must therefore be 'properly taken into account'. Etc. If – generally speaking – what moves us has the essential duality of: on the one hand, that which acts upon us, but equally also the thought that is thereby stirred within us – namely as the 'reception' of the impression – in which the impression is refracted, grasped and interpreted, so that one is free to hold fast to what one feels – then this takes on the character of a 'f a c t' of our affects. Its modality is different from that which determines the view of the world among primitive peoples.

Our fear is an objective, that is to say, well-founded fear. In certain circumstances, one fears something – which amounts to anticipating possibilities that stand in the way of our endeavours. One

'worries' here that (not) … One carefully considers eventualities and seeks to forestall them. And this fear, just like worry, is something one can share with another person. One talks to them about it. Thus, *as indicated by the quotation marks in ink*:i, one also 'asserts' a suspicion, carefully draws on every possible argument to substantiate it, deals with it objectively, is convinced of it, and persuades the other person of it. My worries are, in fact, my own affairs. They are dealt with just like these. Fear and worry can be taken off my hands by the other person. *hCorrected in ink*:i The other person 'understands' me in my fear,i insofar as they 'understand' it 'in my

h0072i p. 59

51 *hBelow*:i Something else is the schizoid aspect of the schizophrenic, who does not engage. The brief connections of the manic, his 'without detours', mean something else.

h0073i p.i 60

'understandable'. Here, fear is a behaviour that is objectively reasonable and appropriate. It exists, as it were, in a specific situation – namely one characterised by *hKorr. m. Tinte*:i – the fear that … On the other hand: fear here is always someone's fear, just as a supposition is someone's supposition insofar as it must be justified and accounted for. One person's fear and another's may differ, just as opinions on a matter may differ. Dangers are recognised in their objectivity. Danger 'is' the object of fearful behaviour. We emphasise here the objectivity of our emotions, whereas previously the affective aspect of cognition was always highlighted when it manifested itself as concern, care, etc. *hGestr. m. Tinte*:i Concern and fear 'manifest' themselves. |

hCorrected with ink:i Worry and fear weigh heavily on me, holding me back; the anxious person considers even the most impossible things to be possible. *hCorrected with ink*:i They affect me insofar as I perceive myself as being hindered by the danger. They hold me back and paralyse me. And the specific uncertainty arises from the fact that the danger may also fail to materialise or pass.

The Aristotelian ταραχη, however, means that, whilst under the impression of something dreadful, one can, for one's part, perceive nothing but danger. One leaps from one possibility to another. *hCorrected in ink*: i

Something is assessed and understood as a danger in its place within the realm of reality. Part of this objective fear is the vastness of a space from which, in terms of one's possibilities, one interprets oneself as being both near and far, determining one's position in relation to attack and flight. ταραχη, however, means indecision, confusion and a loss of composure.

As long as one 'remains under the spell' of an impression, the horror it captures seems unbroken. It then signifies not merely an intrusion into certainties, such as actual dangers. It is not that one is constantly threatened by chance, that the world is always dangerous. *hQuotation marks and correction in ink*:i 'Horror' expresses, rather, a breach into the world of comprehensible reality itself. One cannot compose oneself because one has lost one's footing. Here there is no 'free' relationship, in which one still stands, even in the face of dangers. The impression robs one of the ability to make sense of the world in its objective clarity. And instead of it being 'my' fear here, which I address of my own accord in

Whenever a thought occurs to me about my situation, it is fear and horror 'par excellence' that grip and overwhelm me. This impression reveals a reality that cannot be accommodated. Where nothing but danger is at play, in every direction; where one cannot simply treat it as a danger, or 'leave it at that' as a danger. Here, existence is thrust back from its freedom to create space for itself and to spread out with care; this impression 'isolates' me here.

Thus, even the depressed person finds themselves at the mercy of impressions. Insofar as they no longer feel free to face the future, they have lost their footing and sense of proportion. Feeling insecure, they are prone to exaggeration. All manner of things seem to stand out to him. It seems eerie to him that there might be some significance in a world he senses lies beyond. A wide variety of things converge here in a vivid manner. It is precisely the objective indifference of things that strikes him as eerie. Just as a person's face is perceived, through what they say, their gestures and their facial expressions, in terms of features that may be objectively meaningless. These features are perceived as such from a centre that is itself inexpressible. The impression then takes concrete form first and foremost in what it arouses within me. Just as an emotion resonates in one's gestures, remaining, as it were, trapped within oneself when it cannot continue there, so too here the expression is the very thing being expressed: that which moves a person has the double meaning of referring vaguely to 'all this here', but also to what is thereby evoked within them as a face. In the incomprehensible—namely, in the objectively incomprehensible nature of these visions—the otherness of reality comes to light; here, it is taken as the basis of such expression just as it is laid down as its foundation.

It is precisely from this perspective that the 'world' of indigenous peoples can be understood. For spirits and demons are not here 'added – *inserted with ink*:i or freely imagined' – for the sake of explaining something, for example. *hCorrected in ink*:i For the fact that they are indeed invisible and unrecognisable discredits an uncertain reality. Rather: it is here that human beings, in their state of being moved, express themselves symbolically. +)[52] The

[52] *hBelow:*i +) x In the thinking of the more highly developed Central and South Asian cultures, the realisation that there are no spirits without demons represents one of the highest levels of understanding there is. Consequently, this is attained by only a few. And it is said here that, whilst spirits and demons do indeed exist, they exist only for those who

h0075i hp.i 62

Man 'has' here, as *underlined in ink*: i, *with red and pencil*: x (see 'Mask', p. 14 for addition) i[VIII] that which captures him | as a worry and holds him captive, or which 'creeps up on' him as fear. He becomes 'o b s e s s e d' by these emotions. +)[53] *hM.* in *red*: xi[54] So here, too, it is hatred, for example, that takes hold of a person as an emotion. Certainly – we, too, might well say that someone is 'as if possessed' by hatred. But that then means something else: namely, that someone, out of

'his' hatred, i.e. from which he cannot extricate himself. It is only from the entanglement of the *hKorr. m.Tinte*:i mind and thought that 'passion' arises. ++)[55]

- hHatredi

Hatred is equated with antipathy, contempt, etc., and its place in this series seems to be determined by its opposition to love. However, it is the direction of the feeling, and the fact that it is a thought, that distinguishes hatred from antipathy. Sympathy is a feeling of being taken with … The impression someone makes on me, the effect they have on me, is

experiences, and furthermore, that at the very deepest level, spirits or demons and emotions or moods are one and the same. Hence, the saint, free from desire and emotion, no longer experiences any demons.

[53] *hBelow:*i +) Certainly – *hWritten in ink*:i the 'view' of the world is also different amongst the *hUnderlined in red*:i 'primitive peoples'. The 'logic' that emerges in their concepts – totemism, for example, h,i – is always different and specific. There is, however, nothing unusual about this. Lévy-Brühl's term 'pre-logical' – since sensory certainty is always pre-logical – refers, strictly speaking, to the specific reality of a specific sensibility.

[54] *Stuck at the bottom of the page*: i x For whilst our fear and our hatred are always a form of thought—that is, always a single instance of fear or a single instance of hatred, namely a state of mind—and it is precisely through them that one can become conscious of 'oneself', here it is fear and hatred in the worst sense that take hold of one. And whilst we fear something that occurs in due course—that is, within the framework of a reality thus revealed—and which is recognised as a danger and practically anticipated in that respect, here the individual finds themselves at the mercy of something that bursts in unexpectedly and takes possession of them.

[55] *hBelow:*i

++) 'Passion always presupposes a maxim on the part of the subject to act in accordance with an end prescribed by the inclination. It is therefore always connected with the subject's reason, and one cannot attribute passions to animals any more than to beings of pure reason.' (Kant, Anthropology, p. 227)
[I. Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. Stuttgart 1983, pp. 210–211 [265–266].]

'sympathetic'. And antipathy signifies being repelled. Sympathy and antipathy are modes of being attuned to one another. Antipathy towards someone leads one to avoid them. One keeps one's distance. Even the thought of the other person is irritating. One becomes acutely aware of one's vulnerability in the presence of 'such' people. Even in conversation, one seeks to avoid the subject when the talk turns to them.

In hatred, however, one focuses precisely on the other person. One practically pursues them in one's thoughts and cannot break free. One is fixated on the other person. Hatred is a state of tense bondage. ++ +)[56] Antipathy can turn into hatred. Namely when one is forced by circumstances and living conditions to endure being in the other's vicinity. Out of necessity, one then has to deal with them. Antipathy is taken up here as a thought; hatred 'takes responsibility' for it. One seeks to prove to oneself that the other is worthy of hatred; *Handwritten in ink, at the top of the page and between the lines*: i Hatred relishes and savours the stupidity that confirms it. For hatred seeks to be just. Hatred intensifies in this way. It is a passion; it consumes; one loses oneself in it. Insofar as it seeks to force everything – often delusionally – into its sphere. The greatest power is concentrated therein. Antipathy blocks access, but hatred downright blinds one. Antipathy prevents one from doing something; one seeks to overcome it, or at least to rise above it. Certainly – one 'cannot go against one's nature'. Here, however, this merely means that antipathy is an emotion. Hatred, however, is a state of mind. A person's hatred, unlike the antipathy that characterises their nature, bears the stamp of their personality. It is actively at work in this. 'Even in " " hatred there is jealousy; we want our enemy all to ourselves.' (Nietzsche, XII. 317)[IX]

In hatred, one has relinquished one's free relationship with something, a state emphasised, for example, in the word 'contempt' (written in *ink* on *the bottom line*). One punishes someone with contempt. In contempt – unlike respect, which, like it, is a moral sentiment – a judgement is passed on someone. Respect, however, is simply due as an attitude. Contempt, on the other hand, requires justification and rationale. Namely

56 +++) 'The affect causes a momentary suspension of freedom and self-mastery. Passion relinquishes them and finds its pleasure and satisfaction in a slave-like mindset.' (Kant, op. cit., p. 228)
[I. Kant, op. cit., p. 212 [267].]

This means that one can no longer respect the other person. There is a right to respect which one no longer acknowledges in the other person here. Disrespect means: failing to show respect. Namely, in one's demeanour and attitude. But contempt is more than that. For it strikes at its object . 'Hatred and contempt are mutually exclusive.' (Schopenhauer, Parerga II. 626)[x] *Intro. in ink*:i For whilst contempt disregards the other, turns away from them and strikes them particularly hard in this respect – insofar as they are thereby dismissed and any possibility of restoring a relationship with them is cut off – hatred, on the other hand, sinks its teeth into its object. And in contrast to contempt, which strikes the other outright, anything at all can be hated: not only people, – but also such things as schoolmasters, idealism, pedantry—

| a certain kind of compulsion, etc. One always hates 'this sort of …'. In other words, partly things for which the person in whom they manifest themselves is actually not at all to blame. Things that arise from circumstances. One can hate oneself: the very intensity of hatred is a symptom that one hates something within oneself, but in another. One also hates, for example, 'people'; and it is precisely this indefinite plural that is essential here. (Kant, Critique of Judgement 127)[xi] The relationship between a son and his father, or the position of a slave, can provide the fertile ground for hatred to arise. There is racial and class hatred. Goethe

'Hated' experiments. For this is what is distinctive about 'our' hatred: it develops, expands and establishes itself on firm grounds. It seeks out points of entry where it lingers, probing deeply. Hatred 'sees' less than it distorts things, intruding and pressing in. Hatred is boundless. This tendency to dwell on … often makes it seem petty.

Hatred seeks to kill in order to destroy. This pathos distinguishes hatred from antipathy and disgust, which are concerned merely with the removal of their object. And it is not this that the hater desires—that the other should suffer . Unlike envy and *hUnderlined in red*:i revenge *hEntry in red*:xi[(57)] [which]seek such satisfaction. Exposure through ridicule—

57 *Stuck at the bottom of the page, with red stamp*: xi There is no such thing as 'just' revenge. The other person merely becomes a victim. But one takes 'revenge' on someone – just as in blood feuds, when someone from my clan is avenged against the other clan, and atonement is secured for him. And the fact that – instead of despising the other person because of the unfairness of their triumph – one still wants to show them that …h,i that one is, in a way, taking them seriously again, that is the 'trivial' aspect of revenge. This belief that one must make amends for oneself here. One takes revenge, for example, for insults. For these cannot be repaid. It is from a particular direction and nature of 'sensitivity' that the

Hatred 'plots' to destroy cheerfulness. The thoughtless, carefree manner with which someone makes themselves at home as if they belonged there, the crass familiarity, people's self-assurance, unfounded optimism, and self-righteous hypocrisy must all be put in their place. In hatred, one takes a stand against something. And an 'enemy' is not an opponent. One does not measure oneself against the other. Such a confrontation is, after all, rendered impossible precisely by the other's sense of certainty, by their manner of behaving as if they were above all doubt: that is precisely why one hates them. Above all, that which is

not one's equal becomes the object of hatred. In other words, that which one would have to rise above if one were to take up the fight against it. Stupidity is indestructible. |

Hatred reveals a person's inner nature. That to which one is 'sensitive'. One's character can be discerned in it. However, the objective basis of hatred precludes it from being regarded as the negative counterpart to love. For it is the Other, pure and simple, who is loved. Love teaches us to see. Its blindness towards … means: to regard it as nothing. *hEinf. in ink*:i Love is blind insofar as its unconditional nature causes it to overlook objective objections. Hatred, however, does not 'discover' but rather invents what one seeks to justify it. Hatred has the most varied motives and, as such, does not in itself characterise a person. *hHandwritten and corrected in ink*:i But powerlessness, for example, can also give rise to hatred. When one cannot approach the other. As hatred, *hHandwritten in ink*:i the desire to seek redress through revenge then builds up; hatred bides its time. *hHandwritten in ink and continued. at the top of the page*:i It prevents one from wavering in one's opposition. Disappointed love turns into hatred – all the more so the deeper one's bond with the other had been; hatred demonstrates the necessity of a solution. 'There is no greater hatred in the world than that of ignorance towards knowledge.' (Galileo) What

h0078i hS.i 65

The possibility of an insult – usually entirely unintended. It is a person's position, the insecurity arising from subordination, that robs them of the freedom to respond appropriately. Out of a powerlessness to retaliate, the urge to take revenge arises here, that is, to somehow obtain a substitute for this opportunity denied to me and thereby gain satisfaction. A vengeful person is one who cannot forget what they have suffered. One who dwells on it as though it were not long since over. One who does not wish simply to accept that it is over, but who wants to make it contingent upon redress. As though 'he' were called upon to restore 'his' honour. Judged by its ambition, vindictiveness appears as the desire of a 'small' soul caught up in itself.

267

MS Human nature

Is it such that, in terms of its ignorance, it cannot be compared here with the knowledge for which it is envied? The hater does not wish to acknowledge that which, alongside which, he cannot exist. Yet he is constantly challenged to compare himself with it. A weakness of which he himself is unaware drives him to make this comparison.

- hAngsti

Fearfulness implies a certain vulnerability; there are fearful
'Natures'. But hatred characterises a person. It is not possible to deal with one's hatred in the same way as with the fear that overtakes me – a fear that one can counter with a stance, from which one can objectively distance oneself. For I myself am, after all, at work when I 'contemplate' with hatred …

A n x i e t y, however, is something that arises from within me. In such a way, that it is a u p s e t to me. It springs from the very condition of existence. Anxiety itself is not an emotion. It merely bursts forth in emotions, just as it also acts as the driving force, for example, behind obsessive thoughts. Animals know no anxiety. Only human beings, for whom the inability to be, of their own accord, precisely what they are supposed to be 'themselves' – | signifies a specific powerlessness.

- Agoraphobia

Take agoraphobia, for example: here one finds oneself at the mercy of the void whilst standing on wide open staircases, whilst walking along avenues where rows of closed-up houses offer the gaze no point of reference. A sense of vertigo seizes one. Just as Strindberg, whilst crossing the Place de la Concorde, clung to a lamppost to protect himself against himself , insofar as he had nothing within himself to set against this *so-called* 'temptation' (in red: xi[58]. The alluring nature of the void lacks the enticement of the unknown. Vertigo is much more deeply ingrained in the human condition. In e v e r y o n e, fear lies in wait and on

58 *hBelow, in red:* xi +) The 'temptation' to which the wicked man succumbs, however, is the 'natural' temptation, *hAdded in ink:* i the craving for recklessness.

the leap. One is overcome by vertigo. It is not just any fear that takes hold of one here, something that could be dismissed as unfounded. To the claustrophobic, there seems to be no way left to connect 'here' with 'there' – a *guide mark in ink:* 'Here'. He can no longer find his footing in space. And whilst one ventures forth boldly, following the lure of the unknown—namely, step by step—succumbing to this temptation here means letting oneself fall. The danger lies within oneself. The person suffering from agoraphobia recoils from the vastness of space, which seems to flee into infinity. What impresses them is not the 'structured' space of our existence—despite its boundlessness—in which one can identify places and dwell somewhere within it. Both—the alluring nature of the abysmal and the enticement of the unknown—differ from the impression something makes on me in that, from my perspective, something here comes towards the abysmal. In fear, that which is initially hidden within oneself comes to life. One cannot resist temptation as a challenge. Existence as a whole seems to recede. One is lost within it and by it. And here one slips away from oneself as well, insofar as one – finding no foothold within oneself – clings to the arm of one's companion. – What makes one feel dizzy is actually 'nothing'. For the railing does, after all, protect me. Objectively, there is no danger. One avoids looking down into the depths, yet one is constantly tempted to do so. Here too: it is not the depth as such that causes the dizziness. It is absent, for example, in an aeroplane. But this—the fact that, when looking down along the wall, one cannot find a foothold—makes

one want to let go. One finds oneself powerless here, insofar as one cannot stand firm from within oneself. The emptiness of the space becomes transparent to the world to which one is at the mercy of. Existence fears for itself as existence. And the fact that it is actually 'nothing' does not mean a total nothingness, but merely: it is neither this nor that, none of the above … In vertigo, a fundamental powerlessness opens up, and this precisely with regard to the 'foothold', which is also 'nothing'. Therefore: anxiety is 'rebellious' towards one. One experiences oneself within it as being held within nothingness.

It is also fear that overwhelms some people when, whilst driving through a tunnel, they keep a *hKorr. m. Tinte:*i candle to hand in order to counter the darkness of the tunnel. The sudden darkness, which the eye cannot penetrate, heightens the sense of confinement—

den, *simply put:* the hopelessness that the closed compartment itself already creates. It is foolish, however, to attempt to make this measure seem in any way reasonable by offering explanations about possible outcomes. The phobic individual cannot defend themselves against the healthy person, who, from the order of their world, can only recognise justified fear. On the other hand, however, they always seek to escape from anxiety into their objectively justified or unjustified fear, in which they can remain and with which they can occupy themselves.

- hObsessive thoughtsi

The temptation, which cannot be resisted here, corresponds to the obsessive nature of other phobias. I can only be compelled to do what I do (freely) of my own accord. Drives and inclinations can only be irresistible within me, but not compulsive. Compulsive thoughts recur time and again, against my will, insofar as the matter to which they relate has been objectively resolved. When Heidegger contrasts anxiety with objective fear, he is making a distinction, but not merely one of separation. However, anxiety somehow always relates precisely to objectively resolved fear, insofar as the very resolution of that fear is called into question. Examples: having made a mistake with the decimal places on a prescription and prescribed a lethal dose; not having turned off the gas when leaving the flat; having poked someone in the eye with a walking stick held backwards. – Nor can one counter compulsion here, insofar as the temptation arises from within oneself to keep thinking about it, to imagine the consequences. One cannot talk oneself out of it. Nor is it merely an exaggerated timidity that regards the most impossible as possible, that is satisfied when something has been dealt with objectively, *hCorrected in ink*:i and which then perhaps only discovers new difficulties. For one is, after all, under the spell here of having to check the same thing over and over again. Despite all the findings. Against one's better judgement. The madness of this fear does not mean bewilderment. On the contrary: one sets to work here methodically. Scrutinises everything meticulously from every angle. And time and again one succumbs to the temptation to concern oneself with 'nothing', to convince oneself that it is 'nothing', without being able to do anything about the fact that fear keeps welling up from within. It lies in wait.

It is precisely the fact that I know my anxiety is unfounded that forces me back into fear. For this fear relates precisely to the fact that all these are, after all, merely 'f a c t u a l' certainties, that one has no power over them unless one is 'o n e s e l f'.

Fear 'localises' itself in the prescription, and so on. It drives one to make objective observations, manifests itself in them, and, as it were, constantly requires fresh objective resolution. Anxiety actually only really asserts itself in the very attempt to turn away from it. It is intensified in this process. τα-ραχη here signifies neither being driven away nor indecisive confusion. It lies in the agonising, compulsive, 'mad' nature of these re-examinations, the outcome of which one somehow already knows from the outset.

Stuck at the bottom of the page, cont.:i So one is probably also under the compulsion, for example, to have to jump over every stone. For as senseless as that is, and however much it bothers me – one proves to oneself in doing so that one is free to do so. But how little do I actually 'embody' this freedom if I have to reassure myself of it in such an absurd way? And fear also lies behind the temptation to say the wrong thing in an exam or something deliberately inappropriate in company – to test, as it were, whether one can deny oneself even to oneself. But

'Who' am I, then, or rather, when am I actually 'myself'? (It happens, not compulsively but against one's will and involuntarily, for example, that once one has been set on the track of a possible thought, one cannot turn away from it and ends up saying precisely what one was trying to avoid saying – just as, for instance, one must not fix one's gaze on something in the street that one wishes to avoid.) |

- hPedanteriei

Fear, in its suppressed state, is also the hidden driving force behind all this activity. It lies behind the impersonal pathos of scientific objectivity and provable truth. Here, one clings, as it were, to the processing of material without knowing what it is 'really' all about. One thus remains so absorbed in the task that one shields oneself from the perverse nature of the underlying decision— —which one has not explicitly adopted and whose spirit one does not share.+)[59]

h0082i p. 69

59 *Below, partly stuck to the page*: i +) Just as in a game, one gains a private world within one's 'field'. Not that one could not also share this world with others. Rather, the 'private' nature of this world simply refers to its remoteness. The 'world' with its demands and so on remains outside. One is 'on one's own' in the process. The collective—

h0083i hp. 70

Fear also lies behind pedantry. The pedant seeks to save his own skin. He shifts responsibility by adhering to rules and templates. He evades his fear. He squanders his earnestness on trivialities and withdraws from the matter for which he is responsible. In doing so, he distorts and deforms his

responsibility – less to avoid giving others grounds for attack than to rid himself of scruples. For responsibility demands decision-making as a step towards one's own possibilities. The subordinate tends towards pedantry. He upholds principles. What is striking here is the lack of perspective. Take Robespierre, for example. His idealism of virtue was at odds with reality. Robespierre marched straight ahead with somnambulistic certainty. Certainly unchallenged and without pretence. But without fear? For it was precisely that which was thereby suppressed. 'This man believes everything he says' – with this, Mirabeau hit upon the schoolmasterly quality in Robespierre. His belief was a matter of holding something to be right, of being convinced, in such a way that one could also teach it to others. Whereas the very mark of the betrayal of true faith is that it is always a venture and is shrouded in the abysmal. It always contains the possibility of failure.

Principles, if they can be recognised as correct, would have no need of me at all. The pedant becomes ridiculous when he pompously sets himself up as their witness, as if they only became true through him, as if he were, so to speak, their very essence. Pedants have no sense of humour ; they are touchy (just as the fanatic's unwavering conviction is merely overcompensated insecurity – Nietzsche V 282).[xii] As if what were under attack in them were precisely that which, as a principle, must on the other hand claim universal validity. The subordinate emphasises that 'everything has its limits'. Pedant and fanatic – both, narrow-minded and lacking in perspective, regard their convictions as doctrinal, not 'real' convictions—

The learner devotes themselves to a clearly defined task that must be tackled systematically. The frictions disappear. Just like someone who plays solitaire night after night, finding in it a self-contained space for mere activity that can be repeated at will: everything comes down to this.

The 'pet project' also belongs here. Whilst the overvalued idea takes centre stage and the complex intrudes disruptively, one 'fixates' on something as one's hobbyhorse. One regards it as the yardstick or parallel to all manner of things. Hobbyhorses are ridden 'in parade'. That is why one is sensitive here when they are not taken seriously.

A perspective that remains true to itself, which, as an original sense of truth regarding 'its' case, can always be certain, and which has therefore not lost the freedom to laugh.
Pedantry is seriousness in disguise.

To make a claim 'not in earnest' means that one is merely doing so as if in a game, that is to say, that one does not commit oneself to what one says. A serious situation 'confronts' me; it is a test of my ability, for example. This would, of course, become apparent here. However, to be affected by 'one's own' seriousness means to be 'personally' engaged, insofar as the confrontation with it cannot be avoided 'in my own way'. Not evading the situation here means: not betraying oneself. For what is at stake here is myself as the bearer of a belief. Insofar as one is 'committed' to oneself, subject to the call of one's own self, there are serious situations. What was initially merely a promise, a pledge, a confession, a belief, must now be realised. However, the 'self' to which I stand by here cannot be reduced to a formula. It is not 'complete'. It manifests itself solely in 'my way' – not differently, but just as clearly as 'my' way being distinct from an 'alien' one. 'I myself' is hereby grasped as absolute, insofar as it posits existence under conditions. The pedant, the man of principles, and so on, however, displaces this | 'seriousness'. He is not truly committed to himself in a step-by-step process of becoming real. He allows himself to be governed by principles which can merely be filled in and, in so far as they are 'fulfilled'—in inverted *commas*, in *ink*—but cannot actually come true.

Addendum.

h1.i However, the 'seriousness of life' is understood to be the expectations and demands to which one is bound, which one must live up to, but in the face of which one may also fail . These are the demands of an 'active' life. A respite from this is the σχολή. Διήρηται ο βίος είς ασχολίαν καί είς σχολήν.[xiii] Ασχολία is the act of not lingering, insofar as things are pursued objectively, that is to say, not left as they are or where they are. Σχολή, however, is a 'leisurely pursuit' not in the sense of filling one's time with something because one has nothing else to do, but in the sense of 'free time'. Σχολην ποιεισθαι προς τι means: to be able to take one's time with something. Εχειν means: to pause, to rest. Σχολή is a form of engaged lingering with something. Whatever one engages with here takes on, provided it is not subject to the pressure of intentions and goals, a disproportionate significance. It is taken 'for its own sake'. – Philosophy takes place in the σχολή, which is a mode of relaxed existence that has set aside time for …

h0085i hS.i 72

- In a light-hearted, exuberant mood, however, one is freed from 'oneself'. One finds oneself—*in quotation marks, written in ink*:i—suspended from 'one's' duties and 'one's' position when one is absorbed in the general hustle and bustle and enjoys anonymity behind a mask.
- People laugh when something is 'not to be taken seriously'. But they also laugh out of embarrassment, in desperation, or in scorn. There is such a thing as a conventional smile. People laugh at what 'strikes' them as funny – which reflects that relaxed attitude whereby one simply leaves it at that when faced with something comical. One laughs at people in their stupidity when they make fools of themselves or overreach in their earnestness. This liberating release of laughter is different from that which arises from disappointment. The latter, when understood not as enlightenment but as an affect, signifies a being cast back, insofar as one had 'surrendered' to a delusion. The bitter laughter of despair, in which the enforced detachment from what one desired is expressed, is not 'pure'. The comic is to be understood not from a dialectic of things, but from the sphere of meaning of seriousness, which, by its very nature, points to the temporality of an existence that must first of all win itself over. What one laughs at therefore characterises one. How one laughs betrays one. A person's calibre becomes audible in this. There is foolish and vulgar laughter, and 'pure' laughter is rare. It is generally the undertones that one picks up on. As if the release of laughter were also a loosening of one's demeanour, one that seeks to prevent self-satisfaction, malice and the like from showing on the outside. The mentality of a people is revealed in where and how they laugh. Humour, wit and the grotesque are different ways of finding this freedom to be oneself. For one does not laugh at what has happened to another any differently from how one would laugh at oneself in the same situation. Human beings are always ridiculous, but not as individuals. If someone whose fall we laugh at is overlooked in the process, they are particularly sensitive. And the demeaning, hurtful aspect of mockery and scorn lies in the deliberate nature of this overlooking. The limits of the humour one understands are indicative of where one's seriousness lies, where one feels connected to oneself. Or rather, where they b e l i e v e themselves to be connected. For the seriousness of most people is, after all, merely feigned seriousness, insofar as they shy away from themselves. Foolish people tend to understand little humour. A person's horizons are revealed in what they can laugh at and how they laugh at it. |

- hGeizi

The word 'greed' shares the same root. A miser is not someone who – being narrow-minded – gives nothing away. Nor is it the cautious, thrifty person. Greed, too, is something else. For the greedy person wants to possess something for themselves. They want to exclude others from it— . They begrudge others their share. It is not so much the thing itself as its possession that appeals to them. +)[60] Greed becomes active in the—

60 *hBelow:*i +) The relationship of possession is always on the verge of reversing its subject and object. Collecting things that are a joy to look at,

even with whatever possessions one might possibly have. Rather, a miser is someone who deprives themselves of what they have. The object of avarice is, above all, money. However, it is also avaricious, for example, to collect bits of string whilst seeking to prevent one's own use of them. The miser resists the consumption of anything. Yet money has value only as a means. The madness of the miser lies in his striving to remain in a state of mere possibility. He remains stuck in contemplating all that he could afford with the money – in a ' ' oblivion of the disjunction between these things. (Kant, Lecture on Ethics 226).[xiv] Over time, one becomes 'stingy' in calculating all the things one could do and accomplish during that time.

A miser scrapes together money without putting it to any use. This is what the 'filth' of avarice refers to: avarice is 'filthy' because of the money that the miser counts through his fingers, which is unformed 'dirt'. Money cannot be worn out; it is indiscriminately at everyone's service, and everything imaginable can be bought with it. Money does not bind its owner.

Avarice refers to the accumulation of small, discrete amounts. 'Wealth' here no longer signifies genuine abundance. The miser guards his treasure. And there is something animalistic about this. For the money under the mattress is not m y 'wealth' in the same way as that in the bank, which is in my name. The gold coins set aside lose the very meaning of money, which is, after all, 'money' as a means to an end, through which I am | set free to pursue possibilities. The miser, however, resists spending the money. He does not cling to his possessions out of some instinctive urge, but rather does not wish to relinquish opportunities. Yet only an existence that is temporal in a specific sense can reckon with opportunities.

To the miser, hoarding is not a form of provision. He hides his money from others. He takes pleasure in secretly looking at it, handling it and counting it. He does not want to be asked about what he has. He guards it from the gaze of others, as if there were already an implicit claim that it should be used as a means to an end. He 'sits on' his money. The secretive nature of his behaviour is conspicuous. He wants the money in

which may unleash particular abilities, can, for example, degenerate into an addiction. Namely, when possession is sought as a mark of competence, the 'allure' of the rare is relished, and, moreover, one reflects in the process on a competition that is, for the most part, merely imagined.

He keeps this to himself, thereby depriving it of its purpose.[61] He does not wish to acknowledge it as an asset by which he might be assessed, or against which his conduct might be measured. The miser makes use of and relishes the fact that he remains unrecognised in this respect. Just as he avoids contact with the wider world altogether. The citizen lives on in his possessions—insofar as these distinguish him—even after his death, whilst for the miser, everything comes to an end with death.

But the miser is also filthy himself. For cleanliness is an expression of self-respect. People detest the miser. Precisely
'Psychologically', avarice can only be demonstrated as a vice – just as, for example, Kant's anthropology treated human beings 'from a pragmatic point of view', that is, in terms of what they make of themselves as beings capable of free action. Avarice is a form of self-abandonment on the part of human beings.

- hEifersuchti

h0087i p. 74

Getting worked up is always a sign of a belief that lacks self-assurance. It is the opponent who hopes to gain more by belittling others than by having already found himself. Here, one is trying to convince oneself of something. The zealous person guards something. He shields it from the gaze of others so as not to let it become commonplace. Therein lies the difference between jealousy and envy. For | envy relates to something which – as it were – anyone could have. It therefore regards as commonplace, or renders commonplace , that for which the other is envied. 'Envy always strikes only at having, never at being'. (Hebbel, 1454)[xv] However – what I c o u l d a c t u a l l y have, but which I just happened not to obtain, does not in itself make one envious. Nor is it envy simply to want to have what the other person has, that is, to be able to gain satisfaction only through comparison with others. Rather: it is the apparent *[*underlined *in ink*:] advantage of the other that makes one envious. Envy is directed at the 'happiness' that one does not have oneself, but which the other does. Like resignation, envy seeks to express an inability to accept having to be what one is. Envy is vindictive because it

61 *hBelow, in ink*:i Grandet … he called the investment a waste and took greater interest in the sight of the gold than in the accumulation of profit (Balzac). [Monsieur Grandet from the novel *Eugénie Grandet* by H. de Balzac.]

He must always bear in mind that the other person has something which – he convinces himself of this rather than being truly convinced – I, too, could have. He wishes to cast doubt on the justification for that privilege. Reluctantly, yet as if fascinated by the other's good fortune, he lingers, probing deeper into it. Ultimately, the envious person seeks to prove to himself, , the other's despicability, so as not to be seen as 'Merely' having to know that I am envious. +)[62] The very fact that the other person seems to simply take their advantage for granted – that aspect of them annoys me. For – and this is how resentment arises – wouldn't it actually be 'true' greatness to relinquish one's advantage and start on my level? Secretly, one hopes to discover something that *casts* the other's 'advantage' in a

'different' light. Maliciously, one turns the dark sides inside out. A certain perspective ++)[63] , a certain mentality, is characteristic of being envious. Envy shuns acquaintance with true greatness in the instinctive realisation that it contains something which eludes any attempt at levelling.

Jealousy, however, is concerned precisely with the fear of losing something because someone else might also have it. The fear here is not about possession, but about what one possesses. Distrust and suspicion, however, arise in the jealous person from a sense of insecurity which is ultimately well-founded: namely, from the awareness of an inability to be so closely bonded to one's partner or wife that … For in fact, he cannot assume that …
… This inability then gives rise to a compulsion to control the other person. The jealous person does not want to be pushed out of

62 *hBelow:*i +) An example of how the commonplace cannot escape: it is, as it were, external; one recognises it in shifts, displacements and metamorphoses. One unmasks it as 'nothing more than …'. It is an all too transparent form of behaviour. That which bears the mark of its own origin demands, respects and forbids being judged. 'Of course' … – yet this implies a disparagement in the direction of the ordinary. The very belief that one can objectively explain a form of behaviour already expresses a low regard for that behaviour. 'Behaviour' means: one comes to terms with it. To hold one's ground here means: to assert oneself amongst others. One remains rooted in life. The life one is attached to, the life one clings to – whilst one cannot possibly take a 'self' – if only one were that! – into one's .

63 ++) As in 'Morality', the term is *underlined in ink:* it refers to views that one puts forward. There is a psychology of morality, but not of ethos, which is an attitude that one has 'oneself'.

a relationship over which he feels he has no control – the uniqueness of which he therefore – and in this he already betrays the beloved – wishes to interpret as exclusivity. The boundlessness of the quest for jealousy

is striking, gathering all its strength in its frenzy. Jealousy is capable of anything. This delusional blindness arises from the desire to guard an illusory possession. The jealous person resists having to give up something on which he has just 'staked everything'. Jealousy leads to despair. It resists losing something which, had it been lost, would not have been worth worrying about in the first place. Jealousy is a passion that must be cured. A disguised fear lies behind it. +)[64]

- hExperience

h0089i

Anxiety 'seizes' me in a different way from fear, from which I can distance myself and towards which I can maintain a free, detached perspective. Nothing feels constricting about anxiety, which rebels against me as the thorn in the side of existence. Anxiety prevents me from coming 'to myself'. It blocks my 'connection'. 'Circuit' – by this I mean the process whereby one is opened up through experiences. The paths and levels along which [65] | a person comes to themselves manifest themselves as an intensification and elevation of 'experience'. +)[66]

hS.i 75 _____

[64] *hBelow:*i +) Even ordinary people often find themselves jealous of one another. Without really knowing what it is – true despair – something is being 'played out' here. Not that it isn't 'serious' here, but it is the seriousness of people for whom everything is more a matter of posturing than of genuine feeling. It is precisely this delusional madness that distinguishes 'real', genuine jealousy from the worries of these people, which are objectively well-founded or merely exaggerated.

[65] *Stuck at the bottom of the page:* i ++) Being unable to make sense of life, or having one's footing knocked out from under one in the very things to which one has clung – precisely in a desperate attempt not to have to be oneself – is not true despair. The much greater despair arises from being cast out of oneself, out of one's faith.

([66]) *hBelow:*i +) What the word 'experience' means must be distinguished from what has merely been ascribed to this word. Here one might simply ask: from where, and through what artificial constructs, does one arrive, for example, at the concept of 'experiences of consciousness'? Their methodological legitimacy must be demonstrated. They have a place within problem contexts and systematic significance. However, the reason why the word 'experience' in particular was chosen as the appropriate term for this lies in the

The 'meaning' of this word. It does, after all, convey something. And this must be grasped from its own source. One can allow oneself to be drawn into the reception of this meaning. And

- hWitness

One has experienced something oneself if one was present as a witness. Experiences can be described. + +)[67] Having been a witness oneself— —having seen something oneself stands in contrast to having to rely on another person's account to bear witness to something. +++)[68] One attests, for example, to the reality of something. This reality can only ever be vouched for; it cannot, however, be objectively demonstrated. (Just

as, on the other hand, the cogito can only account for the 'objectivity' of something, namely justify its 'positing'.) For things possess 'reality' in the strict sense only in the mirror of my relationship to them. Only insofar as I am present can I bring things before me in their reality. Otherwise, I merely 'ver- ' them to myself; but presence is merely the reverse side of being present. ++++)[69]

Within the concept of reality, a distinctive situation comes to light, namely the existential situation of being present as a witness. Reality can only be grasped intramundane. However, having experienced something for oneself confers an advantage over others. The guarantee for … is | bestowed upon one. One plays the role of the witness, is called upon as the appointed guarantor for something.

The witness in court testifies to events insofar as, whilst situated within the situation, they have viewed them from a perspective they regard as authoritative. Only insofar as one's own being is engaged can something reveal itself as the 'reality' of an event. The witness's presence is different from that of, say, a supervising observer during an experiment. For the latter is merely a custodian in this context. Certainly – the witness must remain uninvolved, provided that no…

h0090i hS.i 76

The very fact that it is involuntarily aroused beneath the surface provides a safeguard against preconceptions and prejudices, in which all understanding, explanation and imagination remain trapped. Not that one should get hung up on the word itself or place one's trust in the wisdom of language – – but it is its power that must be harnessed.

67 ++) Experiences are therefore not 'psychological'.

68 +++) School psychology shifts this contrast; the experience is set against the 'indirectly given', the knowledge of which – as with things in the external world – requires mediation. Nevertheless: the meaning of the word 'experience' is still alive here in its choice as a technical term: the 'immediately given' is et- something for which I can vouch.

69 ++++) This 'being-with'—that is, being with things—is something other than 'being-in-the-world', that is, being encounterable and approachable by my fellow human beings.

distorting the facts. But he must have been caught up in the situation. In this respect, there are also, for example, the 'witnesses' of an era – the last war, for instance. They bear witness to it insofar as they themselves have been 'shaped' by the war – indeed, 'marked' by it.

- h'History'i

h0091i p.77

An 'experience' in the strict sense means more than a mere event. Events can be described objectively, assessed and recognised. I can convey an idea of them to others using general terms. Such language, however, fails when it comes to experiences. I can only recount experiences as a 'story' – namely, in the context and form described here. For just as articulation through words interposes itself between us and things, so too, in the story, is the experience encompassed by language as a form. It is only as a narrated story that it acquires conciseness. Here, one 'appeals' to the other. The report of an event merely relies on objective possibilities of understanding. But what the other learns from a story cannot be communicated to them in that way at all. Stories must be told concisely. Restraint is necessary to make room for the other to meet one halfway. Here, one counts on the other having a certain receptiveness to such stories. For in them, they discover human possibilities. Yet the degree of closeness to these varies greatly from person to person. Stories often 'fall by the wayside'. The other | gets caught up in the superficial, drifts off into *simple*, factual questions, interests, and so on.

Encounters with the other are recorded in the 'stories' we know about them. It is through these that we get to know them. In them, we characterise them in their unmistakable uniqueness. This stands in contrast to characterisations that merely portray them by means of an assessment based on targeted characteristics. Admittedly, very few people have a sense of the person themselves. It takes courage to acknowledge the limits of our understanding and simply to accept someone in their irreplaceable individuality. The certainty guaranteed by judgement is lost. After all, to judge someone means reducing them to a common denominator. The

unsettling tension inherent in the very nature of boundaries is not endured here. In 'story', existence becomes real, in its stance and attitude. Even when I recount something that has happened to me as a story, I thereby step out of the indifferent familiarity of the other's presence with me. For it is precisely in this that I discover myself before the other: that something has become significant to me at all in the sense of a 'story that happened to me'.

- *Life* experience

To 'experience' something means, in the highest sense, to go through and share in it. One has experienced much or little, depending on how one has fared in the world. In the process, one comes to know 'life' – namely, as it takes shape in its 'circumstances'. For everyone lives in relation to others, for example, precisely in the context of opposing isolation. There are demands, expectations and a 'pressure' inherent in life. The most fundamental experience of life is the resistance of others. For human 'autonomy', the relationship with others is constitutive. An opinion is autonomous simply because it is, in the first place, an 'other' opinion; one contradicts or engages with the opinions of others. The realities of life can only be experienced, not understood. One cannot 'orientate' oneself by them. And they are experienced by an existence that has to cope with 'life'. An existence that wants something from life. These are experiences one cannot be spared, which one undergoes unsought and without asking. One must have them oneself. And they are lessons, insofar as they serve as reminders and warnings. One is roused and brought back to oneself; one is taken to school by life. Nature, on the other hand, does not actually 'teach' me anything. Just as here one can only find and discover things, but cannot have encounters. Yet it is only in encounters with others that one truly unfolds, discovering aspects of oneself that perhaps only another person can bring to light. For although the question of what a person is 'in themselves' only makes sense in relation to human beings – a more precise direction for this question would first need to be worked out, given that everyone is different to everyone else, and that everyone is 'in themselves' open to multiple interpretations.

The reality of life, its 'reality' – which, unlike in nature, is not countered by any ideology – is described as 'power'

h0093i hS.i 79
h0094i hS.i 79a

experience. Nature has no power over me, nor is it stronger than I am. For since I can have no will against it and it can have no will against me, I am not, strictly speaking, comparable to it. Power implies a relationship of subordination: one submits oneself, namely with regard to that in which one might also have a will of one's own. The 'powerlessness' in the face of nature—that is, man's dependence on nature, which consists solely in *the fact* that it is independent of me—can only be described metaphorically as 'subjection' to nature.

Whilst science usually posits 'cases' and its 'body of knowledge' is tailored to mobilisation, I am always in the 'case' of life – insofar as I must meet its demands just as I must limit my own in relation to it. The typical nature of life gives rise to rules, maxims and principles. It confers authority upon those who know life. And 'life experience' manifests itself in various ways: as a resigned wisdom that slips past life, as an instinctively sound shrewdness that has grown with life, as the maturity of old age, or as wisdom. Life's lessons are drawn from cases which, as exemplary – as opposed to occasional, random or somehow unusual ones – illustrate how the world works and what can happen to one in life. *hM. In ink and underlined in red:* i Addendum 79 a |

Addendum.

L i f e e x p e r i e n c e is not yet k n o w l e d g e o f t h e w o r l d — the kind that knows 'the human being', but does not merely know how 'people' 'just happen to be'. Life experience takes account of 'people' in the averageness of their behaviour. Life experience manifests itself in caution and prudence. It expects certain things from people, who are hereby regarded in terms of 'someone as yet unknown'. For life experience always has to do with oneself. 'People', like 'life', are regarded by it as something one is familiar with. And the experiences one has had here with a particular individual, the judgement one forms of them, also tend towards reliability and usefulness. Worldly wisdom, however, knows people in terms of 'their' possibilities. Whilst the experience of all that is possible in human beings implies a self-limiting reservation—since reality is here, as something unknown, merely anticipated in its potential—it is

Human 'potential' is that which 'he' can become, or the purpose for which he can become. And this 'potential' is not a general one, grounded in reality as a possible scenario. Rather, the fact that a human being can become this or that means that the possibility of becoming it lies within him. The 'reality' of a human being is grounded in their freedom – including, for example, their depravity, when they relinquish this freedom and fall away

of 'oneself'. Human possibilities are not natural dispositions, such as the sense of sight, which is acquired as a capacity when it is developed. Rather, they 'remain' possibilities insofar as human reality—that which a person 'is', such as their passions—implies a 'capacity' in the sense of coming to terms with oneself. 'With oneself' – this refers just as much to the ground of one's existence as defined in being, as it does to the nature with which one is endowed. 'Pragmatic (knowledge of human nature) concerns what one, as a freely acting being, makes of oneself, or can and ought to make of oneself.' 'To recognise human beings, therefore, according to their species, as terrestrial beings endowed with reason , deserves to be called, in particular, knowledge of the world, …' (Kant, Anthropology, p. IV)[xvi]

Worldly wisdom, however, is that understanding of human nature which enables the person who knows people – and does not merely 'take people' at face value – to move freely amongst them, that is, to truly 'encounter' them. A 'man of the world' does not become vulgar 'with' people. Just as he maintains a certain distance from things in general.
Here, however, insight into human nature is an a t t i t u d e that seeks to confirm and justify itself. It manifests how one person relates to another, or rather, how one believes one must or can relate to another. Insight into human nature goes hand in hand with self-realisation. A certain
A 'tendency' is evident among 18th-century French psychologists. Vauvenargues, for example. A person is put in their place when, for instance, the nature of their love is seen through, revealing it to be nothing more than … A certain degree of médisance is part of this. In this respect, knowledge of human nature can become a distortion of self-knowledge. For there is a certain 'cheapness' in dismissing something out of hand. Certainly – 'humanity' is already in view here – but knowledge of human nature does not possess the tension of a philosophical question. It is critical, unmasking, revealing the illusory in contrast to reality. *Underlined in ink:*i Philosophical destruction, however, seeks to demonstrate what avarice, for example, 'actually' is, namely in terms of its inner potential. |

- Encounter

The death of another can become a deeply moving experience for me, insofar as it makes my own inevitable death strikingly apparent. This is not an exemplary experience – one that might, for instance, crystallise into a memento mori and serve as a warning to accept my fate. Nor do I experience here that death is imposed upon me as a law. One would simply have to face up to this harsh necessity and prepare oneself for it. Just as the wise person is not shaken by death.
'Awakening' here does not mean being reminded of … h,i, but rather: being brought before oneself. Namely, in the realisation that 'no one can spare me from dying'. That one must therefore take it upon oneself as one's very own possibility. That is to say, death is not merely seen here as a lot that has befallen me as a human being, as the 'destiny' of the

Experiencing people. +)[70] If only he were something so general, I might actually find comfort in that. But I cannot simply dismiss it on the grounds that, as a human being, I am – in any case – already subject to it , and so do not actually have to be 'myself'. The death of the O t h e r ++)[71] confronts me precisely with the – incomprehensible – 'reality' of dying. Insofar as it is taken into the very core of my being. The fact that I am not in control of this signifies neither powerlessness in the sense of a limit imposed by my nature, nor submission to a power that is stronger – its tension arises precisely from the fact that one must be oneself, i.e. | that one must take responsibility for it. The limits inherent in existence are neither barriers nor determinations. The nature of my existence is outlined therein. They are boundaries into which one must enter with open eyes, and within which one must remain free.

Here, one is torn from a state of self-forgetfulness. And it is precisely in this that one has lived beyond oneself here: in that one had understood oneself as a 'human being', that is, in terms of one's universality. The death of the other, however, thrusts me back into solitude, into my irreplaceable individuality. And the shock of this becoming-an-experience stands in contrast to the equanimity of hard-won life experience. Certainly – one was already aware of the 'necessity' of dying, but only as an inexorable law. Such knowledge of the universal, which, though recognised, is nevertheless set aside, is precisely what suppresses the illumination of existence.

The death of the other becomes an 'encounter' for me +)[72] , insofar as dying is my very own possibility. 'Encounter' is contrasted here with trial. Even in the case of trial, it comes 'from within me'

[70] *hBelow:*i +) This is how, for example, people in antiquity experienced death. Just as in *Nemesis*, where, in the truest sense, 'an example is made'. Here, the nature of the human being, with all its 'limits', becomes evident to everyone; indeed, it is recognised.

[71] ++) The Other, namely my like. This expresses how, in the 'Who', the 'What he is' is enquired after, whilst this 'Being' can only be fixed through the equation with 'my' Being. In contrast to things, whose Being is not enquired after at all, but is implicitly taken for granted. Which, beyond their being, are understood only as a 'what' – so that this being could be conceived as nothing more than a mere complement to their concept.

[72] *hBelow:*i +) For the most part, it is simply the Other as my equal whom I encounter—whom I cannot merely come across, that is, 'find', as I do with things. The concept of encounter can, however—as above—be broadened. It then refers generally to that whose essence is Being. (Cf. p. 79)

something that runs counter to what is trying to draw me towards self-abandonment. I can offer nothing to counter the dizziness. Fear 'breaks through'. Yet this does not signify an illumination of existence, as it would in an 'encounter' with something.

To experience something is not merely to go through it. Life experience is not simply *an underlined line in ink*: an encounter with the 'world' in which one lives. A lost court case, for example, which for one person merely adds to their store of experience, can become a defining experience for another. Namely, if they see it as a challenge to their belief in justice. Michael Kohlhaas [XVII], for example, showed what lay within him – what he was prepared to fight for. Experiences open up new horizons and can become destiny . ++)[73] | Only when something touches, strikes or stirs something within me +)[74] can something become an encounter for me. One is transformed when an event becomes an experience.

h0096i hS.i 81

[73] *at the bottom, partly glued to the page*:i ++) Psychotherapy speaks of traumas rather than experiences. A trauma is a 'fixed wound', in which a return to the status quo ante becomes a task. When something is regarded as a trauma, it is understood as merely temporary and reversible, and thus non-binding. The dominant perspective here was that of school psychology: 'drives' are posited which merely seek satisfaction and have an unchanging goal. However, this overlooks the very existence of the human being. Here, the human being is regarded as an 'object' of inner urges and external constraints. In doing so, they are reduced to too little. Supposed inevitabilities are used here to justify one's existence in its mere factuality.

[74] *hBelow*:i +) Which – insofar as it does not imply any affect at all – is to be confused neither with E m p - f i n d l i c h k e i t nor with S e n s i t i v i t ä t.

Sensitivity means hypersensitive vulnerability. One is 'sensitive' to something, and sensitivity usually manifests itself as sensitivity to specific things. For we do not simply call those 'sensitive' who are delicate and finely attuned, who recoil like mimosa plants and withdraw into themselves, who are, as it were, 'without skin'. Sensitivity rather characterises a particular disposition through which one explains certain things: an inability to come to terms with defeats, a scrupulous holding of a grudge, and so on.

A sensitive person, however, is someone who is quick to resonate, the dreamer. Sensitivity is an alert, tense focus on … But insofar as the sensitive person is merely 'tuned in' to the mood, drowning in it, they are not, in fact, shaken. They surrender to the mood. They are 'spoken to' by nature, in which they find themselves, but which does not represent an encounter for them. And in contrast to experiencing oneself in one's own irreconcilable particularity, what we find here is precisely the 'harmony of souls'. Sentimentality is contagious. One can get carried away by it. What came into focus during the Age of Sentimentality was humanity in its natural creatureliness, as it emerges from the Creator's hand in its original goodness.

Below, partly stuck to the page: i +) The 'sensitive' individual, as it were, loosens his objective ties in order to be able to surrender himself to emotion. The 'sentimental' 'affec-

h0097i hp. 82

The 'unfulfilled', which lies in wait for experience, is also expressed, for example, in l o n g i n g. Longing is not merely a desire for something or a craving. For desire relates to something already known; one wants to 'have' it. And one is eager to be able to a c q u i r e something. Desires are fulfilled insofar as they are met; lusts are 'satisfied'. Longing for another person, however, is something other than the desire for their presence, insofar as the latter is always conditional, with the other person being called upon to fulfil a certain role. Longing for the other, however, springs from loneliness. And it is unconditional. One longs for the other insofar as one can only 'be' what one is in the presence of, or with, that other. Longing seeks to arrive at oneself through something. In the stabilisation of everyday life, for example, where everything is taken care of for one and largely dealt with, it senses the obstruction of the original. To 'long for something' means: to wish to move away from oneself in one's unfulfilled state towards another. The direction of longing is the opposite of that of desire and greed. *(Note in ink:* Longing misses something.) A desire, however, is stirred; greed is aroused by something. The person yearning reaches out into the distance beyond themselves. What they miss, in the Old Saxon meaning of the word, is something they actually already possess.

Longing lives, for example, within the adventurer. The 'unfulfilled' state from which he yearns does not mean, for instance, a state of being unfilled – as is the case with someone who demands to be kept busy, whose abilities would otherwise lie dormant, or who is merely seeking to fill the time. The adventurer is repulsed by a life of mediocrity, in which work and pleasure are regimented, and which is lived with a short-term outlook

'feels'—but these are feigned. He acquires them by auction. One notices the artificiality of his demeanour; he comes across as superficial and lacking in depth. He holds the matter up to the mirror of feigned emotions. The formulaic nature of these emotions is striking. They lack a true 'centre', whereas genuine feeling, even in the unambiguous intensity of its expression, cannot deny its unspoken roots. It is as though emotions were at the sentimentalist's beck and call. He provokes them through the demeanour he adopts. They are only inauthentic at their root: insofar as the matter, reflected back by the emotion initially directed against it, does indeed have a reciprocal effect. Sentimentality thus intensifies itself into the emotion. The sentimentalist brings this about; the desire to put on a show drives him to it. Time and again, he 'falls' into the emotion, which only appears to control him, but which he in fact controls.

is – without a destiny, relying solely on luck and chance. What is attainable here seems to him to have already provided his reward. The adventurer is repulsed by this spreading, complacent 'mere existence'. He has an instinctive sense that the citizen's sense of security is, after all, merely one he finds fleetingly by clinging to things, but that he does not actually 'stand' in the abyss. The adventurer longs to stand in the

elemental – which the sensitive soul seeks in nature and can find within himself, insofar as he is part of nature. To the adventurer, however, the elemental reveals itself precisely in the breakthrough to it. It flashes into view as the safeguards that man has protectively interposed between himself and his origin in the course of everyday life are breached. The adventurer questions what the citizen all too quickly regards as the meaning of his life, as if it were already decided. That is to say, what he actually merely believes in, but which has not been achieved from his own origin. The very fact that the citizen harbours suspicions about this question expresses a sense of the loss of safeguards, just as his busyness only laboriously conceals the fear of the utter meaninglessness of this life. Certainly – the adventurer may fail, namely in himself and not merely in his undertaking – just as, on the other hand, it is merely the undertaking of the transgression that fails and proves to be folly – but the citizen is, after all, only wiser than he if he seeks to sneak past the dangers,i that surround existence. The uncertainty that the adventurer senses is a fundamental one. |

It is not to be understood in a privative sense, like the insecurity of bourgeois space, which is always only greater or lesser in degree and is always objectively defined. True insecurity, however, is precisely what takes precedence over any sense of security, in which this insecurity is merely invoked and attempts are made to circumscribe it in order to ward it off. The adventurer sees through the stage-like nature of the space that seeks to draw his gaze to the scene of so-called 'life'; he sees through the charade intended to distract him from what is currently breaking through at the very core of his existence. However, insofar as the 'most intrinsic' possibilities—h,i—of which he feels deprived are transformed within him merely into 'potential possibilities'—h,i—that is, into those which one can seize, provided he seeks to force through opportunities by means of violence, he is a 'broken' existence.

The adventurer is never settled anywhere. He feels compelled to start afresh time and again, to venture into the unknown, and to reach further.

His achievements immediately recede into the background, overshadowed by possibilities yet to be explored. He cannot stop. The mercenaries, for example, were adventurers. For a meagre wage, they staked their lives, thereby expressing their desire to free themselves from those who might otherwise be indebted to them. The adventurer is lured; he succumbs to the temptation to abandon the defined realm of certainties. Recklessly, he ventures forth into the unknown. He does not seek danger for its own sake. Not in the way that one might seek it in order to test oneself, to have one's strength put to the test. 'Self-discovery' would mean here: becoming aware of one's abilities and, consequently, of one's calling. And his life was fulfilled insofar as his strength—inserted *in ink:*—the power characterised by boldness—would otherwise lie dormant. The adventurer, however, faces events passively rather than actively shaping them. He renounces all concern and caution. It is not 'actual' dangers that he anticipates—dangers which one could even encounter with prudence. 'Danger' in this sense is not at all inherent in his undertaking; he is indifferent to it. Recklessness means something other than courage and boldness, in which a person's | measure is found, in which virtues are defined. The adventurer 'throws himself' into the unknown, leaves it to chance. He risks his own downfall. He is prepared for failure. The adventurer distinguishes his life—which, as the text emphasises, can 'perish'—from a life oriented towards death, which is preoccupied with 'worrying' about itself. Yet the unbound nature of his undertaking also deprives the man adrift of the freedom to seek definitive meaning in his experiences and encounters.

The 'foreign', as it is 'experienced' in countries, landscapes and peoples, breaks through the traditional horizon. And the fact that the foreign
'Entices' means something different from the allure of the new. What is new are circumstances one has not previously encountered, in relation to which one must reorient oneself. *hQuotation marks in ink:*i 'New' denotes a factual relationship, whilst 'foreign' denotes an existential one. One succumbs to the allure of the new. Here, one craves it, hungers for the new. This is in contrast to the longing for the unknown, which the foreign represents. One needs the new as a stimulant when one is sated and jaded. Here, one seeks distraction, insofar as one does not know what to do with oneself. 'Curiosity' means: getting involved, taking an interest in something that is none of my business, in which I

I am not the one called to this. One grasps at news as the stuff of non-committal occupation, insofar as one can 'make out' all manner of things from it because of its open ambiguity. Here, one surrenders

oneself to that which causes one to leap ceaselessly from one thing to another. This scramble for the new is something different from the restlessness of the adventurer. The adventurer's path to fulfilment consists of something other than the brief, short-lived 'satisfaction' derived from the new, which is soon dulled. For the adventurer, security is a constricting boundary; for the curious, only the familiar is boring.

The broadening of one's horizon is not merely a matter of one's field of vision. Fields of vision are limited insofar as they are defined by one's profession or determined by the 'circumstances' of life as a natural field of vision. They are characterised by a complacent lack of questioning. One can free oneself from the arbitrariness of one's field of vision—that which relates to what lies within its defined boundaries, to what occurs within it. Fields of vision are objective entities. They may overlap. One can broaden another person's field of vision through training and instruction. However, one's 'horizon' is not something so objective. One acquires one's 'horizon'. Only decisions lie beneath a horizon whose openness does not imply indeterminacy, but rather reveals how precisely the unf ground nature of our existence is manifested in the decisiveness of a perspective
'taken in'. +)[75] Travel initially broadens one's horizons through the new things one sees along the way. The *underlined passage in ink*:i An encounter with the foreign, however, signifies a liberation of the horizon, which is precisely obscured by those horizons. One experiences, for example, the tropics in the physiognomy of their landscape. 'Physiognomy' – therein lies the fact that, like 'landscapes', they can only be grasped through the lens of a particular human existence. Like all decisive encounters, the experience of the tropics is unrepeatable; one is easily disappointed when one returns there. Because the transformation of the horizon cannot take place again. – The narrowness and vastness of the

h00100i
hS.i 85

[75] *hBelow*:i +) 'Horizon', in the usual sense, refers to the boundary of the gaze that penetrates the world and presses towards things. It is a boundary that this gaze does not encounter anywhere as resistance. For it is only to the free—that is, unobstructed—gaze that something can reveal itself as a horizon, as the boundary up to which the gaze 'reaches' in the sense that it encompasses things beneath the horizon. This denotes a boundary that is immanent to space but not fixed. The transcendence of Dasein becomes experience – within the horizon.

Horizontes characterises human beings themselves. It presents people 'without any horizon'. These are the ones who cling to the goals they have set themselves, who live stubbornly in the pursuit of tasks, who enforce principles. They appear 'unfree'. Their 'unwavering' nature is blind busyness. Here, everything remains isolated from one another. They lack the 'world'. These are the people who fail to recognise the fundamentally bottomless nature of their decisions. 'There must be a line that encircles existence, within which it holds itself, just as the visible, bright realm is separated from the unilluminable and the dark.' On the horizon I experience the limits of my | self – in relation to the Other. And the 'light' within the horizon is a 'clearing' that occurs as a decision, through which space is created, as it were laid out, for my life.

- *hPlayer, sensation, etc.*i

After all, the adventurer seeks fulfilment. And he remains true to himself as he presses on. The gambler, however, for whom life has become stale, who is fed up with and weary of it, seeks only temporary oblivion. Security and predictability are probably unbearable to him, too. But he seeks a thrill that can be repeated as a matter of routine. He lives by putting at stake what he has and needs. And the tension between bliss and destruction strikes him in a reality he has never actually left. There is no transformation of existence here – only the single wall of security is torn down. The gambler does not actually stand in opposition to the world of the bourgeois; he is merely more sophisticated than the latter. Certainly – he, too, has a sense of the illusory and pre-fabricated nature of bourgeois life, of the fact that all the things pursued here cannot possibly bear the seriousness with which they are treated. But insofar as he merely introduces a new tension into this world, insofar as he merely senses its lack of appeal, he reinforces the structure of this space and makes it harder to turn away from it. The gambler remains passive when he tries his luck – recklessness is something else entirely. The challenge of chance is just as incidental to the adventurer's undertaking as the arrangement of things.

The fact that the player cannot stop simply means an addiction to gambling, that is, an inability to break free from this passion to which one has succumbed once one has experienced the thrill of the game, that is, this state of

once. The very essence of 'addiction' lies in becoming enslaved to something one can obtain as a stimulus, in enjoying a mere contingency which, whilst temporary, can be repeated at will. Only the human being seeks stimuli for whom this state of being can become a means of detaching oneself from 'oneself', that is, of shedding the burden | of existence, as it is felt in the form of boredom and weariness. Desires and drives are not elementary components of human nature. As a 'being driven to' or as a passion, they constitute a 'behaviour' of human existence, which can be understood here only as a whole and only in terms of its fateful nature.

The gambler, then, is in a state of distortion, of losing control, in comparison with the adventurer. Precisely insofar as he merely puts what he has at stake, he remains bound to what the adventurer leaves behind. The player pretends not to know what he somehow knows to be the fundamental human possibility. He shies away from an unreserved encounter with it. He cheapens himself somewhat. Yet these 'cheapening' are precisely the most commonplace reality.

One seeks, for example, the thrill of danger and relishes this sense of playful tension that prevents things from becoming serious. One wishes to catch a glimpse here of what the adventurer is venturing into. And one can 'secure' this thrill – as opposed to the lure of the unknown that draws one in. Even the shivers

It merely 'brushes against' horror. 'Horror' overwhelms one in the face of abysses, darkness – but also in the face of human depravity

For example, in depravity one encounters human possibilities one would never have 'believed' in. Impenetrable darkness seems to call into question the very possibility of seeing as something inherent in myself. Horror is a forced coming to a halt. , when fixated on the abysmal, it is an escape into the shifting of interpretations; imagination fills in where emptiness and darkness can offer no measure. +)[76] This is also the source of the sophistication inherent in cruelty – which is by no means as simply 'natural' as blunt brutality. |

h00102i
hS.i 87

h00103i
hS.i 88

[76] *hBelow:*i +) A shuddering sense of wonder, however, is aroused by the imposing and the mighty. It takes one's breath away. A reality manifests itself in this as something elemental, something that cannot be grasped or set aside through understanding. Any attempt to grapple with it is silenced. The 'utterly Other'—that is, something which, for that very reason, cannot startle me in the unseen realm of faith—compels this sense of wonder.

One can, however, choose to learn to feel a sense of dread. Here, one has the option of retreating in a playful manner; for instance, whilst walking through a dark forest, one reflects on the fact that the path is, after all, of a known shortness, telling oneself that it is 'actually' nothing. In feeling a sense of dread, one merely savours the horror.

The 'sensation' also belongs here. At first, the curiosity of the onlooker seeks only what is 'worth seeing'. Even as an uninvolved spectator, the circus-goer is transported away from the demands and worries of life, allowing themselves to be captivated by the images they follow. 'Sensational', however, is that which causes a stir, which cannot leave one indifferent—the unheard-of, the deemed impossible. The imagination is sparked by it, conjures it up, dwells upon it. And sensation is also sought in the circus. The ingenious sophistication of this daredevilry is striking. It is not so much the difficulty as the danger that keeps one in suspense. The shiver that runs through one's body is sought after as a sense of belonging. It passes, perhaps lingers, but does not constitute a shock. For in this shiver, one reflects on the security of one's own self, which has not been abandoned.

A thirst for sensation, gambling addiction, the thrill of the macabre, and so on – the distortion here lies in the fact that one wants to take something for oneself. The narrow-minded bourgeois does not wish to step beyond his boundaries. He is cautious in his play. He wants to protect himself against the breakthrough of that which – as the extent of his defences here shows – he is, after all, somehow always aware of. The law of an addiction must be recognised in the same way as that of a curve. That is to say, the demonstration of its inner potential does not constitute a critical unmasking in the sense that, for example, the psychology of ressentiment sets universal human love straight – that is, in the sense that

behaviour is demonstrated here to be ambiguous. Gambling, for example, is not actually presented in this light as something fundamentally different when it is shown to be a cheap substitute for that which constitutes an 'indestructible predisposition' within human beings. There is no general concept of experience with sub-categories, but only a 'sphere of meaning' of experience.

The objective systematisation of psychology must be replaced by an existential one. One cannot seek to identify differences on the basis of general definitions here. For example, there are no individual passions. Conceptually diverse phenomena may in fact be traced back to the very same basic structure. And on the other hand – addictions, for example, 'manifest' themselves in different ways. Gambling, for example – precisely insofar as it becomes a passion—

… does not imply any kind of moral decay, as is the case with the drug addict. The latter's euphoria is a form of oblivion; through the states into which he sinks – as if into his own private world – he seeks, at least temporarily, a radical release from the tensions of life. One cannot seek to categorise things according to feeling, volition and thought. For what is a thought? It is the assimilation of that which initially stirs within me as an impression, whereby, moreover, an intention becomes apparent in the coherence of the thought. Experience seems, as something intellectual and comprehensible, to be the antithesis of 'feeling' – insofar as the latter, when evaluated objectively, constitutes the elementary datum of knowledge. But sensation means: sensing oneself moved by something, insofar as it affects me. And insofar as something can also have a constricting effect on me, this sense of self-awareness involves not only the experience but also the emotional affect.
We take as our starting point the ambiguity of the human being. This is evident
, for example, in the 'we-ness' of human existence, as opposed to individuality, in which everyone 'is' 'their own'—that is to say, in this *context*: human nature—'insofar as' everyone has 'their own' attitude, etc. Fear, etc., are not 'natural' emotions to which one could oppose an attitude. Rather: being oneself is realised therein.[77]

[77] *hBelow*:i +) Even for Aristotle, for example, θρεπτικόν, αισθητικον and νοητικόν do not denote faculties of the soul in the sense in which Kant distinguished between intuition and thinking and identified their root in the imagination. Rather, they are modes of living existence which are grasped through the 'distinction' between plant, animal and human being. And it is Aristotle's method merely to draw parallels. He leaves, for example, αισθανεσθαι as something sui generis when he places it in the light of comparisons – without, however, the αισθησιζ having anything in common with the mere movement of the former, or, *as the* editor notes in *ink*: with the νοειν of the latter.

| *lifted on the page, in pencil*: iAdditions? [XVIII]

hLiving thingsi

The concept of nature as that which a being is capable of within the context of being is tailored to living beings. A living being is in relation to the other, or indeed 'for' the other, insofar as it, for example,
'through the water for the water'. It sustains itself, that is to say, it realises itself within it. Water is the element of the fish and not merely an 'environment', which would be the ratio extrinseca of *a correction and underlining in ink*: merely a subsequent adaptation to it. The 'reason' for an animal's organisation, and thus also for the 'relationships' (Ver) in nature that have come into being within it, is beyond grasping. That is why Goethe calls the fish a 'decided' inhabitant of the water. [XIX]

The inanimate, however, has its cause outside itself. The convergence of circumstances gives rise to 'a cloud', but even a crystal is merely a 'typical' formation. However essential it is for quartz to crystallise in precisely this form, it nevertheless remains external to it insofar as its basis lies in 'something else', namely in the structure of matter. Quartz occurs 'in pieces'. As for the inanimate
'is' only insofar as it is included within the realm of the living. *hCorrected in ink*: i What nature 'is', it is by virtue of the living, which, in its openness to …, in the organisation of its body, is shaped by the
'Nature' is permeated by it. The sense organs are merely specific modes of receptivity to … Light and brightness, for example, are 'in reality' merely light and brightness insofar as they are the cause of the active state of seeing. They are so by virtue of the living being's inability to see without light. The causa here is an enabling ratio extrinseca. But if one allows a natural phenomenon to be 'caused', this does not imply such a dependence. Certainly – one would not exist without the other. But here this merely signifies a state of being 'in debt' to. The coming about of … apparently 'requires' … This and that is 'involved' in it. But what here would be 'dependent' in 'its' being on …? One grounds it only in that which one allows it to be!

We understand the form of a plant differently from that of an animal. Whilst the latter possesses its form as an individual, thereby emphasising precisely the communal nature of its existence, the characteristic growth of a tree, as it branches out

spreads out into space. Vegetation proliferates and 'overgrows' the ground. And whilst the plant is 'in' light, air and earth – which is not merely the external relationship of an 'being-in', as with the chair 'in' the room – the animal is | at a
'here': it can move, that is, change 'its' location. Even when we say something is 'here' or 'there' – the 'here' of my position does not coincide with any point in space, nor with any part of that space. Although, on the other hand, it is precisely what it designates that lies within that space. It may be difficult to decide whether the movement of the tanner's bark is, for example, a spreading out or a moving – just as we also attribute movement to the snail, which, slowly inching along, covers every part of its path with its body, in the
View the 'centre', which first brings it here – then there – in the sense that it 'has' reached 'its own', i.e. a place determined by it. Here – i.e. not there, for which the animal is excluded as not-here, *underlined by m. ink*:i where, whilst being here, it must also – namely, through perception – be there. Hence also: not yet the plant, but first the animal – namely through the individual senses – through its body – can perceive, i.e. feel 'itself'. And hence the connection between moving oneself and being able to perceive. |

hComprehension

'In comprehending, we are what the comprehended is.' (Heymann, On Colour … Diss. Bonn 33).[xx] Things can only be manifest in something like hardness or stability. Something 'is' hard insofar as it appears 'thus' to me. I grasp it as 'hard' in the same way that something is grasped in the gestural act of 'standing'. The interplay of my nature within the uniformity of its essence is evident in the fact that the most diverse things can make the same impression on me. And it is, above all, the inner form of movement—tension and ease—that is reflected in the basic verbal meanings: we 'understand' the ability to lie down and the ability to stand differently. – But not as though things could only be revealed in what we ourselves are, as though the interpretative interpretation were a transference.

'Techniques' are, first and foremost, skilful and practised strokes. One *usually writes with ink*: one then asserts oneself – just as one does in the posture that

h00106i
hS.i 91

h00107i
hS.i 92

MS Human Nature

h00108i
hS.i 93

catches the emotions, regains control of oneself. A measured pace is characteristic of human beings.

The 'concept', however, is also something with which I connect in such a way that I realise 'myself' within it. Just as objective fear is a fear of something, one can – as is always the case in thought – become aware of 'oneself' within it. To stand within a concept implies a decisiveness, and to stand within the concept of oneself means: to have opened oneself up to a meaning. What one 'understands' here, or rather what one is moving towards in this context, is existence in the freedom of its self-understanding. To 'grasp' things now means: to make something comprehensible to the extent that one recognises it in the meaning accorded to it by a traditional interpretation. That something is here 'brought under a concept' is the academic expression for this responsibility. As a person, one commits oneself to justifiable objectivity. The language to which one freely commits oneself embodies the mode of thought of a people. The word reveals both, insofar as it arises not merely as a sound gesture of the imagination, but as a linguistic utterance—something in which one shares, through which one communicates. But it is not the word alone; rather, it is language that is existential in Heidegger's sense. And what is perceived in the word is taken up in the intentions that correspond to its meaning. The συμπαθειν is the fundamental basis for this intentional correspondence. |

hCharacter *hl.*i

A man of principles is regarded as 'a man of character'. This does not refer to principles by which he acts, which might be taught as 'good' or demonstrated as 'right'. 'To be a man of principles' rather expresses the indispensability of a stance. One that cannot be compromised. The 'weakness' of a character is something different from the 'weakness' of a person. A weak person is one who is easily persuaded, 'changes his mind quickly' and is unreliable insofar as he might fail when it really matters. *hAdded in ink:*i His word is not worth much. A weak character, however, changes his convictions quickly. To be 'without character' means: to lack the unconditional, which in turn subjects life to conditions. To have 'little character' means: only there

To regard questions of mere expediency where convictions ought actually to be evident. Or rather, the 'convictions' which a weak character quickly changes—namely, 'discards' and 'adopts'—are not, in fact, any 'convictions' at all. Character consists 'in the originality of the mode of thinking' (Kant 268), [xxi] Convictions cannot be demonstrated in terms of general principles. They spring from their own source. One cannot take them up and analyse them like thoughts, the correctness and truth of which can be objectively determined. Convictions, however, are anchored at such a depth that no discussion can undermine them. They are attitudes which, insofar as they are unconditional, can only be attested to in this way. Namely, by someone whose behaviour can only be determined by them. The lack of self-assurance, when one lives by borrowed convictions, manifests itself in the 'weakness' of a character. This weakness, therefore, does not lie in the fact that one changes one's convictions.

'A character' is not the same as human greatness, i.e.

'greatness of the soul'. 'A character' does not necessarily have to be a 'personality' either. *hContinued at the bottom of the page:* i

There is a certain power, the magic of a personality. It becomes apparent in conversation when it captivates others. It asserts itself as the defining influence. Certainly – one possesses personality ενεργεια only in relation to others, but δυναμει in and of oneself. This is in contrast to the esteem or reputation one enjoys amongst others, whereby what one is in their eyes is merely attributed to one by them. Personality is not merely what one 'presents' to others. |

But should everyone be judged on whether and to what extent they are 'a character'? Does such a question not, for example, fall flat when applied to Napoleon? His yardstick is evidently different. For a certain 'simplicity' is part and parcel of being 'a character'. And this is something that must also be possessed by the person whom one
'no character' – that is, the absence of character. What is 'elementary' about Napoleon is something other than 'simplicity'. 'Firmness' means that one 'stands' within oneself. Yet it is precisely Napoleon's restlessness that points to these elementary qualities; here, his inhumanity is very much part of his greatness.

II.

A person's 'outward expression' is what leads us to speak of 'a character'. (A person's 'authenticity', however, means that they are unpretentious.) 'His' decisiveness is something other than merely

swift resolve, which is an expression of a spiritual strength, *hEinf. m.Tinte:*i an attitude with which one sets to work.

The term 'a person's character' is then used to refer to the traits that distinguish them. Just as an animal's character is its distinctive nature, so too are peculiarities 'characteristic' of … One can characterise a person's appearance, their abilities, but also the person themselves, drawing on a wide variety of factors, depending on the context.

A person's character – that is 'them'. And one is responsible for 'how' one 'is'. However – one might well ask: what 'can' a person actually do about their character? Surely one cannot help one's inherited predispositions. For example, the fact that one is not musical, *[underlined in ink]*: I apologise during an interrogation. But in the case of one's temperament – which is equally inherited and which leads one to be carried away by …h,i – the situation is different insofar as one's temperament
'restrain'. If one fails to do so, one is held accountable. Moreover, however: I myself 'am' hot-headed; 'my nature' is such. And this temperament is held against me. It is not merely something with which I have – by chance – been 'gifted'. Having to be *this way* is something quite different from discovering a talent for … in itself. |

One becomes aware of the free relationship one has with one's talent or, rather, with one's abilities. +)[78] I can make use of them and develop them, but I can also leave them untapped. *According to Grünst:* i[79] I have them at my disposal. They are an asset bequeathed to me. Both – talent and abilities – are always understood in a positive sense, in contrast to the 'disposition' towards … However, 'my nature' is something in which I do not spare myself

78 *hBelow:*i +) A skill is defined as something that can be measured in terms of performance, as something that a person 'can do' of their own accord, rather than something they are merely 'capable' of doing. Generally speaking, however, it is 'the' abilities that need to be recognised here, and which are, for example, attributed to a person's intelligence. It is only in the case of complex achievements that one speaks of 'a' particular ability or, indeed, a specific talent for something. One is capable of what one 'manages to do'; the ability to do something always implies a potential for improvement. 'Inclines' are developed into abilities. The fact that something is a normal or even average ability merely means that its occurrence is nothing out of the ordinary. – 'Capacity', however – in contrast to talent – forms part of a being's 'nature' .

79 *Grünst's view:* i In contrast to *the quotation in ink:*i 'Ability' implies in this context that the application and development of what is acquired here is
'is in my hands'.

can be made. ++)[80] It manifests itself in what I, for example, am easily prone to, in weaknesses and faults. But also in antipathy, for example. It is something towards which and against which I am powerless. Certainly – I can take action against it. But to overcome it does not mean to eliminate it. Nature is not given to me, but I am given to myself within it.

'My nature is such that …' – that doesn't excuse me. One also wants to be taken seriously precisely in 'being that sort of person'. One resists the idea of not being allowed to be 'oneself' in that way. Just as, in general, the older one gets, the less inclined one is to believe in chance or external factors in one's fate. I stand by my nature. Otherwise, my freedom seems to me to be unfounded and bottomless. Hatred, for example, can actually mean wanting to take responsibility for one's antipathy. After all – my nature somehow 'explains' my failings. A great soul is 'free from …'. Even when one speaks of a
'strong nature', it still explains something. |

Nature explains, for example, a person's 'character'. We describe the person 'themselves', for example, as 'generous' or
'small' and perhaps interpret this to mean that he is reactive, envious, and so on. This is how he is 'towards others'; this is how he presents himself in the circumstances of life. It is this 'disposition' that one encounters time and again in him. Character is what he i s , in which he does not merely
'finds' himself, as in his nature, but in which he freely realises himself. |

Addendum to page 3 h = p. 95i

Antipathy and so on develop: 'my own'—that is to say, the 'nature' in which I cannot escape myself—comes to the fore. But quite another matter is a person's physical appearance, as manifested in the coarseness of their feet, their gait, their neck, and in the vulgarity of their demeanour. Socrates' face shows that he was of a 'vulgar sort'. He cannot deny his vulgar origins, this fact. Namely, before others or before himself, insofar as it is evident to him. This inability to deny is therefore something other than being powerless against one's nature. – Hypocrisy, however, relates to

h00111i
hS.i 96

[80] ++) 'Constitution', by contrast, is a systematic concept. As a specific constitution, my nature is expressed in a formula. There are types of constitution. The fact that a particular constitution 'tends' towards something specific means that it is predisposed to it. In this context, the human being is regarded as a case. However, a person's nature is precisely

'his' and n o t in the sense of a merely specific nature, as if it were merely to be found in him and determined as such.

h00112i
hS.i 97

the insincerity of the attitude one puts on for show. – One can overlook one's physical nature in favour of the person themselves, or rather, one can allow oneself to forget it altogether. Physical appearance is something that clings to one like a dialect, for example: 'Usually' one is out of place. One has ordinary feet, a common laugh, and so on. Race, however, is the law of nature. And in this respect, it asserts itself in the style of human bearing. |

The practical insight into human nature demonstrated by Napoleon and Bismarck means: recognising someone's suitability for a particular task, or assessing people correctly. This is underpinned by experience. Worldly wisdom means being able to take people at face value, whether as allies or adversaries. One calculates correctly in relation to others. Knowledge of human nature refers to 'people', to their gullibility, to what 'is to be found' in them. One then comes to know this 'type of person'. What is characteristic here is what is typical of … An understanding of human nature relates not least to how one can win over 'the masses'. It is objective and focuses on specific cases. In the long run, it becomes clear whether one has assessed someone correctly when one included or excluded them.

However, experience of 'people' is not what I need in order to recognise someone in their 'incomparable individuality'. Certainly – every leaf, too, is different, unique. Namely, as an instance of the general. It is unique in concreto, insofar as it is lost in the whole, which is grasped in it as if by the tip. It is, in fact, taken in as 'this-there'. And it would be removed from the concept—from its 'what'—if one were to let it 'slip from one's hand', or lose sight of it. For human beings, however, being held fast is not constitutive. The name by which they are called is not a designation.

The other is not objectively understood in general terms as 'a …'. Or rather, his face is not seen as physiognomy precisely when he is viewed in terms of racial characteristics and presented, for example, as a shield-like form. The racial type that defines a face as a specific instance is something different from the type of a family face. The fact that there are recurring features here, that the face is inherited, shows, on the other hand, how that which is discerned as physiognomically defining is 'incomparable to anything' insofar as it cannot be grasped by means of the general. As something ineffable, however, it can be shared. Nevertheless: everyone is different from everyone else. A binding connection is emphasised here insofar as the other, as my equal, is distinguished from me (whilst things are something else, or

the other | precisely as not-my-like). This relationship to myself is reflected in the varying degrees of closeness with which the other stands in relation to me: as someone closer or more distant, or as a stranger. However, this closeness or strangeness derives its meaning from me in my individuality, and because the face is seen as physiognomy, nothing is more unsettling than the doppelgänger. One becomes uncertain precisely because of the absence of a generative commonality. The second person reminds one of the first, without, however, 'being' 'him' – not even as a brother. One then seeks to reassure oneself of the doppelgänger's illusory nature precisely by attributing it to the contingencies of concrete reality. Just as

one is immediately and automatically thrown out of the physiognomic realm by the realisation that someone is not the person one addressed them as. Unlike in other cases of deception, where the 'matter' is set right. Here one can remain 'with the matter', and this signifies the activity of a practice that renews itself at every step, as opposed to being addressed through the character of a face.

In the language one speaks, provided it is a common language, one does not express 'one's true self'; it is only as a person +)(81) thatone connects with 'one's' language, and thus also with concepts and objective understanding. Thus, for example, one also corresponds to an objective interpretation of things when one 'fears …' and here, for the most part, enters into a relationship with the world as it is interpreted. Our fear is communicable; or rather, one must account for it to the other. It is precisely in this respect that it is one's own, namely as the fear assigned to him as 'author'. One must take responsibility for the fear that, in this respect, he is to 'be'. One 'is' mostly as a person. The λογον διδοναι takes place relatively. The form of the concept – the 'I think that …' – cannot be separated at all from the relationship one has to oneself as reason, nor can it be made to correspond to it. One realises oneself here in a relative manner. Being oneself, i.e. standing up for what one is, therefore does not automatically imply a *[quote mark] in ink*:i
Being 'in itself'.

For it seems one can, after all, ask what someone is 'in themselves' – as opposed to things, which, in their 'whatness', do not refer to themselves

h00113i
hS.i **98**

h00114i
hS.i **99**

81 *hBelow:*i +) No one 'is' a persona in the same way that a vir or a homo 'is'. The expressions personam agare, gerare show that one 'is' a persona only in relation to another, insofar as one is regarded as someone here.

can be set aside. It is simply that the encounter with the other can bring him to light only as a person,i not as he is in himself – just as I, too, am here only in relation to him
'am'. So that, in this context, the recognition of the other would itself be the means to an end. Yet this is no more a distortion than the appearance of things. For we define one another here, and character reveals itself in what one is within the concrete 'relationships' of life. 'You' are the second person and 'I' the first: 'my' autonomy is relative. For it is in relation to you that I assert myself. There is no absolute 'I'.

'Being-in-itself' was evidently conceived, initially, in terms of things. One seeks to get beyond the merely relative determinations to the thing itself. Yet that is precisely what it is,
'in reality'. *hEinf. m. Rotst.*: xi[82] The question of the 'in itself' of things is a legitimate one. But the 'in itself' of the 'Other' refers to it precisely: n o t in relation to …, that is, in its 'for-itself' being.

Something in which one cannot communicate, in which one is essentially *[underlined in ink*]: i alone, which one can only come to terms with oneself, is, for example, my conviction.

The notion of being 'incommunicable' presumably also applies to that which is implicitly determinative of … Intentionally attuning oneself to another through correspondence and pre-correspondence is something different from the
'meeting one another' in a flash of insight. However – the fact that something is, in the final analysis, 'unspeakable' does not mean that it stands alone in this respect. For moods are contagious. And all thinking is, after all – insofar as it is expressed in language – a responsible engagement with that which, whilst moving, can nevertheless be grasped, that is, raised into the light of λογοζ, so that objective understanding with the other is possible.

Convictions, however, arise only from within oneself. To respond to them means more than merely satisfying objective requirements.

82 *Note at the bottom of the page*: i x) The principle of things lies with me. Φυσιζ κρυπτεσθαι φιλει [Heraclitus, Fragment 123: 'Nature (essence) loves to conceal itself.' In: The Fragments of the Presocratics. Greek and German by H. Diels. Edited by
W. Kranz. Volume One. Weidmann, Zurich 2004, p. 178.] does not mean that nature withholds 'its' being-in-itself from me. It is reminiscent of the resistance one encounters when seeking to grasp it, whereby one is assured of its very reality precisely through this resistance.

'My' conviction is not, like 'my' thought, something for which I, as the author, am accountable, and on which others may contradict me. Whilst the independence of a thought distinguishes that thought from those I have adopted from others – without the latter being any the less genuine for that – convictions are something to which I am bound in my individuality, in which I *am* 'myself' *hm. Grünst.*: xi. *hAt the top of the page. m Grünst.*: xi *hAddition in ink*:i In which, however, I am not *bound to* anyone else – as in my 'thoughts' etc. – *h*. Convictions are held. Insofar as I assert something as my conviction, I am conscious of myself as the actual authority in the matter. 'I myself' stand or fall with the correctness and truth of that which comes as a conviction from my 'inner self', in which I perceive myself as unconditional precisely to the extent that it subjects my praxis to conditions. Convictions are, from the outset, beyond the scope of discussion. Discussion finds no foothold in them at all. Here, too, there is a harmony of character, or rather in one's way of thinking. Namely, out of sympathy. And this is what usually enables me, first and foremost, to 'truly' engage in conversation with others. One can hold a conviction, a belief. For 'being-for-oneself' simply

means withdrawing from personal relationships. Just as, in everyday usage, 'being-for-oneself' is synonymous with isolation in the sense of withdrawing from others.

'For oneself', that is, connected to oneself without being connected to others as a person, culminates in what is called 'a character' …

In the portrayal of a character—in what I believe to be the essential traits that characterise another person—I nevertheless unwittingly characterise myself. Different people give different accounts of a person's character, yet this does not constitute a distortion. In principle, one portrayal can be just as true as another. For there are, after all, degrees of truth: a superficial view is not necessarily a false one. (The portrayal of a 'type', however, does reflect the 'figure'. For the type is seen, within the framework of the circumstances of 'life', as the reality that concretely defines it and gives it coherence.)

To characterise someone does not mean to identify them by … For that is what it would mean to 'characterise' things. One characterises them by their characteristics. Just as, indeed, recognition is knowledge. One 'identifies' them as concreta:

h00115i hS.i 100

MS Human nature

h00116i hS.i 101

through the presence of … One becomes acquainted with things through the reality that exists in this context. And so racial affiliation also 'characterises' a person. However, one does not | draw a character in order to make someone publicly known, so that they can be identified by everyone. One wishes to
'to recognise "him"', that is, to make him visible. And the ability to see him must be awakened in the other. *hCorrected in ink*: i And this uniquely individual relationship with this other stands in contrast to the general relationship with reality in the recognition of things, which one can only
'appeal' to it' in the sense that one takes it for granted.

'Greatness' – *underlined in ink*:i – characterises a person. It is attributed to a person. Just as someone is morally judged by the fact that they are called 'a person of character'. Although, therefore, a person's character is not actually 'characterised' here – it is the person themselves who is being judged (unlike when one characterises someone in terms of their historical significance as a personality). But with regard to this measure of a person – does one then take into account a
'Norm' as a point of reference? In the sense that something is regarded as sick when measured against what is healthy? The healthy body is – initially – not merely the norm in the sense that a specimen of a species is deemed normal when measured against the concept. 'Healthy' is that which 'sustains' life – which is inherently ambiguous: insofar as both the body and that by which it lives are 'healthy'. The word 'healthy' in *quotation* marks in *ink* stands in contrast to an overwrought mind. 'Healthy' egoism, in *quotation* marks in *ink*, remains untroubled by considerations which would actually be correct, but which hinder one's self-assertion. Health is oriented towards mere living. Yet
, however, 'leads' his life:

For whilst the animal realises itself in that it sustains its life, determined by its kind, within the framework of conditions which it sets and fulfils – whereby, in its 'capacities', it is shown to be governed by that by which it lives – every human being places 'his' life under conditions and, in the free decision to be himself, grasps himself as always unconditional. He is bound to himself in every step of his existence. What he utters, what he decides, the originality of his way of thinking, his character are revealed in the extent to which he wishes to be held accountable to himself. 'His' possibility lies in the abyss; he may fail.

The decision regarding one's self cannot be justified in the same way as objective decisions, e.g. the determination of—

304

the determination of things. (This applies to every existential decision – including, for example, that which lies behind language). |

One recognises oneself in the fact that one opens oneself up to one's own possibility, that is, one approaches oneself in the act of self-determination. This freedom to oneself – as manifested in the possibility of suicide – is what first and foremost mediates freedom in relation to the thing. For in the back-and-forth perspectives that are constitutive of the 'what' of things, a particular self-understanding is always expressed: one interprets oneself in the grasping of things. This ground that I lay for myself in doing so is the ground
'm y' being. As the 'self', I come to terms with myself. Yet in doing so, I am confronted with my *underlined* 'Existence' – which I have no control over. Existence is the thorn in the side of having to be the 'self'.
'My' existence – this expresses how existence is, in a sense, already determined anthropologically from the outset. For it is not actually
'my' being, that is to say, it is not that in which I am connected to myself. On the other hand, this brings 'my' existence to light, as the facticity of existence, the fact that I have always already been, that I *hCorrected and underlined by me. ink*:i – that I cannot find any reason in this, that I cannot retreat from myself, precisely emerges as the finitude of my existence. For what significance could it possibly have for an animal that it has no control over its own existence? The animal lives the life of its species.

One understands or explains a relationship on the basis of character. For example, on the basis that someone harbours strong antipathies. However, it is not these antipathies themselves that are regarded as the natural cause – just as, for instance, the scuffling between a dog and a cat is something 'natural'. Character has no properties. My nature is certainly something I cannot escape. Namely, insofar as I must be it 'in some way'. Or rather, one refuses to acknowledge one's 'nature' insofar as it would be 'mere' nature. One is not simply quick-tempered, but it is justified anger; it is not mere antipathy, but righteous hatred. (Yet one refuses to acknowledge shortcomings in one's talents or what one has been given as undeniable *[underlined in ink*: i] experiences. Self-knowledge proceeds here no differently than elsewhere: objectively, that is, by comparison, experimentation and measurement. And insofar as these are gifts or blessings, one may here become envious of the other who has fared better.)

A person's spirituality—he *quotes*, *in ink*: 'self'—manifests itself in hatred, insofar as this constitutes a living antipathy as a thought

305

h00117i p. 102

MS Human nature

h00118i hS.i 103

. As a thought that one may well harbour, but which one cannot communicate. Only hatred is a behaviour, that is, a 'trait' of human beings. (M e n t a l i t y is something other than a 'way of thinking' in the sense

| of character. There is the mentality of our time, the American mentality, that of the lawyer, and so on. One falls prey to it. Mentality is an attitude that has become habitual, arising from one's engagement with …, from the nature of practical life, namely from a factually correct and appropriate perspective. There is no existential decision behind it. One grows into it as one does into practised movements. One simply goes along with it.)

It is not a natural inclination or weakness that leads someone to be characterised as good-natured. Rather, it is this: that they – in their way of thinking – are without malice, that is to say, they neither wish evil nor expect it from others. And every form of good-naturedness is incomparable – insofar *as* one *person* 'simply sees nothing wrong with it', whilst another 'regards it as nothing that …' and so on.

Freedom would be unfathomable and bottomless if I could not spare myself from my own nature any more than I can extinguish 'my' existence except through suicide. In *Hat* *(quotation marks in the original text)*: i one 'binds' one's antipathy to oneself. Or rather, one gets stuck, becomes entangled in it, without coming to terms with it, without actually becoming free of oneself: a 'small' character. For character is, first and foremost, a way of thinking, which can, for example, also be banal and ordinary if, for instance, one aligns oneself with the way others think. Only
'a character' implies originality of thought; or rather, it is only here that superior greatness is to be found.

To commit oneself to oneself, and in so doing to conceive of oneself as an absolute, has its parallel in this: to commit oneself, as a rational being, to the moral law as an absolute, that is, a categorical imperative. But human beings are, after all, free in relation to themselves, that is, in relation to the conditions to which they freely commit themselves as their own conditions. Or rather, he becomes so; that is to say, he 'grows' as a human being. Just as character, in general, is something that develops. One can wither away and remain 'impoverished'; there are also 'exuberant' characters.

The animal has no gestures. The 'naturalness' of its behaviour reveals the same thing as the simplicity of its gaze, which
'uninterrupted' gaze that takes in things; the animal's eye is there 'only for seeing'. The 'naturalness' of animal movements signifies something other than that to which a human's behaviour 'na-

natural', namely unaffected and unreflective: as behaviour that is self-evident to someone, insofar as 'their' nature is such. The naturalness of animal movement, however, stands in stark contrast to human behaviour. The animal leaps or runs, pursues, flees or hesitates. |

One 'understands' the flight of the hawk as it circles high above the meadow, scanning for prey – namely as an expression of the elementary relationships captured therein. But to 'behave' is something else: in human situations, insofar as one finds oneself called upon to act in accordance with 'oneself', one behaves. The animal does not 'appear'; the fact that it 'behaves' itself, just as it 'moves' itself – this does not express any freedom towards anything; the 'itself' merely signifies a spontaneity: the animal is the 'centre' of 'its' behaviour, as in the case of this goshawk. The animal merely reacts. *hEinf. m. Rotst.*: x i[83] The impression is not 'taken in' here – as the impression is born in the utterance of the word. I intervene when one thing reminds me of another. (In an impression, however, one merely perceives something – one is not 'affected' in the process. This is why one might seek to interpret the impression, whereas with the affect one finds oneself in, the aim here is to come to terms with it; one seeks, in fact, to detach oneself from it.) The affect is 'mastered' in the gesture. It signifies the beginning of a distancing from that which moves me – just as, through the articulation of the sound, one has succeeded in freely retaining what is contained therein. Except that this is not a thinking λογον διδοναι. In human beings, something is here released into itself. This means: only insofar as one keeps oneself at a distance (μεσότης), does not allow oneself to be carried away, does one succeed in wresting the impression of transience from it. The breaking free from … becomes a becoming free to … And in the expressive sense of the gesture, an intensification is indicated. The animal does not feel 'proper' revulsion. The unambiguous expression of the emotion in the gesture,

however, implies an 'absorption' and articulation – even if the possibility of freely holding oneself back is not yet as firmly embedded in it as it is in the sound, which is audible, as one can see from this
'Word' seeks … At any rate, one recognises 'oneself' in the gesture. And the fact that one can recognise someone by their gait or their laugh shows that,

h00119i p. 104

83 *at the bottom of the page, in red:* xi The animal's faculties enable it to exist in *[quotation marks] in ink:*i 'circumstances'. Man, however, is shaped by 'situations' – 'situation' in the sense that it lies on the path to oneself.

MS Human nature

h00120i hS.i 105

how they are 'mine', that is, a nature defined anthropologically as vitality, and how they are also seen as such. I am 'vivid' in this respect. For human beings have a share in what is universally human. They are not simply that. To share implies a relationship to oneself. How one relates to that which one 'also is' – in the freedom of this relationship, the mode of thought manifests itself as modesty, for example. And I 'possess' talents, find myself existing, and so on. One's relationship to oneself is defined more precisely in the various ways in which one finds oneself, for example, also as
'I' myself, namely 'I' personally. |
I also enter into a relationship with myself in my consciousness. One
'relates' to oneself, for example, in what is understood implicitly. And one also becomes conscious of oneself in that in which one is initially concealed from one's own nature. For the mode of thought reveals itself only in a fragmented, multiplied form. It is usually through another, who is uninhibited in this regard, that one is brought to self-consciousness. The term 'unconscious' here expresses this possibility of 'encountering' oneself within oneself.

'The degree and nature of a person's sexuality extend right up to the very pinnacle of their spirit'. VII, 75[xxii] Insofar as a person projects themselves in this regard *[underlined in ink:* i*]* <u>somewhere</u>, or, insofar as it is first and foremost determined within the circumstances of life. The person

It 'arranges' itself, and it is precisely in this unfolding – insofar as it does not actually come to terms with itself – that it becomes apparent how no one can escape 'themselves'. 'Interpretation' means the repetition of such 'concrete' unfolding.
Coming to terms with oneself – that is to say, not letting oneself be defeated – as if, as it were,

'Drives' that need to be overcome. Just as, for example, courage is set against despondency – that is to say, fearful thoughts! – as an opposing attitude. But I have 'allowed' the antipathy to 'grow', and so on. And the act of surrendering, the squandering, as it were, of freedom to oneself is my own doing.

Human 'instincts' are not natural instincts; they are addictions and passions. An animal, however, is not actually 'driven' when, for example, it seeks its food. It lacks the capacity for such a lack of freedom.

The 'way of thinking' refers to a person's spirituality; but the 'soul' is also said to be the character. The meanings of 'spirit' and 'soul' diverge – in

in a different direction to that in which 'âme' and 'esprit' or 'soul', 'mind' and 'spirit' differ. This difference in meaning is evident in the turns of phrase used to describe a person's character:

There are beautiful souls. And the harmony of souls relates just as much to feeling as a 'sensitive soul' has an appreciation for the feelings of others. The fact that sensitivity to … also specifically implies the tact with which one spares the other's feelings is demonstrated by the dual nature of feeling (the embarrassment of a human situation is felt – just as one can feel ashamed on the other's behalf and also fear for them). The soul is vulnerable, a fact it usually seeks to conceal behind a façade of hardness. People without a soul lack resonance, that full | sound; at their core, they do not resonate. Insofar as they are not attuned, their – consequently soulless – behaviour is reminiscent of idling. The depth of the soul, into which a person is immersed, is contrasted by the height of the spirit, to which they can rise. The strength of the spirit, in contrast to the strength of the soul – as manifested, for instance, in resilient courage – signifies an activity. It is also evident in the breadth of the spirit. Possessing more or less spirit is regarded as a veritable gift. The spirit is not strictly speaking an in e attribute, as is the mode of thought. Spirit and wit are creative. *hM. Rotst.:* xi[84] In the light of the spirit, things are unlocked. Whilst the soul lies in the gaze, a person's spirit manifests itself in their hand. Spirit asserts itself in the shaping of things. It is at work in their examination. The character it imprints upon things manifests itself as style. 'Unspirit' may well take the place of spirit. Spirit ignites; it provokes its own kind. People come together in a particular spirit. One that can spread – as the spirit of an age, for example. Consciousness is something spiritual; that is why 'consciousness as such' is possible. 'I exist as intelligence,' says Kant.[xxiii] The subject of consciousness realises itself relatively – in 'correct' inference, for example – whilst the psychological is perceived, the spiritual is understood. That is to say, one corresponds to its intentions, connects with it, realises oneself within it. Spirit can

'taken in'. It then shapes. A certain spirit has been imbued in language; this is certainly determined by the mindset of a people, but it does not simply coincide with it –

84 *hBelow, in red:* xi Originality is particularly evident in wit.

insofar as one can, after all, grasp it as the spirit of another language and readily connect with it. The way in which one uses a word—that is, the use one makes of one's language—expresses how its 'spirit' manifests itself in the structure of language as an instrument.

In the 'spirit' that one develops, one has just freed oneself from that which is merely arranged and unfolded in one's way of thinking, i.e. that which the way of thinking itself is intended to interpret. Whilst one can meet within a particular spirit and understand one another objectively, there is a harmony of minds, a sympathy in one's way of thinking.

How one behaves towards others and towards oneself, how one approaches life – this reveals what sort of person one is: what one modestly keeps one's distance from, what one prudishly shrinks from. It is seen in how envious and vindictive one is, how one cowardly tries to shift the blame onto others. How one responds to what others say; generally speaking: what prompts one to react in a certain way. Alongside the | greatness of a character, there is the 'narrowness' of a person. There are masculine characters, and so on. But one can also recognise what lies within a person by the way they arrange their surroundings. For example, the fear they have of emptiness, the lack of openness in a person, is revealed in the things with which they surround themselves. The intentions in which the mode of thought +)[85] unfolds become apparent in the aura that surrounds a person. Animals have no intentions. It is precisely in these that human transcendence comes to light: the fact that, in ressentiment, for example, and indeed even in envy, a person has opened up a horizon of opportunities for themselves, that they have 'settled' themselves within it for life. The mode of thinking – this is thus, in effect, the very 'nature' of a person, which is attributable to them. For example, the very weakness of his character, or the fact that he has little or no character at all. That he is the shadow of a human being who may be just as unreal, and so on. For, more often than not, a human being bends to external pressures, becomes entangled in passion, allows others to determine the plane of his existence, which is 'his' only insofar as he cannot be absolved of it. A person is, for example, ordinary, banal. That is to say, 'his' is precisely the ordinary, conformist way of thinking. Ordinariness, namely the fact that he

85 *hBelow:*i +) One's attitude – that is, what one has in mind towards or against others – changes and is motivated. It is regarded as a person's 'character' only insofar as the question of 'what sort of person someone is' is usually shifted to how they are 'towards someone'.

Whatever is commonplace, mingles with him and blends with him, is to be attributed to him. 'His nature' is like that – and this refers precisely to 'him', insofar as he lacks character and originality of thought, is a run-of-the-mill person, just as the lack of expression in his face, his handwriting, and so on, also reveals. However – it is, after all, unmistakable
'his' face. Each of these faces is, in its own way, meaningless. It is not merely the originality of the character that constitutes the 'incomparable' individuality. – Such originality is possessed by one who is always certain of 'his' situation, whose irony and sense of humour express how he cannot run the risk of losing himself. Re: 'From one's own origin' is ambiguous. In one sense, it means that the founding authority of the decision—which lies in the mode of thinking—resides with me, whereby its unconditional nature stands in contrast to a conditional decision grounded in objective reality. At other times, however, it simply means that everyone has 'their own' nature in the sense that their mode of thinking is attributable to them. One cannot conceive of oneself as unconditional within one's nature, just as one cannot find oneself within it as conditional in the sense that one would be absolved of having relinquished one's freedom. To which everyone is, in their own way, exposed. – For example (in the case of the pedant), shutting oneself off as 'narrow-minded' against the intrusion of that which might awaken one to oneself. However, what one is measured against here as 'narrow' or 'small' are demands whose basis lies in the constitution of human existence. (A 'small' or 'medium-sized' soul in Pfänder's sense is a non-concept).[XXIV]

Temperament is 'articulated' in one's character – yet one is not 'dependent' on it. It is not temperament itself, but in what ways and to what extent one allows one's temperament to come to the fore that characterises one; it is in these ways and to this extent that one displays one's vital strength.

One's way of thinking is something which, as something incomparably individual, one can only approach interpretatively; it is something that cannot be reduced to a formula of any particular qualities. For qualities are comparable. What, for example, does the term 'sincerity' not encompass? Rousseau displayed it in his Confessions, insofar as he certainly
'honest', he said. But it is precisely this lack of honesty that stands out: the way he tries to convince us here that he has not embellished or staged anything. He revelles in his confessions with self-indulgence. One is suffocated by sentimentality. Everything is shamelessly laid bare and revealed, one 'sincerity' pitted against another—

h00124i
p. 5ni *cont.*
p. 108i

proclaims, so as to be able to exonerate himself. – Bismarck's magnanimous sincerity is different. He 'tended' towards sincerity. But when can and may one be sincere? For sincerity demands to be received. It makes a claim on the other. This is what shyness, for example, refers to. Not only does one's innermost self not belong to the gaze of everyone – it does not wish to be betrayed at all by being cast into an ambiguous light through disproportionate emphasis: in order not to become vulgar, one fixes – behind a mask – the role in which one wishes to be perceived. There is a tactless kind of sincerity in enlightening everyone about oneself without being asked. There is a presumption in this. The ordinariness of a soul is revealed in this irreverent pushing one's way forward. And was Bismarck insincere, for instance, because he was capable of all manner of stratagems when the cause he represented demanded it? Indeed, a | guarantee of personal sincerity lies in the cool and transparent air of an enlightened mind such as Friedrich der Große's, who was transparent himself, without dark corners, secure in his circumstances, and whose Machiavellianism *[underlined* in ink] was objective. – 'Sincerity', however, can also be an expression of an objectivity that cannot be compromised. Not that this would include a case of 'genuine' sincerity – rather, sincerity is present everywhere, only that the core of character, or a trait of character, is not yet grasped in this alone. – Or: good-naturedness is not always linked to stupidity; there may also lie behind it a greatness that cannot forgive itself, which gives from its abundance with equanimity and carefreeness. And likewise, 'dogmatism' is not always driven by the petty and meagre joy of cheaply obtaining the superiority one otherwise lacks. A sense of what is right can also be expressed in it – which, of course, may in turn border closely on the other: 'insisting on one's right', or enforcing a principle in this way. One can become open to oneself through the right that is held up to one. – Tenacity in resistance can be an expression of a self-aware strength, but also a defiance that first challenges and then seeks to prove itself. – Civil courage is a different kind of courage from that of a soldier. It is not courage itself, but how and in what ways one refuses to be intimidated that characterises it.

Only things and objects have properties. They are analysed for the presence of certain properties, the combination of which – insofar as one cannot be explained by the other, that is to say,

remains misunderstood – even though it is only seemingly a second characteristic. Yet character lies precisely b e t w e e n these traits. And insofar as one's way of thinking is determined by how one relates to oneself and to others, there is not really any contrast here between appearance and reality. What, for example, would 'genuine' compassion even be? Only benevolent friendship could be 'genuine'. But not such a peripheral form of involvement as compassion is. And the fact that something is acted out, feigned or pretended – this reveals the diversity of approaches taken in this regard. Or the 'deliberate' nature of certain boldness, for example: just as one can bring oneself to resolve by adopting a firm demeanour. |

There are grafted characters – that is, those not grown from their own trunk – just as there are people who adopt the handwriting and facial features of those they are with. They are, for lack of substance of their own, the shadows of another. Yet, through their talent, they are also able to express what the *hKorrr. m. Tinte*:i original is incapable of. |

Characters are drawn. Details are treated here as

'Traits' recognised. That is to say, they do not – any more than the features of a face – objectively signify this or that. The 'image' of character is not merely a mental concept. One must have an eye for character, or rather, learn to see it. The principle of character lies in the Other; the power of perception is constitutive of the truth of a character. In its

'Truth', however, lies in the reality of the character – as distinct from the feelings that are 'real' in the sense of being genuine, that is, not merely feigned. The reality of the character is revealed in the truth of his portrayal, that is, in the consistency of his interpretation.

People speak of the character of a landscape, a city, or a people. To characterise them means to be able to d e s c r i b e them, and 'characteristic' features are, in turn, details understood as 'traits'. But every colour, too, has its own 'character'; blue, for example, has a certain coldness, yellow a certain quality of … And in every instance, one can only appeal to the reader to 'see' what one is attempting to describe and express as 'the character of …'. *hKl. m. ink*:i (The 'essence', however, captures the thing for what it fundamentally, in reality, is. One seeks to highlight it as the centre in relation to which the details of a phenomenon are understood and correctly perceived in their objective significance. Something is regarded as (un)essential to … from a certain standpoint—

h00125i hS.i 109

h00126i hS.i 110

MS Human Nature

(judged from this point of view.) But I find myself 'spoken to' by that which has 'character'. There are 'meaningless' landscapes which, in this respect, are 'without character'. In a landscape with character, however, nature has stepped out of the indifference with which it surrounds us, out of the meaningless presence of which it otherwise assures us, and—*as quoted in* **Tinte**:i—'has turned towards humankind'. To 'capture' character means to fix that which I find speaks to me. To find oneself addressed does not merely mean having an impression which one seeks to clarify, or merely to express or capture. To depict character means to 'capture' it through the way one 'draws the lines' here—what one connects, what one leaves 'in between'. One cannot depict a character in the same way that one depicts objects, i.e. by reproducing their appearance. It is through the drawing that the character first comes into its true form. It is not seen as it actually is. To recognise it here means to comprehend it. Instead of general concepts as 'means of knowledge', we have here types of [86] | characters.

We attribute a 'distinct character' to iron, for example, or to an illness, but also in the sense that they possess a peculiarity which does not occur elsewhere, rendering them unmistakable in their appearance. That said, something that is not iron may also be reminiscent of its character. In its overall presentation, a disease 'unmistakably' displays the 'character' of diabetes. Referring to the distinctiveness of a type, Goethe speaks of plant genera that 'have a character'.[xxv] The specific nature of this peculiarity cannot be communicated – just as the essence of a thing cannot be reduced to a formula. – Nevertheless: one diagnoses the 'nature' of a person as introverted, relating them in this context to a classification. There are variations and types in the sense of norms here; however, 'he' is not actually recognised in this context when his case is reduced to a common denominator, explained, that is, demonstratively elucidated as … One can only 'find one's bearings' here in relation to the individual. |

[86] *hBelow*:i ++) Theophrastus's Χαρακτηρες ηθικοι are figurative types, as

'life' reveals. Character manifests itself in features; the face is *underlined in ink:* an expression of character. Whereas one encounters the 'type'. It has something of an appearance about it. Racial theory distinguishes, according to their form, between the 'types' of faces.

314

A person's greatness is something other than 'a character' or 'a personality'. Yet this measure of a person does not refer to the vital strength that enables them to rise to the challenges of their circumstances. Nor is the equanimity one maintains in itself a sign of greatness. For a person only reveals themselves in this respect—that they do not allow themselves to be deterred from their true self—when, in their relationship to people and things, they remain unaffected by what befalls them as a result. (Whereas one reveals oneself as 'a person of character' in one's decision-making: in that one does not 'rationalise' against what one recognises as right on one's path. *Quotation marks in ink:* 'To be "a person of character" is a moral judgement.')

It is 'petty' to become embittered. Or rather, the lack of greatness is revealed above all in the way one can overlook oneself. When one

For example, in resignation, one is so readily prepared to swap places with someone who is more fortunate. When one wishes to be in their place, and, simply by comparing oneself to them, denies one's own will in one's own fate. One becomes great through misfortune. One is elevated by it. One grows with one's fate.

Magnanimity allows one to overlook the pettiness of others. But the greatness of a soul is revealed in its 'breadth'—in the fact that it is not 'narrow' in its adherence to principles, that it has no need for fixed positions.

Free superiority is called greatness. Great is the person who always remains true to themselves, who does not allow themselves to be entangled by things. |

A person's behaviour can be imitated. And certainly – in doing so, one imitates 'them'. But what lies in a person's gaze can only be attempted to be 'translated'. Character can only be discerned through interpretation, in 'traits'. By which I do not mean merely facial features. A person's behaviour, too, is a trait of theirs; the anecdote serves to characterise them. Thus, *as* the *quotation in ink suggests:* a character also 'unfolds' within the circumstances of life. Just as one encounters someone in their manner of speaking, just as one encounters them in the language that 'only they' speak. Gait and gestures, however, are 'expression' insofar as what moves a person resonates within them. A person's nature is revealed in them. Emotions are bound to the body. To be 'present' in one's gaze, however, refers precisely to an eccentric behaviour, just as the attitude towards the world that can be captured in words is something spiritual. The animal is not

315

h00129i hS.i 113

MS Human Nature

h00130i hS.i 114

hQuotation in ink:i 'present' in his gaze, which is, rather, the centre of an environment here. To find oneself – mimicking the gait – within the other is something different from 'playing' a character, i.e. portraying him as an acting figure. One can tell by the way someone clears their throat. But their
'way of thinking', which surely cannot be skilfully practised? There is the 'conception' of a character.

The fact that one is recognised 'by' one's face – that is to say, that the face does not belong to one in the same way as one's body – is also evident in the fact that the face cannot – unlike the body – be naked or clothed. One does not conceal one's face out of shame in the same way as one's natural nakedness: here, one merely avoids the gaze, that is to say, the encounter with the other. The body is not 'himself', or rather, it is only so in contrast to, say, his clothes. It belongs to him. However, a person can be 'seized' by the arm in no other way than by being grabbed by the sleeve. |

One feigns a certain attitude. That is to say, one puts on a false front in front of another, seeking to deceive them in the process. This—that is, the desire to create a false impression in the other, or to insist on this false impression towards the other without realising it—is pre-eminently the trait through which one's character reveals itself in this context. But not the true attitude which I am seeking to conceal here. Insofar as this – an antipathy
, for example – need not even be fully formed. (Just as – in another case – it is not simply hypocrisy that characterises me, but the fact that it has become second nature to me.) The way a person presents themselves is where they reveal themselves first and foremost.

The feigned modesty of coquetry is meant to be taken as nothing else: coquetry can be genuine or insincere. And it comes across as insincere insofar as it does not suit the person, or breaks with their style. For a person to be genuine through and through means that everything about them is imbued with their true self. Insincerity implies a lack of substance. The insincere gives itself away – here as elsewhere –

when something imitated is already regarded as insincere – through uncertain ambiguity – just as a genuine trait – often against one's will – *underlined in ink*:i proves its certainty precisely in the unambiguity of its recognition. A trait 'appears' genuine or inauthentic – so it was said. But only insofar as it is perceived as the trait of a specific person. Just as a colour only appears inauthentic as the colour of an Oriental carpet – that is, not like a natural red, but like an aniline dye.

316

'Real' is that which presents itself as what it is. However, only human beings can present themselves in this way; only they possess the freedom to behave in such a manner … The carpet, on the other hand, is merely 'supposed' to give the impression of something. The appearance that something is capable of evoking – the fact that things themselves suggest a deception, such as a butterfly looking like a withered leaf – does not imply inauthenticity. Rather: as an object that has, or claims to have, a value, the fake gemstone 'presents itself' as a genuine one.

The principle of appearance lies with the observer. Whilst appearance can only be true in the sense of bearing witness – namely, insofar as it is taken as a witness to … – the human being, insofar as he presents himself, is either true or not. A person's truth does not relate solely to their conduct, to the fact that they do not lie – that is, that they do not conceal from others how they see things – but it may also concern the person's own unadulterated integrity, their very substance, as it were; integrity then manifests itself in their behaviour.

False goodwill remains on the surface, just as grief – as one's behaviour otherwise shows – is 'not deep'. What is insincere is a lack of genuine seriousness. (The feigned seriousness of the pedant, however, is something one can be downright obsessed with. Just as one can also be 'genuine' in prudishness.) Friendliness comes across as contrived when one tries to force oneself into it and build it up by adopting the appropriate demeanour, without actually being able to live up to that demeanour.

In the eyes of others, someone who is and remains, in truth, fearful can appear fearless. The fear of being judged by others enables him to 'muster the courage' here. *hKl. in ink*:i (Which is not merely a display of composure. For there need be no tension here against actual fear. Here, one merely displays calm to others, or rather imposes the image of this calm upon them.) Through one thing, the other is overcome here. Someone who knows no fear – that would be true fearlessness and natural superiority. However – not letting anything show, maintaining self-control – 'is' something. One can only be exemplary in this respect. For demeanours can be taught; one can be trained to be a soldier. And one's way of thinking is revealed in whether, and in what, one seeks a demeanour at all.

317

People speak of genuine love – that is, real love – as opposed to pure love, which is disinterested. Behind which nothing else is hidden. Or they deny that someone is 'capable of love'. As if someone had no genuine, real relationship with music. In one instance, this refers to a lack of musical ear; in another, to a person's lack of depth. Neither of them has the slightest idea what love or music is. They confuse it with something else. Certainly – it is not real love, but that does not make it 'fake' love. The reason it presents itself as love is that people mistakenly take it for such. On the other hand: a clear conscience in this matter is lacking. |

- Obsessive thoughts cannot really be attributed to a person. They resist them, as if they were something that comes 'from within them'. For, just as with a paralysed leg, for example, one is not at their mercy. One cannot use them as an excuse in the same way as one might one's poor hearing. On the other hand: it is not 'my' nature either: one does not wish to be, nor can one be, taken seriously in this regard, just as one would not be in the case of, say, 'one's' temperament (in *inverted commas,* in *ink*). Obsessive thoughts are recognised as a general affliction, that is, as one which – like anxiety – lies in wait for everyone. But just as it is not shame itself that characterises a person, but 'their' sense of shame, that is, the way in which one enters into the fundamental human situation opened up by shame – so too here: The significance attached to the path reluctantly taken in the obsessive thought —how far it takes hold, to what extent it can take hold in a person—is where the mode of thinking lies. Resisting it is, at first, something to be understood as natural given the hindrance it poses. Just as one cannot overcome genuine fear through courage, but can only purify one's courage by embracing that fear. On the other hand: one does, after all, suffer from obsessive thoughts. One is assailed by them, and this lies in the fact that one finds oneself 'tempted' into them. Obsessive thoughts are nothing like speech disorders, such as stammering.
- Is there such a thing as an 'epileptic character'? Just as, for instance, it is said that the manic is 'characterised' by the fact that he is immediately on good terms with everyone? The manic way of thinking, however, is rooted in a fundamental state of mind into which the manic person falls during a phase of his illness. Meanwhile, this superficial symmetry—

is not an affinity of the way of thinking! It is the 'peculiarity' of the manic individual, a symptom by which his condition is diagnosed. Whilst the average person relinquishes his freedom, 'his' way of thinking being that of 'everyone else', and is in that respect nothing, i.e. banal (notwithstanding the fact that, in a crisis, he may become a witness to this belief, and thus be 'a character'), 'nothing' can actually be attributed to the manic individual. Just as the stilted, affected solemnity of the epileptic does not actually attest to anything, but rather indicates an inhibition—namely, that everything is somehow handled in a cumbersome manner, and that one cannot approach it freely.

- Yet the listless vegetative state, the mental deterioration accompanying paralysis and catatonia demonstrate a progressive loss of self-awareness. The illness shatters the 'gaze'. Just as, in the weariness, listlessness and triviality of dementia, one can only appear as a blurred figure. When drunk, one is no longer lucid; yet, on the other hand, everyone here – and in this, the undifferentiated – draws closer to the other. Whilst there is certainly a hysterical character and a character driven by resentment. There are split characters; coldness and tender sensitivity – one is defined by the other.
- Just as is the case, I suppose, with impulsive acts committed by someone unable to free themselves from agonising worry – a thought that takes hold of them and, at times, prevents them from engaging fully (their

'true' character is different!), so too – conversely – at the onset of an illness, what is simply 'human' can be liberated, that is, freed from that in which it is entangled as the immediate reality, in which one finds oneself caught up in human relationships. The framework of concrete existence is shattered. The human being becomes free to a truth that is no longer objectively fragmented.

So what does 'character' mean? Clearly not that aspect in which van Gogh or Goethe are incomparable, in the sense that one might describe a painting or a line of verse as 'van Gogh'. Goethe's C h a r a c t e r could only reveal itself 'in life'. It was only here that his essence could be defined through his actions. It is in the 'human' – and here that means in 'personal' relationships – that a way of thinking unfolds and takes concrete form. Character is said to be revealed in a person's face, particularly in their gaze – so the saying goes. Only

h00133i hS.i 117

MS Human Nature

h00134i hS.i 118

h00135i hS.i 119

It is through encountering …, and solely in the way he encounters things in the world, that this perspective is 'determined'. The primal nature of genius is distinct from originality, which is the character's 'being of its own origin'. Genius penetrates to the very foundations. Originality is, in this context, a sign of this primal nature. | Character—what a person can 'become'—is already present in the child. Immaturity is not yet regarded as a characteristic of the young person. And older people can easily appear rigid and mask-like, as if already detached from the circumstances in which a way of thinking is alive. Adulthood is a prerequisite for being able to speak of character at all. This is not, however, the same as 'being finished'. But it is only the adult who has attained the full horizon of life – just as a fully-grown animal has come into its own element. Yet one is an adult in relation to something! |

hReflection.

- One reflects *hUnderlined in ink*:i on something, namely by thinking it over and pondering it. Here, one thinks something through, turning it over in one's mind. To reflect here means: to return to a thought, namely λογον διδοναι. In the process, the thought is unravelled and placed in the perspective of various viewpoints. It is only through rethinking that the contours of a thought, the features of its structure, emerge. One interprets it for oneself when one seeks to connect with it in relation to … Whatever rethinking and re-conceptualisation may entail, there are ways of appropriating it.
- One reflects on the impression something makes. Here, one tries to recall what, *in quotation marks in ink*:i, 'looks the same' or gives the same impression, or is the same – so that this here, *in quotation marks in ink*:i, 'is similar to' … That this here is s i m i l a r to that which it brings to mind in this respect, but which then looks e q u a l l y like it – this relationship between 'similar' and 'equally' is noteworthy. For it is the similarity that determines the impression of both the first and the second. It is purified here by stripping away the different ways in which both are, for example, hard. So that one can retain the impression freely. It is a reflection, insofar as one takes up the thought. 'From the

'Man frees himself from this sensuous, physically awakened animality by liberating his act of seeing from the dominion of sensation.' (Klages)[xxvi] Reflection, in the mode of memory, comes to terms with what stirs within me as an impression arising from the most diverse of external occasions. One 'expresses oneself' through it.

- One becomes – reflexively – a w a r e o f o n e s e l f in what one is about to do. Here, one becomes a w a r e o f o n e s e l f. One relates to something – namely 'oneself' as one who can only be found in the actualisation of oneself. Here, one is drawn into this reflection; it is neither initiated, as in the case of deliberation, nor does it arise of its own accord, as in the second case. And a specific sense of possibilities is to be demonstrated here. For insofar as this becoming-aware-of-oneself | is not merely a given possibility—that is, does not lie merely within the realm of the possible—but is constitutively contained within the unconsciousness of that in which one is and finds oneself, just as sleep is the possibility of awakening. – In this reflection, nothing is taken up. One does not return, but rather comes into contact with … The reflexive aspect lies in the fact that – whilst things are intentionally targeted, i.e. taken under a direction for which one is decisive – one becomes conscious of oneself in a being, namely in one's already-decided-being. But the being of things is entwined with this being. Its origin, its principle, lies here. One recognises 'oneself' in things. Only in oneself can I grasp a being. One 'allows' things to be this or that; the object is posited as being. Experience, however – which even animals possess – involves a process of engaging with, practising … Through experience one becomes wise – without this signifying actual knowledge. For here nothing is recognised in its 'whatness', that

is, ‘addressed’ as this or that. ‘Addressed’ as – the ‘whatness’ of things is that by which they are publicly known. *hM. Rotst.:* xi[87] In relation to

h00136i hS.i 120

[87] *at the bottom, on the page; with red stamp:* xi Practical knowledge – how the craftsman uses pliers

‘knows’ is demonstrated through the test of a skill with … This knowledge, acquired through experience, is defined as ‘ability’. However – one does not thereby grasp the essence of things, which are, after all, merely circumvented, or rather, which one learns to navigate like a flight of stairs. In this way, they are not ‘recognised’ for what they are. Only in the act of freely approaching them are they addressed as … And through language, things are ‘known as …’. Through language, the commonality—

h00137i p. 121

They are ‘recognised’ – that is, analysed and accounted for – as an interpretation embedded in language. This is why the concepts under which things are subsumed constitute the ‘language’ of science. – But whilst, in the cognition of things, I arrive at my own being and characterise it in the interpretation of things, consciousness – and here the reflective aspect of consciousness – signifies an *underlined with ink:*i explicit appropriation of itself. To become conscious of oneself means: to be brought back to oneself in one’s being, for one is, in a pre-emptive resolve, removed from oneself when one understands oneself in relation to things.

- Self-confidence, however, relates to a person's abilities. Here, one is aware of what one recognises as one's own strength. Provided one has passed the tests. It is only through experience that one determines what one is capable of. Yet this positive determination does not imply a boundary against what one clearly cannot do. One does not 'measure' one's abilities here. And correspondingly, there is a becoming aware of one's own powerlessness, without any limits to one's abilities being indicated. Being powerless to do anything about … does not yet indicate the superiority of that against which one is powerless. It is a fundamental powerlessness.

One also becomes aware of oneself – that is, of one's powerlessness – through shame. This manifests itself, for example, in the exposure one subjects oneself to, which is done only in the sense of revealing something in which one finds oneself compromised – as if one's personal integrity had been breached. Whilst the primitive succumbs to the contagion of the taboo, he becomes the very seat of that which he presumptuously touched. In doing so – driven about – he experiences a state of becoming subservient to something else. Possessed by

'Will' he ever be any different? He is that in which he finds himself entangled. Whereas shame relates to something that I myself also am (which must not, however, be contrasted as the difference between mere chance and fate). Thus, for the primitive individual, too, that which he is obsessed with becomes his soul. He cannot get a grip on himself, cannot accept himself within his own selfhood. Or rather, this is not yet possible for him in certain respects. Just as one

the nature of a world. In contrast to the ιδιον of that which the hand can handle, in which one is well-versed.

even in a dream, one is, as it were, subject to an inexplicable power that does not allow one to move freely. Not as though one had slipped into being a mere object of the events, as when one falls – for one does, after all, move 'oneself'. It is worth noting the pictorial quality that things take on here, insofar as – in order to grasp a reality – a free distance would be required.

What is taboo appears more harmless than it really is. Just as a person is not merely what one wishes to make of them. Not that they set out to deceive. The person as we know them is not, strictly speaking, punished for lying. Nor are things, at heart, anything other than what they are. But the sense of impartiality fades. The gaze becomes ambiguous. It is affected by the nakedness that is its object. For the gaze that I direct or cast upon something is something that can be objective, | shameless, ambiguous, punitive, penetrating or superficial, or can become such through my attitude towards … it. It can encounter the other as an object, but it can also encounter them as a person, and so on. For in seeing, I realise myself; I am not merely engaging my senses. In a person's gaze, I encounter them as they are. The sense of smell, for example, which even animals possess, is also active. But in the gaze there is a relationship, a stance towards the world; it implies a d e c i s i o n. – To have lost one's impartiality and, as a result, precisely

However, to have 'come to see' means no longer encountering the other unquestioningly as an equal, no longer freely connecting with them in all things, or no longer freely making sense of things – that is, being able to bring them to a close. |

hTraumi

- Through the perception one forms, one gains an idea, an image of something. In this way, one comes to understand things. And what is realised in the process are intentions that only take shape in the course of observation; something that 'comes from within'—a searching and a sense of foreboding—is carried out in relation to the external world. One ascertains, for

example, what something is in reality—and here that means: what it truly is. The phrase 'being-in-reality' emphasises that this is a lasting realisation. Reality

h00138i hS.i 122

h00139i hS.i 123

MS Human Nature

contrasts with the superficial first impression. And it reveals itself through a step-by-step approach: carefully examining whether … In this way, one ascertains the reality that is always 'present' here in some way. One must take this state of affairs into account. One is always dealing with reality. And its forcefulness is analogous to the physical resistance of sensation. For it is through sensation in the strict sense—through smell, for example—that one becomes certain of 'reality', that is, of the fact that the rose one sees is not merely an illusion. Whereby the experience, the jarring quality of the smell
For example, it also assures me that I am not dreaming. Through pain, one is assured of the relationship to reality perceived whilst awake: that one is 'really' here, and that everything is as one sees it. (Descartes, however, seeks to establish a 'being'. The doubt as to whether what he perceives might not be a dream is just as contrived and just as much an obstacle to a better understanding as the other arguments borrowed from Sextus Empiricus. If the *Cogitationes* are regarded as something of which we are conscious, or in which we become conscious of ourselves, then the focus is on how one unfolds within them, or rather that which one thinks 'is'. This: that we are connected to ourselves in thought. That is to say, the being of my self is determined by the separation from the being of things. For – as Herbart says: what is posited here as being [*underlined in ink*: i] is something one necessarily seeks in vain. On the other hand: in Descartes, sensation is distorted into a cogito.) |
It is through interaction and opposition – that is, solely within the particular context of my situation – that I perceive things.
In the dream, however, the sense of detachment is precisely manifested in the inability to actually gain a foothold or move about. The animal, too, feels; it is in its raw, unadorned existence that one is addressed here. The impression of … is something else entirely. For what 'affects me' here does not do so in the sense of allowing oneself to be guided or of practically attuning oneself to it. Rather: it affects 'me', who holds on to the impression—*underlined* in *ink*—in order to be reminded of … Certainly – even with sensations there is such a 'reflective lingering upon …', but precisely as an inner-worldly lingering. 'A reality' reveals itself to me in the impression. And not one of which one is certain, or of which one is aware as

could be said to awaken. One 'awakens' to something, and memories and thoughts are sparked by it. That is to say: one 'reflects' on the impression. A feeling (including, for example, the feeling that something 'seems suspicious') is, however, absorbed through practice. A reality that reveals itself in this way is, for example, that of a painting by van Gogh. Existence is encountered within it. Here, 'recognition' means something else – even when, for example, one 'recognises' the spirit of a language or someone's character. For here, recognition does not occur in relation to what is known or articulated. Here, it does not mean setting something aside. One does not understand something here by reference to something else – just as the meaning of things is related to a sense. Rather: the centre from which something – namely, *underlined* in *ink* – determines itself from within must first of all be found.

- In a dream, one is detached from one's own selfhood. One finds oneself relieved of the need to grapple with a persistent reality, to set things right. (To which the enduring nature of transcendental aperception specifically refers.) The notion of the imagination as something in which one gains an image of … is an elevation *of* such *an underlying tendency*: that of being at work upon oneself in the interpretation of things. Insofar as reality – 'perceived' in the strict sense – has been made the subject here. When dreaming, one is absorbed in the visions; one does not

withdraw into oneself as one does in the examination of things; one does not have a free relationship with things. The non-binding nature of things – the fact that one thing overlaps the other without mediation – essentially signifies a state of not being bound to oneself. It is precisely when one attempts to objectify the dream – for instance, when one wishes to describe what one dreamt – that the dream evaporates. It is as though, by reaching out , one were pushing the visions aside.

- In a dream, one is – 'anaesthetically', *hm. Red* text: xi[88] – detached from reality. One cannot actually move, as was stated above. Insofar as the sensation is linked to the ability to move.

h00141i p. 125

88 *hBelow, with red mark:* xi A visionary state of being out of one's body manifests itself in insensitivity to pain.

This detachment from oneself and from reality, however, is defined as a 'no longer' or a 'not yet'. This is evident in the peculiarly agonising sense of unfulfilment, in the alien nature of the dream. It is part of being a living human being to be able to feel and to move forward. Just as being human, in its very essence, is a form of selfhood. An essential aspect of sleep and dreams is the possibility of being able to awaken from them.

This dreamlike, otherworldly quality returns in the rambling, unfettered nature of the imagination, whose subject is too distant to stand in a comprehensible connection with the present. In wishing, one dispenses with the concern of step-by-step planning. This detachment of the distant, where one can surrender to the imagination and allow oneself to be carried away by it, is, however, only a relative freedom: although the imagination races ahead of the facts, it nevertheless remains connected to them.

What is dreamt lacks the seriousness of a 'being'. Insofar as this could nevertheless assert itself and prove itself 'in reality',

i.e. in the context of this reality. (It is only in the other that each ενεργεια is what it 'is'.) Not only do things fail to deliver on their promises – it is precisely the seriousness of such a promise that is lacking in the dream. The fragmentary nature of the dream reveals how transcendental aperception can no longer assert itself. To be estranged from oneself here means: no longer being able to 'stand and remain'. One no longer 'finds oneself' in anything – the analytical unity of self-consciousness is only possible on the condition of a synthesis. But transcendental aperception is not simply 'switched off'. Just as the spatiality and temporality of the dream were not entirely absent – for how could that even be possible in relation to these forms of intuition?

Asserting oneself and becoming true to oneself takes place precisely in the moment of awakening. Responsibility is the form of being oneself. One stands up for things as their advocate. And it is in this process that they first take shape and their 'place' is determined.

One does not 'have' oneself in a dream: one cannot make oneself run when one wants to flee. One cannot – without actually being hindered – hold on to what one wishes to keep. And the torment of the nightmare relates precisely to this unresolved state. |

Editor's notes

Notes

i F. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil. Works in three volumes. Edited by K. Schlechta. Vol. II, C. Hanser, Munich 1966, 40, pp. 603–604.

ii S. Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript. Part Two. Collected Works, Vol. 7. Diederichs, Jena 1910, p. 21.

iii F. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil. Works in three volumes. Edited by K. Schlech ta. C. Hanser, Munich 1966, Vol. II, 142, p. 635.

iv ο Η φησι τοιζ εγρηγοροσιν ενα και κοινον κοσμον ειναι, των δε κοιμωμενων εκαστον εις ιδιον αποστρεφεσθαι – 'Those who are awake share a single, common world, but in sleep each turns away from it into their own.' Heraclitus, Fragments, in: The Fragments of the Presocratics. Greek and German by
H. Diels. Edited by W. Kranz. Weidmann, Zurich 2004, Vol. I, p. 171.

v See I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, op. cit., B 133, p. 143b: '… the *analytical* unity of apperception is possible only on the condition of some *synthetic* '.

vi See K. Jaspers, General Psychopathology. Springer, Berlin/Göttingen/Heidelberg 1953, pp. 53 ff.

vii M. Heidegger, Being and Time. First Half, in: Yearbook for Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. VIII. Niemeyer, Halle an der Saale 1935 (4th ed.), p. 136.

viii See H. Lipps, *Die Wirklichkeit des Menschen*, op. cit., pp. 176–178.

ix Nietzsche's Works. Second Section, Vol. XII. Posthumous Works. Unpublished material from the period of *The Gay Science* and *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (1881–1886). Published by C. G. Naumann, Leipzig 1901, *Sayings and Sentences* (1882–1884), No. 463, p. 317:
'Even in hatred there is jealousy: we want our enemy all to ourselves.'

x A. Schopenhauer, *Parerga and Paralipomena: Minor Philosophical Writings*. II. Second Volume. Diogenes, Zurich 1977, § 324, p. 642: 'Hatred and contempt are in definite antagonism and are mutually exclusive.'

xi I. Kant, Critique of Judgement, op. cit., pp. 123–124.

xii F. Nietzsche, The Gay Science. Works Vol. II. Edited by K. Schlechta. Hanser, Munich 1966, p. 213: 'For fanaticism is, in fact, the only "strength of will" to which even the weak and the insecure can be brought …'

xiii Aristotle, ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ, Ζ,ι γ – Politics, Book VII, Chapter XIII. [XIV] (8) [1333]: Διηρηται δε και παζ ο βιοζ εις ασχολιαν και εις σχολην και πολεμον και ειρηνην – Furthermore, all life is divided into business and leisure, war and peace. Aristotle- lis Opera Omnia. In Greek and Latin. Volume One. Ed. A. F. Didot, Paris 1848, 618.

xiv A Lecture by Kant on Ethics. Published on behalf of the Kant Society by
P. Menzer. Pan Verlag R. Heise, Berlin 1924, p. 226: On the mind's attachment to the objects of happiness, or on avarice; for the disjunction, see ibid., pp. 229–230: 'Here, however, an illusion arises for us: whilst we still possess the money, we can regard it disjunctively, in that we could use it for one purpose or the other; we regard it collectively, however, and believe we have everything for that purpose.'

xv Friedrich Hebbel's Diaries. Edited with a foreword by Felix Bamberg. G. Grote'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, Berlin 1885. Volume One. First Diary 1839. I. Hamburg, Heidelberg and Munich. 20 January 1839, p. 136: 'Envy always strikes only at having, never at being.'

xvi I. Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, op. cit., Preface, p. 29 [119].

xvii A novella by H. von Kleist (1811) based on a 16th- th-century historical account of Hans Kohlhase.

xviii The appended supplements were probably added following the lecture series 'The Formation of Character', summer semester 1939. See the comments by Evamaria von Busse on 'Psychology and Philosophy' in: H. Lipps, The Reality of Man, op. cit.,
p. 200.

xix J. W. Goethe, Scientific Writings. Volume Five. Edited by R. Steiner. Dornach 1982. Supplements to the Scientific Writings. Introduction to a General Theory of Comparison, pp. 575–576. – See the remarks by H. Lipps in his essay on 'Goethe's Theory of Colours' (1939), in: H. Lipps, The Reality of the Human Being, op. cit., pp. 109–110.

xx Hans Walter Heymann, On Colour, the Colourful and Seeing. Essays towards an existential interpretation of 'aesthesis', 1933.

xxi I. Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, op. cit., p. 243 [293].

xxii F. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil. Works Vol. II, op. cit., 75, p. 626.

[xxiii] See I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason. Meiner, Hamburg 1956, B 157–158, note,

pp. 174b–175b; cf. I. Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Meiner, Hamburg , 1965, pp. 452 ff., pp. 78 ff.

[xxiv] A. Pfänder, The Human Soul. An Attempt at an Interpretative Psychology.

M. Niemeyer, Halle an der Saale 1933, pp. 304–305: The specifically human 'greatness' of the soul le.

[xxv] J. W. Goethe, Scientific Writings. Volume One. Edited by R. Steiner.

R. Steiner Verlag, Dornach 1982, 'The Formation and Transformation of Organic Beings',

pp. 121–122: 'When I consider what are termed "genera" in botany and accept them as they are classified, it has always struck me that one genus cannot be treated in the same way as another. There are genera, I might say, which possess characteristics that are reflected in all their species, so that one can approach them in a rational manner; they do not easily lose themselves in varieties and therefore deserve to be treated with respect …'.

[xxvi] L. Klages, *The Spirit as Adversary of the Soul*. Bouvier Verlag H. Grundmann, Bonn 1972, Chapter 35: On Animal and Human Cognition, p. 369: 'The original human being detached himself from the sentient or physically awakened animal nature by liberating his vision from the dominion of sensation.'

BERSERKER
BOOKS